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Abstract  
 
This research aims at assessing the extent to which the political rhetoric related to the role of 
cooperatives in agricultural development in Lebanon corresponds to the producers’ own view of 
benefits and problems in their cooperatives. It explores the role and impacts attributed to 
producers’ cooperatives in agriculture by the Lebanese government and development agencies. 
The thesis is based on text analysis and semi-structured interviews with the government, 
development agencies, directors and members of producers’ cooperatives. Active cooperatives, 
identified as such by the Lebanese Directorate General of Cooperatives, were examined under 
five dimensions: initiation phase and progress, organisational structure, partnership and 
environment, services supply and participation, and problems and benefits. The investigation 
results are quantified through 22 components and 89 indicators. Special attention is given to 
differences between agricultural regions and agricultural sub-sectors, the impact of gender on 
cooperation, and membership practices at the producers’ level. The findings reveal that the 
official rhetoric on the role of producers’ cooperatives in inducing socio-economic development 
in Lebanon does not match the empirical reality of how the producers evaluate the benefits and 
challenges resulting from the cooperatives. Producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon are tools of 
political influence and corruption, formally legalized under the cooperative law and occasionally 
sustained by development aid offered by development agencies. They are generally wasteful, 
failing to reduce the cost of production or to increase income. This research argues that under the 
Lebanese neoliberal environment, agricultural cooperatives did not carry adaptation, 
hybridization, or degeneration to increase their performance, but have instead wasted 
development aid, fostered corruption, and increased political control. Neoliberal post-war 
reconstruction and development policies in Lebanon have produced a weak cooperative sector 
with funding-dependent enterprises characterised by corruption and mismanagement. 
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Chapter 1- Theoretical Framework and Research Method      
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Throughout the long civil conflict that lasted for around fifteen years, the agricultural 
sector has accounted for a significant share in the Lebanese economy and has played a crucial 
role in rural food security. Yet, serious physical and non-physical damages have impaired the 
development of Lebanese agriculture. In the regions that witnessed heavy conflicts, the majority 
of producers have suffered from a severe destruction of main infrastructure such as irrigation 
canals, storage facilities, road, terraces, etc. The internal and external marketing channels have 
been ruptured. The services delivered by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) have been reduced 
to minimal ineffective interventions after the breakdown of regional extension offices and 
research institutions.  Moreover, the general crisis of the national economy, expressed by the 
depreciation of the local currency, has restricted large investments in the agricultural sector 
characterized by high environmental, technical, and marketing risks (UNDP, 1992).  
After the end of the civil war and with the first parliamentary election, in 1992, the government 
designed a ten-year plan for reconstruction and development (Najem 1998). In the agricultural 
sector, the plan aimed to modernize, expand, and revive the basic production components that 
will contribute in the long-term to reduce poverty in rural areas. The Council for Development 
and Reconstruction (CDR), an independent public institution carrying out reconstruction tasks 
across Lebanon, the MOA, and other local and international non-governmental organizations, 
were the key players involved in the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector. Overall, no specific 
policies were developed in opposition to the general liberal and non-interventionist Lebanese 
economic policy (Kubursi 2001). The first phase of the agricultural development plan has 
focused on strengthening institutional support, increasing producers' income and productivity, 
opening new marketing channels, and preserving the environment (UNDP 1992). Producers' 
cooperatives, which have the potential role of fostering democratic and equitable economic share 
of resources and benefits (FAO 1998, UN/DESA 2005, Tchami 2007), have been considered a 
major tool to implement the designed interventions, in particular in rural areas. All subsequent 
plans have continued to use producers’ cooperatives as a strategic tool to resolve the prevailing 
21 
 
agricultural problems. In 1999, the MOA identified cooperative enterprises as an essential 
element capable of solving the main production and marketing challenges. Cooperatives can 
increase the efficiency of production, develop solid and direct marketing channels, and introduce 
mechanization and new technologies for the dominant small scale farming in Lebanon (MOA 
1999). In the 2005-2009 strategic agricultural development plan, cooperatives were given a basic 
role in empowering farmers, increasing the competitiveness of some selected crops (olive oil, 
potato, strawberry, etc.), implementing efficient  irrigation methods/technologies, increasing 
marketing channels, and producing certified plant resources. Furthermore, the government 
planned to offer technical training on the cooperative enterprise tool and its management as well 
as business development training for small collective projects (MOA 2005). In all agricultural 
strategies, a budget has been allocated to support cooperatives (MOA 2004). Recently, in the last 
agricultural strategy (2010-2014), the new government continued to support cooperatives as a 
tool to improve marketing and processing opportunities (MOA 2009). Accordingly, the MOA 
encouraged producers to initiate cooperatives as a key for their socio-economic development 
(MOA 2011, Al Balad 2011, Al Joumhouria 2011, Al Markaziya, 2011). Besides the 
government, development planners (Donors and NGOs) have supported cooperative enterprises, 
facilitated their initiations, and worked to resolve their internal and external challenges (WRF 
2008, CHF 2006, IFAD 2007, ADP 2003, USAID 2008).  
Indeed, producers’ cooperatives can play a key role vis-à-vis the characteristics of the Lebanese 
agricultural sector and the Lebanese economy.  Lebanon has admitted a liberal economic policy 
since independence in 1943 (Makdisi 1979), which offers a suitable environment for investment 
and facilitates the development of cooperatives. In a liberal environment, cooperatives are 
considered as a distinct form of autonomous economic organizations. They have the freedom to 
pursue business operations with all the facilities applied to capitalist enterprises. Also, they are 
capable of merging activities and encouraging investment across boundaries. The cooperative 
principles, in particular Voluntary and Open Membership, Democratic Member Control, and 
Autonomy and Independence, are seen by international institutions as more compatible with a 
liberal cooperative sector than with state-driven controlled cooperative enterprises (FAO 1996, 
COPAC 1999). The agricultural sector is the weakest sector of the Lebanese economy, 
generating 5.7% of GDP as an average from 2002 to 2007 compared to 10.8% and 73% for the 
industry and services' sectors respectively (MOF 2009). The majority of famers are small. 
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Seventy-five percent of farmers cultivate less that 1 ha Useful Agricultural Surface (UAS) and 
work only twenty percent of the national UAS. Two percent of farmers have more than 10 ha 
UAS and plant thirty percent of the national UAS (MOA 2007). This division reflects a dominant 
class difference in the sector. Sixty-six percent of farmers are involved in non-agricultural jobs 
(MOA 2007), making agriculture a secondary source of income. Moreover, the agriculture sector 
has been neglected by the government since the end of the civil war. The average budget 
allocated to the MOA accounted for 0.64% of total government expenditure from 1997 to 2006 
(MOF 2007).  The agriculture and irrigation sector received 1.5% of total government spending 
on the reconstruction and development plan implemented by the CDR between 1992 and 2004 
(CDR 2005). Accordingly, these components and characteristics theoretically offer producers’ 
cooperatives an important strategic role in developing the agricultural sector in Lebanon.  
However, several reports issued by MOA and various development agencies have described the 
weaknesses of Lebanese producers’ cooperatives and highlighted their failure to achieve tangible 
impacts on socio-economic development. In 1992, The United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) mentioned that the agricultural cooperative movement, which was highly supported by 
the government in the 1970s, was stagnating and far from delivering services for small farmers 
(UNDP 1992). In 2001, the MOA studied the efficiency of agricultural cooperatives in Lebanon. 
Findings showed high percentage of dormant cooperatives which rarely responded to their 
members' need, rarely offered efficient services, and were mainly established for vested interest 
(MOA 2001). In 2004, Charles Adwan, who carried out a study about post-war corruption in 
Lebanon, stated that the re-emergence of cooperatives was mainly driven by political parties and 
donor initiatives. This situation has strongly damaged their reputation and accordingly their 
potential role (Adwan 2004). In 2007, the UNDP and the Institute for University Cooperation 
(ICU) assessed the condition of agricultural cooperatives in South Lebanon. Results revealed that 
most cooperatives were not based on the common needs of members and had been mainly 
established for a political aim and for the arrangement of development funds (UNDP/ICU 2007).  
In 2010, The Agriculture Minister, Dr. Hussein el Hajj Hasan, stated that there are only fifteen 
active cooperatives from a total of 1200 registered cooperatives in Lebanon. The remaining 
cooperatives have the cooperative institutional structure in-name only and not in terms of 
services and benefits for members. All cooperatives were given a deadline to show proper 
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effectiveness in their activities, or risk being dissolved by the Directorate General of 
Cooperatives (DGC) (MOA 2010).        
Therefore, there is a paradox between the given strategic role and the continued support for 
agricultural cooperatives on the one hand and a reported highly significant failure on the other 
hand. This paradox is marked from the end of the civil war up to today and essentially by the 
same actors: the government and development agencies. It reflects a degree of doubt about the 
relevance and efficiency of actors’ policies and programs while relying on the cooperative 
enterprise model to develop the agricultural sector in Lebanon. Further, the opinion of producers’ 
members regarding the efficiency of their own enterprises in fostering socio-economic 
development is absent from the listed studies and reports. Another gap in the literature is the root 
causes of failure of cooperatives. Why cooperatives were not delivering services and benefits for 
members especially because they are supported by the government and development agencies. 
No in-depth studies have been found to show the structural or practical reasons for the failure of 
cooperatives in Lebanon. For instance, stating that cooperatives were initiated with the interest of 
receiving development funds from politicians or development agencies cannot be considered a 
root cause of failure. Sometimes, development funds could represent a real chance for 
cooperatives to initiate services that members were not able to supply due to a lack in their 
financial resources. Root causes might be a weakness in democratic members’ control, absence 
of members’ economic participation, inefficient organizational structure, internal corruption, etc. 
that lead to mismanagement or failure to generate beneficial outcomes from development funds. 
In other cases, the failure might derive from development agencies themselves proposing and 
implementing inappropriate interventions.  Therefore, it is interesting to explore in-depth 
empirical evidence to support or reject the reasons for the reported failure by both actors.  
 
1.2. Study aim and research questions  
 
This research will study and analyze the political rhetoric surrounding the role of cooperatives in 
agricultural sector development after the end of the civil war in Lebanon and measure the extent 
to which it corresponds with how producers view the benefits and problems in their cooperatives. 
On the one hand, it assesses the role and performance of producers’ cooperatives under the 
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government post war agricultural development policies and the complementary initiatives of 
development agencies. On the other hand, it examines the performance of producers’ 
cooperatives by checking their adherence to normative cooperatives practices through five 
dimensions detailing the initiation process, the organizational structure, partnership and 
environment, services’ supply, challenges, and benefits received by members. Findings of both 
parts will be compared together to evaluate the coherence of policies, initiatives, and their 
associated impacts with the empirical achievements of cooperatives in terms of socio-economic 
benefits. 
This research begins by outlining the characteristics of the Lebanese economy and the status of 
the agricultural sector. Then, it presents an in-depth analysis of the roles, activities, and outcomes 
attributed to producers’ cooperatives in the policies adopted by the government and development 
agencies. Finally, it explores the status of cooperatives in the different agricultural regions of 
Lebanon from the perspective of the board of directors and the producers’ members.   
The overall goal of this research is to assess and evaluate the strategic role of cooperatives in 
developing the agricultural sector in Lebanon under a neoliberal policy since the end of the civil 
war. It aims to increase the efficiency of producers’ cooperatives by assessing their main 
advantages and identifying their main challenges. Findings will constitute a general database 
review of cooperatives that would be essential for the government and development agencies in 
their elaboration of further strategies and interventions. By exploring the case of the Lebanese 
agricultural cooperatives and by outlining the views and interpretations of producers’ members, 
this work will contribute to the existing body of literature on the use of cooperative enterprises as 
a strategic socio-economic development tool.  
The research will address the following questions:  
1. What is the nature of post-1992 Lebanese agricultural development policies and how 
does the support of agricultural cooperatives fit into it? How far does this support benefit 
the development of the agricultural sector?  
2. Are producers, who are the ultimate target of policies, getting benefits of their 
membership in cooperatives and recognizing the positive impacts of coops? Or to what 
extent are cooperatives improving the socio-economic conditions of producers? 
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These research questions reflect two main interests. The first one is a post-war agricultural policy 
analysis supporting cooperatives under a neo-liberal policy agenda – an ideology granting 
cooperatives an essential role in rural development; however, due to increased market 
competition, cooperatives may perform worse or may degenerate into capitalist enterprises 
(Isomorphism-defined later in this chapter). The second interest is to analyze the status and role 
of producers’ cooperatives in post-war reconstruction and development phases under a 
minimalist state government (since independence in 1943) and where cooperatives have never 
been controlled or considered a state-driven institution as they were in the African continent.  
 
 
1.3. Theory of cooperative enterprises  
 
This section explores the theory of cooperatives as a different form of market enterprises. It starts 
by defining cooperatives and their ideologies. Then, it details the principles and values of 
cooperatives, which represent the identity of the cooperative enterprise model. Finally, it 
examines the different classifications of cooperatives and presents their special organizational 
structure in primary cooperatives and between cooperatives.   
 
1.3.1. Definition 
 
In literature, several definitions are used to describe cooperative enterprises. Some definitions are 
theoretical describing the characteristics that distinguish cooperatives from the other types of 
enterprises, while others are comprehensive dealing with the planned objectives behind 
cooperation.  
To define cooperative enterprises, it is first essential to understand the term "cooperation" from 
which the cooperative word derives. Cooperation is "The action or process of working together 
toward the same end" (Oxford Dictionary 2005). Sometimes the benefit sense is added as 
follows: "A situation in which people or organizations work together to achieve a result that will 
benefit all of them" (Halsey 1973). Both definitions have the common notion of plural, not 
individual, action in addition to the idea of same objectives and benefits. Indeed, cooperation is a 
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social behavior in which individuals group together to realize a common goal (Graig 1994). It is 
an undertaking together and on equal terms (Barberini 2003). Richard Williams simplified this 
approach by comparing cooperation with a game in which all players work to accumulate points 
for the entire group while using their unique potential and building on process orientation 
(interaction) rather than rule orientation (Williams 2007). Cooperation requires an action of 
separate people or organizations that were not in a previous harmony and were brought together 
through a clear process (Little & Smith 2006).When it is compared to other behaviors, scholars 
define cooperation as opposite to competition and selfishness (Tuomela 2000). It generates 
higher level of productivity and better achievements (Johnson & Johnson 1981).  Therefore, 
cooperation can be a simple sharing of information between two co-workers to accomplish an 
action, i.e. teamwork, and can go as far as forming an economic business enterprise between 
people sharing the same objectives; such is the case of producers' cooperatives.  
Scholars draw on the cooperative behavior to define the cooperative movement and the 
cooperative enterprise. Patrick Develtere defined the cooperative movement as "A social 
movement which uses some forms of economic cooperation (organization) aiming to deliver the 
common interests of a social group through the active involvement of all members. These 
common interests will be endangered if members of the social group do not react through 
cooperatives” (Develtere 1994). When it comes to a cooperative enterprise, most definitions add 
the basic elements of principles and values to the definition of cooperation. "It is a user owned 
and controlled business in which benefits are distributed according to the members' use of the 
association" (USDA 1995). This definition reflects the two main principles of cooperatives: 
democratic member control and members’ economic participation. Its highlights the three 
features of the cooperatives' users in terms of "User-owner, User-control, and User-benefit". 
Similarly, Gurmukh Madan and Richard Williams defined cooperative enterprises by relying on 
the characteristics that distinguish them from other types of corporation such as members' 
participation and control requirement (one member-one vote), equitable distribution of resources, 
self-help, and mutual aid enterprise (Williams 2007, Madan 2007). Alexander Laidlaw defined 
cooperatives by their objectives. They reduce the cost of production, prevent exploitation of 
weaker members, protect the right of each member, and promote mutual understanding and 
education (Laidlaw 1962).  
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In general, most descriptions of cooperatives are embedded in the universal definition adopted in 
1995 by the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), which is an independent non-
governmental organization uniting, representing, and strengthening cooperatives worldwide 
through awareness, technical assistance, and right policy environment, etc. The ICA defines 
cooperatives as follows (ICA 2007):  
"A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise" 
 
The ICA definition is also adopted by the highest international bodies promoting cooperatives 
such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Committee for the Promotion and 
Advancement of Cooperatives (COPAC), the United Nations (UN), etc. In this definition, the 
principles and values of cooperatives are grafted to the characteristics of a business enterprise. 
The cooperative enterprise is an autonomous association, which reveals the independence in 
control. It is a gathering of persons who are united voluntarily; meaning that membership cannot 
be compulsory. It is built not only to meet the common economic needs of members, but also 
their social and cultural needs. It is jointly owned and democratically controlled; making clear 
the distinction from other public and private enterprises (Taimni 2001).  
 
1.3.2. Cooperative ideologies and schools of thought 
 
Cooperatives are not understood by a single ideology upon which all the cooperators agree. They 
are promoted differently in countries depending on the nature of the existing political and 
economic system, which usually designs the objectives envisaged from the cooperative 
enterprise model. Alexander Laidlaw and Vishnu Borkar distinguished between four different 
schools of thought (Laidlaw 1974, Borkar 1989):   
First, the Cooperative Commonwealth School in which all important economic and social 
instruments of production in the state have been taken under collective control until it becomes 
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an-all inclusive system (Gronlund 2009). It places cooperatives as the only defining form of 
economic organizations for all activities in life (Keillor 2000). Robert Owen and Charles Fourier 
led to the basic framework of the cooperative commonwealth (Dutta 1991).  
The second is the School of Modified Capitalism which is originally a North American 
ideology that considers cooperatives as a capitalist business with a slight modification in a set of 
rules (Archerd 2007). In this school cooperatives are most useful in sectors not attractive to 
capitalists or where profit is risky or marginal. It was rarely supported outside North America 
(Laidlaw 1974).  
Third, the Socialist School of thought in which followers consider cooperatives as a socialist 
institution driven by the left-wing ideology. This derives from the belief that "cooperation is 
socialism" (Lenin 1923). Some adherents to this school see cooperatives as state public or social 
organizations, while others consider them as partners of the state in a centrally planned socialist 
economy (Borkar 1989). This ideology was dominant in all communist countries, some countries 
of Western Europe, and developing countries including India (Laidlaw 1974).  
Finally, the Cooperative Sector School considers cooperatives as distinct economic enterprises 
different from public and private enterprises but with some features in common (ICA 1970). This 
ideology, in contrast to the Socialist and Commonwealth schools that place cooperatives as state-
driven enterprises, considers other types of enterprises and their importance alongside 
cooperative enterprises in building a strong economy. It was developed by the French scholar 
Georges Fauquet and was widespread in Europe and the Scandinavian countries (Clemente 
1977).  
 
1.3.3. Cooperative principles and values 
 
Principles and values are the essential features that distinguish cooperatives from other   
economic enterprises. 
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1.3.3.1. Values of cooperation  
 
In the statement of the cooperative identity, the ICA identified and specified the cooperatives 
values as follows (ICA 2007).  
"Co-operatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, 
equity and solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, co-operative members believe in the 
ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for others" 
Cooperatives’ values were figured out from the belief of the first cooperative pioneers (Lee 
2003). They provide the basics of a culture approach in defining the role of members inside their 
cooperatives (Davis 1999; Jerker 1996). 
The first set of values reflects the real cooperation character. Self-help means that all members 
should struggle to meet their common needs. It highlights the responsibility of each member in 
achieving the goals planned by the cooperative. Democracy gives members the opportunity to 
manage their objectives on the basis of "one member-one vote" (Taimni 2001). Equality means 
that all members are equal in participation, decisions making, and opportunities. This is one of 
the major characteristics differentiating a cooperative enterprise from a capitalist firm. Equity 
refers to the fair contribution in capital and distribution of rewards for active members. 
Solidarity is the strength of achieving goals through a collective action in which the financial 
and social assets belong to the group (Diwana 2008). The second set of ethical values "honesty, 
openness, social responsibility and caring for others" describes the purpose for which 
founders set up cooperatives. These values outline the relation between members in fulfilling 
their needs and developing their communities (Taimni 2001, Lewis 2006). They grant 
cooperatives with an increased social capital that would be a strong instrument in managing the 
challenges that usually arise between members (Behera 2006).  
 
1.3.3.2. Principles guiding cooperatives  
 
The principles of cooperatives are the life of the movement. They represent the nature of 
operating rules in cooperative enterprises. They are guidelines on which members should rely to 
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succeed internally with one another and externally within their environment. They include 
business and social principles; therefore, merging the social and economic aspects of production.  
The new statement of the cooperative identity has embodied the essential arguments that make 
cooperatives more effective and distinct in the 21st century. Cooperatives should rely on 
principles in order to be differentiated from other economic enterprises (Taimni 2001). Principles 
should be viewed as guideposts or goals and the flexibility in their application is necessary 
without compromising their basic sense (Dunn 1986). 
The first principle, Voluntary and Open Membership, reveals that membership should be 
voluntary, available to all people in need of the coop services and willing to accept related risks 
and responsibilities without gender, social, racial, political, or religious discrimination (O'Connor 
2003, ICA 2007, Diwana 2008, Abell 1988). Whenever members feel dissatisfied with the 
services offered, or no longer in need of them, they have the freedom to leave and collect back 
their initial shares (Tchami 2007). Open membership for all people does not mean an 
unrestricted number of members, but cooperatives can only accept a determined number of 
members depending on their capacity to serve, and so, may impose a limit on membership 
(Taimni 2001). This principle reflects the equity and equality values in declaring the equal 
chance of members to benefit from the services offered by their cooperative (Birchall 1997). 
The second principle is Democratic Member Control. It ensures that cooperatives are 
democratic organizations only controlled by their members (Abell 1988). No member has a 
greater voice in decisions and operations than any other member (Williams 2007). Cooperatives 
fail in the long term without efficient ways of consulting members and enabling them to express 
their hopes (ICA 2004). Members of primary cooperatives elect their representatives by relying 
on the basic principle of "one share-one member-one vote" and participate equally in planning 
their objectives (Diwana 2008, O'Connor 2003). Democracy becomes meaningful through 
members' participation which is not necessary in management, but can be in proposing, pushing, 
demanding, and defending common objectives (Marcus 1988). Democratic participation creates 
leadership among members who become more active at local level in civic and political 
organizations (Nembhard 2004). Board members are responsible of the equitable delivery of 
benefits to members and are accountable, at election time and throughout their mandate, for their 
actions toward the membership (Taimni 2001, Tchami 2007). Decisions in secondary level 
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cooperatives such as cooperative unions or federal cooperatives are also taken in a democratic 
manner (ICA 2007). The equality and liberty (self-help and self-responsibility) values appear 
behind this principle (Birchall 1997).  
Member Economic Participation is the third principle. As cited in the cooperative statement, 
"members should contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their co-
operative. At least part of that capital is usually the common property of the co-operative. 
Moreover, members usually receive limited compensation, if any, on capital subscribed as a 
condition of membership. They allocate surpluses for any or all of the following purposes: 
developing their co-operative, possibly by setting up reserves, part of which at least would be 
indivisible; benefiting members in proportion to their transactions with the co-operative; and 
supporting other activities approved by the membership" (ICA 2007). Limited compensation and 
equitable contribution indicate that capital is the servant and not the master of cooperatives. In 
general, the capital shared by members should only receive limited bank interest rate, if any 
(Madan 2007). Members decide how to spend surpluses, but a part of them should be kept to a 
common, indivisible fund (Taimni 2001, Tchami 2007). This principle is linked to the solidarity 
value emphasizing the common ownership in cooperative enterprises (Birchall 1997, Williams 
2007).  
The fourth principle is Autonomy and Independence. "Co-operatives are autonomous, self-
help organizations controlled by their members. If they enter into agreements with other 
organizations, including governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so on 
terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their co-operative 
autonomy" (ICA 2007). This principle describes the partnership strategy that cooperatives should 
adopt in the new condition of the global market economy vis-à-vis governments, development 
planners, and other capital resources (Birchall 1997a). It does not forbid mutual agreements, but 
it reminds members to keep their autonomy and independence (Tchami 2007).  
The fifth principle, Education, Training and Information, calls "cooperatives to provide 
education and training for their members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so 
they can contribute effectively to the development of their co-operatives. They have to inform the 
general public - particularly young people and opinion leaders - about the nature and benefits of 
co-operation" (ICA 2007). It underlines the cooperative movement in its long-standing and 
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distinguished devotion to education (Taimni 2001, Tchami 2007). Cooperative societies should 
regularly educate their members, officers, and employees about the techniques and spirit of 
cooperation (Abell 1988, Nembhard 2004). New members should know the cooperative 
enterprise difference in its principles and values and should be offered guidance to experience 
their roles and responsibilities inside their cooperative. Members need to understand on which 
basis they should work together by putting the individual interest in favor of the group interest 
and how the cooperative should be run democratically (Tchami 2007). In this principle, 
communication plays a vital role for the success of any cooperative enterprise in delivering 
messages and informing rights and roles (Parnell 1999, McCarthy & Ward 2001).  
Cooperation among cooperatives is the sixth principle. This principle encourages cooperatives 
to bind their power at local, national, regional, and international levels to better serve their 
members. Essentially, they need to cooperate in a strategic approach to survive in the 
competitive global economy (Treacy 2000, Diwana 2008). This principle recognizes the 
fundamental role of pooling resources, strengthening solidarity, and increasing power. For 
example, a small primary cooperative can cooperate with a large scale cooperative or union with 
the aim of providing better services to members. In addition, cooperatives in different sectors can 
diversify their services, such as, an agricultural coop getting a loan from a credit union to add 
multiple services requested by members (Tchami 2007). This principle highlights the awareness 
of the global opportunity; thus, by working together, cooperatives can secure a greater expansion 
and increased benefits for the movement than by working separately (Green 2002).  
The last principle, Concern for Community, links cooperatives to the community they belong 
to. "Cooperatives work for the sustainable development of their communities through policies 
approved by their members" (ICA 2007). This principle, going beyond the social corporate 
responsibility with charitable causes (Novkovic 2006), states that members are responsible for 
developing their communities (ILO 2000). Although cooperatives need to primarily serve their 
members, the wellbeing of cooperative members according to the cooperative ideal could lead to 
that of the community (Hagen 2005). This principle includes a concern for the environment and 
the sustainable livelihood of communities (Williams 2007).  
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The analysis of principles reveals how they are inter-linked. If one is ignored, all will be 
diminished. Principles are linked to the values embedded in them. The first four principles are 
internal core principles and without them cooperatives would lose their identity. They assure a 
good environment for members to join, control, and receive benefits (UN/DESA 2009). 
However, the remaining three principles and a part of the fourth principle, define the rules for 
external relations in cooperatives. The education principle fosters active membership and spreads 
the cooperative idea, while cooperation among cooperatives is a business strategy to assure a 
degree of economic viability. Concern for community combines the social and economic 
objectives of cooperative enterprises (Birchall and Ketilson 2009). All principles should be 
understood as an empowering framework to increase the competitiveness of cooperatives in the 
global economy. They must be applied in the daily activities of all members and workers 
(Taimni 2001). In evaluating the performance of enterprises, cooperatives should be judged on 
their adherence to all principles and not on the basis of any single principle (Birchall 1997a). 
 
1.3.4. Classification of cooperatives 
 
Today, cooperatives can be found in any business activity. They initially started in traditional 
economic sectors such as agriculture, finance, etc. and progressively spread to almost all other 
sectors including health, funeral, schools, sports, etc (ICA 2009). They are classified in 
categories in which sectors could be also subject of classification. The different types of 
agricultural cooperatives are elaborated in this research.  
 
1.3.4.1. Categories of cooperatives 
 
The easiest way to classify cooperatives is by answering the questions: "who owns cooperatives? 
And who are their members?" (Lewis 2006). Accordingly, four categories could be distinguished 
as follows (NCBA 2009, ICDC 2004, nz.coop 2009):  
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First, consumers’ cooperatives in which consumers, buying services or products, own the 
cooperative. This category includes credit unions, electric and telecommunications, health care, 
housing, food store coops and many more.  
Second, producers’ cooperatives in which producers, delivering/selling products or using 
services during production, own the cooperative. Under this category, farming, handcraft, 
fishing, beekeeping, and artisans' cooperatives are found. They pool their resources to increase 
production, reduce cost, and develop new marketing opportunities.  
Third, workers' cooperatives in which workers of the business collectively own their 
cooperative and democratically control it. Cooperatives provide workers-members an 
employment and a parallel ownership opportunity. Restaurants, processing companies, food 
stores, and so on are under this category.  
Fourth, purchasing/shared services' cooperatives in which cooperatives are owned by 
independent small business owners such as small municipalities, restaurants and many others 
which cooperate to enhance their purchasing power, reduce their running costs, and improve 
their services.  
Most sources categorize cooperatives in this way; however, other kinds of classifications exist 
and differ slightly. Cooperatives may be classified by taking the purpose of their establishment 
as a criterion. Therefore, consumers, producers, and purchasing services’ cooperatives in which 
members seek to receive new services could be grouped together as a first category. Workers’ 
cooperatives constitute the second category in which members aim to establish an economic 
enterprise and work together in it to supply multiple services (Tchami 2007). Other literature 
uses the same criterion of who owns cooperatives, but only lists three categories by combining 
consumers’ cooperatives with purchasing services' cooperatives (UN/DESA 2009, Lewis 2006).    
 
1.3.4.2. Types of agricultural/producers cooperatives 
 
Agricultural cooperatives can be organized on the basis of the three major functions they could 
perform (USDA 2002, Onuoha 1988, Cobia 1989):  
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1. Supply cooperatives include the wholesale buying and retail selling of farm inputs 
(seeds, fertilizers, etc.), credits supply, or any other services before production 
2. Service cooperatives perform pesticide applications, fertilizer spreading, artificial 
insemination, irrigation, insurance, or any other services during production 
3. Marketing cooperatives sell and process products or any other services after production  
 
Given the interdependence of services in agriculture, the majority of cooperatives are mainly 
involved with two types of functions.  
  
1.3.5. Organizational structure  
 
As defined in the principles and values, members should manage their cooperatives based on 
democracy, equity, equality, and solidarity. Therefore, a particular kind of organizational 
structure is applied. Most often, the structure is detailed in the cooperatives’ law. It slightly 
differs between countries.  It usually defines the role and the power of each member in pursuing 
the common objectives either in primary cooperatives or between several cooperatives. 
 
1.3.5.1. In primary cooperatives 
 
Members unite together to establish their primary cooperative society in which all of them have 
roles, benefits, and responsibilities. The common organizational structure of cooperatives 
includes the following four actors: general meeting (all members), board of directors 
(management committee elected by all members), manager, and auditors (Tachmi 2007). 
Diagram 1 represents the prevalent internal connections between these actors.  
The general meeting is the highest body of the cooperative. It gathers all members. It is 
responsible for the direct expression of the cooperative democracy difference. It assures the 
participation of all members in the decision-making process based on the principle of democratic 
members’ control. All members decide and vote on work strategies, the cooperative's dissolution, 
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the division of surpluses, the annual balance sheet (Borzaga and Defourny 2004), and the 
membership in a cooperative union or a federal cooperative (Co-operatives Secretariat 2009).  
The key role of the general meeting is to elect the board of directors and auditors who represent 
all members and monitor the progress toward the achievement of members’ common interests 
(USDA 1988, Rapp & Ely 1996). The board of directors is the policy-making body 
representing all members in managing the coop's business affairs. Board members are not paid 
for their management activities (Borzaga and Defourny 2004) and their family relatives are 
generally not allowed to be employed in the cooperative (Abrahamsen and Scroggs 1957). They 
elect a board chairman who represents the cooperative vis-à-vis court and third parties, but 
he/she cannot separately take decisions (Tchami 2007). Board members report to the general 
meeting on the progress of activities and achievements and give direction to the manager without 
going into details of the day-to-day operations (Gamble 2002). They keep handling the strict role 
of the manager in implementing decisions and strategies taken by the general meeting 
(Abrahamsen and Scroggs 1957). The manager, along with the employees, takes care of the 
day-to-day management of the cooperative. He/she has the same responsibilities and power as a 
manager in an investor-owned enterprise i.e. organizing, planning, and controlling on a daily 
basis (Co-operatives Secretariat 2009). The role of the manager is to put into effect the policies 
of the general meeting. Regular contact is kept with board members by reporting and seeking 
advice (Abrahamsen and Scroggs 1957). Auditors elected by the general meeting are an 
independent permanent body that temporarily controls the financial aspect of the cooperative. 
Their role is to audit rather than to manage by presenting reports directly to the general meeting 
(Tchami 2007). 
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Diagram 1: Classical inter-connections in a primary cooperative 
 
 
1.3.5.2. Between cooperatives – cooperative movement structure 
 
Encouraging cooperation between cooperatives is a main principle included in the statement on 
the cooperative identity to strengthen their survival in today’s competitive environment through 
increased services, power, and representation. The cooperative movement is constituted by a 
bottom-up structure that works as a strong web to secure the common needs of members in 
primary cooperative societies. Four different levels are identified at a national basis in addition to 
the ICA as an international holding body (Diagram 2) (Cracknell 1996).  
A cooperative union is an association of at least two primary cooperatives having similar 
interests or complementary functions (Lewis 2006).  In general, cooperatives group their efforts 
to achieve some objectives that are difficult to be realized individually. Therefore, cooperative 
unions should be able to achieve a better economy of scale compared to primary cooperatives 
and should also be able to offer particular services for cooperative enterprises such as 
accounting, strategies’ development, and many others (Hagen 2005). At the third level, and also 
with the aim of representing and defending their common interests, at least two cooperative 
unions cooperate together to initiate a federation. Federal cooperatives have their own structure 
with an independent manager, staff, and a board of directors elected by members, which are 
unions in this case (USDA 1994). Primary cooperatives can directly join a federation even if they 
are not represented at the second level in a cooperative union (Tchami 2007). Members in 
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primary cooperatives agree to give some of their autonomy to the federal structure in exchange 
for support and benefits (Taimni 2001). The majority of federal cooperatives provide banking 
and international marketing services (Cracknell 1996). At the fourth level, at least two 
federations join together to form a cooperative confederation or an apex organization of the 
national cooperative movement. Federal cooperatives in a confederation should differ in the 
economic sector in which their unions or primary cooperatives operate (Harvold and Mitchell 
1979). Confederations represent the cooperative movement in front of the government and 
related authorities at both regional and international levels. They provide information about the 
size and the performance of the cooperative movement by carrying out research and publishing 
essential statistics (Tchami 2007, Taimni 2001). 
Finally, the ICA represents and promotes the cooperative movement at an international level. It 
is the official body responsible for the protection and renewal of the cooperative identity. One of 
its main duties is to show the contribution that cooperatives make to socio-economic 
development at national, regional, and global levels (ICA 1995).   
Diagram 2: The structure of the cooperative movement 
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1.4. Theory and practice of cooperative enterprises  
 
This section explores the different aspects of producers’ cooperatives. It details their 
potential/normative role in production, marketing, and services at the enterprise level. It 
examines their socio-economic development role from empirical and theoretical perspectives. It 
highlights their major internal and external challenges and accordingly, it proposes a list of pre-
requisites for success. It ends by assessing the performance of cooperative enterprises under 
Neoliberalism and exploring corruption practices while relying on cooperatives as a development 
tool. My field work and data analysis will be based on the theories elaborated in this section. 
 
1.4.1. Potential role of producers' cooperatives at the enterprise level  
 
By applying the economy of scale concept, producers’ cooperatives can decrease the cost of 
production and can consequently increase the members’ income. When small producers 
group their efforts and resources in the supply of inputs, marketing, handling, and other 
activities, cooperative enterprises can assure a lower price per unit of production or per service 
than individual producers try to get separately (Mather and Preston 1980, UN/DESA 2005, 
Wanyama et al. 2009). Empirical findings have demonstrated that a group of producers, joined 
together under a cooperative enterprise, can in the long term achieve an increased efficiency per 
unit cost (Ariyaratne et al. 2000). Cooperatives represent a practical tool to reduce transaction 
costs for both producers and buyers (Penrose-Buckley 2007, Nilsson 2001). For instance, a study 
of dairy marketing cooperatives in the Rift Valley of Kenya, showed how the cost of marketing 
services decreased by 0.07 percent with each one percent increase in the quantity of marketed 
milk. Accordingly, there is potential for further reduction in the unit cost by expanding the 
volume of milk collected from several producers (Kebede and Schreiner 1996). 
Furthermore, producers’ cooperatives can improve access to markets by arranging multiple 
marketing outlets. It was estimated that fifty percent of the global agricultural outputs were 
marketed through cooperatives (Billy and Shaw 2005). While small farmers are the greatest 
victims of marketing inefficiency, marketing cooperatives can be an effective way of developing 
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new marketing channels, reducing market margins by eliminating middlemen, and improving 
prices received by members (Lele 1981). For instance, the Indian dairy cooperative network, 
supplies large marketing services to twenty-two state federations covering nearly 101,000 
primary cooperatives and serving eleven million members (Kurein 2004). Cooperatives can offer 
an efficient transport service by delivering products to distant markets that are not accessible 
individually by small farmers (Markelova et al. 2009).  Asprepatia, a marketing cooperative in 
Colombia, has enabled members to sell their crops in a distant wholesale market with better 
prices compared to selling them to local traders (Penrose-Buckley 2007). The major contribution 
of cooperatives is in the marketing of perishable commodities, which cannot wait to get a fair 
price at the local village level (Empson 1984). Usually, offering sufficient quantities of  good 
quality products via cooperatives can attract more buyers and open many outlets (USDA 1995, 
Vorley et al. 2007) such as supermarkets, which prefer to deal with big and medium farmers and 
discard small farmers lacking a stable supply (Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003). In addition, 
cooperatives can reach international markets through the fair trade initiative. "Thousands of 
farmers in coffee cooperatives in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Timor-leste, and central America are 
benefiting from North-South fair trade arrangements" (UN/DESA 2009) . New innovations 
through packing and processing in the existing value chain can also offer members an efficient 
entry into new markets (IFAD 2001). 
What is most important under the marketing aspect is that cooperatives can present an essential 
tool to increase producers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis buyers and traders (Bhuleshkar 1973, 
World Bank 2007). By investing in storage, transport, and communication in addition to the 
economy of scale concept, cooperatives enable producers to eliminate the factors decreasing 
their power in various marketing channels (O'Connor 2003). They can guarantee a fair price that 
is hardly obtained by individual farmers (Deininger 1995). For instance, in a survey carried out 
in Ethiopia, findings showed that cooperative members have been able to sell their products at a 
higher price than non-members (Veerakumaran 2007). Moreover, cooperatives can reduce 
excessive margins taken by the handlers of food products (Mather & Preston 1980). By 
supplying bulk quantities with improved quality, they can meet the precise demands of big 
customers and accordingly negotiate to receive better prices (Penrose-Buckley 2007).  
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Cooperatives can improve and increase access to services as requested by members. The 
increased economy of scale in addition to the lower transaction costs allows the possibility of 
supplying feasible services and encourages producers to take the risk of diversifying services. 
The latter includes machinery for fieldwork and processing, testing soil, spreading fertilizer, 
applying pesticide and more (Mather and Preston 1980). For example, an agricultural 
cooperative enterprise in Mozambique has managed to offer extension and input supply services 
that are more expensive when farmers try to obtain them at an individual level (Penrose-Buckley 
2007). Likewise, new services can be added because cooperatives, due to their credibility and 
legal function, have better access to the credit market than individual producers or any other 
producers' group (Birchall 1994, Deininger 1995). All listed advantages, from access to new 
markets to increased income and new services, encourage members to diversify their production, 
increase quality, and add value to their products; and accordingly, get a better price too.  
On a technical/scientific level, increasing producers' skills can be a major role for cooperative 
enterprises. They facilitate the dissemination and adoption of relevant innovations between 
members, such as new fertilizing techniques, processing methods, etc. (Deininger 1995). For 
example, in Guatemala, the Federación de Cooperativas Agrícolas de Productores de Café has 
transferred and applied appropriate technologies and good agricultural practices which have 
increased farm productivity as well as the quality of coffee (UN/DESA 2009). Cooperatives can 
increase the competitiveness and efficiency of members (UN/DESA 2007) and offer them social 
recognition through the creation of new networks (Ravensburg 2009). Members rely more on 
solidarity to confront the risks of the markets. Cooperatives are becoming more aware of 
developing human and social capital (Nembhard 2004). They are described as a catalyst for 
entrepreneurial growth, which can develop the community in which they are present (UN 1996). 
Finally, cooperatives can enhance the power of producers to influence their policies at local 
and regional levels through their union and federal structures (Empson 1984, Birchall 2004). For 
instance, by representing 100.000 members, the National Association of Farmers in Malawi has 
lobbied the government to withdraw a decision imposing a seven percent income tax on tobacco 
cultivation (NASFAM 2010). In many countries, the advantages and power of cooperatives are 
legally offered under the cooperatives’ law and regulation through certain forms of exemption 
and tax arrangements (O'Connor 2003). 
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All potential roles show that producers’ cooperatives can offer various socio-economic benefits 
for members. However, many cooperatives fail to achieve these benefits for many reasons that 
are going to be explored below.  
 
1.4.2. Cooperatives’ tool in socio-economic development 
 
Cooperatives are widely cited by development planners in the discourses on rural development, 
poverty alleviation, and social empowerment. The effect of cooperatives in improving the living 
and working conditions of men and women was proclaimed long ago. Before liberalization, 
cooperatives were used by governments as a state-driven instrument for growth in most 
economic sectors. They have received public funds under national and regional development 
programs. This approach has limited their autonomy and reduced their impact due to a 
widespread political control, mismanagement, and corruption. After bringing state control to an 
end, international development agencies set up strategies and programs to help governments -
directly or indirectly- to create a favorable environment for the development of democratic 
bottom-up cooperatives. The self-administration system and the participatory development 
component, incorporated in the cooperative model, are increasingly used by development 
agencies to reach local communities and enhance their living conditions. It is assumed that 
cooperatives have positive effects at the micro, meso, and macro-levels. At the micro-level, 
cooperatives can initially enhance the living conditions of their members. They can produce 
economic and social changes for the surrounding community at the meso-level. And finally, they 
play a key role in national and international development at the macro-level (ICA 2012). In fact, 
the plurality, equality, and solidarity that are embedded in the cooperative model protect better 
the interest of poor people and offer an acceptable alternative income in the market economy. 
The achievements of poverty alleviation, social cohesion, sustainable employment, fair 
globalization, and Millennium Development Goals are attributed to the cooperative enterprise 
model. They are widely used by development planners in the normative discourses on the 
potential role of cooperatives in socio-economic development.  
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1.4.2.1. Poverty alleviation 
 
Cooperatives offer a strategic tool to fight global poverty due to their ability to reach out to the 
majority of poor people in rural and urban areas (ILO 2009). In 1994, the UN estimated that 
cooperatives secure the livelihood of nearly three billion people, or half the world's population at 
that time (COPAC 1999, ILO 2000). The Asia-Pacific office of the ICA served 530 million 
members who benefit from services offered by cooperatives (ICA-Asia and Pacific 2008). 
Cooperatives are considered major contributors to the food security of poor people. In 1997, 
nearly one-third of all food stuffs and drinks were provided and marketed through cooperatives 
(Groppo 1997). For example, cooperatives were responsible for fifteen percent of national food 
production in Hungary, for seventy-six percent of dairy market and seventy percent of coffee 
market in Kenya, for seventy-five percent of fresh green vegetable production in Mauritius, for 
thirteen percent of the food industry's market in Latvia, for seventy-five percent of dairy 
production in Poland, etc (ICA 2012). The participation and inclusion found in the cooperative 
model are key fundamental approaches used by development planners in reducing poverty 
(Tchami 2007). Principles and values develop strong argument for cooperatives as a tool for 
poverty alleviation (Birchall 2003).  
Cooperatives eradicate poverty directly by improving the socio-economic conditions of 
members, and indirectly by stimulating the economy and enhancing the social fabric of the 
communities in which they are found (UN/DESA 2005). For instance, cooperatives were 
responsible for nine percent of GDP in Vietnam, for six percent of GDP in Iran, for six percent 
of GDP in Colombia, for forty percent of agricultural GDP in Brazil, for forty-five percent of 
GDP in Kenya, etc. (ICA 2012). No real progress in reducing poverty can be made without the 
poor themselves participating in empowering and influencing their policy and productivity. In 
view of this, cooperatives offer an economic system in which the poor can make choices as how 
to improve their economic situation (Johnson 2003). They offer the institutional framework that 
enables members to manage the productive activities on which they rely for their livelihoods 
(Wanyama et al. 2009). In other words, cooperatives increase the opportunity, empowerment, 
and security of individual poor people to create growth and find a way to reduce their risks 
(World Bank 2001). "Cooperating out of poverty" fits more in local economies where the poor 
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live and need to transmit their voices to improve their daily working and living conditions (ILO 
and ICA 2005). Cooperatives sustain income and employment opportunities in remote areas 
where public and private initiatives are weak or absent (UN/DESA 2007). For example, in 
Colombia, when banks ceased to operate in conflict zones, credit unions were able to survive and 
provide financial service. The added value of cooperatives is found in the efficiency of getting 
services and using resources that are difficult to obtain, especially for the poor (UN/DESA 
2005). Credit cooperatives mobilize capital for entrepreneurial activities and productive 
investment at a non-exploitative interest rate which avoids members' indebtedness. Globally, 
credit cooperatives reached seventy-eight million clients living below a poverty line of USD 2 
per day. In South Africa, fifty-four percent of borrowers living below USD 2 per day were 
served by cooperatives (UN/DESA 2009). In Bolivia, credit cooperatives provided eighty-seven 
percent of all micro-credits and in Asia forty-five million people are members benefiting from a 
credit union (ICA 2012). For the seven member countries of the West African monetary union, 
cooperatives accumulated nine-six percent of mobilized savings and sixty-four percent of 
disbursed loans in the microfinance sector (World Bank 2007). The World Council of Credit 
Union served 185 million members in 53,639 credit unions (WOCCU 2008). Insurance 
cooperatives reduce the vulnerability of poor to economic shocks by protecting their assets and 
reducing risks  (UN 1994, UN 1996, UN/DESA 2005, UN/DESA 2009, COPAC 1999). The 
International Cooperative and Mutual Insurance Federation had 216 insurance cooperatives in 
membership from seventy countries with an asset approaching USD 1 trillion (ICMIF 2009). In 
India, for instance, the integrated insurance scheme of the Self Employed Women’s Association 
provided insurance coverage for 32,000 women workers (UN/DESA 2005). La Equidad, an 
insurance cooperative in Colombia, served more than 3.3 million people as members and 
customers (Billy and Shaw 2005). Agriculture cooperatives- by applying the economy of scale in 
pooling resources, by increasing exchange of services and goods, by offering technology transfer 
(Randriamamonjy 2002), by improving market access and bargaining power, and by decreasing 
the cost of production- enable poor farmers to improve their earning and productive capacities 
(UN/DESA 2009).  Consumer Cooperatives enable poor people to purchase goods at lower 
prices and in case of any profits they get a share (UN/DESA 2005). In India, there were more 
than 25,000 consumers' cooperatives with around 700 central wholesale warehouses (Birchall 
2003). In Singapore, consumers' cooperatives held fifty-five percent of the market from 
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supermarket purchases. In Moldova, the Central Union of Consumer Co-operatives was 
responsible for seven percent of consumers' market (ICA 2012). From all above we can conclude 
that the economic security assured by cooperatives enables the alleviation of poverty for millions 
of people and safeguards many millions more against falling into poverty (UN 1994).  
 
1.4.2.2. Social cohesion & integration 
 
From the general point of view that democratic, self-help, and voluntary organizations could 
increase the social capital (Fukuyama 1995, Randriamamonjy 2002), the cooperative model is 
used as an instrument to promote social cohesion and integration based on equality in social 
capabilities, increased empowerment and rights, and enhancement of access to diverse services 
(UN/DESA 2005). Cooperatives have demonstrated the ability to facilitate the social unity in a 
variety of cultural and multi-cultural environments (COPAC 1999). They are called the "Schools 
of Democracy" when they are not directly controlled (FAO 1998). They offer their members the 
chance to recapture authority, as they are uniquely positioned between public and private 
institutions. Members and non-members trust more cooperatives due to their democratic 
structure and the principle of concern for the community. Cooperatives are not seen as vested 
interest organizations that work for profit maximization (Dobrohoczki 2006). They are 
participatory, answer local and common needs, and help particularly vulnerable groups of people 
(ILO & ICA 2005) to become market actors in a context in which they have been excluded from 
the economy in rural markets (FAO 2009). Accordingly, cooperatives constitute the essential 
framework of social capital in the countryside (FAO 1996). They empower, set effective 
representation, and raise the voice of poor people by allowing them to organize into federations 
and alliances (World Bank 2001). The principle of training and education promotes capacity 
building and human capital investment for the development of organizational and 
communication skills (UN/DESA 2005). Cooperatives have proved to be a unique organizational 
form in building new models to combat social exclusion (ICA 2000). Child and elderly care, 
disabled, immigrant, health, and other social cooperatives have flourished throughout the world 
by responding to social challenges (UN/DESA 2002, UN/DESA 2005, UN 1996). In Colombia, 
for example, health cooperatives provide 30% of Colombian health services (ICA 2012). In 
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Burkina Faso, the Réseau de Caisses Populaires du Burkina grants loans for weddings and 
funerals (UN/DESA 2009). Brazil’s Unimed, a cooperative health-care provider, had one third of 
the country’s medical practitioners as members (UN/DESA 2005). Gender equality is well 
represented in the principles and values of cooperatives. Women, through cooperatives, are 
assured better economic empowerment and employment opportunities (UN/DESA 2006). In a 
study carried in Nigeria to assess women’s participation in cooperatives, findings showed that 
women engaged in cooperative activities were better, in terms of productivity and economic 
well-being, than non-member women (Amaza et al. 2009). In India, for instance, women ran 
2500 dairy cooperatives and represented eighteen percent of membership from the total dairy 
coop members (Ganju 2005). Credit unions allow women to manage a business and participate in 
the rural economy (Hussi et al. 1993, UN 1994, UN 1996, UN/DESA 2005, UN/DESA 2007).     
The characteristics prove the significant role that the cooperative model could play in supporting 
poor members to overcome the current tendencies of social disintegration in today’s market 
economy. 
 
1.4.2.3. Sustainable employment  
 
Cooperatives are significant economic actors, providing more than 100 million jobs around the 
world (ICA 2012, Cronan 2006, ICA 2005, Lewis 2006, ILO 2009). For example, they generated 
233,000 jobs in Argentina in 2007, 160,503 in Bolivia in 2006, 123,643 in Colombia in 2009, 
288,589 in Indonesia in 2004, 1.5 million in Iran in 2007, 250,000 in Kenya in 2009, 75,000 in 
Slovakia in 2008, etc. (ICA 2012). The ILO recognizes the fundamental role of cooperatives in 
generating employment in regions neglected by public and private enterprises and declares that 
cooperatives meet all the requirements of decent job by providing basic social protection and 
enabling members' voice to be heard in a democratic environment (Tchami 2007, Lewis 2006). 
Cooperatives' principles and values translate the role of cooperatives in delivering fair incomes, 
security in workplace, personal development, social protection and integration, freedom of 
members to participate in decisions affecting their lives, equality of opportunity, and gender 
equality in employment (Hertig 2008). Therefore, cooperatives place more emphasis on job 
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security for employee-members and employees’ family members and on promoting additional 
income through profit sharing (UN/DESA 2006). People that faced unemployment resulting 
from company shutdown have succeeded in securing productive jobs by initiating their 
cooperatives in collaboration with their former management or with the support of local 
authorities (ILO 2000). In Argentina, for instance, after a severe economic adjustment in 2001, 
workers' cooperatives took over about 100 shuttered factories and shops keeping the businesses 
operating and saving more than 10,000 jobs (Jeter 2003). Cooperatives directly affect 
employment by jobs generated within the cooperative enterprises and indirectly by jobs that 
complement all cooperatives’ activities such as the suppliers of inputs for cooperatives 
(UN/DESA 2007, COPAC 1999). Moreover, cooperatives provide an effective tool for the 
informal economy workers to form a legal association that could promote and enhance their 
employment towards the decent work that ILO calls for (UN/DESA 2008, UN/DESA 2009). One 
of the most successful informal sector workers’ cooperative is the Self Employed Women’s 
Association in India, which organized over 500,000 women members in a number of different 
ways – including trade unions and cooperatives (Billy & Shaw 2005). Through cooperatives, 
informal workers overcome the lack of skills offered in the education, information, and training 
programs implemented by governments and federal cooperatives (Hertig 2008). In Rwanda, for 
example, the ILO SYNDICOOP program helped informal motorbike transportation workers to 
organize themselves into a cooperative that provides credit, training, crime protection, and local 
government lobbying (Smith and Ross 2006). By offering stable jobs to local people, 
cooperatives decrease migration and attach members to their communities (UN/DESA 2007). 
Their benefits allow members to continue generating income from their self-employment such as 
farmers who continue growing crops due to services assured by cooperatives, and therefore, this 
self-employment contributes to rural community development (Hertig 2008). Finally, 
cooperatives can generate employment in all sectors. Financial cooperatives provide members 
with credit services helping to finance new projects that can also promote job creation 
(UN/DESA 2007). The Komak cooperative in Azerbaijan, for example, offered credits to small 
and medium enterprises with an average loan size of $1,089 to expand their activities. In 
Uruguay, the Cooperativa Nacional de Ahorro y Crédito offered financial services to enterprises 
as they grew from marginal informal enterprises to sizable formalized companies (UN/DESA 
2009). Producers' and consumers' cooperatives generate jobs in marketing, sales, transportation, 
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and distribution (UN/DESA 2007). In India, dairy cooperatives generated employment 
opportunities for around 13.9 million farm families (NDDB 2009). Workers' cooperatives 
promote employment by enabling skilled members to start a common business (UN/DESA 
2007). In Colombia, for instance, workers' cooperatives provided 537,859 jobs as workers-
owners (ICA 2012).    
 
1.4.2.4. Contribution to millennium development goals (MDGs) 
 
The crucial roles of cooperatives in poverty alleviation, social cohesion and integration, and 
sustainable employment are well positioned to meet the MDGs - aiming to solve the problems of 
poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination of women - 
which were admitted in the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000 (UN/DESA 2008). The 
United Nations cannot achieve their planned eight goals, by 2015, without a massive effort in 
participatory development through cooperatives or similar self-help groups (Birchall 2004).  
For the first goal, eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; it was mentioned in the poverty 
alleviation role how cooperative enterprises get people out of poverty. Decent employment 
generation and food security offered by cooperatives could also help in achieving this goal. The 
second goal, achieve universal primary education, is part of the principle of education, training, 
and information that cooperatives are committed to applying (ICA 2007). By increasing family 
income, cooperatives enable children to get more access to primary schools. Moreover, where 
local government fails to provide primary schools, they fill the gap by using their own funds to 
build local schools by applying the principle of concern for community (Birchall 2004). For the 
third goal, promote gender equity and empower women, the first two cooperative principles - 
voluntary and open membership and democratic member control - in addition to the equality and 
solidarity values, offer the equal right for women to participate in the control of their 
organization and empower them to enroll an economic activity that ensures better living 
conditions. Women cooperatives in the dairy sector in India are a good example (Ganju 2005). 
Increasing income, providing decent jobs, women’s empowerment, and the participation in food 
security could contribute to the fourth and fifth stated goals: reduction of child mortality and 
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improve maternal health. Specialized health care cooperatives are well equipped in deprived 
areas to provide services for children and their mothers. For example, in Colombia, twenty-four 
percent of all health sector jobs were provided by cooperatives that insured thirty percent of 
Colombian people (ICA 2007).The sixth goal, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 
goes also under the health care cooperatives' services and the education principles. For instance, 
the Kenya Rural Savings and Credit Societies Union offered credit loans to cover medical bills 
and hospital fees for HIV/AIDS sufferers (Billy and Shaw 2005). In 2005, the ICA adopted a 
regional strategy to combat HIV/AIDS given its increased impact on workers' cooperatives that 
leads to lower productivity and social problems. Prevention, capacity building, and awareness 
were key elements in the strategy (Bibby 2006). For the seventh goal, ensure environmental 
sustainability, the main objectives are to improve the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 
and to halve, by 2015, the number of people without access to safe drinking water (UN 2000). 
Here, cooperatives are able to rely on the solidarity value to assure safe water. Housing 
cooperatives that proved to be an alternative to slum clearance in the USA, UK, and Scotland 
could be a key tool in achieving this goal (Birchall 2004). For slum-dwellers in Central and 
South America, housing alternatives are being developed through the promotion of sustainable 
housing cooperatives with the support of the Swedish Cooperative Centre (UN/DESA 2005). 
Finally, the goal of developing a global partnership for development is well established in the 
principle of cooperation between cooperatives. Indeed, the cooperation between federal 
cooperatives in developing countries and cooperative development agencies in developed 
countries could achieve this aim (Birchall 2004).  
In addition to the MDGs, by increasing opportunity, empowerment, and security, cooperatives 
could also play a major role in achieving the World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategies (World 
Bank 2001). 
 
1.4.2.5. Fairer globalization 
 
Since the 1980s, widening inequalities have been developed between the South and the North. 
Twenty percent of the world's population in developed countries receives eighty-two percent of 
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the total world income, while twenty percent of the population in developing countries only gets 
1.4 percent (Panitchpakdi 2001, Culpeper 2005). Today, producers in the South have to compete 
with heavily subsidized food transnational companies and highly capitalized agricultural 
producers working in the North (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2008).  
With 1.02 billion people undernourished worldwide (FAO 2009b), globalization has not yet met 
its goals either for poverty reduction nor for the creation of decent jobs (ILO 2004). Any 
economic development unaccompanied by a sense of justice and responsibility cannot solve 
social exclusion problems. Instead, it may create more inequality in society (Barberini 2003). In 
this context, cooperatives, based on the equitable distribution of goods for members and concern 
for communities, could enable a fairer globalization or what is called a "globalization from 
below" (Williams 2007). In fact, the values, the principles, and the organizational structure of 
cooperatives deliver more balanced global and local interests and provide a globalization with a 
human face (Salazar 2005). The latest modification of cooperative principles by the ICA in 1995 
strengthened the cooperative model with a new outward oriented policy offering cooperatives the 
opportunities to compete and prosper in their environment (Levi 2001). Combating exploitation, 
increasing social cohesion and integration, and alleviating poverty help in creating a more just 
society in the dominant global economy (Taimni 1998). Cooperatives connect the local to the 
national and the global, building the bridge to reduce marginalization and deprivation and the 
side effects of globalization (Green 2002, Salazar 2005). Under the fair trade movement, 
cooperatives are called vehicles for exchanging producers' goods and consumers' needs between 
the North and the South. They expand market opportunities and secure more income for 
members (UN/DESA 2007, Salazar 2005, COPAC 1995, Milford 2004, Develtere & Pollet 2005, 
Pirotte 2005). When it comes to corporate social responsibility, cooperatives, which only 
represent their members and respond to their needs with no-profit objectives, are well positioned 
for social involvement compared to capitalist enterprises (Cid 2004, Lewis 2006, Barberini 
2005). In reality, cooperatives generate trust which is the most functional asset that private 
enterprises over the world try to build (Somavia 2003). In the last financial crisis, cooperatives 
proved to be a more resilient form of enterprise to shocks because they are not based on charity 
but on self-help. They increased in number, while other enterprises had to cut back (Hagen 2009; 
Birchall & Ketilson 2009). Credit cooperative unions experienced a rapid increase in 
membership and in the deposit of savings (UN/DESA 2009, UN/DESA 2008, Hagen 2009, 
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Birchall & Ketilson 2009). In conclusion, cooperatives offer more justice and stability in their 
approach to development problems in the current global economy and offer a fairer future at 
local, national, and global levels.  
 
1.4.3. Why do producers' coops fail?  
 
Producers' cooperatives are facing various internal and external challenges that should be 
overcome in order to be able to deliver their socio-economic benefits at the enterprise level.  
Challenges are widespread in developing countries and can be observed in other cooperatives' 
categories.  
 
1.4.3.1. Internal challenges  
 
Capital formation and its management, known as the horizon problem or undercapitalization, 
challenge the growth of producers' cooperatives in local markets (Ferrier and Porter 1991). “The 
horizon problem concerns the impossibility for members to recoup the self-financed capital 
invested in the cooperative when their expected tenure in the cooperative is shorter than the time 
it takes for the stream of discounted net returns from the project to equal the initial cost of the 
investment” (Gagliardi, 2009). It arises when members try to raise the capital needed to invest in 
new services and apply the economy of scale concept. Some non-active/old members, who will 
not benefit directly or in the long-term, reject new investments and sometimes withdraw their 
initial contributed capital (Cook 1995). Other than that, low resource mobilization from members 
is attributed to the limited return on capital principle, the subsidized notion of producers' 
cooperatives in developing countries through previous governments' direct support (Von Pischke 
and Rouse 2004), and the limited means of poor members in contributing to capital formation 
(Taimni 2001). In fact, members tend to under-invest in opportunities because the received 
returns are less than the generated ones through the collective asset (Ortmann and King 2007). 
Furthermore, the complexity increases with the heterogeneity element among members who set 
different priorities and tend to seek their self- interest instead of their common interest (Fahlbeck 
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2007). This is the portfolio problem in which members differ in their preference for investment 
with various levels of risks. This point creates different perspectives regarding the purpose of the 
cooperative initiative and results in sub-group conflict (Nilsson 2001). For example, members 
focusing on a differentiated singular production prefer their cooperative to invest in one specific 
product, while members seeking diversified production desire that new investments reflect their 
on-farm diversification. The same goes for members proposing a high growth strategy which 
could meet new technologies and be capable of reaching out to new markets, or others 
suggesting a low growth strategy aiming progressively to increase product prices over a long-
term objective (Plunkett 2005). The portfolio problem mostly arises when there are different 
generations in the cooperative. Older producers, who are mainly elected in the board of directors, 
tend to influence the manager to implement their own short-term objectives without being honest 
or accountable to the members they represent in the general meeting (Fulton and Hueth 2009). 
Producers’ cooperatives also face a control problem represented by poor governance and lack 
of trust between members, the board of directors, and managers. It is a widely acknowledged 
factor leading to cooperative dissolution (Penrose-Buckley 2007, Deininger 1995). In general, 
managing a group of producers with multiple backgrounds and sometimes different priorities is 
more difficult than managing a public or investor-owned firm. The principle of democratic 
member control legally gives non-active members or members with minor 
supplies/responsibilities the role and equal rights in decision-making that members, who are 
responsible for the main surpluses in the cooperative, do have. This point creates a control 
problem in management (Cook 1995). Moreover, managers in cooperatives have less incentive 
than those in private companies to implement effective governance due to the shared ownership, 
the heterogeneous membership (Ortmann and King 2007), their limited skills, and in general, due 
to low wages that result from undercapitalization  (Poter and Scully 1987, Davis 1999). The most 
important aspect of the control problem is the use of cooperatives by local elites, rich farmers, 
and politicians who promote their interests and increase their power over poor members. This is 
a prevalent aspect that can destroy efficient membership and the potential behind the cooperative 
model (Lele 1981, Penrose-Buckley 2007).     
The free rider or common property problem is also a common challenge for producers' 
cooperatives. Free riders are new cooperative members who receive the same benefits as initial 
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members without having shared in the initial investment capital (Olson and Cook 2007). The free 
rider problem can also happen when new members do not effectively contribute to the capital in 
the economy of scale approach. Therefore, this problem is a free ride on investment and benefit 
that affects initial members and dilutes their returns (Von Pischke and Rouse 2004).  It causes 
the horizon problem by allowing members to avoid investing in capital for new services (Fulton 
and Hueth 2009). It can lead to members withdrawing when free riders join the cooperative to 
get higher prices for their low quality products, associated with low cost of production, at the 
expense of high quality products offered by old members (Penrose-Buckley 2007).         
Finally, the influence cost problem is a cost associated with inefficient activities in which 
cooperatives engage to better distribute wealth or services among members (Ortmann and King 
2007). Such cooperatives pay high influence and transaction costs that include the direct cost of 
influence and the cost of poor decisions in terms of misallocation of resources (O'Connor 2001). 
Accordingly, high transaction costs reduce the potential of cooperatives and could lead to a loss 
of confidence and members' withdrawal when an external trader, having lower transaction costs, 
pays more to members (Penrose-Buckley 2007). 
 
1.4.3.2. External challenges 
 
Since the 1980s, and mostly in developing countries, producers' cooperatives are facing the 
challenges of a highly competitive liberal market economy. Cooperatives are forced to 
compete with large international producers on the basis of quality and safety standards that are 
requested by buyers (Von Pischke and Rouse 2004). For instance, farmers' cooperatives in Latin 
America were urged to retreat to shrinking rural markets when changes in the food retailing 
systems in the 1980s put them in competition with supermarkets selling produce from highly 
subsidized American and European farmers (Dugger 2004). Moreover, governments that were 
directly controlling cooperatives before liberalization have stopped their support and subsidies 
under the market economy (Bosc et al. 2002). Therefore, producers' cooperatives found 
themselves having lower levels of support and were urged to participate in a global economy. 
They are challenged to take more pro-active roles in marketing, upgrade their organizational 
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structure, and increase their integration within the value chain (Cook and Plunkett 2006). From 
an alternative point of view which supports the liberal environment, the market economy could 
be seen as an advantage to locate new niches or new marketing channels and more innovations in 
production and distribution from which cooperatives could benefit and provide more feasible 
services (UN/DESA 2007, Dash & Sen 1998, Davis 1999). In fact, this is the objective of fair 
trade agreements that try to remove international market challenges by favoring North-South 
opportunities (Hiscox 2007). For example, Green and Black's chocolate company in the UK 
signed a fair trade agreement with Toledo Cacao Growers Association, a farmers' cooperative in 
Belize, to buy the entire cacao that members can produce at a price higher than average market 
prices (Global Exchange 2007). Furthermore, globalization can rapidly disseminate the message 
of cooperation and increases cooperatives' power, but members need to ensure that principles are 
applied on the basics of democracy, equality, and equity (Rodrigues 2001). 
Next to the market competition, an unsuitable national environment in terms of legislation and 
roles that cooperatives could play also presents a real challenge for producers’ cooperatives. 
They cannot deliver their benefits without an enabling legal, regulatory, and policy environment 
that assures their autonomy. Governments must see cooperatives as productive actors and not an 
instrument of policy or a tool to implement donors’ agendas (World Bank 2007). In many 
situations, the support of governments has not been productive and has been mainly for political 
reason rather than the aim of enhancing cooperatives’ performance in the market economy 
(Hussi et al. 1993).  
The question that arises now is how could these internal and external challenges be overcome? 
The following section explores how members could plan and act to achieve their objectives 
while respecting the principles and values of cooperatives.     
 
1.4.4. Prerequisites for success 
 
Despite the low support for cooperatives and the increased market competition of globalization, 
as well as the internal challenges, cooperatives are still offering considerable benefits for 
members and the cooperative movement continues to play an economic and social role at the 
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global level. Applying the pre-requisites for success is essential to cope with the challenges of 
cooperatives. The pre-requisites are classified according to the challenges they could resolve. 
Hence, internal and external pre-requisites are distinguished.  
 
1.4.4.1. Internal success  
 
Internal challenges are mainly constituted by members seeking different interests inside an 
enterprise that should represent all of them, as well as a control problem of dealing with a 
heterogeneous membership and a widespread ownership. Internal pre-requisites for success 
emphasize the original objective of cooperatives, the importance of principles and values, and 
the necessity of good governance.  
First, cooperatives are established to respond to common needs as described in their definition. 
Therefore, answering producers’ needs in an efficient way is an essential key for success. If 
cooperatives offer services that do not address the purpose of initiation, there will be no need for 
cooperation and the initiation of an economic productive enterprise. Internal and external 
challenges will certainly lead to a failure. From this point, sharing a common problem in addition 
to identifying a common future in the initial phase of cooperation can lead to a success among a 
group of motivated producers (Jones 2004, FAO 1998). What follows is the generation of capital 
that should be also based on common needs (COPAC 1995) and the ability to offer members a 
better economic situation by supplying feasible services and goods (Hanel 1992, USDA 2002). A 
precondition of potential benefits for producers is a clear indication for successful cooperation 
either by increasing production or by improving market access (Shepherd 2007). Accordingly, 
the early achievement of economies of scale is a key factor in the initiation phase (Brazda and 
Schediwy 2001). Homogenous groups are more likely to succeed in cooperation if they share 
common needs (IFAD 2001). Cooperation between poor and rich producers tends to fail because 
the latter are more likely to receive the benefits of the coop (Coulter 2006, Baland and Platteau 
1999). Cultural homogeneity presents successful conditions for a cooperative initiative (Becker 
and Ostrom 1995). Relying on members’ own financial resources is crucial to activate 
membership and accordingly, to select producers’ essential needs (Stringfellow et al. 1997). 
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Cooperative entrepreneurship in answering common needs increases the spirit of economic 
cooperation and the chances for success (Tchami 2007). 
Second, applying the principles and values of cooperatives can enhance the relationship 
between members and their environment and can lead to success. The growth of producers' 
cooperatives is linked up with the values of solidarity, self-help, equality, and equity, and with 
the principles of democratic control, member economic participation, etc (UN/DESA 2001). The 
right of members to control ensures that capital is only utilized to achieve the enterprise goal 
(UN 1996). Ignoring principles and values due to a lack of awareness is one of the main 
obstacles toward the development of cooperatives (Tchami 2007). Consequently, the education 
and training of members around cooperative principles and values - indispensable in the 
statement on the cooperative identity - is essential for cooperatives to thrive (UN/DESA 2005). 
This is mostly needed in developing countries to fill the gap left by the government withdrawal 
after liberalization (FAO 1996). Principles initiate trust and confidence among members and help 
to develop interpersonal relationships that enhance social capital and put away the vested 
interests of individual members (Jones 2004).  
Third, initiatives for strong members’ participation are considered an important stimulant for 
cooperatives’ success (Tchami 2007). No membership organization is sustained for a long time 
without the strong participation of its members (UN/DESA 2005). Developing a sense of 
ownership, adopting good communication skills, and linking participation directly to members' 
livelihoods are effective approaches (Williams 2007). Moreover, participation should be 
encouraged by the necessity of making a financial contribution to investments, by having a 
decision making role in the general meeting, and by sharing the benefits generated in terms of 
surpluses and joint services (FAO 1998). A positive correlation is demonstrated between capital 
contribution, member control and participation on the one hand, and the success of cooperatives 
in the market and their growth on the other hand (COPAC 1995). 
Finally, an efficient organizational structure is essential for good governance in producers' 
cooperatives. The board of directors should be fully accountable and committed to the vision of 
the cooperative’s social and economic purposes selected by the general meeting (UN/DESA 
2005). At least one member of the board should have leadership skills and the ability to represent 
the remaining members. Cooperatives' managers should be motivated, dynamic, and able to plan 
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and implement the policies of members (FAO 1998). They must at least apply what other 
business managers do i.e. in terms of strategic management plans (Tchami 2007) that enable 
cooperatives to compete in their environment and better serve their members (Trewin 2003). 
Strong workers-members interaction in addition to a sense of ownership increases the potential 
of success (Williams 2007). Managers and workers must know what is affecting member's 
ownership interests and try to protect it (USDA 2002). They should be familiar with the 
principles and values of cooperatives. This will facilitate their dealings with members who are 
users and owners in the same time. Cooperatives can thrive more if they are led by 
entrepreneurial cooperators and managers with an understanding of cooperation and the ability to 
create innovative services (Tchami 2007). External assistance in the form of leadership 
management and finance training are needed as a step toward voluntary and self-reliant 
cooperatives in developing countries (Lele 1981, Barham 2006). 
 
1.4.4.2. External success  
 
To compete and prosper in today’s market-based economy; producers' cooperatives should adopt 
and implement innovative strategies targeting their external interaction within their environment. 
Otherwise, it is difficult to continue delivering feasible services. A suitable environment is 
necessary to achieve these strategies.  
First of all, the initial success of cooperatives requires a great deal of support from the 
community. It is impossible to operate a cooperative without involvement and inclusion within 
the community in which it works (Williams 2007). In order to survive, cooperatives, which 
reflect the cultural and political backgrounds of members, must build good networks and 
relationships with their societies (Laidlaw 1987, UN/DESA 2005). Successful cooperatives have 
ensured good communication through the formation of advisory committees, communication 
centers, and ordinary publicity (Williams 2007). The most important is that cooperatives should 
avoid political or any external influence that threatens their democratic control and makes them 
dependent. Otherwise, they might end up realizing the aims of the controlling agent and not their 
own common interests (UN/DESA 2005).  
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Second, cooperatives need a supportive environment in order to thrive. They can only induce 
members’ socio-economic development if provided with an appropriate legal and policy 
environment in which genuine cooperatives can work (COPAC 1999, FAO 1996). Freedom to 
operate without undue restrictions on management and business activities should be ensured 
(Hussi et al. 1993). A positive government policy is needed by detailing the role of cooperatives 
in their societies and recognizing them as a legal and distinct form of economic enterprise that 
has the flexibility to act as any other autonomous organizations (UN/DESA 2005). International 
development organizations advise governments to stop seeing cooperatives as vehicles for the 
injection of financial political aid, to promote their growth by removing legislation that limits 
their operations, and to allow them to merge activities and invest across national boundaries 
(FAO 1996, UN/DESA 2005). Furthermore, governments should provide an adequate physical 
infrastructure in terms of pricing policies, storage facilities, technology development, investment 
in infrastructures, and improved market intelligence (Lele 1981). Accordingly, it is very effective 
to build a strong partnership between the government and cooperatives, such as a special unit 
designed to promote cooperatives while respecting their autonomy and democracy (Tchami 
2007, UN/DESA 2005). 
Finally, increasing unity between cooperatives, as cited in the statement on the cooperative 
identity, plays a significant role in achieving external success. A network of homogenous 
cooperatives can drive higher member benefits and enhance the spirit of belonging to a 
movement (Brazda and Schediwy 2001). A strong umbrella organization (apex or federal) that 
actively cooperates with international apex organizations is a fundamental element capable of 
decreasing or removing the higher transaction costs of newly established cooperatives 
(UN/DESA 2005).  
 
1.4.5. Performance of cooperative enterprises under Neoliberalism 
 
In the earlier parts of this section, the normative potential roles of cooperatives and their 
challenges at internal and external levels were presented. In addition, the key theoretical pre-
requisites for success were highlighted under perfect markets. This part explores the general 
performance of cooperative enterprises under Neoliberalism. It relies on empirical literature to 
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analyze how cooperatives in today’s neoliberal conditions are capable of doing business, similar 
to their capitalist counterparts, and also capable of keeping a balance between their economic 
and social identity. It starts by locating their market position compared to other firms and 
detailing the main differences that affect their performance. Then, it explores the persistent 
challenges preventing cooperative enterprises from active competition in today’s market 
economy and concludes by presenting proposed solutions and current adaptations.  
Under Neoliberalism, cooperatives are considered private organizations involved in businesses 
that fall under the social economy. They are part of the third sector or non-profit sector 
addressing socio-economic initiatives that the private and public sectors do not appropriately 
address. Cooperatives provide a vital model for rural development. They are needed to group 
small producers in order to increase their power in a highly competitive market (Kangayi et al 
2009, Hudson 2009). The roles designed for cooperative enterprises under Neoliberalism are 
included under the two liberal cooperative ideologies: the School of Modified Capitalism and the 
Cooperative Sector School. The question that arises is why cooperatives under Neoliberalism are 
seen as different third sector private enterprises. It is because, unlike their capitalist counterparts 
which aim to maximize profit that is equivalent to the enterprise’s values, the goal of 
cooperatives is the maximization of profit by members and not the overall wealth of the 
cooperative unless it is reflected in increasing income for members (Miller 1990). Moreover, it is 
because of the difference between common good and total good. The common good is the aim of 
the social market economy, while the total good is the aim of the capitalist market economy, i.e. 
the profit motive. “While the total good is the largest benefit for a limited number of individuals 
on the basis of their share in capital, the common good in cooperatives is like a product in which 
the multipliers are the good of individuals or groups” (Zamagni and Zamagni 2010 p.9). This 
point highlights the socio-economic difference in identity for cooperatives- the social side of an 
enterprise that seeks meta-economic aims and generates benefits for members and for the 
community, and the economic side of an enterprise that should be viable within the market and 
accept its logic. These differences or characteristics and what they generate in terms of 
difference in ideologies are challenging the competitiveness of cooperative enterprises under 
Neoliberalism. In fact, underinvestment or undercapitalization, mentioned above as the horizon 
problem, is the main persistent challenge affecting the priority for growth that is considered a 
main pillar of the market economy. Whenever the time horizon of the majority of coop members 
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is shorter than the economic horizon of the investment, the democratic member control principle 
produce sub-optimal investment strategies and progressively contribute to the exclusion from the 
market (Gagliardi 2009). Moreover, investment in cooperatives is less attractive to members due 
to its inflexibility and its inability to spread the risk that, in the event of bankruptcy, members 
lose their income/benefits as well as their capital. When external financing solutions are 
proposed, private banks have no incentive to lend to cooperatives. By themselves seeking profit 
maximization, banks consider cooperatives a bad investment and prefer lending to capitalist 
firms (Miller 1990). Peter Lindsay mentioned that the market itself has not provided a feasible 
solution to the investment problem of cooperatives. And when no investment is secured for 
growth, it is extremely difficult for them to compete with their counterparts and produce similar 
or higher efficiency (Lindsay 2005). Accordingly, when cooperatives are analyzed in comparison 
with capitalist enterprises, most empirical evidence shows a lower profitability rate, lower 
growth rate, and lower efficiency. Cooperatives have lower return on equity, lower leverage, 
lower effective capital structure, and lower market share. They are technically less efficient due 
to the horizon, portfolio, free-rider, non-transferability, and control problems. In a study of the 
US milk processing plants, cooperatives were only seventy-five percent as efficient as capitalist 
enterprises and they could increase their output by thirty-two percent without the need to add 
extra inputs. Under optimal situations, most studies have outlined similar return on equity, a high 
level of technical efficiency, and significant higher asset efficiency than capitalist enterprises 
(Soboh et al 2009, Putterman 1993).  
Given this lower performance, technical suggestions as well as adaptations provide solutions to 
the current status of cooperatives under Neoliberalism. For the underinvestment challenge, 
Stefano Zamagni and Vera Zamagni proposed a market for membership rights. The ability to 
invest would increase and be more attractive when retiring members could receive the current 
value of future earnings by selling their membership to a new member or to current cooperative 
members. Likewise, they suggested increasing members’ shares in cooperatives for further group 
investments instead of distributing surpluses for individual investments. On the other hand, a 
better communication line between workers and members, in addition to a commitment to 
practice equity to prevent exploitation, were recommended to manage the control problem in 
cooperatives (Zamagni and Zamagni 2010). Francesca Gagliardi proposed external financing 
sources via financial institutions as a measure that allows cooperatives to flourish and succeed. 
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These institutions can regulate the problem arising from the credit market failure and open more 
opportunities by convincing other financial institutions that have scarce experience to lend to 
cooperatives (Gagliardi 2009). Other suggestions that favor the position of cooperatives in the 
social economy sector consider the social rationality of members seeking non-commodity base 
benefits in parallel to economic benefits. The charge of lower efficiency is compensated in 
cooperatives by the democratic control and equity base (Miller 1990). Some cooperatives have 
chosen an adaptation reform in order to withstand local and external competition favored by 
today’s market economy. The process of adaptation is called isomorphism or de-
cooperativization. It is the tendency of large cooperatives to modify or adopt different 
institutional structures or practices in order to increase their efficiency via their capitalist 
counterparts (Fernandez 2006). Roger Spear has identified four main trends (Spear 2004):  
1. Adaptation of the cooperative model: they are legislative reforms opening doors to 
facilitate market operations, for example, non-voting shares for a financial member, 
voting rights counted according to members’ investment capacity, and altered 
membership rights to include financial partners as members. 
2. Separating the economic and social identity: in this adaptation, the aim is to create 
separate objectives for users and members. For instance in consumer cooperatives, coop 
members receive the benefits of the social identity in addition to the benefits of the 
economic identity, while non-members’ consumers (users) only receive the benefits of 
the economic identity. .  
3. Hybridization: a new trend to utilize capitalist structures as a form of owning share based 
subsidiaries (commercial corporations as a flexible form of growth) or to merge 
economic activities via a joint venture with capitalist enterprises. 
4. Degeneration of the cooperative model in three different ways: 
a. Principal degeneration: where membership becomes restricted and employees are 
hired to maintain a higher income for members 
b. Goal degeneration: where the goal of the cooperative becomes similar to any 
small capitalist enterprise 
c. Organizational degeneration: where the democratic control becomes dominated 
by few members. 
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As a result of these trends, Ray Hudson has indicated that cooperative enterprises increasingly 
look like and behave like capitalist enterprises. Large cooperatives are shifting from democratic 
decentralized decision-making to centralized decision-making dominated by professionals and 
market analysts and accompanied by a reduction in members’ participation as well as their rights 
and obligations (Hudson 2009). The relationship of members in cooperatives starts to resemble a 
simple clients/suppliers relation. Accordingly, democracy is often changed into bureaucracy 
(Corby 2010). 
In conclusion, Neoliberalism has produced two distinct cooperative models where the choice is 
left for cooperators. Members either choose to accept a reduced efficiency with non-commodity 
base benefits or otherwise to progressively lose the social side via the new updated structures 
that very closely resemble capitalist enterprises.  
 
1.4.6. Corruption, development, and cooperatives 
 
Despite the useful role of cooperatives in inducing socio-economic development as analyzed in 
the different parts of this section, there is evidence, mainly in developing countries (Wanyama 
2012, Shaw 2006, Develtere et al 2008), that cooperatives did not contribute to local 
development and hence creating less production, lower economic growth, less equality and 
equity, and increased poverty. The potential of cooperatives and their key role in development 
has, in many cases, showed serious imperfections and lower expectations. Corruption, being 
expressed in mismanagement, misuse of development funds, self-interest replacing the common 
interest, and use of cooperatives for political ends, etc., has been a common aspect for 
cooperatives. In critical literature, cooperatives are described as organizations that have been 
effectively taken for the benefit of few individuals with a high level of corruption and a lack of 
trust among members and between members and the board of directors (Fulton et al. 2003).    
Assuming that corruption tends to be minimal in cooperatives where members rely on their own 
economic participation and their democratic control in achieving their common interests, this 
part explores the corruption in cooperatives that have received development aid donated either 
by local governments or by development agencies. Controlling corruption at the enterprise level 
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would offer cooperatives a real chance to survive in today’s market economy and make the aid 
intended for the development of cooperatives more efficient and sustainable. The degree of aid 
corruption via producers’ cooperatives would be significant unless corruption practices were 
controlled in agricultural development projects. Agricultural cooperatives received one percent 
of the global agricultural aid between 2005 and 2008. Veterinary services, financial services, and 
agrarian reform received the same percentage during the same period (Islam 2011). 
This part starts by defining corruption and how it could be manifested inside cooperatives. Then, 
it relies on empirical literature to show cases and types of corruption in cooperatives around the 
world and ends by listing measures taken by development agencies to restrict corruption in 
development initiatives.  
No single definition of corruption seems to cover the perspective of different disciplines or the 
context in which it happens (Ware and Noone 2003). The globally adopted definition is the one 
developed by the Transparency International, the organization leading the global coalition 
against corruption. It defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” 
(Transparency International 2012). Other definitions reflect the same meaning such as “the abuse 
of public power for private benefit or profit” (Webster 2008); “use of public office for private 
gain” (Ware and Noone 2003); “the abuse of entrusted authority (public or private) for 
illegitimate private gain” (Boucher el al. 2007). In the context of corruption in cooperative 
enterprises, “the violation of common interest for the sake of special Interest” (Hamer 1981), as a 
definition, reveals the self-benefit of individual members in pursuing their self-interest at the 
expense of group interest. For the corruption in development aid while relying on the cooperative 
tool, a practical definition is adopted by the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD) as follows: “Offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting directly or indirectly of anything of 
value to improperly influence the actions of another party” (IFAD 2005). This definition broadly 
differs from others in the sense that it covers all the activities carried out under development 
projects such as the selection of beneficiaries, procurement, design of efficient interventions, etc. 
Therefore, a cooperative which accepts to receive any support that will not influence properly its 
activities in terms of direct members’ benefits is considered to commit a corrupt practice that 
would result in money wastage and inefficient impacts. Equally, if development agencies support 
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cooperatives to apply inappropriate activities that would not contribute to members’ socio-
economic development, they will also be considered as committing a corrupt practice.  
Moving to the empirical literature, the corruption of cooperative enterprises has been widely 
reported. After the liberalization of cooperatives in the African continent, most cooperatives 
collapsed in a short time period due to corruption and associated mismanagement. In Zimbabwe, 
corruption, embezzlement, misuse and sabotage of collective properties were the prevailing 
culture in the day-to-day operations of most cooperatives. Chairmen and committee members, 
who controlled funds, have replaced common public support into family and personal use 
(Bernard et al. 2008). In Sierra Lone, like other initiatives implemented under the agricultural 
development strategy before and after the end of the civil war, cooperative enterprises, have 
mismanaged development funds due to rampant corruption. Attempts by the government and 
development agencies in mobilizing cooperatives to induce rural development have not worked 
out. Cooperatives have proved to be ineffective as a tool for rural development and income 
generation (Osusu and Iyede 2008). In Kenya and Uganda, a large scale of corruption after the 
complete withdrawal of the state control has paralyzed cooperatives. Most of them have failed to 
hold board members’ elections, have issued illegal payments, etc. (Shaw 2006). In Tanzania, the 
image of cooperatives has become negative. They are stuck in the past, unable to stand out in 
modern economic realities. Their image is dominated by corruption, poor administration, and 
weak business practices (Bibby 2006). In the Tigray region in Ethiopia, cooperatives have 
witnessed a considerable crisis. Members have become doubtful about the potential of 
cooperatives in inducing socio-economic development. Corruption has inhibited the development 
of cooperatives and negatively affected their performance (Mahmud 2008). There is a general 
consensus that cooperatives across all Africa have mainly collapsed after state withdrawal due to 
corruption (Wanyama 2012). Moreover, another consensus across developing countries is that 
credit cooperatives, which were used as credit channels in rural areas, showed after liberalization 
a wide inefficiency, corruption, and the breakdown of the whole credit network (Seibel et al 
2005, Shaw 2006).  
The examination of corruption practices has shown multiple aspects reflecting the abuse of 
common interest for individual private gain. The main reported practices are the following:  
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• Misuse to pursue political aims: the control of cooperatives by local political elites or 
board members (Lele 1981, Throp et al. 2005, Bernard et al. 2008, Kwapong and 
Korugyando 2010). This challenge has created a patronage based corruption. The scarcity 
of resources has been manifested in a patron-client relationship as a mean of socio-
economic survival (Satgar 2011, Hamer 1981). Factional conflict among members 
distracts them from the achievement of their economic objectives (Crawford 1997). In 
Gujarat, in western India, factions in cotton cooperatives have subordinated their political 
interests to cooperatives’ business interests. The distribution of dividends tends to 
become a “bone of inter-faction contention”. This situation has increased the role and 
impact of the state government in cotton cooperatives politics (Rajaram 1999).  
• A tool to receive government/donors support: instead of initiating private companies, 
cooperatives were largely preferred by members having family ties to take advantage of 
special benefits granted by the government such as tax exemptions and preferential 
treatment in awarding contracts or the advantage of available funds for local non-profit 
organizations donated by development agencies (Ellner 2010). 
• Benefit to non-members and restriction of membership: a common practice in 
cooperatives is the tendency to market from non-members who can offer lower prices 
than members for several reasons, in particular the scale of production and the use of 
agricultural machineries. These cooperatives shift to answer traders’ needs seeking a 
lower price and not members’ needs aiming to receive a better price. Also, one common 
feature is the restriction of membership after receiving development aid. It is related to 
the fear that more members will lead to the dilution of the value of each member’s share 
(Holtland 2011).  
Empirical literature lacks in-depth detailed descriptions or examples of corruption practices that 
may happen when cooperatives receive development aid. The limitation of the literature is not 
only at the level of internal practices between members, but also at the external level when 
building partnerships with the government and development agencies. Examples of corruption 
practices are the following: unpaid use of cooperative services for some members, privatization 
of coop donated projects (ex: a cold storage facility) for one member at a very low cost that will 
not even generate the return on investment, receiving financial support from politicians during 
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elections, private use of donations and control over resources by the coop chairmen, coop 
members getting no direct benefits from coop services (a teacher in an agricultural coop), 
government intervention in selecting affiliated coops to receive development aid, direct 
management by development agencies of projects donated to cooperatives and for their own 
financial benefits, bilateral organizations asking politically affiliated NGOs to support 
cooperatives for politically affiliated groups, etc. What is also still a gap in the empirical 
literature is the increased tendency of cooperatives to commit corrupt practices when they are 
heavily promoted during post-war reconstruction and development phases such as the case of 
Lebanon and Sierra Leone.  
Corruption practices in cooperatives are being progressively managed by local governments and 
development organizations. Anti-corruption measures are taken into consideration in the 
different phases of agricultural development projects. For instance, in 2005, the IFAD issued a 
new policy to prevent and combat fraud and corruption in its activities and operations (IFAD 
2005). Preventing corruption in cooperatives goes also under the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption which came into force in 2005 and is the first international cooperative 
initiative to prevent and combat corruption based on a broad international consensus (Argandona 
2007).    
   
1.5. Importance of studying producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon 
 
Studying the performance of producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon presents a unique model that 
would be hard, with all its combined characteristics, to find elsewhere in the world. These 
characteristics may challenge the development of producers’ cooperatives or offer them 
appropriate opportunities for growth and increased performance. The main characteristics are the 
following: 
• Liberal or ultra-liberal economic policy: cooperatives in Lebanon have never been 
controlled or operated by the government such as in African states. Since independence, 
the laisser-faire Lebanese economic policy has enabled cooperatives to operate in the 
market without restrictions, similar to capitalist enterprises. The minimalist state role, 
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which favors the development of private initiatives, necessitates the availability of 
alternative economic enterprises that can group small producers under a common interest 
concept and progressively improve their socio-economic conditions. 
• Weak agricultural sector: agriculture is the weakest sector of the Lebanese economy. Its 
contribution to GDP growth is progressively decreasing. It has also the lowest generation 
of job opportunities. It has several structural challenges including the small size of 
holdings, part-time farming, and land fragmentation. Other challenges include technical 
difficulties, low marketing efficiency, and credit availability for small producers. These 
challenges coincide with a liberal agricultural policy, low public investment, and high 
trade deficits. All these characteristics make cooperative initiatives an interesting tool for 
agricultural development. In fact, cooperatives in Lebanon are the only legal institutions 
through which producers’ can group their efforts. 
• Civil war and Post-war reconstruction: the cooperative sector in Lebanon has survived a 
peace period after independence, the fifteen-year civil war, and the post-war 
reconstruction. These different phases have affected positively and negatively the 
performance of cooperatives. The role of cooperatives is essential in the production 
sector that received the lowest budget in the government reconstruction plan.  
• Extensive support from development agencies: the minimal role of the government in the 
agricultural sector is compensated by an extensive support from development agencies. 
The impact of development aid on the performance of cooperatives is an important 
aspect to be explored for further interventions.   
• Highly political influence: the nature of the sectarian policy in Lebanon gives politicians 
and local elites control over major public resources and power to direct support to their 
affiliated groups. Moreover, the initiation of non-governmental organizations by political 
leaders legalized their role in socio-economic development and accordingly their reliance 
on legal tools such as producers’ cooperatives. The effect of such practice in favoring 
corruption in producers’ cooperatives is also an interesting aspect to explore.   
Findings of this research will show the combined effects of all these characteristics on the 
performance of producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon.  
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1.6. Research design and methodology  
 
In order to understand whether the political rhetoric surrounding the role of cooperatives in 
agricultural sector development after the end of the civil war in Lebanon corresponds with how 
producers view the benefits and problems in their cooperatives, this section outlines the chosen 
methods to answer the following research questions:  
1. What is the nature of post-1992 Lebanese agricultural development policies and how 
does the support of producers’ cooperatives fit into it? How far does this support benefit 
the development of the agricultural sector?  
2. Are producers, who are the ultimate target of policies, getting benefits of their 
membership in cooperatives and recognizing the positive impacts of cooperatives? Or, to 
what extent are cooperatives improving the socio-economic conditions of producers? 
 
These research questions are targeting two main populations. The first population represents 
development planners, the government and development agencies, which rely on the cooperative 
model to develop the agricultural sector in Lebanon. The second population is the producers’ 
cooperatives represented by the board of directors and individual members in the general 
meeting. Accordingly, the data for this research will be generated from different agricultural 
policies and project documents that were planned and implemented after the end of the civil war 
and will be coupled with semi-structured interviews for both populations.  
The overall approach of the thesis is to compare the performance of producers’ cooperatives 
from the perspective of these two populations. For the first population, the role attributed to 
cooperatives in agricultural policies and the role of the government in enabling cooperatives to 
meet their objectives will be analyzed. The outcomes of the selected cooperatives’ development 
policies after the end of the civil war will be elaborated. Moreover, the role of cooperatives in 
development agencies agenda, the activities of development agencies in promoting the 
development of cooperatives, and the impacts of the projects implemented with cooperatives will 
be examined to reveal the effectiveness of producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon from the 
perspectives of development agencies. For the second population, cooperatives represented by 
the board of directors and their members will be studied by looking to their adherence to the 
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normative practices of cooperatives, in particular the initiation process, the source of owned 
assets, the application of principles and values, the application of the specific organizational 
structure of cooperatives, the existence of the pre-requisites for success, the avoidance of 
common challenges, and the supply of potential role/benefits.  
The empirical research was conducted across Lebanon where I have interviewed respondents 
from both populations over one year period extending from September 2010 to September 2011. 
After detailing the methods used for fieldwork, I explore in this section my adjustment to the 
field in addition to the issues of access and trust within the field. 
 
1.6.1. Policy study  
 
To answer the first research question, a macro study was carried out to analyze the main 
discourses and political rhetoric on agriculture, development, and cooperatives after the end of 
the civil war in Lebanon. Several units of analysis have constituted the baseline for the main 
secondary data that were published by the key actors of the first population, in particular the 
MOA, the Directorate General of Cooperatives (DGC), donors (multinational and bilateral), and 
non-governmental organizations (international and local). Units included the following: 
newsletters and websites, statements, project reports and their evaluations, development 
strategies for reviving the agricultural sector. A snowballing sampling method was used to find 
related documents. Materials were checked to locate statements and arguments related to 
economic and agricultural development interlinked with the producers’ cooperatives theme. This 
was the coding frame in the policy study. The strategic plans for the development of the 
agricultural sector after the end of the civil war were the key documents used to evaluate the role 
attributed to producers' cooperatives by the government. A significant number of documents 
were accessed through the internet. They were collected from the homepages of government 
institutions, development agencies, and internationally acknowledged institutions such as the UN 
and the WB.   
Materials were coupled with semi-structured interviews that were carried out with different 
actors when it was possible and useful. By relying on the semi-structured interviews, I was able 
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to focus on the interest of my research and at the same time on issues that my respondents 
considered to be more interesting or important. I did not use a specific order for my questions. 
Instead, I always tried to start with simple and introductory questions and then moved to more 
complex ones. I interviewed all regional managers of the DGC and the Minister Consultant for 
the development of the cooperative sector (in particular producers’ cooperatives). For 
development organizations (donors and NGOs), I selected my respondents on the basis of their 
level of influence on the public sector in accordance with the size of their budget allocated for 
interventions through cooperatives. I intended to cover multinational and bilateral donors, 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), as well as international and national NGOs. My 
personal experience in agricultural development across Lebanon and my field networks 
facilitated the selection procedure. During interviews, questions which are detailed in Annex I 
and II for different actors were indirectly asked. Questions were divided into two major themes: 
the support of cooperatives by different actors and the associated development policies. In 
concrete terms I wanted to know where, why, and how cooperatives serve different actors in 
their intentions to develop the agricultural sector in Lebanon. What problems could cooperatives 
solve and what problems they were not likely to solve? What do the government and 
development agencies hope to achieve by promoting the cooperative tool? 
The snowballing method offers the possibility to reach the most related information with the 
least cost and time. One respondent or document led to other related respondents or documents 
and so on. Snowball sampling is set within the link-tracing sampling methodologies (Spreen 
1992) which take advantage of relations of identified interviewees or documents to provide the 
surveyor with a good set of potentially related information (Thomson 1997). Content analysis 
methodology was used to analyze interviews. Discourse analysis methodology was used to study 
the secondary collected data. Content analysis is defined as a research technique for the 
objective, systematic, and quantitative descriptions of the manifest content of communication 
(Rubin and Babbie 2009). It is a technique for making inferences from a local text to its social 
context in an objectified manner (Bauer 2000). However, discourse analysis is nothing more than 
a deconstructive reading and interpretation of a problem or a text (Powers 2001). In this 
technique, discourse analysts are interested in texts in their own right, rather than seeing them as 
a mean of "getting at" some reality which is deemed to lie behind the discourse –whether social, 
psychological or material. Therefore, instead of seeing discourse as a pathway to some other 
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reality, discourse analysts are interested in the content and organization of texts (Gill 2000). 
Simple descriptive statistics, in the form of percentage and correlations, were used to present and 
quantify the collected data.  
 
1.6.2. Study on cooperatives' status and producers' opinions 
 
To analyze the status of cooperatives in inducing the socio-economic development of producers, 
ten cooperatives from each of the four different agricultural regions in Lebanon were studied. To 
select these cooperatives, I used the last index published in 2008 by Partners for Development in 
coordination with the DGC (PFD 2008). Eighty-eight percent of producers’ cooperatives were 
classified under the production/agricultural sub-sector (plant, animal, and processing) and the 
remaining twelve percent under the fishery and beekeeping sub-sectors. Therefore, my sampling 
strategy was saturated by randomly selecting eight production/agricultural cooperatives, one 
fishery, and one beekeeping cooperative from each of the four agricultural regions. In total, forty 
producers’ cooperatives were surveyed in this thesis.  
The sample frame of my study is constituted of all producers’ cooperatives that were established 
after 1990 by the DGC. A first stratification, on the basis of different agricultural regions, was 
carried out to ensure covering Lebanon and to check if there is a difference between the regions 
due to the involvement of different actors or due to any agro-ecological variables. Then, in each 
region, a second stratification at the sub-sector level (production, fishery, and beekeeping) was 
conducted to explore producers' cooperation regarding the characteristics of their agricultural 
systems. Random sampling at the sub-sector level was performed.  
Semi-structured interviews were used to collect the data in this part of the study. Instead of 
giving my respondents a list of standardized questions, I tried to consider, rephrase, and re-order 
the questions so that I could get the most information related to my subject. Interviews with the 
board of directors of each cooperative were performed to explore the reasons for cooperation, 
services offered, problems, activities, and the relationship with members. Questions detailed in 
Annex III were explored. In concrete terms, I wanted to know if the selected cooperatives were 
real coops or in name only, established to seek development and political aid. 
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To explore different producers' opinions, a deeper study for each cooperative at the producers' 
level was conducted to capture the reasons behind membership and the benefits of cooperation. 
Three producers, selected randomly from the list of members of each cooperative, were 
interviewed. Questions detailed in Annex IV were explored. Moreover, in the same working area 
of each cooperative, one or two producers who were not members and chose not to join 
cooperatives were interviewed. I wanted to discuss their decision not to join a local cooperative. 
Questions are detailed in Annex V.  
Content analysis method was used to analyze interviews in each region. Simple descriptive 
statistics, in the form of percentage, correlations, etc., were used to quantify the role of 
producers’ cooperatives in different regions, sectors, and across Lebanon. 
 
1.6.3. Getting in the field 
 
My access to the field was not difficult. I am a Lebanese citizen familiar with the different 
agricultural regions in Lebanon and an agricultural engineer with a scientific experience in 
agricultural extension and cooperative enterprises’ development. My eight years technical 
experience in agricultural development projects across Lebanon also facilitated my fieldwork. 
My scientific and technical experience encouraged my respondents to detail and specify their 
answers. Moreover, having a good network in the agricultural sector, i.e. the MOA, fellow 
agricultural engineers, farmers, and development agents, allowed me to reach easily all my 
respondents. I did not put too much effort to cultivate trust with my respondents. Respondents 
have clearly shared their problems, challenges, failures, as well as their achievements. They did 
not exaggerate their answers and views whether in success or in failure in front of someone 
knowing essential issues related to the field. Indeed, without being Lebanese and having such 
experience and personal connections it would have been very difficult to carry out this research. 
 
Most of my interviews were previously fixed through phone calls or emails. First, I introduced 
myself as a research student and then explained the reason for carrying out my interviews. When 
the person in charge, either the cooperative chairman or program manager, showed no interest 
due to lack of time, I asked them to recommend someone linked to the subject and well informed 
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about the situation of the cooperative or the program activities. Sometimes, friends working for 
the development agencies that I wanted to interview introduced me to the person in charge of the 
agricultural department. In two cases, agencies refused to receive me even after being introduced 
by a friend. In this case, I relied on the available secondary data to explore the work of these 
agencies with producers’ cooperatives.   
Once the appointment was fixed, I arrived on time as decided. In many cases with cooperatives, 
a friend, originating from the area where I carried out my interview, joined to help break the ice 
of the first contact and assure trust. With producers, I also planned to wear something similar to 
what they wear so they would feel comfortable to exchange information. When some 
respondents were not ready, I proposed the choice of delaying the meeting or rescheduling it. 
Only one meeting was rescheduled. For board members and individual producers, I started with a 
general discussion about agriculture such as the previous harvest and its profitability, the 
problems encountered during the season, etc. I intended first to exchange interest in the sector. 
Sometimes I gave farmers technical extension recommendations; for instance the control of 
diseases and insects or processing methods. This helped me collect from my respondents the 
main problems they have encountered because they believed I might be able to offer solutions 
later. However, I faced one major challenge with my board members’ respondents. During my 
fieldwork, the MOA declared its intention to dissolve non-active/dormant cooperatives. 
Therefore, members in the board of directors thought that I may be gathering data for the 
ministry. In this situation, I induced trust by explaining that the ministry would only inform these 
cooperatives to revise their annual balance sheets and update their status and that my visit was 
not linked at all to the ministry work. I even showed my university ID as a proof.  
With development planners, I shared a short history about my scientific background, my 
employment history, and my decision to go for a PhD. This information reflected an internal 
position in the sector. Respondents went directly to the description of their interventions with 
cooperatives and elaborated the role of cooperatives in socio-economic development.  
 
Although I prepared semi-structured interviews, I intended not to impose a questions-answers 
atmosphere. After presenting a general description of my study, I gave the floor to respondents to 
express their points of view about their cooperatives or their activities with cooperatives. I 
listened to them carefully and showed respect for their opinions and views, even if I disagreed 
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with them. I tried to show them that my experience in the sector was in no way superior to their 
own. I also avoided interrupting my respondents when they were developing their stories, even 
when these stories were perhaps irrelevant to my research. I waited for them to finish and then 
redirected the discussion to the purpose of the study. My questions were short and clearly 
directed to the information I am interested in. After finalizing all my questions, I asked the 
participants if they would like to add any issues or stories. When nothing was added, I showed 
appreciation for their time and valuable information. This is the way all my interviews were 
performed.  
 
1.6.4. Method modifications based on field findings 
 
From the index of cooperatives, I stratified cooperatives upon regions and the three selected sub-
sectors (production/agriculture, fishery, and beekeeping). Then, I carried out a random sampling 
and selected cooperatives to be interviewed. I started my fieldwork in the Bekaa region. 
However, after interviewing several cooperatives, I found myself facing a real problem. Many 
cooperatives were dormant and had nothing to report in terms of services or any benefits 
delivered for members. Most of them mentioned that they were not able to start a common 
project due to the lack of investment (the horizon problem) and that they did not receive any 
support either from the government or development agencies to help them financing a part of 
their common project. In this case, I would have ended up by reporting a dominant dormancy of 
producers’ cooperatives without assessing their performance when they offered services to 
members and when they received support from the government or development agencies. 
Therefore, I decided to carry an additional stratification for dormant and active cooperatives. I 
wrote a letter to the Agriculture Minister, Dr. Hussein el Hajj Hasan, explaining my field 
challenge and asking to receive a list of cooperatives that the DGC identifies as active and 
having the minimum characteristics to be classified as an economic cooperative enterprise. The 
minister accepted my request and asked the regional offices of the DGC to prepare a list of active 
cooperatives in the three different sub-sectors. From this list, I carried out a random sampling 
and started my fieldwork again.  
With this modification, I redirected my research to assess the most active cooperatives in the 
agricultural sector across Lebanon. I can show what cooperatives could offer to 
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members/producers within the Lebanese context that combines, as described before, several 
characteristics affecting the performance of cooperative enterprises.  
Even though, I have changed my initial random sampling, I assessed in the different agricultural 
regions several dormant cooperatives (the number dependent on the saturation of data) that were 
not recommended by the DGC. My objective was to explore the reasons that prohibited these 
cooperatives from being active and delivering common benefits for their members.  
 
1.7. Thesis structure 
 
This research has been divided into two different parts. The first part (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) 
explores the strategic use of producers’ cooperatives as a development tool by the Lebanese 
government and development agencies, while the second part (Chapters 5, and 6,) describes the 
status and performance of producers’ cooperatives and their effectiveness from their members’ 
perspective.  
Chapter 2 explores the status of the Lebanese agricultural sector within the neoliberal economic 
development policy. My aim is to analyze the effect of post-war policies on the development of 
the agricultural sector in Lebanon. This chapter details the structure of the Lebanese economy 
and the weight of the agricultural sector in it. It highlights the major characteristics and 
challenges of the Lebanese agricultural sector. Finally, it explores the nature of post-war 
agricultural policies and their effect on the socio-economic development of farmers.  
Chapter 3 analyzes the role of cooperatives in the government agricultural development policies. 
My objective is to explore where, how, and why the government used cooperatives in developing 
the agricultural sector. This chapter details the potential theoretical role of cooperatives in the 
Lebanese context by relying on the analysis from Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Then, it studies the 
role of government in facilitating the development of cooperatives. Finally, it discusses the 
cooperation of the government with different actors to develop the cooperative sector.  
In Chapter 4, I study the role of cooperatives in development agencies’ agenda. My aim is to 
explore how and why development agencies used producers’ cooperatives and what cooperatives 
contributed to their development plans. Chapter 4 analyzes the nature and the process of projects 
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implemented while using the cooperative tool. Then, it examines the outputs of these projects 
and their long term development effect. It concludes by exploring the coordination with the 
government to support the development of cooperatives.  
Chapter 5 explores the empirical status of the Lebanese producers’ cooperatives. Are we talking 
about real or ghost cooperatives?  This chapter draws the empirical findings from the board of 
directors’ interviews. It analyzes whether the surveyed cooperatives are offering feasible services 
and other benefits to members or are just a tool to receive political aid and foster corruption. It 
explores the status of cooperatives in the different agricultural regions and agricultural sub-
sectors and examines the effect of gender on the success or failure of cooperatives.  
Chapter 6 examines the membership of producers in their cooperatives. It draws the empirical 
findings of producers’ interviews. My aim is to analyze what role cooperatives have played in 
the socio-economic development of producers. I start by studying the original idea behind 
cooperation. Then, I explore the practices of cooperation between producers; their roles and their 
rights. Finally, I detail the benefits from cooperation and the reasons preventing other producers 
from joining cooperatives.  
Chapter 7 summarizes the findings and conclusions of the study in relation to the research 
questions that this thesis aims to address. It shows the contribution of the study to the existing 
body of literature and proposes recommendations for the main stakeholders to develop 
cooperative enterprises in Lebanon.  
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Chapter 2- Lebanon: Background, Economy, Post-1992 Policies, and 
Detailed Agricultural Sector  
 
This chapter examines the specific characteristics of the Lebanese political and economic system 
and elaborates the different subjects that help to answer my research questions. It constitutes the 
Lebanese analytical framework that identifies, in addition to the producers’ cooperatives 
theoretical framework detailed in Chapter 1, the main features that are essential to analyze the 
empirical findings of this study. It starts by a short description of the Lebanese background that 
defines the major development phases since independence. Then, it presents the structure of the 
Lebanese economy and the main elements of post-1992 economic and reconstruction policies. It 
ends by a detailed description of the Lebanese agricultural sector and the nature of post-war 
agricultural policies. The aim of this chapter is to summarize the political and economic 
environment in which producers’ cooperatives have developed since the independence of 
Lebanon and to explore in depth the main characteristics of the agricultural sector and post-war 
agricultural policies that either challenge or facilitate the development of cooperatives.     
 
2.1. The Lebanese background 
 
Three major phases can be distinguished to describe the development of Lebanon since its 
independence in 1943. The first phase is the progress from the independence to the eruption of 
the civil war in 1975. The second phase represents the civil war itself (1975-1990). It ended 
officially with the signing of the Taif Accord in October 1989. The third phase is the application 
of the Taif Accord and the post-war period that focused on the reconstruction of the economy 
and infrastructure.   
The aim of this section is to give the reader a rapid overview about the evolution of the main 
circumstances on the Lebanese arena since independence.  
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2.1.1. Phase I: Independence, economic development, and main challenges: 1943-1975 
 
In 1943, The Lebanese National Pact, an informal Maronite-Sunni agreement, signed the 
independence of Lebanon from the French colonial power and governed the nature of its political 
power sharing (Harris 1997). According to the dominant religious communities in the population 
in the first census of 1932, the president was to be reserved for a Maronite-Christian, the prime 
minister for a Sunni-Muslim, and the speaker of the parliament for a Shiite-Muslim. Six 
Christian members of the parliament (MPs) for every five Muslim MPs was the agreed 
representation ratio safeguarding a Christian majority (Zisser 2000, Beshara 2005). Public jobs 
were distributed along sectarian lines. They were mainly given as a political favor to strengthen 
the power of politicians (Gaspard 2004, Dagher 2002). The National Pact legalized sects to 
become the main social organizations though which political power and resources could be 
secured (Faour 2007, Harik 1998). In the economy, independent Lebanon has adopted a service-
oriented laissez faire system that has favored a totally free foreign exchange market and the 
freedom of transfer of capital with the rest of the world (Aris 2008). The government has 
maintained a private initiative environment with little intervention in the market process, has 
worked to provide adequate infrastructure necessary for business activities (electricity, roads, 
communications, etc.), and has safeguarded a monetary stability essential for the flow of private 
capital (Gaspard 2004, Makdisi 2004).  
 
Despite the sectarian nature and the minimalist state, associated with fragile administrative 
reform, post-independent Lebanon has experienced a stable economic development generally 
expressed by high growth rates and relative financial stability. In real terms, in the 1950s, the 
average annual GDP growth rate was about 7.5 percent (Makdisi 2004). The free economy has 
facilitated the interaction of the private sector with the outside world and has encouraged the in-
flow of capital which has generated balance of payments surpluses and maintained the stability 
of the Lebanese pound (Gaspard 2004). The services sector dominated the economy. It 
accounted for more than sixty percent of Lebanon’s GDP (Kubursi 1999). The share of the 
production sectors - agriculture and industry- hardly passed thirty percent of GDP (Nasr 1978).   
Nevertheless, essential socio-economic aspects of development lagged behind. Two broad 
headings have been highlighted: (i) prominent unevenness of development between different 
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regions with the concentration of major economic activities in Beirut, and (ii) limited progress in 
decreasing the gap between high-income and low-income groups (Makdisi 2004). In addition, 
the political stability induced by the unity of religious communities under the National pact was 
challenged by multiple sources. Muslims were concerned about the political power sharing 
formula as being unrepresentative of the population. When the Maronite president refused to 
recognize the new entity of the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), a civil war broke out in 
1958 between the president’s supporters and his rivals; most of them were from the Muslim 
community (Beshara 2005). The fighting ended with the election of General Fouad Chehab as a 
new president (1958-1964). General Fouad Chehab re-stabilized the political system and 
maintained the power sharing formula. He focused on building and consolidating state 
institutions in order to promote social and economic development. His mandate was described as 
the only developmental period in modern Lebanon, where the government set social and 
economic development as its primary objectives (Chami 2002, Gaspard 2004).  
 
2.1.2. Phase II: Civil war – causes and effects: 1975-1990 
 
A mutual interaction of domestic and external factors led to the collapse of the Lebanese political 
system and consequently to the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war that lasted for around 15 
years.  
The disagreement over Lebanon’s identity and role in the region, the unresolved sectarian 
tension, the uneven socio-economic development between different regions, and the wide gap in 
income distribution were the main domestic factors (Makdisi 2004, Salibi 1967). The sectarian 
factor, raised by the two major Muslim communities, has increasingly become uncontrolled 
(Khazen 2000). More important was the rising military power of Palestinian organizations acting 
from Lebanon, especially after the Arab Israeli war in 1967. Their power has significantly 
clashed with the interests of the state from the perspective of Christian leaderships (Haddad 
2003). In April 1975, twenty-six Palestinians were killed in relation to an attempt of 
assassination against Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Christian Phalangist Party. This incident 
ignited the civil war. The two warring groups were often labeled Christian versus Muslim 
(Stedman 2002). External interventions played a major role in the duration and severity of the 
civil war. Apart from the supply of arms and substantial financing, most important were the 
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military interventions from the two neighboring countries - Syria and Israel. Both supported one 
of the two warring parties to protect their interests in the region (O'Balance 1998, Carter el al. 
2008).  
Given its long duration, the civil war progressively witnessed deteriorating economic and social 
conditions along with increased emigration, massive human losses, and the depreciation of the 
financial situation. It is estimated that the total number of battle deaths was 131,000 (Dibeh 
2007, Gebara 2007). Around 740,000 Lebanese left the country between 1975 and 1987 (Labaki 
1989). For the economic output, real GDP has sharply fallen. Over the whole civil war period, it 
is estimated to have fallen to one third of its 1974 level (Gaspard 2004). Trade and services 
continued to dominate the Lebanese economy. However, their share declined from about sixty-
four percent in 1974 to about fifty-two percent in 1990 in favor of the agricultural and industry 
sectors (Kubursi 2001). Financially, the Lebanese pound has rapidly depreciated. By comparing 
annual averages (Lebanese Lira (LL) in terms of the USD), the Lebanese pound started 
depreciating by about thirty percent in 1984, 134 percent in 1986, and reached a peak of 485 
percent in 1987. The exchange rate averaged about LL 702 per USD in 1990 compared to an 
average of LL 6.5 per USD in 1984 (Makdisi 2004). In addition, inflation, which was 
characterized by one-digit rates in the 1960s and 1970s, increased to fourteen percent in 1984 
and peaked to 487 percent in 1987 (Al-Khalil 1991). In terms of government performance during 
the war, expenditures increased while revenues have decreased. The government lost control 
over public revenues (Kubursi 1999). As a result, budget deficits increased from twenty-eight 
percent of total expenditures in 1978 to ninety percent in 1988 and then falling back to eighty-
four percent in 1990. Accordingly, internal public debt increased from LL 22 billion in 1983 to 
LL 1483 billion at the end of 1990. In dollar equivalents for the same period, internal public debt 
declined from USD 3.96 billion to USD 1.76 billion. Foreign debts were almost insignificant 
during the whole war (Makdisi 2004).  
There were many attempts to rebuild the country during short peace intervals. In 1977, the 
government established the Council for Reconstruction and Development (CDR) to prepare and 
implement reconstruction plans. Attempts were interrupted by the renewal of violence over the 
long duration of the Lebanese civil war (Gebara 2007, Najem 1998).  
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2.1.3. Phase III: Taif Accord and post war 
 
With the signing of the Taif Accord, in autumn 1989, Lebanon phased out the war. Sponsored by 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and backed by the United States of America, the remaining members of the 
last parliamentary election in 1972 met in Taif, Saudi Arabia, to draft and agree on a new 
scenario on which warring parties/militias would accept to stop fighting (Nizameddin 2006). The 
new Taif Accord changed the power sharing formula into a balanced representation between 
Christians and Muslims (Hudson 1999). The pre-war presidential system was changed to a 
system of government dominated by the Council of Ministers (Adwan 2004). In addition, the 
Taif Accord formally induced a new power in Lebanon. The Syrian presence was legitimized by 
offering it a privileged position on different matters linked to national security (Najem 1998, 
Haddad 2002). The new government, led by Omar Karami, had engaged with the assistance of 
Syrian troops in the disarming and dissolution of Lebanon’s militias (Norton 1991).  In 1992, the 
parliamentary election was resumed. Most of the members of the new parliament had been 
affiliated to the dominant militias of the war (Hudson 1999).  
Subsequently, Rafic Hariri, a Lebanese-Saudi billionaire and building contractor, was elected as 
Prime Minister (Nizameddin 2006). He envisaged that rapid economic growth resulting from 
reconstruction and financial stabilization would certainly reduce poverty and unemployment 
(World Bank 1994). The Lebanese pound progressively appreciated against the dollar (Gaspard 
2004). The task to design a plan for reconstruction and development was entrusted to the CDR. 
“Horizon 2000”, a ten year plan (1993-2002), set public investment goals in all economic sectors 
(Najem 1998). Privatization, centralization, and the lack of public participation were the three 
main political attitudes that characterized the overall approach of reconstruction. The policy of 
the new government assumed that public institutions were not equipped to carry and manage 
such diverse and massive projects (Kabbani 1992). The prominent example of post-war neo-
liberal approach for privatizing urban reconstruction is SOLIDERE, the private real estate 
holding company initiated in 1992 by the Prime Minister Hariri to oversee the reconstruction of 
Beirut’s central district (Becherer 2005, Schmid 2006, Norton 1999). 
The government expected funding Horizon 2000 from there major sources. A significant part 
was projected to be allocated from government budget surpluses (around 47%). The second part 
was supposed to be foreign currency borrowing (around 34%). The third part was foreign grants 
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which were assumed to account for six percent of financing requirements (Najem 1998).  Since 
Lebanon had almost no foreign debt, the government had started to borrow on international 
financial markets without the burden of previous debts (Kubursi 1999). When the 
implementation of the project started, the economy showed a significant growth but not as 
expected in order to finance the project from budget surpluses. In 1994, the economy grew at a 
rate of eight percent. However, in 1997, the economy grew at three percent and the country 
entered a recession by early 2000s. Accordingly, the government changed its initial plan and 
started to rely more on borrowing from domestic markets at high interest rates and from grants 
and soft loans (Gebara 2007). The foreign debt increased from USD150 million in 1992 to over 
USD 2.7 billion in 1998. The sum of external and internal debt accounted for USD 17 billion in 
1998 (Kubursi 1999). It reached USD 34.8 billion or 158 percent of GDP in December 2005 (the 
year of Hariri assassination) and quickly increased after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, reaching 
over USD 40 billion or 185 percent of GDP (Hockel 2007, Quilty and Ohrstrom 2007).  
 
2.2. Structure of the Lebanese economy 
 
2.2.1. Introduction  
 
Without interruption since independence, Lebanon has adopted a free open-market economy 
with a strong laissez-faire commercial tradition. Commodities, in particular capital and foreign 
currencies, have been exchanged and transferred without restriction (Gaspard 2004). The 
Lebanese government has succeeded in maintaining a non-interventionist stance towards private 
investment and has limited public ownership to infrastructure and some utilities such as 
electricity and water. Historically, the private sector accounted for more than eighty-five percent 
of national expenditures (MOF 2010). In 2000, in order to reduce public ownership and increase 
market freedom, the government enacted a privatization law that sets the parameters for the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises. This law initiated the Higher Council for Privatization 
which is responsible for the planning and implementation of privatization programs and their 
associated operations (HCP 2012).  
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2.2.2. GDP: composition and real growth 
 
A lack of natural resources and a largely urbanized population have contributed to the 
development of economic activities based on a strong services sector and commercial interests. 
Official statistics, published first in 1997 by the Economic Account Mission (EAM), showed that 
services sector, in particular market services, trade, transport and communication, formed an 
average of sixty-four percent of GDP from 1997 to 2009 (Chart 1). The size of the government 
was significant; it generated 10.5 percent of GDP which is just above the size of the industrial 
sector (10.4 percent). Agriculture has constituted the weakest sector of the economy; it generated 
an average of 5.8 percent of GDP over the whole period (EAM 2007, 2008, 2009).  
Chart 1: Composition of GDP in Lebanon between 1997 and 2009 
 
Source: EAM 2007, 2008, 2009 
 
The percentage of employment in 2011 reflected the average composition of GDP over 1997-
2009. Market services and trade contributed to sixty-six percent of total employment. Agriculture 
accounted for six percent of employment, just below transport and communication (Yaacoub and 
Bader 2011).  
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GDP registered high growth rates in 2004 and over 2007-2009. The average real growth rate for 
1998-2009 periods was 4.1 percent. It is slightly lower than the average of MENA region (4.5 
percent) and all merging and developing countries (5.5 percent) for the same period. Services 
were the main contributors to growth on a cumulative basis. For a sixty-one percent cumulative 
growth between 1998 and 2009, they contributed a total of forty-six percentage points. 
Agriculture had almost no contribution, while the industry sector presented a small contribution 
(IMF 2011). 
 
2.2.3. Balance of payments and trade 
  
Large trade deficits characterize the predominant importing nature of Lebanon; however, these 
deficits are almost covered by capital account inflows in addition to inflows from tourism and 
other services. The average inward remittance flows was USD 6143 million over 2003-2010. On 
the other hand, Lebanon also has high outward remittance flows. They accounted for USD 5749 
million in 2009 (World Bank 2011). But the balance of payment surpluses is always positive 
with an average of USD 2258 million over 1999-2010. In 2010, trade deficits had reached USD 
12257 million. They have approximately doubled as compared to 2001 trade deficits (USD 5919 
million) (MOF 2004, 2011). The average percentage value of exports over imports accounted for 
twenty percent over 1997-2010. It increased from 8.6 percent in 1997 to 23.7 percent in 2010 
(Lebanese Customs 2010). Middle East countries accounted for an average of thirty-one percent 
of total Lebanese exports over 1999-2010; however, they only represented 5.6 percent of total 
Lebanese imports (Table 1). Most imports were from industrialized countries and in particular 
from the European Union (MOF 2004, 2011).  
Table 1: Percentage share of countries in total exports and imports in Lebanon between 1999 and 
2010  
 % of total exports % of total Imports 
Countries  1999 2005 2010 1999-2010 1999 2005 2010 1999-2010 
Industrialized countries 40.4 20.2 25.2 31.3 66.4 52.7 50.1 55.4 
Middle East 25.7 41.3 32.3 31.4 3.2 6.2 6.1 5.6 
Other developing countries 33.9 38.5 42.5 37.3 30.4 41.1 43.8 38.9 
Source: MOF 2004, 2011 
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The participation of Lebanon in the global economy is based on several trade agreements and 
various treaties. The main regional agreements are the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
agreement, the European Fair trade Association-Lebanon, and the Greater Arab Free Trade 
agreement.  In 1999, Lebanon was granted an observer status in the World Trade Organization; 
however, to date no full membership has been offered (Lucke et al. 2007).  
 
2.2.4. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 
The characteristics of the Lebanese economy favor the development of FDI. In 1994, the 
government established the Investment Development Agency in Lebanon (IDAL), which aims to 
facilitate and retain FDI.   
In 2009, Lebanon received USD 4.8 billion of net FDI inflows, approximately twice as much as 
2006. The average annual growth rate was twenty-six percent over the period 2006-2009. The 
share of FDI inflows in GDP accounted for fifteen percent in 2009 (IDAL 2010, MOF 2010). 
FDIs were mainly concentrated in the real estate and residential sectors. In 2009, both sectors 
received seventy-one percent of total FDI inflows. The second interest was in the tourism sector 
which attracted twenty-two percent of FDIs during the same year. Trade amounted to 2.5% of 
total FDI inflows. In general, the share of industry and agricultural sectors continue to be 
negligible (IDAL 2010).   
 
2.2.5. Public finance  
 
2.2.5.1. Revenues  
 
Tax revenues represented seventy percent of total government revenues in 1997 and increased to 
seventy-nine percent in 2010. Domestic taxes on goods and services, in particular Value Added 
Tax (VAT), constituted the main tax revenue and accounted for thirty-six percent in 2010. In 
addition, non-tax revenues increased from 14.4 percent to sixteen percent between 1997 and 
2010 respectively. Income from public institutions and government properties, mainly telecom 
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surpluses and revenues from Casino de Liban, represented 67.6 percent of total non-tax revenues 
in 2010. In contrast, treasury revenues decreased from eighteen percent in 1997 to five percent in 
2010 of the total government revenues (Chart 2 and Table 2) (BDL 2010). 
Chart 2: Average government revenues in Lebanon between 1997 and 2010   
 
Source: BDL 2010 
Table 2: Details of government revenues in Lebanon in 2010 
Government revenues in 2010 L.L. in billion % 
Non-tax revenues 2043  100 
• Income from Public institutions, government 
properties 
1382  67.65 
• Administrative fees and charges 535  26.19 
• Penalties and confiscations 8  0.39 
• Other non-tax 118  5.78 
Tax Revenues 9973  100 
• Taxes on income, profit, and capital gains 2050  20.55 
• Taxes on property 1088  10.91 
• Domestic taxes on goods and services 3583  35.92 
• Taxes on international trade 2802  28.09 
• Other tax 453  4.54 
Treasury revenues 666  100 
Total revenues 12684   
Source: MOF 2010 
66.9 
14.4 
18.6 
79 
16 
5 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
Tax revenue Non-tax revenue Treasury Revenue 
%
 
Type of revenues 
Percentage of total Government revenues: 1997-2010  
1997 
2010 
87 
 
2.2.5.2. Expenditures 
 
Interest payments and foreign debt principal repayment has constituted the main element of 
government expenditures. Forty percent of expenditures were allocated for debt services as an 
average between 1998 and 2010. Wages and salaries accounted for an average of thirty percent. 
Capital expenditures, acquisitions of land and building, equipments, and constitution in progress 
received the lowest average of expenditure with a total of 5.9 percent (Chart 3) (BDL 2010).  
Chart 3: Average government expenditures in Lebanon between 1998 and 2010 
 
Source: BDL 2010 
 
2.2.6. Connections between Lebanese economy and producers’ cooperatives  
 
The first section of this chapter revealed that producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon are developing 
under a free market environment that enables them to perform and merge economic activities 
similar to other market enterprises without any restrictions. However, this environment may 
challenge their performance due to the increased external competition generated by the openness 
of the Lebanese economy through the involvement of the government in several trade 
agreements aiming to facilitate the free exchange of goods, in particular agricultural products. In 
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view of the weak agricultural economy, expressed by the lowest share in GDP, the negligible 
contribution to GDP growth, and the lowest percentage of employment, producers’ cooperatives 
are found in a sector that is neither considered as a priority for the government nor the private 
sector or foreign investor due to its riskier nature. This status affects the role that producers’ 
cooperatives might play in the development and economic policies.  
 
2.3. Post 1992- economic and reconstruction policies 
 
After signing the Taif Accord and while moving ahead in its implementation in the first post-war 
parliamentary election in 1992, there were sufficient reasons for the government to believe that 
with the creation of economic stability and the reconstruction of basic public and social 
infrastructures, the economy could resume its growth and a suitable environment for private 
sector development could be re-established.  
There were many challenges to overcome. The huge destruction of basic infrastructure had to be 
resolved. Rampant inflation had to be arrested and the depreciation of the Lebanese pound had to 
be slowed down. The outflow of Lebanese talents had to be turned into an inflow. The fiscal 
order had to be restored. And finally, the social and economic imbalances between sects, regions, 
and economic sectors had to be addressed (ESCWA 1999) 
Prime Minister Hariri came to power with an economic plan that has specific targets: cutting 
inflation, strengthening the Lebanese pound exchange rate versus foreign currencies, and 
carrying out a massive reconstruction and rehabilitation program (Baroudi 1998) 
Post-1992 economic and reconstruction policies are detailed in this section. In the first part, the 
reconstruction policy with a specific focus on the adopted economic reconstruction plan 
“Horizon 2000 for Reconstruction and Development” is examined. The second part explores the 
macro-economic policies adopted for adjustment and stabilization.  
 
2.3.1. Public reconstruction plan: Horizon 2000 
 
In 1993, the CDR formulated “Horizon 2000 for Reconstruction and Development”. The CDR 
took into consideration the particular characteristics of the Lebanese economy to prepare and 
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design the reconstruction plan. First, since Lebanon is a small country with limited natural 
resources but with an exceptional geographic location and human resources, an efficient 
investment in infrastructure with the re-activation of productive sectors would generate a rapid 
growth and high public revenues. Second, there was a high financial credibility for Lebanon after 
the war. The government can rely on domestic and external borrowing to secure funds required 
for the reconstruction plan. Third, the economy would not resume its activity unless the private 
sector restarts investing with vigor and intensity. Therefore, the main objectives of the 
reconstruction plan were to rehabilitate the essential physical and social infrastructure, to achieve 
balanced development at sector and regional levels, and to strengthen the investment 
environment essential for the development of the private sector (CDR 1993). 
 
Initially, Horizon 2000 was spread over a ten-year period (1992-2002) and later on, it was 
revised and extended to thirteen-year spending on public and social infrastructure (1995-2007) 
(Dibeh 2005).  
 
2.3.1.1. Objectives and achievements   
 
2.3.1.1.1. GDP growth 
 
The initial plan envisaged an average real GDP growth rate per annum ranking between eight 
and nine percent over 1992-2007. However, the real situation registered much inferior rates 
averaging 4.2 percent until 2007. The average annual growth rate between 1992 and 1997 was 
around six percent which was mainly generated by the public investment in physical 
infrastructure. From 1998 to 2002, the real GDP growth rate registered a significant decrease 
induced by the growing burden of public debt and fiscal imbalances. After the inflow of financial 
commitments agreed in 2002 under Paris I and II donors’ conferences- explored later under the 
economic policy part- real rates of GDP growth started to show a significant increase that fell 
sharply with the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005 and the summer war of 2006 
(MOF 2004, 2010).  
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2.3.1.1.2. Distribution of expenditures among sectoral groups and sectors 
 
Horizon 2000 was established on a sector basis. Nineteen sectors, classified under four major 
sectoral groups, have been distinguished. Physical infrastructure sectoral group (water, roads, 
electricity, etc.) received thirty-seven percent of expenditures, the highest percentage from total 
expenditures. The productive and the state apparatus sectoral group received the lowest 
percentage: sixteen percent the total equally divided for the productive sectors and the state 
apparatus (CDR 1993).  
Until 2009, physical infrastructure (electricity, telecommunication and transport) received forty-
eight percent of total CDR expenditures. The productive sectors –Agriculture and Industry- and 
the state apparatus accounted for the lowest percentage (7.2 percent). Half of their initially 
planned expenditures have been re-allocated for public services and mainly for physical 
infrastructure (Chart 4) (CDR 2009).  
 
Chart 4: Horizon 2000 – Variations at sectoral group expenditures between 1993 and 2009 
 
Source: CDR 1993, 2009, 2010 
The variations of expenditures’ distribution among sectoral groups have produced major changes 
at the sector level. Higher investments in electricity, telecommunication, water supply and solid 
waste have been significant; in parallel, less investments were marked in education, agriculture 
and irrigation, and other sectors (CDR 2009).  
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2.3.1.1.3. Regional distribution  
 
In all published CDR annual reports, no updates exist for the allocation of distributed 
expenditures over Mohafazat (plural of Mohafazah: it is an administrative division equivalent in 
France to a region and is generally divided into several Caza). In 1997, after five years of 
implementation, UNDP revised per capita planned and real expenditures over Mohafazat and 
reported an increase in the allocated expenditures for Beirut and Mount Lebanon with a 
significant reduction for all the other Mohafazat, in particular in the Bekaa where agriculture is 
the main economic sector (UNDP 2004).  
 
2.3.1.1.4. Budget deficit  
 
The initial plan predicted to reduce the government budget deficit to 0.4 percent of GDP in 2000 
and then to reach 4.1 percent of budget surpluses in 2007. Instead, the expansion of government 
expenditures and the slow recovery of revenues produced serious fiscal imbalances. Public 
finance showed that budget deficits accounted for twenty-four percent of GDP in 2000 and 
decreased progressively to ten percent in 2007. The average budget deficit between 1999 and 
2007 represented fourteen percent of GDP (MOF 2004, 2010).  
2.3.1.1.5. Public debt 
 
The government expected an increase of the net public debt to reach ninety-one percent of GDP 
by 1999 and then a gradual decrease to forty-two percent of GDP by 2007. However, in order to 
finance the increased budget deficits, the government was forced to expand foreign and domestic 
borrowing. Accordingly, the net public debt reached 120 percent of GDP in 1999 and increased 
to 166 percent and 155 percent for 2006 and 2007 respectively (MOF 2004, 2010). 
2.3.1.1.6. Debt servicing 
 
Instead of reducing the debt interest payment to thirteen percent of government revenues as 
planned for 2007, the debt servicing increased to ninety-three percent of revenues in 2001 and 
later decreased to fifty-six percent in 2007, amounting to more than four times the expected 
percentage (MOF 2004, 2010).  
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2.3.2. Economic policies 
In addition to the reconstruction plan, the government planned specific policies to ensure macro-
economic and financial stability aiming to curtail rampant inflation and to stabilize the Lebanese 
currency. The government adopted a restrictive monetary policy that controlled money supply, 
stabilized the Lebanese pound and gradually tried to reduce interest rates. The exchange rate 
based on the nominal anchor policy was implemented by means of a supportive high interest rate 
policy. The government has borrowed from the domestic market at rates that were much higher 
than the prevailing rates on dollar accounts. Higher interest rates have been essential to stabilize 
the foreign exchange value of the Lebanese pound and were required to attract foreign capital 
and finance the government budget deficits. However, interest rates continued to be significantly 
higher than normal rates. They increased government budget deficits and borrowing 
requirements, crowded-out private credit for investment, and consequently appreciated the 
Lebanese pound far above its true equilibrium (ESCWA 1999, Dibbeh 2005).  
 
2.3.2.1. Monetary stability 
 
With the new monetary policy, the government succeeded in maintaining low inflation rates and 
a steady appreciation of the Lebanese pound versus the USD. The annual average inflation rate, 
which reached 120 percent in 1992, declined gradually and accounted for 3 percent in 1998. 
After the summer war in July 2006, the inflation rate increased to 9.3 percent; however, it 
decreased again to 4.6 percent in 2010. The pound depreciated by thirteen percent between 1992 
and 1998; going against USD from 1721 LL in 1992 to 1507.5 LL in 1998. Extraordinary 
exchange rate stability kept a constant rate over 1998-2010. Both achievements contributed to 
the replenishment of foreign exchange rate reserves with gross reserves (excluding gold) at the 
central bank increasing by eighty-one percent (BDL 2010).  
On the other hand, high stable interest rates favored by government policy encouraged the 
banking sector to invest in safe treasury bills. This has negatively affected GDP growth rates. 
Interest rates for 12-month and 24-month T-Bills remained higher than twelve percent until 
2003. Twelve-month T-bills interest rates declined from twenty-seven percent to thirteen percent 
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between 1992 and 2002. Also, 24-month T-bills interest rates decreased from 29.5 percent to 
14.1 percent between 1992 and 2002 respectively (Chart 5) (BDL 2010).    
Chart 5: Interest rate of 12 and 24-month treasury bills between 1992 and 2010 
 
 
The ratio of the net domestic public debt over foreign debt accounted for 3.8 and 2.7 between 
1999 and 2001 respectively. From 2002, the government began a financial reform to restructure 
public debt and succeeded in converting its high interest domestic debt into lower interest 
external debt. In 2007, the ratio of domestic debt over foreign debt amounted to 0.98 percent 
(MOF 2009).  
2.3.2.2. Fiscal imbalances  
 
By relying on high interest rates that have been instrumental in decreasing inflation and 
stabilizing the exchange rate, public expenditures have shown lower returns on investment and 
have been challenged by the increased burden of public debt and debt service (UNDP 2004). As 
detailed in the public expenditures of the Lebanese government over 1998-2010, interest 
payments and foreign debt principal repayment had accounted for forty percent of total 
payments. Wages and salaries amounted to twenty-nine percent of total payments. Accordingly, 
seventy percent of public expenditures have been only allocated for interest payment and 
salaries. Only six percent were allocated for capital investment expenditures by the government 
(MOF 2004, 2008, 2010). 
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It is also clear from the results of specific indicators for the reconstruction plan -in particular the 
percentage of public debt from GDP, the percentage of interest payment from GDP, the budget 
deficit percentage of GDP, and GDP real growth rates- that the government has been unable to 
curtail public debts over time and has been completely dependent on the financial banking 
system to safeguard the collapse of the economy.  
 
2.3.2.3. Credit sector development  
 
When the government started the high interest rate policy, commercial banks preferred to invest 
in T-bills and accordingly the fraction of private sector credits from total credits declined. The 
ratio of public over private loans has rarely gone below one over 1999-2010. This situation has 
negatively affected the availability of low interest rate loans for the private sector (EAM 2007, 
2008, 2009). Moreover, due to the traditional dominance of the services sector over the 
production sector and the neo-liberal policy for reconstruction that has neglected the production 
sector, the trade and services sectors amounted to forty-four percent of bank credits over 1997-
2007. The agricultural sector and the industry sector accounted for 1.3 percent and thirteen 
percent respectively of bank credits over the same period. The dominance of services and 
construction sectors has created unbalanced employment in economic sectors and has 
concentrated job opportunities in urban areas (EAM 2007). In fact, Beirut and Mount Lebanon 
received ninety percent of private sector loans in 2000. Bekaa and North Lebanon, the main 
agricultural regions, received four percent and three percent respectively (Table 3) (ABL 2000).  
Table 3: Distribution of private sector loans across Lebanon in 2000 
Private sector loans distribution by Mohafazah (%) 
Bekaa 4 
South Lebanon 3 
North Lebanon 3 
Mount Lebanon 9 
Beirut 81 
Total 100 
Source: ABL 2000 
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2.3.2.4. Tax reform 
 
In post-war period, the government reformed the taxation structure in a typical supply side mode. 
It decreased the income and the profit marginal tax rates. In order to encourage business 
activities and make investment an attractive proposition for foreigners, the Lebanese Parliament 
passed the DL 282/93 law in which the top marginal profit tax rate was reduced from fifty 
percent to ten percent and the top marginal wages tax rate was reduced from thirty-two percent to 
ten percent. Corporation tax rate was reduced from thirty-two percent to a ten percent flat fixed 
rate. Accordingly, indirect taxes became the major source of government revenues. The 
government progressively increased gasoline tax and introduced in 2002 the VAT which 
imposed a ten percent tax on all goods and services (Dibeh 2005, 2007). Post-war tax reforms 
have been highly regressive and have imposed a greater burden on poor people. Indirect taxation 
has affected the poor and rich equally. Taxes have been increasingly used for revenues’ 
generation without any regard to their regional impact.  
 
2.3.2.5. Paris I, II- fiscal, financial, and privatization reforms 
 
In 2001 and 2002, with a stagnated economic growth and a public debt reaching 170 percent of 
GDP, Prime Minister Hariri sought a foreign aid solution to prevent the collapse of the economy. 
Two international donors’ conferences, Paris I and II, were held to seek external borrowing with 
low interest rates and long-term maturity. The government presented an economic program of 
fiscal, financial, and privatization reforms that would be able to preserve monetary and financial 
stability and manage the burden of public debt. The strategy of the government was to reduce 
high interest rates paid on domestic debt. Accordingly, it would favor and encourage private 
sector investment and growth. Also, lower interest rates would increase public savings in 
bringing down the overall fiscal deficit (UNDP 2004, Nasnas 2007).  
In Paris I, the World Bank and the European Investment Bank provided Lebanon with Euros 500 
million. Paris II conference pledged around USD 3.1 billion from international participants 
namely Malaysia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and France. In 
2003, the Lebanese economy showed a recovery period and registered a high level of real GDP 
96 
 
growth. However, public debt has continued to increase because various parts of reforms did not 
take place in addition to several political crises- in particular Hariri assassination in 2005 and 
July 2006 war- which produced a reduction in growth and increase in expenditures (MOF 2010).  
 
2.3.3. Connections between reconstruction policies and producers’ cooperatives 
 
Post-1992 reconstruction policies revealed that the agricultural sector has been neglected by the 
government. Although the budget allocated for agriculture and irrigation in the initial plan was 
very low compared to the transport and electricity sectors, the real expenditures in 2009 were 
seventy-five percent lower for agriculture and irrigation and equal to the initial plan for transport 
and electricity. Moreover, real expenditures in the main agricultural regions (Bekaa, Nabatiyeh, 
North Lebanon, and South Lebanon) were much lower than the initial plan and in contrast were 
higher for Beirut and Mount Lebanon where the main activities of the service sector are centered.   
This negligible interest for agriculture goes in parallel with the structure of the Lebanese 
economy in which agriculture represents the weakest sector. Therefore, producers’ cooperatives 
faced the challenge of self-recovery under post-1992 reconstruction policies. They are negatively 
affected by the low investment capacity of the government due to the increased public debt and 
budget deficits. This situation has turned up the majority of government expenditures into debt 
services and salaries, while reducing in parallel capital expenditures from which producers’ 
cooperatives could benefit. On the other hand, the investment in the physical infrastructure 
would facilitate the development of cooperatives by assuring the basic requirements for the 
private sector development. Regarding the economic policies, producers’ cooperatives and the 
agricultural sector in general have benefited from the increased financial security associated with 
a normal inflation rate and a stable exchange rate. However, high interest rate policies have made 
difficult the potential of cooperatives to secure credits required for growth. The whole 
agricultural sector received only 1.3 percent of the totality of credits between 1997 and 2007. 
Finally, the indirect tax strategy affected negatively the producer-members in a similar way to 
low and medium income societies; especially because cooperative enterprises, which do not seek 
profit maximization, would not benefit from the reduction of tax on profit.  
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2.4. Agricultural sector in Lebanon: a detailed description 
 
Agriculture continues to play an important role in the Lebanese economy and constitutes a major 
source of income in rural areas. The diversity of agro-ecological zones, with adequate soil and 
sufficient water resources, enables Lebanese farmers to grow a variety of agricultural products. 
Agriculture is considered a key sector for socio-economic development in Lebanon and a 
strategic element for food security. Agricultural exports bring in foreign currencies and reduce 
trade deficits. The government, consistently with the liberal market-based economy, has given 
the private sector the main role for agricultural sector development. It has been involved in the 
infrastructural development projects and major public services essential for market regulation; 
however, the private sector has mainly invested in the upstream and downstream agricultural 
services that are characterized by a lower risk in investment compared to farming activities.  
This part of the chapter describes the agricultural sector in Lebanon by exploring its main 
strengths and weaknesses that affect the potential role and performance of producers’ 
cooperatives.   
 
2.4.1. Agriculture in the Lebanese economy  
 
Progressively, the contribution of Lebanese agriculture to GDP has been declining during the last 
twenty years. After the end of the civil war, in 1990, agriculture accounted for twenty-three 
percent of GDP. In 2009, its share had decreased to 4.9 percent of GDP (MOF 2004, 2011). In 
parallel, the agricultural labor force has been decreasing. The share of the agricultural labor force 
has declined from ten percent to 6.3 percent between 1990 and 2009 respectively (UNDP 1992, 
Jaber 1997, CAS 2007, CAS 2009). In 2007, the North Lebanon region accounted for the highest 
percentage (42.3 percent) of population employed in agriculture. The Bekaa and South Lebanon 
regions accounted for 19.1 percent and 29.7 percent respectively. Forty-one percent of the 
agricultural labor force had a self employed work status in 2007. Twenty-one percent were 
employees at daily or weekly based wages. However, only thirteen percent of agriculture 
employment was made up of employers (CAS 2007). In 2009, employment in agriculture was 
equally distributed over gender: six percent of the total female labor force and seven percent of 
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the total male labor force were working in the agricultural sector (CAS 2009, Yaacoub and Bader 
2011).  
 
2.4.2. Agricultural production and trade 
2.4.2.1. Value of production 
The production surveys, carried out by the Lebanese Observatory for Agricultural Development 
in partnership with the MOA and with the support of FAO, were published from 1997 until 2007. 
Therefore, the figures in this part will be limited to this interval period.  
Plant production represented an average of seventy-three percent of agricultural production 
between 1997 and 2007. Animal production accounted for the remaining twenty-seven percent 
over the same period. Compared to 1997, agricultural production increased by thirty-one percent 
in 2007 at constant prices. Fruit trees (excluding olives) contributed an average of forty percent 
of plant production values between 1997 and 2007. Vegetables accounted for an average of 
twenty-nine percent. Olives represented a significant percentage of total plant production values 
and amounted to an average of eleven percent between 1997 and 2007. Poultry represented the 
highest average of animal production value by amounting to a total of thirty-seven percent 
between 1997 and 2007. Milk production ranked the second and accounted for an average of 
twenty-five percent for the same period (MOA 2007, 2007a, and CAS 2009a). 
  
2.4.3.2. Agricultural trade and self-sufficiency 
Agricultural production is amounting to a significant part of trade. In 2003, it accounted for 
nineteen percent of total imports and sixteen percent of total exports. Its total share was 
progressively decreasing. In 2007, it amounted to sixteen percent of total imports and thirteen 
percent of total exports. The value of agricultural imports decreased between 1997 and 2000. It 
gradually resumed its 1997 value in 2004.  It sharply increased after the summer war of 2006 and 
registered a thirty-two percent increase in 2007 compared to 1997. However, the value of 
agricultural exports has been steadily increasing with time and amounted to a 130 percent 
increase in 2005 and a 206 percent increase in 2007 compared to 1997. The value of increased 
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exports and stable imports has both narrowed the value of agricultural deficits by twenty-five 
percent in 2006 compared to 1997. Accordingly, the ratio of agricultural exports to imports 
increased from eight percent to twenty percent over the same period (Table 4) (MOA 2007, 
2007a, CAS 2009a).  
Table 4: Value of foreign trade of agricultural products in Lebanon between 1997 and 2007 
 Foreign trade of agricultural products (LL billion)  
Year Value of 
Imports (I) 
Value of 
Exports (E) 
Agricultural 
deficit (I-E) 
Ratio (E/I) 
% 
1997 2208.9 189 -2019.9 8.6 
1998 2120.3 208.1 -1912.2 9.8 
1999 1859.6 239.4 -1620.2 12.9 
2000 1707 197.7 -1509.3 11.6 
2001 1912 243 -1669 12.7 
2002 1898 268 -1630 14.1 
2003 2027 360 -1667 17.8 
2004 2249 379 -1870 16.9 
2005 2144 435 -1709 20.3 
2006 2165 436 -1729 20.1 
2007 2914 580 -2334 19.9 
Source: MOA 2007, 2007a, CAS 2009a 
 
Processed and semi-processed agricultural products have represented the highest percentage in 
value of imports and exports and accounted for forty-one percent and fifty-four percent 
respectively between 1997 and 2007. The large difference has been in the value of imports and 
exports of animal substances and derivatives. They only amounted to 2.1 percent of total exports 
value, however, they represented twenty-nine percent of total imports value (MOA 2007, 2007a, 
CAS 2009a). 
In terms of quantity of plant products, Lebanon exports fruits more than it imports. For 
vegetables, imports are higher than exports; however, the deficit is considered low compared to 
other crops. In 2007, it amounted to twenty-four percent. The deficit for cereals is extremely 
high. Lebanon imported in 2007 a total of 823.984 tons of cereals compared to a total export of 
18.350 tons. In animal production, poultry exceeded local consumption and substantially 
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contributed to exports. About eighty-two percent of red meat, thirty-seven percent of raw milk, 
and seventy-five percent of fish were imported to cover domestic consumption deficits (MOA 
2007).  
 
2.4.3. Natural resources and agricultural production 
 
2.4.3.1. Main agricultural regions 
 
The topography and geography of Lebanon offers favorable conditions for agricultural 
production in comparison to other Arab countries. Lebanon stretches over a length of 225 km 
and a width extending from 48 to 80 km inland, from north-east to south-east along the eastern 
cost of the Mediterranean Sea. It is constituted of two mountain chains: the Mount Lebanon 
chain near the sea and the Anti-Lebanon Hermon chain in the east. The fertile Bekaa valley 
stands in between at an altitude of about 1000 m. The distribution of precipitation widely varies 
from less than 200 mm/year in the Northern Bekaa and Akkar to more than 1400 mm/year in 
Mount Lebanon (UNDP 1992).  
The following agricultural regions can be distinguished (ESCWA 1999, Tatyan 2000, UNDP 
1992, Baalbaki 1985, Iskandar 1995, Asmar 2011):    
a- The coastal strip – parallel to the sea: it stretches from North to South with a narrow 
width averaging around 7 km.  
b- Akkar Plains: in Northern Lebanon with small to medium farm size mainly cultivated 
with cereals and vegetables.   
c- Mount Lebanon: large mountains with deep valleys and steep slopes stretching from the 
Akkar plain to Awali River in the South. Abundant water resources allow irrigated 
production.  
d- Bekaa valley: situated at an average altitude of 1000 m east of Mount Lebanon. Its length 
is 120 km and its width varies from 8 to 12 km and reaches 25 km in Hermel area. It is 
divided into three production areas: Central, Northern, and Southern. The central and the 
Southern areas are the main agricultural areas in Lebanon.   
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e- South Lebanon: a hilly land, where rainfed or mainly poorly irrigated crops, in particular 
tobacco, cereals, olives and grapes, are cultivated.  
f- Anti-Lebanon: a mountain range that has similar features to Mount Lebanon, however, 
classified as an arid area with low agricultural potential.  
These different regions are grouped based on the cropping pattern and water availability. 
However, when linking the decentralized public activities to the agricultural sector, the 
government distinguishes four agricultural regions that group different parts of the divisions 
elaborated above. They are the following:   
• Bekaa valley: groups the Bekaa valley and Anti-Lebanon  
• North Lebanon:  covers the northern part of the coastal strip, Akkar plain, and the 
northern part of Mount Lebanon 
• South Lebanon: groups the southern part of coastal strip and the South Lebanon part. 
Sometimes Nabatiyeh, a Mohafazat in Lebanon, is excluded from South Lebanon and 
mentioned as a separate agricultural area 
• Mount Lebanon: the same as the division above but lacking the Northern part  
To study the performance of producers’ cooperatives across Lebanon, these four agricultural 
regions were used as a stratification criterion to select cooperatives interviewed in this research.     
 
2.4.3.2. Land cover and land use  
 
The total land area of Lebanon is 1,017,000 Ha, of which around thirty-five percent (360,000 ha) 
is cultivable (UNDP 1992). Forests cover around 136,900 ha (13.4 percent of total land) and 
other wooded lands account for 106,000 ha. Together, forests and other wooded lands represent 
23.5 percent of Lebanon (FAO 2010a). About thirty-six percent of total land area is classified as 
pasture land. Cultivated areas increased from 266,000 ha in 1997 to 277,100 ha in 2007 (MOA 
2007, 2007a).  
Bekaa is the largest agricultural area in Lebanon. In 2006 and 2007, it represented thirty-eight 
percent of total cultivated areas. North Lebanon ranked second in terms of cultivation and 
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amounted to twenty-nine percent of cultivated areas in 2007. The remaining was equally divided 
between the other three Mohafazat (Mount Lebanon, South Lebanon, and Nabatiyeh). On 
average, fifty percent of cultivated areas were irrigated in 2006 and 2007. The highest percentage 
of irrigated land is situated in the Bekaa (sixty-six percent of cultivated areas in the Bekaa were 
irrigated in 2007) (MOA 2007). Population growth has endangered agricultural land in most 
fertile areas. Uncontrolled urbanization and the horizontal expansion of cities around the coastal 
strip and the central Bekaa are happening at the expense of agricultural fields, forested areas, and 
other natural areas of unique environmental significance (Asmar 2011, MOE/UNDP/ECODIT 
2011).  
 
2.4.3.3. Water resources and irrigation 
 
Lebanon has abundant water resources. In terms of annual water availability, it is third in the 
region after Iraq and Iran (World Bank 2010). Precipitation results in an average annual flow of 
8600 million cubic meters (Mm3), feeding forty major streams and rivers (seventeen perennial 
rivers) and more than 2000 springs. Up to ninety percent of precipitation falls between 
November and April in the form of heavy showers. Annual precipitation may vary from 2000 
mm in some areas located in the western mountain range to 200 mm in areas located in the 
eastern mountain range (Northern plain). Coastal areas receive an average of 600-1000 mm 
annual precipitation (MOE/LEDO/ECODIT 2001). In 2010, annual available water resources 
accounted for 2700 Mm3 from which 2200 Mm3 are in the form of surface water and 500 Mm3 
as exploitable ground water (MOE/UNDP/ECODIT 2011). Nevertheless, Lebanon may face 
chronic water shortages starting in 2020, unless measures are taken to increase supply and 
manage demand. On the one hand, water demand will be largely driven by the increase of 
industrial and domestic demand; on the other hand, low water storage capacity, the large amount 
of water lost to the sea, the deficiency of the existing water networks will increase the seasonal 
water imbalance (World Bank 2010).  
In terms of water use, the agricultural sector is the largest consumer of water in Lebanon, 
followed by domestic and industrial use. In the 2010 State and Trends of the Lebanese 
Environment report, several references were presented to explore the quantity of water use per 
sector. On average, in the three presented references, the agricultural sector accounted for fifty-
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eight percent of total water use (MOE/UNDP/ECODIT 2011). The main irrigation problems in 
agriculture are summarized as follows (IRWA 2010, UNDP 1992, Karam and Karaa 2000, Karaa 
el al. 2009, AFIAL 2001, Mallat 2002): 
• Reduced efficiency of irrigation networks and inadequate management/development of 
individual initiatives on networks 
• Uncontrolled and unauthorized water pumping from private wells 
• Traditional water schemes, open channels with low efficiency 
• Low technical know-how of farmers for modern irrigation techniques. Low water use 
efficiency 
• Use of contaminated water in irrigation 
• High cost of irrigation due to deep water pumping  
• Complex legislative framework for water use and preservation 
 
2.4.3.4. Cropping patterns and livestock 
 
In 2007, fruits trees accounted for 27.8 percent of the total cultivated surface and were followed 
by cereals and olives which accounted for 25.1 percent and 21.1 percent of the total surface 
respectively. Seventy percent of fruit trees were irrigated. Olives were mainly produced under 
rainfed systems. Ninety-four percent of olives were not receiving additional water. For cereals, 
wheat represented the major production. It occupied 52,800 ha from the total surface. In 
vegetables, tomato and cucumber were the major crops in terms of surface. They represented 
4060 ha and 3100 ha from the total surface respectively. Eighty-seven percent of vegetables were 
subjected to irrigation (MOA, 2007). 
Most crops are cultivated in the Bekaa Valley. In 2007, the largest production of cereals, 
legumes, vegetables, fruit trees, and other crops was found in the Bekaa. Industrial crops and 
olives were concentrated in the Nabatiyeh (thirty-seven percent) and North Lebanon (forty-two 
percent) respectively. Moreover, the majority of livestock production was located in the Bekaa 
valley. The total number of livestock accounted for 836,500 heads in 2007. Goats were the 
largest stock with 434,700 heads. Fifty-seven percent of goats were found in the Bekaa valley. 
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Cows were the smallest stock with 77,400 heads, from which 38.6 percent and 31.7 percent were 
located in the Bekaa valley and North Lebanon respectively (MOA 2007).  
 
2.4.3.5. Poultry, fishery and beekeeping  
The data published for white meat, eggs, fish, and honey production goes back to 2005. The 
introduction of modern techniques in poultry production has saturated market needs and covered 
through export a part of the shortfall in red meat. In 2005, Lebanon produced 131 thousand tons 
live weight of white meat and 758 million eggs and exported 681tones and 3,667 tons 
respectively (MOA 2005b). In 2005, the estimated quantity of fish capture (marine) accounted 
for 8,000 tones distributed over four seasons (forty-two percent in the summer). In aquaculture, 
200 units of trout production took place, mainly situated in the Bekaa in four areas: Hermel, 
Anjar, Zahle, and Yammouneh. Total production reached 700 tons in 2005 (FAO 2005). The 
same production quantity was published by FAO up to 2010 (FAO 2012). In beekeeping, honey 
production amounted for 1,095 tons produced by 132 thousands beehives (MOA 2005b). 
 
2.4.4. Farms 
2.4.4.1. Land tenure  
 
Land tenure in Lebanon is constituted of different systems/categories (MOE/UNDP/ECODIT 
2011) 
• Waqf: lands owned by religious communities and managed by individuals from the same 
community 
• Macha’a: lands owned by the state and managed by municipality councils 
• Amiri: lands owned by the state and mainly managed by the MOA or the MOF 
• Mulk: private land, owned and managed by individuals  
 
In 1998, Mulk accounted for 84.6 percent of total UAS. It represented ninety-five percent of 
small holdings. Amiri amounted for 12.1 percent of UAS and Waqf for 1.3 percent (Choueiri 
2002). In terms of land tenure arrangements, four different types have been identified (Hamadeh 
et al 2003):  
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• Owner-operator: owners manage their lands. They supply productive resources and 
receive production outputs 
• Renting: tenants rent land from landlords by oral or specific agreement. They pay rent 
costs and productive resources and then receive all production outputs 
• Sharecropping: producers supplying their labor force and landlords share the cost of 
productive resources and divide, upon pre-plantation agreement, the production outputs 
• Mixed: represent the case of many tenants who hold more than one type of arrangement 
to increase their income  
 
In 2010, eighty-seven percent of producers owned their lands and were exploiting them. They 
accounted for sixty-eight percent of total UAS. Six percent of farmers were tenants renting the 
land they were operating. They cultivated eighteen percent of total UAS. The remaining eleven 
percent was mixed and sharecropping production, working fourteen percent of total UAS (Asmar 
2011). These figures reflect the significant role of land tenancy and sharecropping in the 
Lebanese agriculture. They represented seventeen percent of farmers who were cultivating thirty-
two percent of total UAS.  
 
2.4.4.2. Small holdings and part-time farming 
 
The small size of farm holdings (either for plant or for animal production) in Lebanon is 
considered to be a major barrier for producers’ socio-economic development (Baalbaki 1985, 
Gaspard 2004). Holdings, as technically identified in the agricultural census of Lebanon, are 
economic units with single management including all livestock kept and all land used with 
minimum production thresholds of a value of 0.1 ha open field, 0.05 ha greenhouses, 7 goats, 
and 1 cow (FAO 2010).  
The number of holdings in Lebanon had increased by thirty-four percent between 1961 and 
1998. Accordingly, the percentage of holdings having less than 0.5 ha surface increased from 
thirty-five percent of the total number of holdings in 1961 to fifty-three percent in 1998 
(Baalbaki 1985, FAO 1999). In 1998, two percent of holdings had no UAS. They mainly 
represented small ruminants’ producers. Seventy-five percent of holdings were cultivating less 
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than one ha UAS and representing only twenty percent from the total UAS. Ninety-five percent 
of holdings were cultivating less than four ha UAS and accounting for fifty-one percent of total 
UAS. Only 1.6 percent of holdings were cultivating more than ten ha UAS and representing 
thirty percent from total UAS. This means that 3,117 producers in Lebanon were cultivating, in 
terms of UAS, ten percent more than 146,121 producers (FAO 1999). Large holdings are mainly 
owned by traditional “feudal” landowners, religious communities (The Waqf), or by extended 
families (Baalbaki 1985). For the distribution of holdings among Mohafazat, North Lebanon 
accounted for 29.4 percent of the total number of holdings and was followed by Mount-Lebanon 
(21.6 percent) and Bekaa (18 percent). In terms of farm size distribution, Bekaa holds the largest 
farms in Lebanon. The average farm size in the Bekaa amounted to 2.9 ha in 1998 compared to 
0.6 ha in Mount Lebanon. The average farm size in Lebanon amounted to 1.27 ha in 1998 (FAO 
1999).The dominance of small holdings would not allow the application of economy of scale and 
would impose higher costs of production for farmers with lower efficiency on the production 
side (UN 2007). Small holdings could hardly succeed in using modern techniques, in particular 
for machinery, and therefore constitute a handicap in increasing producers’ competitiveness. 
Small producers have low opportunities to get credits and difficult access to distant markets 
unless they rely on middlemen (UNDP 1992).  
The small holding factor has led to the dominance of part-time farming in Lebanon. A large 
number of farmers depend mostly on non-agricultural incomes. The available data indicates that 
in the 1960s more than half of Lebanese farmers have worked in a secondary, usually non-
agricultural job (Gaspard 2004). In the last agricultural census published in 1998, sixty-six 
percent of farmers/producers have an income from a secondary initial job (FAO 1999). The 
alternative secondary income explains how small producers were able to survive. They partially 
rely on their agricultural income and do transfer a part of their non-agricultural earnings to cover 
production costs that will be reimbursed at the end of the season. That is how small producers 
have been able to sustain their production units and have generated enough income for their own 
subsistence (UNDP 1992). 
2.4.4.3. Land fragmentation  
 
In addition to small holdings, land fragmentation constitutes another challenge for agriculture at 
farm level (Tatyan 2000). In 1970, small holdings were widely scattered into small plots ranging 
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between five and twenty-four plots (Andreou et al. 1979). In 1998, the total number of holdings, 
accounting for 194,829, was sub-divided into 491,700 plots. On average, exploitations in 
Lebanon were split into 2.5 plots (Choueiri 2002). The rapid development of urbanization 
(Thomas 2000) and the process of land inheritance intensify land fragmentation (Asmar 2006). 
Accordingly, production costs are increasing due to higher costs of irrigation, mechanization, 
and land reclamation. In fact, by increasing the number of small holdings over time, land 
inheritance and fragmentation makes agricultural production a cost ineffective activity, and 
therefore, the reliance on agriculture as a secondary income would accelerate. 
 
2.4.5. Producers 
 
The Atlas of Lebanese Agriculture is the last published reference describing producers in 
Lebanon. It goes back to 2005. Data showed that only thirteen percent of producers who were 
cultivating twelve percent of UAS were aged below 35 years old. However, twenty-three percent 
of producers, who were cultivating twenty-four percent of UAS, were aged above 65 years old. 
The remaining sixty-four percent of producers were aged between 35 and 65 years old.  In 
gender distribution, female producers represented seven percent of total producers. Only six 
percent of female producers were aged below 35 years. In terms of education, it appeared that 
sixteen percent of producers are illiterate and were exploiting sixteen percent of UAS. Sixty-one 
percent of producers received basic primary education and were exploiting sixty percent of UAS 
(MOA 2005a). Producers’ education constitutes another challenge for Lebanese agriculture at a 
holders’ level. Education is necessary to increase the production efficiency and competitiveness, 
to adopt new technologies, to implement extension recommendation, and finally to reach diverse 
markets without intermediaries (Yasmeen et al. 2011).  
With the dominance of small holdings, self consumption was the destination of production for 
thirty-seven percent of producers whocultivated around nine percent of the total UAS. The 
remaining sixty-three percent of producers have marketed their production at local and external 
market levels (MOA 2005a).  
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2.4.6. Mechanization and agricultural inputs 
 
Mechanization and production resources are the main elements for high agricultural productivity. 
In Lebanon, the private sector is mainly responsible for the upstream agriculture, in particular 
these two elements. The public sector limits its intervention in providing appropriate extension, 
information, research, and the promotion of group work through cooperatives.  
The last official findings published in 2002 by the Lebanese Observatory for Agricultural 
Development showed that eighty-three percent of holdings relied on agricultural machinery 
(tractors, seeders, sprayers, milking machines, etc). These holdings were exploiting ninety-four 
percent of total UAS. The remaining seventeen percent were small holdings exploiting only six 
percent of total UAS. Ninety-five percent of producers cultivating a UAS higher than two ha 
have reported the use of agricultural machineries (Choueiri 2002).  
In 1999, Moatasim Sidahmad and Teffera Betru assessed the status of agriculture mechanization 
in Lebanon. They reported that sixty-eight percent of mechanized farming was based on custom 
hiring from neighboring farmers on the basis of availability. They indicated that agricultural 
machinery was small, over-utilized, and relatively old. Moreover, they highlighted the lack of 
mechanization in several agricultural operations such as weeding, seeding, and harvesting except 
for potatoes and wheat (Sidahmad and Betru 1999). In parallel, Chami Saade and Imad Chatila 
underlined that the low access of farmers to credit, land tenure and sharecropping, poor access to 
land, and the limited number of agriculture cooperatives supplying machinery services were the 
major constraints to achieve the level of mechanization required in Lebanon (Saade and Chatila 
1994). 
In the use of production resources, in particular fertilizers and pesticides, intensive application is 
reported in Lebanon despite the fact that the government has banned the use of some dangerous 
pesticides and issued appropriate rules and regulations to control customs, safe handlings, and 
reduce pressure on the environment (MOE/LEDO 2001). Compared to the Arab world, Lebanon 
uses the highest rate of pesticides per hectare, approximately 2 to 3 times the rate used in Egypt, 
Jordan, and Amman. In 2006, it was classified fourth after UAE, Egypt, and Oman in terms of 
kilos of fertilizer usage per hectare. The average use was 414 kg/ha. These excessive applications 
tend to reduce the quality of food and may contribute to diverse side effects (Bashour 2008).  
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The overuse of fertilizers and pesticides is mainly promoted by private input suppliers who 
control the distribution of agricultural inputs across Lebanon. Large monopolies over supplies of 
veterinary products, seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides characterize the input supply system in 
agriculture (Saade and Chatila 1994). 
 
2.4.7. Education, research, and extension 
 
2.4.7.1. Agricultural education 
 
Education is essential to improve agriculture as a business unit and as an instrument for rural 
development. It reduces agricultural risk and increases marketing opportunities. In Lebanon, 
agricultural education is offered by both public and private sectors at different levels as follows:  
a- University level: 
1. The Lebanese University, Faculty of Agricultural Engineering and Veterinary 
Medicine: offers BSc and MSc degrees in agricultural engineering and veterinary 
medicine (LU, 2009). No appropriate technical field trainings were offered to 
students up to 2010.  
2. The American University of Beirut, Faculty of Agricultural and Food Sciences: 
offers BSc and MSc degrees in agricultural engineering, food technology and 
nutrition. The faculty manages the Agricultural Research and Education Center 
(AREC), which is devoted to improving rural livelihoods in dry lands (AUB 
2012).  
3. Holy Spirit University of Kaslik, Faculty of Agricultural Sciences: offers BSc and 
MSc degrees in agricultural sciences, human nutrition and dietetics, and agro-food 
sciences. Students receive appropriate technical trainings (USEK 2012).  
4. Saint Joseph University, Higher Institute for Agricultural Engineering for 
Mediterranean Countries: offers BSc and MSc degrees in agricultural engineering 
(USJ 2007).  
b- Secondary education level:  
Schools are managed by the MOA. They offer high school certificates in agricultural and 
livestock technicians (MEHE, 2012).   
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c- Vocational Training level:  
It is mainly provided by local and international NGOs working in the agricultural sector 
such as RMF, arcenciel, YMCA, etc. The government, through the CDR, has initiated 
several vocational training centers across Lebanon (CDR 2010).  
The university level in agricultural education in Lebanon is much more developed than the 
secondary and vocational training levels, revealing a serious imbalance between theory and 
technical experience. Technicians, more than engineers, are needed in rural areas to provide 
close technical support for farmers. In general, students at the secondary level prefer to continue 
their education to the university level (UNDP 1992) so they might be more paid and find better 
working conditions. There is no official number of agricultural technicians in Lebanon; however, 
it is certain that the number of agricultural engineers is much higher than agricultural 
technicians.  
 
2.4.7.2. Agricultural research 
 
Because research is considered a primary factor for economic development, Lebanon has 
promoted agricultural research through various organizations.  
In 1957, the government established the first research station in the Bekaa Valley. This station 
became the agricultural scientific research center of the MOA. Few years after, several stations 
were also established across the country. In 1964, all stations were organized as an autonomous 
public institution in the “Lebanese Agricultural Research Institute” (LARI) under the direction of 
the MOA. LARI carries out research, offers some services to farmers (soil test, water test, etc) 
and manages demonstration plots in the four different agricultural regions. It maintains close 
bilateral cooperation with agricultural research centers in the region and developed countries. It 
coordinates with local and international NGOs to transfer to farmers the results of scientific 
research (LARI 2009). 
Besides LARI, several organizations, either governmental or non-governmental, conduct 
agricultural research in Lebanon. The National Council for Scientific Research (CNRS), a public 
institution established in 1962, performs agricultural research on water, land use, land cover, 
land degradation, etc. (CNRS 2012). The Litani River Authority (LRA), a public association 
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established in 1954, conducts research on irrigation in agriculture, in particular water use, 
irrigation systems, irrigation policy (LRA 2009). In addition, the Green Plan (GP), an 
autonomous public association established in 1963, carries out agricultural research on a limited 
scale, in particular land degradation (Green Plan 2010). In the non-governmental sector, AUB, 
through the AREC, conducts agricultural research in the Bekaa (AUB 2012). The International 
Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA) established many centers across the 
Bekaa valley. ICARDA conducts research on agricultural productivity to ensure the efficient and 
equitable use of natural resources (ICARDA 2011).  The Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and 
Agriculture in Lebanon carry out some agricultural research in the field of food packing and 
processing (FCCIAL 2007). Local and international NGOs such as World Vision (WV), Instituto 
per la Cooperazione Universitaria (ICU), FAO, Rene Moawad Foundation (RMF), etc. conduct 
agricultural research that is mainly related to the projects or programs they are implementing. 
For instance, GIZ promotes conservative agriculture in Lebanon. It carries research on no-till 
practices and then disseminates it to farmers across Lebanon (GIZ 2012).  
 
All agricultural research initiatives are crucial for the development of agriculture in Lebanon. For 
the time being, few big producers benefit from these initiatives. A solid cooperation should tie all 
stakeholders involved in agricultural research with producers’ organizations in order to 
disseminate research results and applications for small producers on the one hand and to conduct 
research based on empirical needs on the other hand.  
 
2.4.7.3. Agricultural extension 
 
Agriculture extension transfers agricultural research and modern technologies to the practical 
field application through the proper education and training of producers. It aims to increase 
productivity and efficiency by ameliorating producers’ skills at the production and marketing 
levels. In developing countries, agricultural extension is perceived as a public policy service and 
has received large financial support from international development agencies (Swanson et al. 
1997). In Lebanon, it was identified as a major policy instrument essential to stimulate rural 
development during the post-war reconstruction phase (Betru and Long 1996). 
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The government and NGOs, in addition to the private sector offer extension services across 
Lebanon. In 1957, the MOA initiated the extension department in the Studies and Coordination 
Office. It offers extension services through twenty-eight centers scattered across the twenty-six 
Lebanese Caza. The webpage of the extension department is not developed; it only displays one 
study for vegetable production under greenhouses. It clearly mentions that the performance of 
public extension services is very weak today. There is no independent budget line for extension 
services in the ministry budget (MOA 2012a). The CDR, during the reconstruction phase, 
rehabilitated some extension centers and granted many contracts for NGOs to offer extension 
services (CDR 2009). The current agricultural minister, Dr. Hussein el Hajj Hasan, is intending 
to activate public extension services across the country. He recruited several agricultural 
engineers to lead the main offices at District and Caza levels. He signed a grant agreement with 
the EU to equip all extension offices (NNA 2011). The current number of extension agents is 
115. It was forty-five in 1968 when the number of holdings was close to 143,000; approximately 
one extension agent for 3,177 farmers (Baalbaki 1985). In a recent study for the status of 
agricultural extension in part of the Bekaa valley, results revealed that extension services are 
weak varying from office support to few field visits. In one office (Douris village), extension 
agents had no facilities to reach farmers and during an 8-month period they have only received 
100 farmers. In Hermel office (a Caza), there was only one agricultural engineer who carries 
field visits twice a week for an average of ten farmers (Moses 2011). The total number of 
holdings in Hermel is 2335 (MOA 2006). 
Next to the government, local and international NGOs provide extension services in rural areas. 
The main actors are Young Men’s Christian Association, Safadi foundation, Hariri Foundation, 
arcenciel, ICU, IFAD, George Frem Foundation, Action against Hunger, Rene Moawad 
Foundation, Jihad el Bina Development Association, Cooperative Housing Foundation, etc. In 
most agricultural development projects, a small budget has been allocated for extension services. 
Legally, these organizations are not obliged to coordinate with the MOA because they are 
registered under the Ministry of Interior Affairs and have the freedom to work in the agricultural 
sector. However, the extension department in the MOA has managed to coordinate with most of 
them and sometimes it has itself received direct support in terms of new extension techniques 
and updated technical leaflets and trainings (Moses 2011).   
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Finally, private enterprises such as agricultural supply companies play the main role in the field 
of agricultural extension. First they have the tool, i.e. agricultural engineers, and second they 
have the products/machines. They give recommendations to farmers and directly sell them 
products to apply. These enterprises are regulated by the MOA, which urges them to register all 
products displayed in the market. In comparison to the government and NGOs, private 
enterprises have the advantage of product supply with credit facilities; however, they have the 
disadvantage of marketing orientation that is mainly associated with a lack of trust. Because 
agricultural engineers get a percentage on sale, they mainly recommend higher application rates 
or additional numbers of applications (Jaber 1997, Betru and Long 1998). On the other hand, 
NGOs that have religious or political ties may target specific farmers. Their activities are 
selective and tend to be project driven for a short-term period and according to budget 
availability (Moses 2011).  
 
2.4.8. Rural institutions and marketing 
 
2.4.8.1. Agricultural credit  
 
Credit plays a crucial role in agriculture development. For small and big holdings, it enables 
producers to carry out new investments essential to adopt new technologies, expand production, 
and reduce agricultural costs. In Lebanon, agricultural credits are either offered through the 
formal banking system or through the informal micro-credit institutions, input suppliers, and 
wholesale traders. The government has provided guarantees for banks to offer agricultural loans, 
has subsidized credits to producers, and has initiated special credit institutions for the agricultural 
sector.  
Three specialized agriculture credit institutions exist in Lebanon (UNDP1992):  
• Bank of Agricultural, Industrial, and Real Estate Credit (BCAIF) 
• National Union of Cooperative Credit (NUCC) 
• National Bank for Agricultural Development (NBDA) 
Due to the effect of rampant inflation during the war, the BCAIF stopped its activities in 1984 
without being liquidated (Choueiri 2002). Due to the cessation of budgetary support under new 
post war policies in 1992, The NUCC stopped credit allocation to cooperatives and ran short of 
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financial and human resources (Assaf 2010). The NBDA, which was initiated by the Lebanese 
government in 1977, has never practically become operational (Choueiri 2002). Therefore, 
specific agricultural credit institutions in Lebanon exist, however none of them is functional.  
 
In the formal sector, Commercial banks either offer agricultural credits from their resources or 
facilitate logistically the guaranteed government loans or micro-credit institution loans.   
Agricultural credits from commercial banks accounted for 1.3 percent of the total credits offered 
between 1997 and 2007. Banks prefer to provide low risk credits to the service sector 
characterized with high profitability. The share of the service sector from commercial bank 
credits amounted to forty-four percent over the same period (EAM 2007). In fact, credit 
requirements of banks are difficult to be secured by small producers. Always, banks ask for 
collateral in addition to property mortgage asset amounting for a sum higher than that of the loan 
(Choueiri 2002). Accordingly, the majority of commercial loans are received by big holdings 
averaging for more than 20 ha (Iskandar 2000). In addition to this logistical challenge, high 
interest rates ranging between sixteen and twenty-two percent are a major handicap for credit 
efficiency in the agricultural sector (Choueiri 2002). The government, by offering subsidized 
guaranteed loans through commercial banks, has worked to reduce interest rates and assure 
specific guarantees. “KAFALAT” program is the most efficient financial instrument for small 
and big producers in Lebanon. Loans, reaching maximum L.L. 300 million (equivalent to USD 
200,000) for individuals, are offered with a subsidized five to seven percent interest rate over a 
7-year maturity period and with a 1-year grace period (Markou and Stavri 2005, KAFALAT 
2012). Other schemes are elaborated by the government. They are agreements with individual 
commercial banks to offer more agricultural loans backed by the government subsidized 
guarantee. Recently, in 2010, the MOA signed an agreement with Fransabank, a local Lebanese 
bank, to offer government subsidized agricultural credits (ABL 2012).  
 
Alternative credit services are offered in the informal sector through micro-credit institutions. 
Born in the late nineties, the micro-finance sector in Lebanon is concentrated in the hands of two 
big institutions: Al Majmoua and Access to Microfinance and Enhanced Enterprise Niches 
(AMEEN). Most micro-credit institutions are supported and sometimes initiated by international 
donors, such as the WB and EU, to increase the distribution of credits over regions and sectors 
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(Assaf 2010). The main concern in the informal sector is the high interest rate. Al-Majmoua, 
initiated by a USAID project in 1994, offers credits at a 2.98 percent effective monthly interest 
rate (annual rate is 35.76 percent) and AMEEN, initiated as well by USAID in 1998, provides 
loans at a 2.42 percent effective monthly interest rate (annual rate is 29.04 percent). Interest rates 
offered by both institutions are four times higher than interest rates offered by the government 
guaranteed loans (IFC 2008). In addition, several NGOs (local or international) have a micro-
credit component in their projects. Credit amounts vary between NGOs as well as interest rates; 
however the latter tend to be higher for big amounts (Grace and Saad 1997).  
Finally, input suppliers and wholesale traders offer informal credit support for the majority of big 
and small producers. Input suppliers provide credits in the form of production resources such as 
fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, machinery, etc. with a due date after harvest for annual and 
perennial crops. However, wholesale traders offer cash money for producers with due date at the 
beginning of harvest by receiving the production. In fact, producers, who go to wholesale traders, 
need credits to pay in cash the cost of production resources secured with higher costs from input 
suppliers if received in terms of credit as above. However, such producers do not escape the 
negative side of wholesale traders who in their turn impose lower product prices. Therefore, with 
informal credits either from input suppliers or from wholesale traders, producers’ are somehow 
exploited in the selling prices, in the cost of inputs, or in the quantities of delivered products 
(wholesale traders register lower quantities: explained later in this chapter) (Choueiri 2002, 
UNDP 1992, Jaber 1997, Baalbaki 1985, International Bechtel and Dar el Handasah Consultants 
1992, Thomas 2000).  
 
2.4.8.2. Producers’ cooperatives  
 
Although cooperation between producers has existed under several agricultural activities such as 
threshing of grain, assigning of water rights, and sharing of draft animals, it was not until 1937 
that a successful cooperative model, based on principles and values, was initiated in Abadiyeh 
village, close to the capital Beirut. It was founded by a native from the village in coordination 
with the Near East Foundation of New York and the American University of Beirut. It was an 
agricultural cooperative supplying credit at low rates and marketing services. It succeeded in 
packaging and delivered higher returns for members compared to non-member producers. 
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Members learned only to borrow money based on productive purposes and were able to expand 
and diversify their production. After this success, the country leaders saw the cooperative model 
as a useful tool to solve most agricultural challenges in Lebanon (Tannous 1949). During the 
Second World War, similar initiatives were founded in nearby villages. In fact, the policy of the 
British government, which directed the pre-war export agricultural strategy to an inward self-
sufficiency aiming to fulfill military needs, encouraged the establishment of cooperatives. 
However, little tangible progress has been made (Gates 1998). In 1941, a law regulating the 
initiation of agricultural cooperatives was enacted. It did not contribute to the development of 
cooperatives in other sub-sectors (Graindorge and Waisfisz 1972). Later in the 1950s, Lebanon 
witnessed an expansion in the number of agricultural cooperatives initiated by small producers. 
Most of these cooperatives were inactive and were only initiated to benefit from the production 
resources support, mainly fertilizers, donated by the United Nations and the financial support of 
the MOA which was only limited to cooperative enterprises. As such, from the 130 registered 
cooperatives in 1952, only eleven cooperatives were offering marketing and processing services. 
These cooperatives were generally classical dealing in common services and not specialized to 
certain crops or values chain. In 1964, after ending the fertilizer distribution program, the MOA 
dissolved 130 dormant cooperatives and enacted a new cooperative law covering cooperative 
societies in different sub-sectors and imposing additional monitoring on them through the DGC 
(Baalbaki 1985). This law defined everything needed for cooperatives to work as autonomous 
organizations. Facilities in the form of tax exemptions have been offered to cooperatives in 
comparison to other economic enterprises. Cooperatives are not required to pay taxes on building 
permits, on rental values, and on wages, are exempted from electricity and water charges, and 
benefit from fifty percent reduction on export customs (Lebanese Republic 1964). It should be 
noted here that such progress happened during the Chehabist period (1958-1964), the only 
developmental period in the modern history of Lebanon characterized by the promotion of socio-
economic development through public institutions and infrastructure modernization (Gaspard 
2004).  In 1968, cooperatives were united under a federal national cooperative promoting the 
cooperative movement as follows (MOA 2012).  
• Accounting services: a new accounting system was adopted 
• In depth studies of most important cooperatives 
• Research detailing the challenges of cooperatives 
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• Education service: mobile workshops to educate the cooperative advantage 
In 1972, only thirty-nine agriculture cooperatives existed. Six of them were specialized and 
thirty-three classical. At this stage, the cooperative sector succeeded under specialization to offer 
a proper progress in agricultural development (Baalbaki 1985). For instance, the Cooperative of 
Sugar Beet Growers marketed all sugar beets produced in Lebanon, the Bekaa Cooperative for 
the Production and Distribution of Eggs marketed forty-seven percent of the Lebanese egg 
production, the Potato Cooperative was responsible for fifty-five percent of the Lebanese potato 
production, etc. (Andreou et al. 1979). However, these specialized cooperatives, which were 
initially established by big farmers and accordingly were controlled by them, marginalized small 
farmers and deprived them the chance of overcoming their socio-economic challenges (Baalbaki 
1985). In 1973, the government initiated the Ministry of Housing and Cooperatives, expressing 
the essential socio-economic role of cooperatives in the Lebanese context and the need to 
manage and promote their activities independently from other ministries, in particular the MOA. 
In 1975, there were 115 cooperatives (from which 67 agricultural) and the number of members 
was 29,999 (Andreou et al. 1979).   
During the civil war, no progress was reported on the cooperative movement development 
(UNDP 1992). In 1987, the Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Cooperatives, 
while studying cooperatives' membership in different countries, reported that Lebanon accounted 
for five percent in the percentage of cooperative members/total population (COPAC, 1987).  
After the end of the war and with the aim of reducing poverty, cooperatives were used as an 
instrument for rural development. In fact, the government, politicians, and development agencies 
encouraged producers to join together in cooperatives that partially collapsed during the war 
(Kubursi 2001). In 2000, this Ministry of Housing and Cooperatives was abolished and the DGC 
was merged within the MOA. The DGC supplies the following services (MOA 2012) 
• Registration of cooperative societies based on a socio-economic feasibility study 
• Provision of technical assistance in business management 
• Encouraging cooperation between cooperatives 
• Planning and organizing cooperative education and training  
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In 2011, The MOA reported that 1,636 cooperatives has been the total number of officially 
initiated cooperatives in Lebanon since independence. 445 of them have been dissolved. Table 5 
shows the distribution of 1,191 cooperatives across Mohafazat.   
Table 5: Distribution of cooperatives across Lebanon in 2011 
Mohafazat Number of cooperatives 
societies 
Percent of total 
Bekaa 209 17.5 
Nabatiyeh 208 17.5 
Beirut 42 2.5 
South Lebanon 164 12.7 
Mount Lebanon 252 21.2 
North Lebanon 315 26.4 
Source: MOA 2012 
 
Sixty-six percent of cooperatives societies are classified under the agricultural sector (plant, 
animal, processing, fishery, and beekeeping). They are distributed among the Mohafazat as 
follows:  
• North Lebanon: 32.97 percent 
• Bekaa: 30.9 percent 
• Nabatiyeh: 20.25 percent 
• Mount Lebanon: 15.5 percent 
• South Lebanon: 14.35 percent 
Financial support for cooperative societies has been a key policy in post-war agricultural 
policies. It increased from LL 512 million in 1998 to LL 812 million in 2001, when 100 
cooperatives societies benefited. Then, it was reduced to LL 45 million in 2004, the last year of 
direct financial support to cooperatives. In 2009, the DGC received four percent from the total 
budget allocated for the MOA (MOF 2009a).  
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As detailed in the introductory section of Chapter 1, the Lebanese government acknowledges a 
failure of coop societies.  However, no arguments were given to reveal what were the root causes 
behind this failure. Why were cooperatives not based on common members' needs? Why were 
they initiated to channel donors' support? And why do members not benefit from such support to 
implement sustainable services? No statistics were reported about the size of failure or the size of 
the survey carried to publish such data. In addition, why the government and development 
agencies continue to consider the role of cooperatives in agriculture development after declaring 
their failure was not elaborated. What is mostly lacking is the opinion of producers who are the 
target from relying on the cooperative tool in socio-economic development and might be the 
cause of failure.  
 
2.4.8.3. Agricultural marketing 
 
In the Lebanese market-based economic policy, the private sector is concerned with the 
marketing of agricultural products. The government has interfered in the marketing of some 
strategic crops and has established trade agreements in addition to norms and regulations which 
have mostly facilitated and fostered the development of agricultural exports.    
 
2.4.8.3.1. Marketing institutions: public and private 
 
Specific public and private marketing institutions have been initiated to help producers and 
traders in increasing their marketing opportunities and strengthening their competitiveness in the 
market economy.   
The “Regie Libanaise des Tabacs et Tombacs” is a state monopoly initiated in 1936 and is 
responsible for controlling the production, manufacturing, and trade of tobacco under the 
guidance of the MOF. This institution issues production permits and determines the yearly fixed 
quantities that can market for individual producers (RLTT 2003).  
The National Office of Cereals and Sugar Beets was initiated in 1959 to regulate the supply of 
cereals (wheat, barley, corn) and sugar beet in Lebanon. It is directed by the Ministry of 
Economy and Trade. It aims to secure the stability and safety of bread supply and to increase 
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local cereals production. In 2010, the office purchased 10,893 tons of wheat from local producers 
at a forty percent higher price than the global market and included barley in a new subsidy plan. 
The activities related to sugar beet were completely canceled by the government decision to stop 
subsidizing sugar beet production in 2008 (MOET 2011).  
The intervention of the MOA is indirect through policies and standardizations. It is mainly 
reflected through the yearly formulation of an agricultural calendar which restricts the import of 
certain agricultural products during the production season. Moreover, the MOA, through the 
agricultural resource management unit, disseminates norms and standards for classifying, 
sorting, and grading agricultural products (Choueiri 2002). Standards and norms are defined in 
collaboration with LIBNOR (the Lebanese Standards Institution), which is a public institution 
attached to the Ministry of Industry for setting national standards for all products falling under 
the agro-food sector (LIBNOR 2008). They have contributed to the improvement of exports 
through increased uniformity and labeling; however, at the local market level, there was no 
efficient mechanism to apply them among producers and wholesale markets.  
IDAL, a government institution under the guidance of the Prime Minister, promotes agricultural 
marketing by subsidizing exports and assisting traders in accessing new markets through 
technical capacity building and promotional support programs. IDAL’s system is to subsidize 
kilos of exports based on the application of norms and standards (IDAL 2006).  
As a private institution, the four Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture, which are 
located in Beirut, Tripoli, Saida, and Zahle, provide different marketing services to agricultural 
stakeholders; mainly technical advice on quality norms, market access requirements, market 
prices, trade agreements, trade statistics, contact details of importers and exporters in Lebanon 
and abroad (FCCIAL 2007).  
NGOs work to establish or facilitate post-harvest and processing services. Several interventions 
were applied. They could be either infrastructural work such as agricultural roads, processing, 
storage, and packaging units, or product design and development such as labeling and branding. 
For instance, USAID has granted several packing and post-harvest units across the country. With 
Rene Moawad Foundation, it implemented a project to sort, grade and pack apples; with World 
Vision Lebanon to pack and market organic agriculture products; etc (USAID 2012). The EU has 
also funded several packing units through the Agricultural Development project (ADP) that was 
implemented with cooperatives across Lebanon (EU 2008). 
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2.4.8.3.2. Description of marketing channels 
 
Producers in Lebanon have limited direct market access at local and external levels. Few big 
producers have been able to reach distant markets without the intervention of middlemen.  
 
2.4.8.3.2.1. Big holdings 
 
This category is mostly concerned with the export of fruits, in particular citrus, apples, grapes, 
bananas, and pears, with some vegetables, mainly potatoes, to nearby Gulf markets. Up to four 
intermediaries can intervene in the export process as follows: 
• From producers, a middleman (1) purchases the crop before harvest (prediction of 
production) or at harvest 
• From middlemen, wholesale traders (2), owning logistical tools such as transport 
vehicles, sell crops to exporters. 
• Exporters (3), usually operating in a packing unit, sort and pack crops and export them to 
external markets where a commission agent (3)- commission up to 6%- or representative 
sells the crop in wholesale markets. 
Few large holders are exporters at the same time without any intermediaries. In addition to 
marketing their production, such holders purchase directly from other small and medium 
producers to cover their export requests (Jaber 1997, Baalbaki 1985, Choueiri 2002). Exporters 
usually apply LIBNOR norms and standards and sometimes have received financial subsidies 
from the government through the export promotion program. Ninety-eight percent of exports are 
directed to Arab countries by land transport via Syria (IDAL 2010). Under several political 
challenges with Syria, the transit problem has paralyzed the export market and has made 
marketing under this category dependent on regional political circumstances (Habib 2007).  
  
2.4.8.3.2.2. Small holdings 
 
Representing the majority of the Lebanese producers, this category is concerned with the local 
marketing channels for varied agricultural produce. It involves several intermediaries to reach 
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the Lebanese consumers. From producers, middlemen (first intermediary) purchase the 
production on field. They pay transport costs to deliver it to wholesale markets or otherwise sell 
it to wholesale traders (second intermediary). The latter distributes production to wholesale 
dealers owning small units in wholesale markets (third intermediary). At this level, retailers 
(forth intermediary), either supermarkets, small shops, or mobile sellers, purchase the produce 
and sell it to individual consumers. For processed food, processors (fifth intermediary) usually 
buy from wholesale dealers, transform the product (jam, pickles, etc), and then sell it again to 
retailers. Most producers can directly reach wholesale dealers but few of them sell to retailers, 
who prefer to work with wholesale dealers that offer increased homogeneity and supply stability. 
In fact, medium sized producers prefer also wholesale dealers because they pay weekly, 
compared to retailers who pay quarterly. Dealers take a commission of ten percent on sale. The 
price is neither fixed between producers and dealers nor displayed on products. Producers allow 
dealers to sell their production based on trust. Every week on a fixed day, the dealers give a 
statement to producers detailing the selling prices. No accounting system monitors all the selling 
activity either for weight or for price. This dealing system is highly vulnerable to corruption. 
Producers cannot know if they are getting what retailers have paid. Dealers could register any 
price on the statement and then deduct ten percent from the total amount. This is the current 
system, no other choices, and producers are the weak part of it. Sometimes, when the loss in 
weight and waste are counted, the commission could reach thirty percent of the selling amount 
(Jaber 1997, Baalbaki 1985, Choueiri 2002). For instance, being a farmer, when I was receiving 
USD 0.6/kg of apples as return from wholesale dealers, consumers were paying USD 1.6/kg. 
There is 177 percent additional sum between what farmers get and consumers pay. Retailers are 
the main beneficiaries of the local marketing system. They get in one day, by selling products to 
consumers, more than producers can get from these crops during the whole production season. 
Producers get an even lower return when the cost of production is counted. Moreover, retailers 
have no risk compared to producers who are threatened by diverse natural challenges. When 
dealers get involved in supplying credits to producers, they force them to accept lower prices by 
being urged to sell them. In this case, producers face additional restricted marketing channels 
(Thomas 2000). At local markets, producers do not apply LIBNOR norms and standards. 
Different grades are packed in the same container, which may lower the total average price. No 
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conditioning for products is applied. Dealers try to sell products as soon as they reach the market. 
Otherwise, increased waste would occur. 
 
2.4.8.3.3. General marketing challenges  
 
Producers’ marketing challenges can be summarized as follows: 
• High market risks and the volatility of prices: the weak implementation of the agricultural 
calendar allows the dumping of subsidized products exported from other countries and 
accordingly affects market prices. It is a lack of market information and production 
strategies which generate over production without appropriate marketing channels 
(Iskandar 2000). 
• Lack of trust and abuse of small and medium producers by wholesale dealers. Local 
marketing channels are not transparent and based on considerations vulnerable to 
corruption. Several intermediaries reduce producers’ income and make available local 
marketing channels inefficient (Jaber 1997, Baalbaki 1985).   
• The weaknesses of producers’ marketing institutions such as cooperatives, which can 
reduce intermediaries, increase bargaining power, and open direct marketing channels.  
Also, unsuitable infrastructure going from transportation, packaging, cold storage, to 
distribution reduces the performance of agricultural marketing in addition to the quality 
of products. The development of fruit production in neighboring countries has reduced 
the export market of big holdings and has imposed further adoption of norms and 
standards that many small producers are not able to meet without proper government 
technical and financial assistance (Tatyan 2000).      
• Lack of agricultural credits with low interest rates makes producers dependent on input 
suppliers and market dealers who assure these credits, but control marketing 
opportunities or increase production costs. The lack of extension services to apply new 
marketing techniques is also considered a main challenge for Lebanese producers 
(Choueiri 2002).    
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2.4.8.4. Vocational associations 
 
In addition to cooperatives, unions and producers’ associations could play an essential role in 
increasing the power of small producers to influence and lobby decision makers at policy level. 
Such associations are crucial in the Lebanese context dominated by small and marginal 
producers. Their main objectives are to enhance the living conditions of producers’ members and 
protect their interests.  
In Lebanon, the unions of farmers have started at sub-sector and regional levels such as the 
Union of Grape Farmers in North Lebanon (1934), the Union of Dairy Cows in the Bekaa 
(1961), the Union of Apples and Fruit Trees in Lebanon (1972), and the Union of Tobacco 
Farmers (1973). Accordingly, the work of these unions differed upon crop needs and usually was 
limited to seasonal activities. For instance, the Tobacco Union asked higher prices from the 
MOF; however, the Dairy Cows Union asked to control the monopoly of forages supply and the 
need to initiate milk collection centers directly controlled by the Ministry of Economy and 
Trade. In 1975, all unions joined together to initiate the National Alliance of Farmers Unions in 
Lebanon. This union has formulated needs at sector level and has tried to influence decision 
makers to implement them across the country. For instance, it worked to cover producers by a 
specialized health and social insurance system, to import production resources directly from 
external markets without relying on input supply companies, to restore the supply of agricultural 
credits for small producers at low interest rates, to force the proper application of the agricultural 
calendar policy, to initiate a national fund for crop insurance against natural disasters, etc. 
(Baalbaki 1985). After the war, the UNDP mentioned that the influence of farmers’ unions is 
restricted for several reasons, in particular political control (UNDP 1992). There are no recent 
references updating the activity of the National Farmers Unions across the country.  
Sub-sector unions continue today to coordinate with the government their sectors’ needs at 
national level. For example, in 2011, the head of the tobacco farmers’ union requested a thirty 
percent increase in tobacco prices paid by the government and called on members to join a strike 
organized by the General Labor Organization to seek equitable salaries (The Daily Star 2011). In 
2003-2004, the Union of Apple Growers asked the government to raise compensation for crop 
losses caused by a natural hailstones disaster (El Ghoul 2004). Nowadays, the Lebanese 
Farmers’ Association is the most active farmers group at sector level. For example, in 2008, it 
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urged the government to maintain the agricultural calendar policy when the Minister of Economy 
and Trade decided to open the Lebanese market without any restrictions (The Daily Star 2008). 
There is no reference describing the internal problems of farmers’ unions and associations in 
Lebanon. However, similarly to all other vocational associations in other sectors, such groups are 
facing serious sectarian and political challenges that are imbedded in the Lebanese system.  
 
2.4.9. Nature of post-war agricultural policies in Lebanon 
 
2.4.9.1. General framework 
 
In parallel to the adopted neo-liberal economic policies, post-war agricultural policies did not 
contradict or deviate from the general framework of a non-interventionist state, except for some 
distinct supports targeting rural development and natural resource protection. This policy has 
limited government intervention to the development of required physical and social 
infrastructure; the formulation of legal and regulatory frameworks facilitating competition and 
increasing transparency; and the supply of essential public services covering market imbalances 
and reducing risks (ESCWA 1999, MOA 2005, Jaber 1997, Thomas 2000, Tatyan 2000, Nasnas 
et al. 2007). Similar to other economic sectors, the government has seen that agricultural 
development can only take place through private sector initiatives. Accordingly, subsidy 
programs were used to increase the private sector participation and secure benefits through 
minimum efficiency, in particular price support for tobacco, wheat, sugar beet; credit support 
through KAFALAT credit program; and export support through Export plus and Agri-plus 
programs (Markou and Stavri, 2005, Hunter 2006, Iskandar 2000).  
Since 1992, Lebanon has been increasingly taking part of the globalized movement toward freer 
trade with a low focus on national food security compared to neighboring countries such as Syria 
and Egypt (Hunter 2006). Food products represented the largest simple group of imports at an 
average rate of sixteen percent from 2003 to 2007. The value of agricultural exports over 
agricultural imports reached twenty percent in 2007 (MOA 2007).  Apart from the agricultural 
calendar, trade restrictions have been gradually disappearing and bilateral and multilateral free 
trade agreements are being ratified in order to decrease tariffs and subsidies (Hunter 2006). The 
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liberal agricultural policy is mainly expressed by the post-war low budget allocated for the 
MOA, which received an average of 0.87 percent from the total budget between 1992 and 2006 
(MOF 2007). Even when other budgets linked to the agricultural sector policy are counted, such 
as the tobacco subsidy through the MOF, the cereals subsidy through the Ministry of Economy 
and Trade, the export subsidy through IDAL, and reconstruction activities through the CDR, the 
agricultural share from the total budget did not surpass the one percent amount (Markou and 
Stavri 2005). The support allocated for the agricultural sector by various international donors 
(such as EU, USAID, Japan, several Arab countries etc.) has exceeded the government budget 
and in 2003 was more than the double (Hunter 2006).   
 
2.4.9.2. Agricultural and trade policies 
 
Post-war governments have planned to target small and big holders to regain competitiveness in 
a global market economy. They have been undertaking reforms that promote market 
liberalization by minimizing restrictions, modernizing laws, and simplifying measurements that 
facilitate the growth of the private sector and increase the productivity of public services. In 
addition, they kept on and updated the major components of the Lebanese agricultural policies 
such as the Green Plan and the agricultural calendar.  
2.4.9.2.1. Subsidies or price support 
 
Subsidies were allocated directly to selected crops in order to maintain a certain strategic 
production in the country or indirectly through the support on export.  
2.4.9.2.1.1. Selected crops 
 
Wheat: The government, through the Office of Cereals and Sugar Beet in the Ministry of 
Economy and Trade, has assured the purchase of wheat production at a subsidized price and has 
provided farmers with selected seeds. Wheat subsidy is not a new policy; the office has been 
purchasing the total local wheat production since 1963. What has changed since 1991 is that the 
government has urged flour mills to purchase locally produced wheat at the subsidized rate in 
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order to allow them to import the remaining market needs at global rate prices (Nasnas et al. 
2007, Hunter 2006, Tatyan 2000). In 2005, the government purchased 72,900 tons of wheat and 
paid a forty percent additional price compared to market prices (MOET 2011).  
Sugar beet: Likewise, the production of sugar beet and its transformation has been subsidized by 
the government through the same office. The difference with wheat is that subsidies of sugar beet 
were not on production quantities but on cultivated areas and on farmers’ size. Small farmers get 
a higher subsidy rate per unit area compared to big farmers. Moreover, sugar beet production has 
only started to be subsidized under post-war governments since 1991. The number of sugar beet 
farmers increased from 750 to 1,250 in 1999 and land surface planted by sugar beet increased 
from 1,062 ha to 7,221 ha in 1998 (Iskandar 1999). In 2001, the government stopped the sugar 
beet subsidy. Then, it renewed it in 2004 for only three years when the priority was given to 
small farmers with a maximum 5 ha receiving subsidy per farmer (MOET 2011, Markou and 
Stavri 2005).  
Tobacco: The National Office for Tobacco and Tombacs in the MOF oversees the subsidy 
program for tobacco farmers. The office subsidizes farmers by buying their production at higher 
market prices. The rate of subsidies differs between agricultural regions, which are able to 
produce different qualities. The subsidy rate is fifty percent in South Lebanon- very good quality 
demanded in the international market such as USA; 600 percent in the Bekaa- low quality due to 
soil conditions and irrigation requirements; and 800 percent in North Lebanon- very low quality 
(ESCWA 1999). The production of tobacco has increased from two million kg in 1992 to around 
eight million kg in 1999 (Iskandar 1999).  
Other crops:  The MOA subsidizes the cost of vaccinations and drugs for livestock breeders 
(Markou and Stavri 2005). Fruit and vegetable farmers have no direct financial support on 
production similar to wheat and tobacco farmers. Instead, on occasion of natural disasters or over 
production, fruit and vegetable crops have benefited from a subsidized marketing program to 
cover the need of the Lebanese Army or other public institutions (Hunter 2006). Olive farmers 
have also received occasional subsidized marketing support from the Higher Commission for 
Relief under the authority of the Council of Ministers. In 2003, 1500 olive oil tons were 
marketed from farmers across Lebanon and then sold at subsidized prices for the Lebanese Army 
and social organizations (Markou and Stavri 2005). 
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2.4.9.2.1.2. Support on export 
 
The government, after stopping the sugar beet subsidy in 2001, launched the Export Plus 
program which technically and financially supports Lebanese traders to export agricultural 
products into regional and international markets. The program has targeted exporters, producers, 
and agricultural cooperatives. IDAL prepared this program at an estimated cost of USD 33 
million. Until 2010, 144 Lebanese exporters benefited from the support of Export Plus. Unlike 
the support of selected crops for local consumption, the Export Plus program has subsidized the 
export of fruits, vegetables, flowers, and eggs. Cash subsidies were paid to exporters in order to 
cover a part of the transportation cost. Therefore, subsidies have differed according to market 
destination. Only exporters meeting specific LIBNOR norms and standards have received 
financial support (IDAL 2006). From 2002 till 2007, total exports through the program increased 
by 224 percent, going from 144,745 tons to 469,336 tons respectively. Non-Arab countries only 
accounted for three percent of the total export in 2007. Syria accounted for twenty-three percent 
in the same period (IDAL 2007).  
 
2.4.9.2.2. Agricultural calendar 
 
Since Lebanon has always been able to meet self sufficiency in fruits and vegetables, agricultural 
policy makers have put special concern to protect these products and export their surpluses 
through the the application of the agricultural calendar policy or import restriction since the 
1960s. The post-war government kept this policy and amended it in 1992 and 1995. This policy 
restricts the imports of citrus, apples, olives, grapes, and potatoes. Other crops may be imported 
but need a special permission from the MOA, including cucumbers, tomatoes, and onions. As 
well, some crops such as squash, eggplants, watermelons, garlic, apricots, peaches, and pears can 
be imported without permission from the MOA but in restricted times when the same local crops 
are in short supply (Jaber 1997, ESCWA 1999). Animal product imports, especially milk, are 
also restricted during a certain periods of the year (Hunter 2006). Under the Greater Arab free 
Trade Agreement, a maximum of nine agricultural products can be included in the agricultural 
calendar and for a maximum of thirty-five weeks. This restriction does not authorize 
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prohibitions. Products listed in the calendar are allowed to enter into the Lebanese market; 
however they do not receive the reduction in tariff rates during the restriction period (MOET 
2011a).  
 
2.4.9.2.3. Trade policies 
 
Since the Lebanese government policy has historically favored an open market economy, 
agricultural trade has been promoted and expanded with post-war governments. The main 
agricultural trade agreements effective today were signed after the end of the civil war. Lebanon 
has signed various bilateral trade agreements including one with Syria, Kuwait, UAE, and Egypt, 
etc. In 1997, new tariffs and bans on food imports were forced with the aim of cutting trade 
deficit and increasing government revenues. However, in 2000, following a pressure from the 
EU and other trading partners, the government replaced import bans and administrative 
regulations by import tariffs which were to be cut from an average of twenty percent to an 
average of fifteen percent and rates over 100 percent were reduced to seventy percent (Hunter 
2006). Under the seventy percent tariffs category, the self-sufficient agricultural products in 
Lebanon such as chicken, honey, yogurt, and various fruits and vegetables are included (Markou 
and Stavri 2005).  
In 1998, Lebanon signed the Great Arab Free Trade Agreement which governs trade relations 
with most Arab countries receiving more than ninety-five percent of Lebanese agricultural 
exports. Under this agreement, tariffs on all agricultural products were gradually decreased and 
subsequently eliminated by 2005. Some products are forbidden to enter some Arab countries for 
religious and sanitary reasons (MOF 2009, 2010, 2011). In 1999, the government allowed the 
free trade of Syrian agricultural products (Markou and Stavri 2005). In 2002, an association 
agreement was signed with the EU as a part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative. 
Under this agreement, most agricultural Lebanese products enjoy zero tariffs access to EU 
market, while the progressive elimination of tariffs on EU products is to occur between 2008 and 
2014. In 1999, Lebanon applied for membership in the WTO and was granted an observer status. 
In 2001, the Memorandum of Foreign Trade Region was submitted to the WTO as a second step 
toward full membership. To date, several working party meetings have reviewed the government 
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responses to the issues raised by the WTO members; however, Lebanon has not yet been granted 
a full membership. In 2004, the government has signed a free trade agreement with the European 
Free Trade Association grouping Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Iceland. The 
agreement became applicable in 2007. It only covers processed agricultural products (MOF 
2009, 2010, 2011).  
 
2.4.9.3. Infrastructure policies: Green Plan (GP) and Irrigation 
 
Post-war governments have continued to promote the policy of land reclamation and irrigation 
modernization led by the GP, which provides financial support for farmers undertaking the 
following activities:  
• Land rehabilitation 
• Agricultural road initiation (group of farmers) 
• Water storage initiation: concrete water tanks, earthen ponds, irrigation canals, etc 
• Reforestation 
• Production resources: seeds, trees, etc. 
• Complementary works: fences, irrigation pumps, trellis for table grapes, support walls in 
hilly areas, etc. 
Until 2008, around 62,000 farmers benefited from the GP support. Thirty-four thousand hectares 
were rehabilitated, 1100 ha were irrigated, and 740 km of agricultural roads were initiated 
(Green Plan 2010a).  
Since irrigation water is a decisive factor for agricultural development and productivity, post-war 
governments have invested in the rehabilitation and expansion of water resources. Legal 
frameworks for the management of irrigation and groundwater resources has been revised and 
updated. The government has planned to increase irrigation capacity by thirty to fifty percent 
over the period 2003-2030. The government investment was managed by the Ministry of Energy 
and Water Resources, The Litani River Authority, and the CDR. Sixty percent of the Ministry of 
Energy and Water investment programs were allocated for the initiation of new dams and the 
remaining forty percent for the modernization of irrigation networks. Since 1994, irrigation has 
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received nine percent from the total public capital expenditure in the water sector. Public 
irrigation services have been differently charged upon area and volumetric consumption though 
the use of pressurized networks. Tariffs have ranged from very low levels up to USD 450/ha 
(World Bank 2010).  
 
2.4.9.4. Public services 
 
Because agriculture in Lebanon is the weakest sector of the economy and has received low 
investments compared to other sectors, public services were highly essential in order to ensure 
fair distribution and equitable access to essential resources. The post-war government has 
continued to offer a variety of public services aiming to reduce market imbalances, shortages and 
to regulate the general legal framework of various components in the sector, such as water, soil, 
market, prices, etc. As detailed above in the earlier sections describing the agricultural sector, the 
government has been engaged in the following services: laws and regulations for farm holdings 
and farm structure (land fragmentation, land tenure, small holdings, etc.), regulation of input 
supply, education, extension, credit supply, research, studies and strategies, cooperative 
enterprise management, market regulation (domestic and foreign), food security, forest 
protection, etc. (UNDP 1992, International Bechtel Inc and Dar el Handasah Consultants 1992, 
MOA 2005).   
This part is limited to the type of public services and not to their efficiency. Since the 
government strategy has promoted the private sector, it is clear from the agriculture descriptions 
above that private initiatives, in addition to the involvement of non-governmental organizations, 
have offered similar and more relevant agricultural services and have effectively participated in 
the formulation of regulatory and legal frameworks.  
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2.4.9.5. Reconstruction policies 
 
In the post-war reconstruction period, agriculture has received little support from the government 
in comparison with other sectors of the economy and in particular under the Horizon 2000 plan 
for reconstruction and development. Initiatives were left to the private sector to carry out the 
needed investments.   
Only 4.8 percent of the total Horizon 2000 budget were allocated to the agriculture and irrigation 
sector. Physical investments were divided 40 to 60 between agricultural and irrigation 
respectively. The budget in agriculture was mainly directed to the rehabilitation and development 
of agricultural roads, land preservation and reclamation, increasing access to credits, 
reforestation, and the rehabilitation and extension of the ministry services, agricultural schools, 
and training centers. Agriculture credits and construction of roads have received 44.6 percent of 
the budget. Studies have received 27.3 percent. In irrigation, physical investments targeted the 
rehabilitation of all existing irrigated networks and the development of newly irrigated land 
(CDR 1993). For the distribution of agricultural and irrigation expenditures among Mohafazat, 
South Lebanon received the highest percentage (37%), followed by the Bekaa (33%), North 
Lebanon (19.3%), while Mount Lebanon received the lowest percentage (10.6%). 
 
2.4.9.6. Evaluation of post-war agricultural policies 
 
This overview of the main agricultural and trade policies reveals that agriculture was a low 
priority sector for post-war governments. Associated policies were carried out in a highly 
fragmented and disconnected manner (Hunter 2006, AFIAL 2001, ESCWA 1999). Low 
government expenditures and the reconstruction budget in agriculture explain the minimalist role 
of the state in agricultural development compared to other sectors (Hunter 2006). Unfavorable 
macro-economic conditions expressed by the over-valued Lebanese currency and high interest 
rates have promoted imports over exports and have reduced domestic production. The trade 
balance has been decreasing and free trade has been increasing through various trade agreements 
(ESCWA 1999). Export subsidies were limited to 144 exporters across Lebanon and small 
farmers have complained that traders and intermediaries were only benefiting from such export 
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programs (Hunter 2006). Subsidies for specific crops were based on a societal cost (for instance 
to replace illegal crops) and not as a part of an overall strategy for agricultural development or 
specific economic or environmental justifications. There were no specific criteria for farmers’ 
eligibility for these subsidies. The price support did not help farmers to invest in increasing 
production but was offered as short term solution to cover the price difference compared to 
similar crops when imported from foreign markets. It is also noted that specific subsidies have 
benefited large producers at the expense of small producers and poor consumers. The 
composition of the population over ethnic lines has also made the process more complex and 
allowed room for favoritism. Cutting subsidies on sugar beet was driven by budget deficit and 
public debt and not by the inefficiency of such subsidies on the long-term (Hunter 2006, 
ESCWA 1999, AFIAL 2001). The weak implementation of the agricultural calendar by the 
government has allowed the dumping of subsidized agricultural crops from neighboring 
countries (Iskandar 1999, 2000).  The Green Plan was only able to respond yearly to 15-20 
percent of total submitted requests for land reclamation and other services (Green Plan 2010a).  
Therefore, it appears that post-war agricultural policies have increased food dependency and 
reduced food security under a general neo-liberal environment. Adopted policies and related 
budgets have left local markets to be dominated by private sector initiatives which were directly 
supported through credits and subsidies. Policies have targeted big producers and exporters more 
than small producers that have been progressively moving out of the sector due to several 
structural challenges, especially that sixty-six percent of them were classified as part-time 
producers. The low government involvement will certainly leave room for NGOs that appeared 
to be investing twice the amount of the government in 2003. Knowing that there are several 
political NGOs working in the agricultural sector, small producers’ control for a political aim 
will increase on the long-term.  
 
2.4.10. Connections between agricultural characteristics and producers’ cooperatives  
 
Multiple connections can be outlined to show the close relationship between agricultural 
characteristics in Lebanon and producers’ cooperatives.  
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The following specific agricultural characteristics highlight, when combined together, the 
importance of cooperation between producers aiming to increase their production efficiency:  
• Dominance of self-employment  
• Small size of holdings, part-time farming, and land fragmentation 
• Importance of share cropping and renting 
• The low percentage of youth farmers 
• Dominance of Mulk ownership 
Producers’ cooperatives, by their potential role in increasing income and access to markets, 
improving producers’ skills, increasing access to services and power to influence their policies, 
and increasing bargaining power, could be an important tool to resolve the main Lebanese 
agricultural challenges and induce rural development. In particular, they could address the 
following challenges: 
• The low education level of producers 
• Lack of mechanization in some agricultural operations  
• The inefficient link between producers and research institutions 
• Weak extension services 
• Low irrigation efficiency 
• Lack of specific agricultural credit facilities, high interest rates for agricultural credits 
from commercial banks 
• Fragile marketing channels and the presence of several intermediaries between producers 
and consumers 
• Weak vocational associations 
• And finally, the fragmented agricultural policies that only benefit large producers  
Accordingly, successful cooperatives initiatives could be classified strategical while aiming to 
develop the agricultural sector and increasing its contribution to GDP, to employment, and to 
exports.  
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Chapter 3- Role of Cooperatives in Government Agricultural 
Development Policies 
 
This chapter examines the potential role of cooperatives assigned by the government in the main 
agricultural policies that were developed after the civil war. First, it elaborates the potential 
normative role of producers’ cooperatives in the Lebanese context by matching their 
characteristics in theory and practice, outlined in Chapter 1, with the detailed features of the 
Lebanese economy and agricultural sector, elaborated in Chapter 2. Then, it analyses the main 
agricultural development policies and identifies what were the objectives and impacts planned by 
using the cooperative enterprise tool. It continues by showing what the government has 
undertaken in order to facilitate the development of cooperatives and ends by examining its 
cooperation with other actors (NGOs, coops, etc) for sustainable interventions.  
This chapter relies on available secondary data such as agricultural development policies and 
agricultural sector analysis and on other primary data gathered during interviews with the 
Minister Consultant for cooperatives’ development in the MOA, Eng. Hasan Atwe, and the 
office managers of the DGC across the different agricultural regions.  
 
3.1. Potential normative role of producers’ cooperatives in the Lebanese 
context 
 
In this section, the theory of cooperatives and agricultural development elaborated in Chapter 1 
are analyzed in conjunction with the structure of the Lebanese economy, the post 1992-economic 
and reconstruction policies, and the in-depth description of the Lebanese agricultural sector that 
were detailed in Chapter 2. This section explores and evaluates the normative role that 
producers’ cooperatives could play in the Lebanese agricultural context. It aims to show how 
producers’ cooperatives could, whenever internal and external constraints are avoided under 
optimal conditions, induce producers’ socio-economic development in Lebanon.  
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3.1.1. The Lebanese economy 
 
As a pre-requisite for external success, the laissez-faire liberal market-based economic policy 
that has been adopted in Lebanon since independence supports the development of cooperative 
enterprises. Producers’ initiatives, legalized as cooperative enterprises, are considered an 
autonomous organization free to work in Lebanon and invest in what members see as important 
for their socio-economic development. Cooperatives can operate without limitations on 
management and agri-business activities; also the government has enacted laws and regulations 
that assure their autonomy and independence. The restriction of public ownership to 
infrastructure and some main utilities has favored the private sector role under which producers’ 
cooperatives have the legal authority to offer goods and services for members and surrounding 
non-members asking for cooperative services. In addition, the government has promoted 
cooperative enterprises by giving them special arrangements in terms of tax reduction or 
cancellation. Therefore, Lebanese economic policy facilitates cooperatives’ initiatives and favors 
their external principles that are described by the ICA as the life of the movement in the global 
economy. In particular, the principles of autonomy and independence of cooperatives, voluntary 
and open membership, and cooperation between cooperatives are highly advocated in Lebanese 
cooperative law. Cooperatives are allowed to cooperate democratically with each other at 
regional, national, and international levels in order to bind their power against the external 
challenge of highly competitive markets. On the other hand, a main theoretical disadvantage for 
cooperatives under the free Lebanese economy is the increased competition with capitalist 
enterprises that showed a better performance under Neoliberalism as previously detailed in 
Chapter 1. But, since the agricultural sector in Lebanon is unattractive to private investments 
compared to the service sector; producers’ cooperatives could be the main economic enterprise 
solution in the context of low market competition especially in rural areas where agriculture is 
mostly located. 
Looking to the structure of GDP composition and the status of the agricultural sector as the 
weakest sector in the Lebanese economy, producers’ cooperatives could be identified as a 
strategic tool to increase the share of agriculture in the total GDP. By theoretically having the 
potential role of expanding production and increasing its efficiency, enhancing market access 
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and reaching regional and international markets, and increasing producers’ income and power, 
producers’ cooperatives could expand the output of the agricultural sector at national level or at 
least maintain its size. In parallel, cooperatives may then increase the contribution of agriculture 
to GDP growth. In fact, this role is highly essential in the Lebanese economy where agriculture 
had approximately showed no contribution (0.7 percent points) to GDP growth between 1998 
and 2009. Both effects, the increased size of agriculture in GDP and its growth, would generate 
agricultural job opportunities especially in rural areas. Accordingly, the lowest share of the 
agricultural sector in employment (6 percent) in Lebanon could be increased. What is important 
is that cooperatives can help not only in creating permanent or seasonal jobs but also in ensuring 
decent jobs and reducing rural migration without gender preference as expressed in the open 
membership principle, cooperative values, and the sustainable employment potential role of 
cooperatives.  
Moreover, producers’ cooperatives, by their potential role at enterprise level and as a socio-
economic development tool, can offer an effective solution to reduce trade deficits in Lebanon. 
In 2007, agriculture accounted for sixteen percent of total imports and thirteen percent of total 
exports. The ratio of agricultural exports to imports has been accelerating. It increased from eight 
percent to twenty percent between 1997 and 2007. Accordingly, federal and confederation 
cooperatives at national level can design long term strategic plans to decrease imports of crops 
that could be produced locally and increase the exports of other crops that register self-
sufficiency in Lebanon. The percentage of exports to imports is still low and could be increased. 
Already, Lebanon exports more fruits than it imports and has self-sufficiency in poultry produce. 
However, eighty-two percent of red meat, thirty-seven percent of raw milk, and seventy-five 
percent of fish consumption are imported. Here, cooperatives have the potential to develop these 
sub-sectors and progressively cover domestic consumption. Indeed, the government policy 
facilitates such an approach by preparing land for exchange through trade agreements and 
treaties such as the Grater Arab Free Trade Agreement, Euro-Mediterranean, and diverse 
bilateral agreements. Likewise, trade is encouraged through the export support policy under 
which cooperatives are authorized bodies to receive government financial support. The three 
percent export gap to non-Arab countries in the Export Plus Program, which supported traders by 
subsidizing exports, could be enhanced through cooperatives which can offer technical support 
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and new technologies to meet the quality requirements of European markets and post-harvest 
facilities and services to reach these markets.  
Members, through the principle of member economic participation, can overcome together the 
negligible foreign direct investment in the agricultural sector. They can share in investment and 
offer services essential for their production. Also, this principle helps covering the low capital 
expenditure in public finance which only accounted for six percent from 1998 to 2010 compared 
to forty percent of interest payment and foreign debt principal repayment.  
In conclusion, producers’ cooperatives can theoretically improve the role of the agricultural 
sector in the Lebanese economy by increasing the contribution of agriculture to GDP and its 
growth, reducing trade deficits, and carrying out collective investments.   
 
3.1.2. Post-1992 economic and reconstruction policies 
 
The contribution of the agriculture sector to GDP during post-1992 economic and reconstruction 
policies has been gradually depreciating in favor of the service sector for which macro-economic 
policies have been far more accommodating. The share of agriculture to total GDP declined from 
eight percent in 1994 to five percent in 2009. In fact, the stable exchange rate based nominal 
anchor policy, which was implemented by means of a supportive high interest rate policy, has 
had a major negative impact on the competitiveness and health of the agricultural sector. High 
interest rates, which were essential to attract foreign capital and stem out the domestic liquidity 
required to finance the government Horizon 2000 project as well as to cover budget deficits, 
have appreciated the Lebanese pound far above its true equilibrium and have crowded-out 
private credits for investment, in particular for the agricultural sector. This appreciation has 
limited the growth in agricultural exports compared to the growth in agricultural imports. 
Agricultural exports increased by L.L. 391 billion; however agricultural imports increased by 
L.L. 705 billion between 1997 and 2007. Accordingly, agricultural trade deficits increased by 
fifteen percent over the same period. For the availability of credits, the ration of public over 
private bank loans rarely went over one between 1999 and 2010, with an average of 1.12 over 
the same period. The lack of liquidity has increased the overall production costs and has reduced 
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the capacity of expanding and sustaining production operations by means of credits. This fact is 
well articulated through the lowest percentage share of the agricultural sector from banking 
credits. Agricultural credits have amounted to 1.3 percent of total banking credits between 
1997and 2007 compared to thirty percent for the trade sector over the same period. Likewise, 
Bekaa, the largest agricultural region in Lebanon, received four percent of private sector loans 
between 1997 and 2007 compared to eighty-one percent of loans concentrated in Beirut where no 
significant agricultural production is being carried out. 
Under the Horizon 2000 reconstruction plan, the production sector received the lowest 
percentage of total budget expenditures. Its budget amounted to a total of eight percent compared 
to thirty-seven percent for physical infrastructure and twenty-five percent for social 
infrastructure. In the production sector, around five percent was allocated for agriculture and 
irrigation. However until 2009, only 1.2 percent of the total budget was spent on both sub-sectors 
compared to fourteen percent on electricity and twenty-five percent on transport. In terms of 
budget regional distribution and what was achieved until 2009, it is noticed that where 
agriculture is concentrated, e.g.in the Bekaa, Nabatiyeh, south and north Lebanon, real 
expenditures have been lower than planned expenditures. However, in Beirut, where there is no 
agricultural production, real expenditures have been higher than what was planned.  
Post-1992 regressive tax reforms have imposed a greater burden on small producers when the 
government has relied on indirect taxes such as gasoline tax and VAT. In general, the 
agricultural sector was severely affected by the increased public debt, budget deficits, and debt 
services which have expanded under post-1992 economic and reconstruction policies. The 
government has limited capital expenditures as a whole and in particular in agricultural rural 
areas and has focused on infrastructure development and rehabilitation essential for private 
sector initiatives that rarely invest in agriculture.  
Therefore, individual producers under post-1992 agricultural challenges have low potential to 
sustain production and compete at local and international markets without government direct 
support and more importantly without pooling their efforts and resources.   
The cooperative enterprise model could have a high potential for alleviating these challenges and 
developing the agricultural sector in general.   
140 
 
The values of cooperation, the cooperation among cooperatives principle, and the potential role 
of cooperatives in enhancing the power of their members to influence government policies 
through unions, federals, and apex structures are well located to lobby government agricultural 
policy in Lebanon. All agricultural challenges reported under post-1992 economic and 
reconstruction policies- either for the percentage share of total expenditures in the reconstruction 
project, for the distribution of expenditures among Mohafazat, or for macro-economic policies of 
stable exchange rate and high interest rates- can be overcome through the increased power of 
cooperatives. Producers’ cooperatives, which already get tax exemption by-law, can ask the 
government to reform the regressive tax structure in coordination with the community and other 
civil society organizations. By their potential role in decreasing the cost of production and 
increasing market access, cooperatives can help members to surmount the side effects of the 
over-valued currency and reduced exports. Likewise, credit cooperatives, offering lower non-
exploitable interest rates for members, can offer a solution to the high interest rate policy. 
Cooperatives can also guarantee better access to credit institutions because they are more trusted 
than individual producers. Finally, for the challenges of debt and budget deficits that limit the 
government capital expenditures, producers’ cooperatives, through the principle of members’ 
economic participation and their normative role at enterprise level, are highly effective at 
overcoming the reduced government intervention in the agricultural sector under Lebanese 
liberal market policy. 
The potential of producers’ cooperatives under post-1992 economic and reconstruction policies 
may reflect a theoretical overestimation about the capacity of cooperative enterprises. But if not 
cooperatives, what other type of enterprises could be equitable and offer equal opportunities for 
small producers? It is difficult to answer this question and give convincing alternatives 
comparable to the potential role of cooperative enterprises.  
 
3.1.3. Lebanese agricultural characteristics  
 
In Chapter 2, the major challenges of Lebanese agriculture could be mainly classified under the 
following interdependent components: 
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a. Structural (small producers, part-time farming, land fragmentation, etc.)  
b. Technical (education, irrigation, etc.) 
c. Services supply (mechanization, production resources, etc.) 
d. Marketing  
e. Credits (availability, access, and interest rates) 
On first impressions, producers’ cooperatives appear to be a strategic tool to resolve the main 
challenges of Lebanese agriculture.  
Starting by the definition of cooperative enterprises -organizations that aim to meet the common 
economic, social, and cultural needs of a group through a jointly owned and democratically 
controlled enterprise- producers’ cooperatives are well positioned to manage the small and part-
time structural challenges of Lebanese producers. When small producers, accounting for 
seventy-five percent of the total number of producers, invest together to supply and manage their 
common needs through their cooperatives, they can decrease their cost of production by applying 
the economy of scale principle and accordingly their production efficiency can increase. 
Likewise, cooperatives can help part-time producers, representing sixty-six percent of Lebanese 
producers, to maintain production without being challenged by the lack of production and 
marketing services. By managing these structural weaknesses, the challenge of land 
fragmentation and its associated low efficiency could be overcome. Regarding the limitation of 
land tenure under renting and sharecropping- significant in Lebanon by accounting for thirty-four 
percent of UAS- cooperation can overcome the lack of investment caused by short term contracts 
and, through the increased power of members, can demand longer term contracts assuring 
minimum production efficiency. This way, cooperatives can undertake themselves renting and 
sharecropping contracts and then distribute land to members.  
By their apex organization, producers can influence the government to control the degradation of 
agricultural fields caused by uncontrolled urbanization that was accelerated with the 
reconstruction boom after 1992. They can ask the government to protect lands which were 
classified for agricultural use and limit construction permits to rainfed or less fertile hilly lands.  
The education principle and the potential role of increasing producers’ skills give producers’ 
cooperatives an essential role in managing technical weaknesses. Cooperatives can be effective 
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in facilitating public extension services by helping government agents to reach a group of 
producers instead of individual producers and to carry out farmers’ field school. Likewise, in 
coordination with the input supply companies, cooperatives can ask private extension agents to 
reach producers’ members through their centers on condition to homogenize application rates 
and costs of production resources. With NGOs, cooperatives can seek funds to implement 
demonstration plots and deliver extension services to non-members too by applying the principle 
of concern for community. Moreover, they can lobby the government to allocate more financial 
resources for extension services under the public services policy. Ensuring proper extension 
services for members helps overcoming soil and water pollution caused by the overuse of 
pesticides and fertilizers. In addition, since agriculture is the largest sector in Lebanon in terms 
of water demand, efficient extension services on new irrigation techniques and sustainable water 
management can be effective in delaying the expected water shortage in Lebanon. In the 
agricultural research, cooperatives can transfer field problems to research institutions and can 
work to initiate a solid link between students, producers, and researchers. Technical issues are 
crucial for the majority of Lebanese producers who did not pass the primary education level. 
For the lack of services challenge, producers’ cooperatives can apply economies of scale and 
initiate, by relying on the principle of members’ economic participation, service centers to offer 
mechanization in multiple agricultural operations, post-harvest activities (packing, storing, 
processing, etc.), input supply, etc. By offering mechanization services, cooperatives can 
enhance the low distribution across Lebanon and improve the limited availability in different 
agricultural operations and during peak season demand.  For input supply, cooperatives can 
either cooperate with input suppliers to homogenize application rates and costs as elaborated 
above or offer input supply services themselves to break the monopoly of suppliers.  
In terms of marketing, producers’ cooperatives could be highly effective in Lebanon. First of all, 
for the link with marketing institutions, cooperatives can help logistically small producers to 
reach these institutions and vice-versa. With the aim of targeting the majority of producers, it 
would be more efficient for the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, for LIBNOR 
(the Lebanese Standards Institution), for NGOs, and related ministries to deal with groups of 
producers working together through an economic enterprise controlled internally by members 
and can be legally involved in financial partnerships. Second, in terms of marketing channels, 
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producers’ cooperatives are well located under big and small holdings to reduce the number of 
intermediaries and reach distant outlets across the country as well as export markets. For big 
holdings, several producers can invest together to own logistical and post-harvest facilities as 
well as employ their representatives in export markets. This way, they can decrease operation 
costs and commissions taken by different intermediaries. Moreover, producers selling their 
production to exporters can also bind their efforts to increase their bargaining power. For small 
holdings, cooperatives are much more needed in Lebanon. Small producers have irregular supply 
and small quantities limiting their negotiation capacity. They have only one choice to sell their 
production to wholesale traders or through wholesale dealers. As detailed in Chapter 2, the 
commission of dealers can reach thirty to forty percent. Therefore, cooperatives can provide an 
important solution by operating their outlets in wholesale markets or by selling directly to 
consumers through big farmers markets. Here also, producers can increase together their 
bargaining power with traders in case they did not manage to run their own outlets. 
The norms of LIBNOR can be applied by coordinating with cooperatives. Credits offered by 
cooperatives can help small farmers to cover the cost of needed production resources and avoid 
the exploitation of wholesale traders and dealers who lend money to producers on condition that 
they restrict their marketing opportunities. Extension services for new marketing techniques 
(packing, labeling, etc) can be assured by coops as detailed above. Branding products is more 
applicable for a group of small producers than individual small producers. 
To improve the access of small producers to credits within the latent status of specialized 
agricultural credit institutions in Lebanon, credit cooperatives can normatively supply members 
with credits at non-exploitable interest rates and with minimum guarantee requirements. 
Accordingly, the challenges of high interest rate credits and producers’ exploitation through 
informal credits would be managed. In addition, the cooperative confederation can lobby the 
government to activate specialized credit institutions and allocate enough financial resources for 
them. 
Finally, the political, sectarian and organizational weaknesses of the national farmers’ union and 
sub-sector unions could be overcome by the essential role of cooperative unions and the 
cooperative confederation in increasing the power of producers and fostering their objectives. 
The values of cooperation and the principles of voluntary and open membership, cooperation 
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between cooperatives, autonomy and independence, and concern for community could be highly 
effective in managing these weaknesses. 
 
3.1.4. Post-war Lebanese agricultural policies 
 
Neoliberal post-war Lebanese agricultural policies have mainly supported big producers either in 
the subsidies’ programs, the agricultural calendar, trade measurements, or infrastructure and 
reconstruction policies. Therefore, by increasing the power of small producers to influence 
government agricultural policies and by being themselves enterprises that could supply efficient 
services based on a set of principles and values, producers’ cooperatives could be normatively 
identified as an essential tool for small producers’ socio-economic development under post-war 
Lebanese agricultural policies. 
The cooperative confederation can push the government to increase investment in the 
agricultural sector, reflected in post-war period by the low budget allocated for the MOA which 
mainly covered public services’ expenditures. The private sector’s lack of interest in agriculture 
compared to the service sector would be overcome if producers in cooperatives rely on the 
principle of members’ economic participation to assure the initial investment cost needed to start 
a new project or initiate new services. For trade policies, the cooperative confederation can ask 
the government to participate in designing the main trade agreements. Likewise, it uses its power 
to increase tariff rates on imported products during their local production season. For special 
crop support, cooperatives can decrease favoritism by the equality and equity coop values and 
can help the government to set clear criteria for the financial support selection and to include this 
support under an overall agricultural development strategy not as a societal cost lacking 
sustainability and credibility. 
For the export support policy that benefits a few exporters at the expense of producers, 
cooperatives can group small producers to export their products directly through collective 
investments in post-harvest services. Under reconstruction policies, the cooperative 
confederation can lobby the government to invest in collective assets such as post-harvest or 
processing units directly managed by cooperatives, instead of commissioning technical and 
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project studies that have received twenty-seven percent of the total budget allocated for 
agriculture in Horizon 2000 plan. Moreover, the cooperative confederation can push the 
government to effectively implement the agricultural calendar and reduce smuggling on borders. 
It can seek more investment to be allocated for the Green Plan which only addressed fifteen to 
twenty percent of land rehabilitation requests. What is more important is that producers’ 
cooperatives, being legally authorized to carry out economic activities and accept donations, are 
well positioned to support international donors in implementing development projects. 
Development agencies have invested in agriculture more than the Lebanese government since the 
end of the civil war.   
In conclusion, all analyses provide a theoretical account of the usefulness of producers’ 
cooperatives in the Lebanese context. The main economic and agricultural challenges could be 
overcome through collective economic initiatives legalized in terms of cooperative enterprises. 
Indeed, producers’ cooperatives could be normatively named strategic for producers’ socio-
economic development in Lebanon.  
 
3.2. Using cooperatives in government agricultural policies 
 
This section considers the way the Lebanese government has used and relied on producers’ 
cooperatives in post-1992 agricultural policies. Agricultural reconstruction and rehabilitation 
studies, agricultural strategies, and related studies developed by the MOA, the Lebanese 
Parliament, and other institutions, which have supported the government to elaborate agricultural 
strategies (such as UNDP, FAO, etc) or have been commissioned to undertake related studies 
(such as International Bechtel Inc and Dar el Handasah consultants), are the key documents used 
to evaluate the role attributed by the government to producers’ cooperatives. Accessing 
agricultural strategies in the archives of the MOA was the most challenging part. Two strategies 
developed in 1992 and 1998 were not found. They were not archived. They were not even saved 
in the library where there is no index to search or locate available documents. The library is very 
small and almost closed, reflecting a weakness in documenting and updating agricultural 
development. I checked all available documents. I did not succeed in finding the two strategies. 
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Instead, I was lucky to locate two documents that are directly related to them. One was the 
preparatory document to develop the 1992 strategy and the second was a yearly report for the 
achievements of the MOA in which the 1998 strategy was summarized.   
Secondary data were complemented with semi-structured interviews with the MOA and The 
DGC (Questionnaire in Annex II) to assess why such roles have been given to producers’ 
cooperatives and to analyze their associated achievements.  
All the documents analyzed have in common a concern regarding the weakness and inefficiency 
of cooperatives in Lebanon for producers’ socio-economic development. The following 
statements elaborate this point:  
• “At present, the agricultural cooperative movement is stagnating, especially as far as 
smallholder farmers are concerned. Severely set-backs during the long term period of 
internal conflict, the weakness of the agricultural cooperatives movement is another 
serious constraint of agricultural rehabilitation and development” (UNDP 1992).  
• “Poor performance of agricultural cooperatives has been seriously affected by the long 
period of hostilities and by social and political fragmentation. Cooperation among 
farmers and agricultural cooperatives has attained only moderate success in Lebanon” 
(International Bechtel Inc and Dar el Handasah Consultants 1992).  
• “The high fragmentation of agricultural holdings represents a main constraint as to the 
efficient use of irrigation and machinery. Consequently, this leads to an increase in the 
cost of agricultural production. In addition, the absence of agricultural extension services 
and the weak performance of agricultural cooperatives along with their restrictive 
authorities and the absence of any coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture, increase 
the intensity of this problem. Challenges of agricultural markets reside in the following: 
random distribution, lack of organization of domestic markets, and the absence of a role 
for cooperatives in market operations; thus, enforcing the role of middlemen, increasing 
their profits at the expense of farmers” (MOA 1998).   
• “Farmers have low market access and direct sale in Lebanon because marketing 
cooperatives are not playing their role. The agriculture sector and small producers are 
facing several challenges due to the weakness of agricultural cooperatives and their 
inefficiency” (Tatyan 2000). 
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• “The weakness of the cooperative movement is challenging the sustainability of the 
agricultural sector in Lebanon” (LP 2001). 
• “Pre-requisites for success do not exist in most agricultural cooperatives in Lebanon. 
Most cooperatives have financial shortage to invest in services and show low equality if 
they deliver services to members. Moreover, members went away consider cooperative 
associations as capitalist enterprises directed toward fund seeking from international 
organizations. This situation threatens the development of the cooperative movement 
which is now considered as a control tool for self-interest objectives” (MOA 2001). 
• “In agriculture, Lebanon has recently seen a proliferation of cooperatives that are 
supposed to involve farmers in structures acting for the benefit of members and deciding 
on democratic procedures. It is clear that most of the existing cooperatives are fictitious 
and meet objectives that have nothing to do with the spirit of cooperation and the 
cooperative law. This falsification of objectives and motivations is more close to the 
willingness of tax evasion or the capture of subsidies for mutual interest. It should also be 
noted that in general, cooperatives do not have sufficient credibility to attract the banking 
system and generally have great difficulty in raising finance and increasing their 
capitalization” (Franklin - AHT Consortium, MOA 2003).  
•  “High cost of agricultural production in Lebanon is associated with the declining role of 
cooperative enterprises and trade unions. The absence or weakness of institutional 
structures in the private and public sectors constitutes a major obstacle for the 
development of the agricultural sector, including the agricultural credit, the role of 
cooperatives or trade unions or networks of packaging and cooling, manufacturing, 
marketing, and exportation” (MOA 2009). 
After declaring these weaknesses and inefficiencies, almost all studies and strategies highlighted 
the necessity of initiating, encouraging, and supporting agricultural/producers’ cooperatives that 
are essential and key for the Lebanese agricultural development. Some strategies listed the 
support and development of agricultural cooperatives as a primary objective. The following 
statements explain the government and other institutions’ perception about the strategic role of 
agricultural/producers’ cooperatives:  
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• “Individual farmers may not be able to stand the challenge of competition alone, 
especially with respect to their market position. The government policy should be to 
promote agricultural cooperatives that are founded and managed by farmers without 
direct interference of public administration and services” (International Bechtel Inc and 
Dar el Handasah Consultants 1992). 
• “The present situation of input supply, product marketing, packing and storage, farm 
mechanization, etc. can scarcely be improved for the majority of small and even medium 
farmers without mutual cooperation” (UNDP 1992).  
• “One of the basic factors for the success of the agricultural plan is the encouragement of 
initiating agricultural production and marketing cooperatives in the different regions of 
Lebanon. In addition, the plan recommends the supervision of agricultural cooperatives 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and their reintegration within its structure (previously 
under the Ministry of Housing and Cooperatives) in order to facilitate their orientation, to 
monitor their activities, and to provide them with the necessary support” (MOA 1998). 
• “Re-activating agricultural cooperatives to resolve agricultural challenges at institutional 
level” (Tatyan 2000)   
• “Supporting and encouraging agricultural cooperatives in rural areas is crucial for 
agricultural development. The availability of human and natural resources is not 
sufficient for agricultural development. Credits, marketing, and extension services are 
necessary. These services could be delivered more effectively under transparent 
cooperative enterprise initiatives” (MOA 2001). 
• “The revitalization of the voluntary cooperative sector appears to be essential to 
modernize agriculture, mainly for small and medium-sized farms. These organizations 
are not an end in itself but a means for small farms to access the factors of modernity and 
accordingly increase performance. By grouping together, farmers can solve many 
problems they would have great difficulty to solve at individual level. This is, in 
particular, for the access to the means of production, market access, the improvement of 
quality, etc.” (Franklin - AHT Consortium, MOA 2003). 
• “Agricultural cooperatives play a fundamental role in fostering farmers’ rights and the 
development of the agricultural sector. It is necessary to activate agricultural cooperatives 
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and to demonstrate their important role in developing the Lebanese agriculture” (MOA 
2001). 
• “Activating and monitoring the progress of the cooperative movement is highly essential 
in the Lebanese context. It can provide a suitable solution for land fragmentation, part-
time farming, and the low percentage of employment in the agricultural sector in 
particular for the youth generation” (MOA 2005). 
 
By stating first the weaknesses of agricultural/producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon and then 
listing their potential strategic role in the Lebanese context and relying on them to develop the 
agricultural sector, this approach demonstrates that the government has planned to use 
cooperatives to induce agricultural development based on their normative roles at the enterprise 
level and in socio-economic development.   
In the strategies and policy papers under consideration, the government specified various roles 
for producers’ cooperatives. Table 6 lists all the roles attributed to cooperatives, their objectives, 
and respective sources.  
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Table 6: Roles attributed to cooperatives and their associated objectives in the strategies and policy papers considered 
References Roles Attributed to Cooperatives Specific Objectives 
UNDP 1992 • Participate in setting market policy for a competitive agriculture 
• Supply agricultural inputs and marketing services to break monopolies 
• Introducing modern equipment (mechanization, etc) 
• Supply credits to small producers 
• Facilitating extension services and research in collaboration with the MOA 
• Institutional cooperation with different stakeholders 
• Rehabilitation and development of agricultural production: potato seed 
production, aquaculture and marine fisheries (input supply, marketing, 
processing, etc) 
• Reduce the cost of production and 
accordingly increase income 
• Increase access to markets 
• Improve the quality and diversity 
of production 
• Increase access to production 
services and resources 
• Increase investment opportunities 
• Increase members’ power 
International 
Bechtel Inc 
and Dar el 
Handasah 
Consultants 
1992 
• Input supplies, collection, storage, grading, packing, and marketing of products 
• Managing processing facilities for fishermen 
• Supply credits at low interest rates 
• Common use of equipments and machineries 
• Disseminate quality standards of crop production 
• Introduce modern systems of common/cooperative ownership to resolve land 
tenure problem 
• Link farmers to extension agents of the MOA 
• Increase access to services 
• Reduce the cost of production and 
accordingly increase income 
• Increase access to markets 
• Increase producers’ technical skills 
• Increase investment opportunities 
Lebanese 
Parliament 
• Cooperatives to import directly pesticides and fertilizers 
• Supply credits at low interest rates 
• Reduce the cost of production and 
accordingly increase income 
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2001 • Technical support for plant, animal, fishery, beekeeping 
• Supply machinery services for cereals production 
• Supply storage services for potato production; transport and storage services 
for milk production; processing for beekeepers 
• Manage packaging centers, transmit farmers’ opinions on trade agreement, 
monitor subsidized export 
• Operate marketing outlets, represent producers in the discussion of bilateral 
trade agreements 
• Link farmers to research and extension institutions 
• Facilitate the registration of producers in public health insurance 
• Improve access to services and 
introduce new services 
• Increase producers’ technical skills 
• Improve access to local markets 
• Increase product competitiveness 
to  reach new markets 
• Increase producers’ health 
MOA 1998 • Marketing animal products (collection centers) 
• Supply agricultural machineries 
• Develop the fishery sector (production resources, fishing boats) 
• Improve access to local markets 
• Improve access to services 
• Reduce the cost of production and 
accordingly increase income 
MOA 2001 • Import necessary production resources 
• Marketing agricultural production: plant and animal 
• Reduce the cost of production and 
accordingly increase income 
• Improve access to markets 
• Increase producers’ bargaining 
power 
Franklin - 
AHT 
• Supply credits at low interest rates 
• Mutual health insurance for producers 
• Increase investment opportunities 
• Increase producers’ health security 
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Consortium, 
MOA 2003 
• Link producers to service centers • Increase access to services 
MOA 2005 • Information dissemination for the proper use of pesticides and fertilizers 
• Promote animal health and nutrition 
• Dissemination of new production techniques 
• Activate internal and external markets through packing and processing 
services 
• Update and develop fruit trees species 
• Develop fruit and vegetables sector through proper services: storage, 
packaging, export 
• Develop cereals sector through proper mechanization and agricultural inputs 
• Increase olive oil production through marketing and production resources 
• Develop medicinal and aromatic plant sector (production, marketing, packing) 
• Develop tobacco production (including post-harvest) 
• Develop viticulture and wine sector through packing and marketing 
• Develop and regulate beekeeping sector (production, packing and marketing) 
• Adopt efficient production techniques 
• Develop the quality of milk production (packing and processing) 
• Increase production efficiency 
• Reduce pollution and increase 
public health 
• Reduce the cost of production and 
accordingly increase income 
• Increase products’ quality and 
competitiveness 
• Increase access to local and export 
markets 
• Increase bargaining power 
• Increases access to services 
• Improve producers’ skills 
MOA 2009 • Activate and develop quality systems (labeling, certification, etc.) 
• Implement and facilitate processing activities 
• Develop internal (wholesale markets and popular markets) and external 
• Increase products’ quality and 
competitiveness 
• Increase access to services 
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markets • Increase access to new markets 
and improve direct sale 
• Reduce the cost of production and 
accordingly increase income 
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The roles attributed to cooperatives in post-1992 agricultural development strategies and policies 
reveal that the government has relied on cooperatives in the supply (inputs, credits, machineries 
for land preparation, etc), services (various machinery used during production, insurance, 
extension, quality control, etc), and marketing (post-harvest, processing, transport, etc) aspects of 
the production cycle. Granting cooperatives this diversity of production activities is strategic in 
the Lebanese context being dominated by small and part-time producers. Cooperatives are an 
essential tool for local economic development where agriculture is the main economic activity. 
Therefore, it appears that the government has used producers’ cooperatives to perform all 
normative objectives that could be delivered via the cooperative enterprise model. These 
objectives were detailed in Chapter 1 under the theoretical role of cooperatives, and namely: 
• Decrease the cost of production 
• Improve access to market 
• Improve and increase access to services 
• Increase bargaining power 
• Enhance the power of producers to influence their policies 
• Increase producers’ skills 
Once these specific objectives are achieved, the government assumes that development 
objectives, in particular poverty reduction, social cohesion, and sustainable employment, would 
be attained in the agricultural sector.  
In combination with these roles, producers have been encouraged themselves or by the 
government to initiate new cooperatives. Accordingly, the number of producers’ cooperatives 
have more than doubled in a 10-year interval period and increased from 162 in 1990 to 431 in 
2000 and then to 890 in 2010. It increased by 450 percent between 1990 and 2010. During this 
period, no cooperatives were dissolved (MOA 2012).  
In fact, in the semi-structured interview carried out on July 29, 2011 with the Minister Advisor 
for the cooperative sector development, Eng. Hasan Atwe, it was confirmed that the roles 
attributed to agricultural/producers’ cooperatives in all documents explored above were only 
normative, and not linked to real field facts or previous successful experiences. The advisor 
added that post-1992 producers’ cooperatives (around eighty-two percent of current registered 
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cooperatives) have played no role in terms of agricultural sector development. Indeed, most 
cooperatives have shown a low capacity to offer feasible services to their members. Even though 
encouraged and supported to perform diverse activities in all strategies and policies, cooperatives 
have been mainly used by the government to legalize the political support offered to producers. 
In fact, cooperatives are the main institutions representing producers in rural areas and thus 
essential to facilitate the communication with the government. By-law, the board of directors in 
cooperatives can accept donations from different stakeholders (government, politicians, 
individuals, NGO’s, etc) without needing a prior approval from the general meeting. The advisor 
mentioned that most cooperatives have been established through a top-down approach either by 
the government or NGOs, but not by producers themselves. Cooperatives were initiated to 
channel political and development aid in the recovery, reconstruction, and development phases 
after the civil war and were not based on clear common projects to alleviate producers’ needs. 
The advisor highlighted the decision of the minister to dissolve, in a first round, 200-250 
producers’ cooperatives across Lebanon. Indicators were the following:  
• The general meeting did not convene for the last three to four years not even for the 
election of the board of directors 
• The cooperative did not submit the annual balance sheet to the DGC 
• The cooperative did not communicate as required by-law with the DGC 
This decision was the first step taken in 2010 by the Minister, Dr. Hussein el Hajj Hasan, to 
rehabilitate the cooperative sector in Lebanon. At that time, the rehabilitation plan was not 
published yet for further revisions. The Minister, backed by Hezbollah Shiite party, has opposed 
post-1992 liberal policies that did not favor agricultural sector development and accordingly, the 
development of the cooperative sector. He planned to restructure the cooperative sector that was 
facing serious challenges going from low performance to corruption and mismanagement. In 
fact, using cooperatives as a tool for rural development is a strategy for Jihad el Binaa 
Development Association, a political non-governmental organization managed by Hezbollah.  
Cooperatives that were selected for the first round dissolution were given a short time period to 
update their status. Some of them have been dissolved, but the majority carried out elections, 
submitted accounts, and sent communications to the DGC- mainly because the Minister declared 
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his intention to offer financial support to cooperatives. Therefore, the first stage of the selection 
of active cooperatives and the dissolution of dormant ones could not be considered effective. 
First, cooperatives can carry out elections and submit communications and annual balance sheets 
to the DGC without offering services to members. In this case, they would be classified legal 
enterprises applying by-law requirements without delivering benefits to members. Second, active 
cooperatives could not be selected by using such indicators. Cooperatives should be assessed on 
the basis of the efficiency of their services and socio-economic benefits assured for members. A 
detailed study for individual cooperatives should be undertaken in order to identify their real 
status and accordingly take an appropriate decision either to support or dissolve them.  
 
3.3. Role of government in developing producers’ cooperatives 
 
This part details what the government has planned to implement, in the strategies considered, in 
order to facilitate and encourage the development of producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon. In 
particular, this part examines the measures that have been taken by the government to reduce the 
external and internal challenges facing producers’ cooperative enterprises. Then, by relying on 
the semi-structured interviews with the MOA (The Minister Advisor, the central office of the 
DGC, and the office managers of the regional departments of the DGC), previous and current 
achievements of strategies are elaborated.  
The DGC in the MOA, which is the only institution supervising and monitoring the cooperative 
movement in Lebanon, was interviewed at the central and regional offices to study the way it has 
supported cooperative enterprises and what type of services it has offered them. Before and 
during the civil war, the DGC was under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing and 
Cooperatives. It was in 2000 that it came under the supervision of the MOA; reflecting the 
dominance of cooperation in the agricultural sector (eighty-one percent of total number of 
cooperatives) compared to other sectors (handcraft, housing, credits, etc.). The DGC is in charge 
of the following activities: 
• Initiating cooperative enterprises: based on a project proposal that should be able to 
deliver technically economic and social benefits for at least ten members. Regional 
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offices do not check whether members are producers or not related to the agricultural 
sector. Only the IDs of members are required as official documents. There is no 
restriction on kin-based relationships between members even if they belong to the same 
family. After submitting the file, regional offices and the central unit study the project 
proposal, suggest some modifications, and usually recommend the initiation of 
cooperatives to the Agriculture Minister. Once accepted/signed, members should deposit 
in any bank their initial financial share to collectively implement their project. However, 
it is not required to guarantee the availability of the total investment cost that is detailed 
in the project proposal.  
• Supplying training on the cooperative model: directly after initiation or upon request, 
members receive one session training in order to understand better how cooperative 
enterprises work. The training session mainly covers the following topics: financial 
issues, the role and responsibilities of different actors, boards of directors’ meetings, 
general meetings, elections, and coop dissolution, etc. In some cases, when trainings were 
carried out in the central office in Beirut before 2009, the DGC did pay transportation 
fees for members to attend.  
• Monitoring cooperatives: by requesting by-law the annual balance sheet of all 
cooperatives and checking the minutes of meetings of the board of directors and the 
general meeting. In special cases, when large cooperatives are involved, regional offices 
attend elections to monitor and assure the democratic procedure.  
• Dissolving cooperatives: in case members have decided to stop their cooperation after 
achieving their common objectives, or in case the DGC has identified dormant/ghost 
cooperatives after long-term monitoring.   
• Providing financial support to cooperatives and their unions: within the scope of its 
support and encouragement for the cooperative work, the DGC was distributing financial 
support for individual cooperatives from the budget allocated to non-public sector aids. In 
2004, the DGC disbursed USD 300 thousand to fifty-seven cooperatives from a total of 
976 cooperatives across Lebanon (MOA 2012). The financial support is based on a 
project proposal; however, no monitoring was carried out to check whether the grant was 
spent according to the project proposal or on other not related activities.  
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Several weaknesses could be identified in the services of the DGC. Accepting the establishment 
of a cooperative based on any ten names could open the door for ghost cooperatives that are set 
up to distribute development aid and not to achieve common needs. Likewise, establishing 
cooperatives without assuring the total start-up investment cost of the proposed project allows 
ghost cooperatives to submit any feasible project proposal irrelevant to needs and start later 
seeking development aid. Developing the capacity of members about the cooperative enterprise 
model in one training session is impossible. Paying for members the transportation cost to attend 
training sessions shows that the DGC was having difficulties in delivering this service and in 
showing its value for the proper management of cooperative enterprises. Monitoring cooperative 
enterprises by only checking the annual balance sheet and minutes of meetings without carrying 
out regular field visits to evaluate the services offered to members may facilitate corruption 
practices. Few members can manage to receive donations based on their cooperative initiative 
and then employ benefits for their individual self-interest. It should be noted here that the DGC 
faces a shortage in human resources and equipments such as computers or vehicles necessary to 
offer the services listed above. When the number of staff positions in the DGC was set, there 
were sixty-three cooperatives. Nowadays (before the last dissolution) there are around 1,200 
cooperatives and the number of staff remains unchanged (MOA 2012). When I carried out my 
semi-structured interview, the Minister of Agricultural Dr. Hussein el Hajj Hasan issued a decree 
to appoint new civil servants in several vacant positions in the central and regional offices. 
Finally, the financial support offered by the DGC can achieve low impacts. It is based on a 
project proposal that is not monitored by regional offices and its amount is relatively small 
(around USD 5000) not even enough to implement a small agricultural project. It could be 
classified as political support for cooperatives affiliated to different political ruling parties. It 
should be noted that the DGC stopped its financial support in 2005 and re-activated it in 2010 
when the Agriculture Minister issued a new plan to restructure the cooperative sector. 
The services of the DGC can play a limited role in the development of cooperative enterprises. 
They go in parallel to the adopted liberal agricultural policy and can offer few opportunities to 
resolve the internal and external challenges of cooperatives. More importantly, these services 
cannot help controlling corruption practices at the cooperative enterprise level, in particular 
when cooperatives receive donations from NGOs. The allocated budget for the DGC is relatively 
low compared to the detailed functions that cooperatives can have in government agricultural 
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strategies. It amounted to four percent in 2008 and 2009 of the total agricultural budget (MOA 
2009). During the semi-structured interview, Eng. Hasan Atwe criticized the way financial 
support has been offered by the DGC and classified it as a political support linked to the whims 
of previous ministers. He added that the commissioned studies by the DGC to explore the 
efficiency of cooperative initiatives in Lebanon have also been a kind of political financial 
benefit for some minister consultants. He mentioned that the DGC is aware of the UN 2001 
guidelines (UN/DESA 2001) and ILO recommendation R 193 (ILO 2002) to create a supportive 
environment for cooperatives development and is trying, through the government policies, to 
foster these mandates.  
In the studied strategies and policy papers, post-war governments have planned to undertake 
diverse interventions to facilitate the development of agricultural cooperatives across Lebanon. 
All interventions have been structured in a way to reflect a liberal open market agricultural 
policy. Post-war governments have concentrated their activities on the following:  
1. Establishing and developing general public infrastructure and services in rural areas 
which were detailed in Chapter 2, i.e. roads, communications, education, etc 
2. Providing the necessary public services to target the development of agricultural 
cooperatives: 
• Training and education: on business development, monitoring and evaluation 
(Franklin - AHT Consortium, MOA 2003), update the services of the DGC 
(MOA 2005), train agricultural extension agents on cooperative legislation 
(UNDP 1992, MOA 2001) 
• Extension: disseminate new technologies (MOA 2005, UNDP 1992)  
• Research: install demonstration plot, fertilization procedures, rehabilitate 
laboratories (MOA 2005), develop a database on cooperative enterprises and 
related development projects, information dissemination (Franklin - AHT 
Consortium, MOA 2003; MOA 2005)  
3. Establishing and updating the legal framework of cooperative enterprises and issuing 
appropriate norms and regulations 
• Revise and update the cooperative law (MOA 2005; Franklin - AHT Consortium, 
MOA 2003, LP 2001, MOA 2009) 
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• Issue new rules and regulations for coop initiation and dissolution (MOA 2005) 
• Establish quality norms and standards for agricultural produces and a control 
system for their observance (UNDP 1992) 
• Establish binding quality, sanitary, and hygienic norms and standards for 
agricultural supplies and products and enforce their application (UNDP 1992) 
• Update laws on the structure of DGC (MOA 2009) 
4. Setting up and implementing appropriate measures for the regulation and stabilization of 
agricultural markets that directly affect cooperatives: 
• Facilitate access to market information (MOA 2005) 
• Encourage export through cooperatives and find appropriate subsidy measures 
(MOA 2005, LP 2001) 
• Establishment of a market study and statistics service for production, 
consumption, offer and demand of food commodities (UNDP 1992) 
• Establishment of a market orientation service for price quotations on farm gates 
and wholesale levels of agricultural commodities on internal and external markets 
(UNDP 1992) 
• Protection against the unrestricted entry of subsidized agricultural products from 
neighboring countries (agricultural calendar) (UNDP 1992) 
• Set up and revise bilateral trade agreements (LP 2001), initiate new wholesale 
markets (LP 2001), organization and development of popular and wholesale 
markets and farmers markets (MOA 2009) 
5. Ensuring access to finance for cooperative enterprises  
• Restructure the National Union of Cooperative credits (Franklin - AHT 
Consortium, MOA 2003, UNDP 1992)   
• Facilitate access to low interest rate credits based on a specific project proposal 
(MOA 2005, LP 2001) 
6. Providing distinct financial support (subsidized project) targeting rural development for 
cooperatives and their unions (MOA 2005, UNDP 1992, International Bechtel Inc and 
Dar el Handasah Consultants 1992, LP 2001, Franklin - AHT Consortium, MOA 2003) 
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There is no doubt that if these interventions had been implemented under the liberal agricultural 
environment, the government would have actively contributed to the development of the 
cooperative sector by alleviating the internal and external challenges of cooperative enterprises. 
Specifically, external challenges, related to the highly competitive liberal environment and the 
difficult national environment, are directly targeted by post-war government strategies. However, 
these strategies have been rarely implemented for various political and financial barriers. Since 
1972, no amendments have been introduced to the cooperative laws and regulations in Lebanon. 
The DGC, as explained earlier, faces a shortage in human resources and equipment to provide 
necessary training and carry out appropriate research and extension work (MOA 2012). The 
NUCC was never restructured and since 1992 has been challenged by the shortage of financial 
and human resources after the cessation of government budgetary support (Assaf 2010). The 
weak implementation of the agricultural calendar by the government has allowed the dumping of 
subsidized agricultural crops from neighboring countries (Iskandar 1999-2000). Subsidized 
projects are mainly political showing no impacts on members’ socio-economic development. The 
Minister Advisor criticized previous strategies by being normative and having modest tangible 
results in the development of the cooperative sector.  
 
3.4. Government cooperation with different stakeholders for sustainable 
interventions 
 
Post-war governments have planned as mentioned in the studied agricultural strategies and 
policy papers to cooperate with different stakeholders, either NGOs or federal and unions’ 
cooperatives, involved in the development of the agricultural cooperative sector. For instance: 
• In 1992, the government highlighted the participation of stakeholders in the development of 
agricultural strategies as an essential requirement for sustainable interventions. It proposed 
the establishment of regional commissions for agricultural and rural development within 
which members should undertake the following actions (UNDP 1992): 
o Make an inventory of regional needs and development constraints 
o Identify development actions and available means in the region 
162 
 
o Establish regional priority development programs and phasing 
o Identify problems to be solved at a higher level and propose appropriate action to the 
respective authorities 
• In 2001, the government stressed the necessity of making producers’ groups at national level 
decide what solutions were more suitable to resolve their challenges. It also noted the 
importance of giving an active role for NGOs in designing agricultural development 
strategies (LB 2001).  
• In 2003, the government mentioned in the methodology used to prepare the agricultural 
strategy that it has involved producers’ groups and NGOs in the identification of 
interventions and their evaluation (Franklin - AHT Consortium, MOA 2003). 
• In 2005, the government identified the lack of communication and planning with NGOs as a 
major weakness in the agricultural sector at the level of institutional cooperation and 
guidance. Therefore, it planned to involve NGOs in the design and implementation of 
appropriate interventions at national and regional levels through the following measures 
(MOA 2005):  
o Apply the principle of discussion and communication with NGOs at field level 
o Facilitate their activities through the decentralized regional offices of the MOA 
• In 2009, one axis of the strategy specifically stressed on the need for coordination with 
NGOs and producers’ groups in order to contextualize programs and projects in an integrated 
strategy for agricultural development. Their participation in policy formulation and programs 
development is essential for long term impacts.  
 
All these measures explain that until the last strategy developed in 2009, the cooperation of the 
government with different stakeholders to develop the cooperative sector was very limited and 
thus requires further systematization and regulation. This challenge was highlighted during the 
interviews carried out with the Minister Advisor and the regional offices of the DGC. In fact, the 
Lebanese Federal Cooperative, which groups all cooperative associations and unions and 
represents them in front of the DGC and the government, is almost in a situation of work 
cessation and has not received any financial support since 1996 (MOA 2012). Under these 
conditions, the only federal cooperative in the country did not play a role in the formulation of 
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appropriate strategies for cooperative development and has effectively no power to lobby the 
government to adopt and implement projects responding to members’ needs. The Minister 
Advisor added that the seven existing cooperative unions across the country have not also played 
a role in designing the government agricultural cooperative policy. For NGOs, the situation is 
different. NGOs are not legally urged to communicate with the MOA for their agricultural 
interventions because they are registered in the Ministry of Interior Affairs.  For instance, if an 
NGO, either local or international, decides to implement an agricultural project not in 
conjunction with the government strategy, the MOA will have no authority to modify any 
interventions. It can only recommend modifications. Previous cooperation between the DGC and 
NGOs was mainly in the dissemination of databases on cooperatives or the facilitation of setting 
up cooperatives for certain agricultural projects. Moreover, monitoring NGOs’ activities was 
only possible through the legal authority over cooperatives. Therefore, the DGC knew what 
NGOs were implementing with cooperatives through the minutes of meeting of the board of 
directors. If board members do not report their activities with NGOs, the DGC will not be able to 
know what is being done with cooperatives. The manager of the regional office of DGC in North 
Lebanon mentioned that some cooperatives which have received more than USD 300 thousand 
as donations from NGOs were selected for the first round dissolution in 2010. In some cases, 
NGOs were seeking the support of the DGC to select active cooperatives and to receive legal 
consultations for internal cooperative management.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
Theoretically, cooperative enterprises could represent a strategic tool to manage the main 
agricultural and economic challenges of small producers in Lebanon. Under appropriate 
conditions, in particular where internal cooperative challenges are controlled, findings revealed 
their essential role under the structure of the Lebanese economy, post-1992 economic and 
reconstruction policies, the Lebanese agricultural context, and the nature of post-war agricultural 
policies. Accordingly, post-war governments have relied on the normative role of cooperative 
enterprises to induce agricultural development but not on field evidence or previous successful 
experiences. They intended to use cooperatives to increase market access, decrease the cost of 
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production, improve access to services, etc. The findings from the interviews showed that such 
roles were not achieved and cooperatives did not significantly contribute to agricultural sector 
development. In parallel to the role attributed to cooperatives, findings showed that post-war 
governments have planned appropriate strategies and policies to support the cooperative model 
as well as to cooperate with other stakeholders for sustainable interventions; however, few of 
them have been implemented. Here, a link could be traced, on the one hand, between the lack of 
implementation and the weak management of strategies that are essential for the good 
performance of cooperatives; and on the other hand, the inefficiency of producers’ cooperatives 
after the end of the civil war. In fact, the weakest point in the government’s activities is in the 
role of DGC which is the only institution monitoring cooperatives’ activities on field. The 
processes of initiation, monitoring, support, reporting, etc., are all susceptible to corruption by 
producers seeking self-interest or political benefits.  
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Chapter 4- Cooperatives and Development Agencies: Role, Support, 
Impact, and Coordination  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
After exploring the role of producers’ cooperatives in post-war government agriculture 
development strategies in Chapter 3, this chapter analyzes why and how development agencies 
have relied on the producers’ cooperatives tool to induce agricultural development in Lebanon 
and what impacts the implemented interventions have had. In this research, by “development 
agencies” I refer to the combination of non-governmental organizations (International non-
governmental organizations (INGOs), Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and National 
non-governmental organizations (National NGOs)) and donors (bilateral and multilateral) that 
have been active in the field of agricultural development in Lebanon since the end of the civil 
war. This chapter starts by examining the strategic role that development agencies have 
attributed to producers’ cooperatives. It details how these agencies have supported and facilitated 
the development of producers’ cooperatives. It also explores the main projects implemented with 
cooperatives and their impacts, from the perspective of development agencies. Finally, it 
assesses the coordination of agencies with the government to develop the cooperative movement.  
 
4.2. Selection of development agencies 
4.2.1. Used indicators 
 
Several indicators or baselines were used to select the development agencies that were 
interviewed in this study. First, my survey of producers’ cooperatives, which is explored in 
Chapter 5, was carried out before starting my field work for this chapter. During this survey, I 
was investigating projects that were funded by development agencies as a part of the assessment. 
Accordingly, I prepared an initial general list of development agencies that have supported 
producers’ cooperatives across the country. Second, I conducted a rapid secondary review of the 
development projects implemented with producers’ cooperatives after the civil war. The majority 
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of these projects were implemented by active development agencies previously listed. This 
second step allowed me to identify the weight of interventions of various development agencies 
and accordingly the level of influence they can have on the public sector. Third, I classified 
agencies based on their categories: Multilateral donors, Bilateral donors, INGOs, IGOs, and 
National NGOs and selected those with the largest interventions in terms of budget and activities 
implemented with producers’ cooperatives. Finally, based on my personal field experience 
(around eight years) in agricultural development projects across Lebanon as well as my field 
network, I verified and confirmed my first selection and developed a final list of development 
agencies to be interviewed. However, I was not able to interview all selected agencies either 
because they showed no interest in giving information about their projects implemented with 
producers’ cooperatives, or because they had stopped working in the agricultural sector and most 
of the staff involved in previous projects had left the agency. Therefore, to study agencies that I 
was not able to interview, I have relied on project reports, evaluation and monitoring reports, 
strategies, and policies for agricultural development. Table 7 lists the selected development 
agencies, their level of assessment, and their categories.  
Table 7: Selected development agencies, their level of assessment, and their categories 
Level of 
assessment 
Development Agencies Categories 
Interviewed  US. Agency for International Development (USAID) Bilateral Donor 
Agriculture Cooperative Development 
International/Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance 
(ACDI/VOCA) 
INGO (American) 
Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) INGO (American) 
Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) INGO (American) 
International Labor Organization (ILO) IGO 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)/Art Gold IGO 
Istituto per la Cooperazione Universitaria (ICU) INGO (Italian) 
Arcenciel (aec) National NGO 
René Moawad Foundation (RMF) National NGO 
Amal Development Association (ADA) (Part of Amal 
political Movement) 
National NGO 
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Studied 
only 
European Commission in Lebanon (EC) Multilateral donor 
Worldvision International (WV) INGO (American) 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) IGO 
Safadi Foundation (SF) National NGO 
Jehad AL Benaa Developmental Association (JBDA) National NGO 
Total number of development agencies = 15 
 
4.2.2. Description of selected development agencies 
 
This section elaborates a short description of the development agencies interviewed and studied. 
It highlights the following information:  
• Date of starting activities or initiation in Lebanon 
• Programs of work in Lebanon  
• Main partners 
• Main projects implemented with producers’ cooperatives 
• Political background  
Table 8 details this information for the 15 selected development agencies 
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Table 8: Description of selected development agencies  
Agencies (Date 
of initiation in 
Lebanon) 
Main Programs of work Main Partners In Lebanon Main projects with coops in 
Lebanon 
Political 
Background 
USAID  (1951)  Governing justly and 
democratically 
 Investing in people 
 Economic growth 
 American NGOs (ACDI/VOCA, CHF, 
YMCA, World Rehabilitation Fund, 
etc) 
 International development consulting 
enterprises (social impact, 
Development Alternatives Inc., etc) 
 Universities (American university of 
Beirut, Lebanese American university, 
etc) 
USAID is a bilateral donor, 
projects implemented with 
cooperatives are detailed under 
various INGOs  
Fosters US 
foreign policy 
interest. 
Accordingly it 
supports INGOs 
and National 
NGOs fostering 
US policy. 
ACDI – VOCA 
(2006) 
 Agribusiness 
 Enterprise development 
 Financial services 
 Community 
development 
 Food security 
 Several National NGOs (SF, aec, 
Hariri foundation, etc) 
 Trade associations 
 Local cooperatives 
 Chamber of commerce, industry and 
agriculture 
 Universities and local consulting firms 
 Action for sustainable agro-
industry in Lebanon  
 Lebanese business linkages 
initiative  
 Agricultural quality control 
and certification program 
 Farmer to Farmer program 
Main donors are 
USAID and 
USDA. It 
fosters US 
foreign policy 
interest. 
CHF (1997)  Economic development 
 Civil society and 
 Several National NGOs (RMF, Hariri 
foundation, Ameen (micro-credit), 
 Rural economic development 
initiative (1997-2002) 
Main donors are 
USAID and 
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capacity development 
 Emergency response 
 Global health 
Injaz Lebanon, etc) 
 Municipalities (more than 40) 
 Universities (Balamand and USEK) 
 Cooperatives (Liban village, several 
fishermen coops, etc) 
 Ministry of Finance 
 Ministry of Education  
 Agro-business and 
community infrastructure 
(2001-2003) 
 Clustering for economic 
development (2002-2005) 
 Humanitarian assistance in 
Lebanon (2006-2007) 
 Lebanon apple production 
improvement (2009-2010) 
USDA, 
therefore it 
fosters US 
foreign policy 
interest. 
YMCA (very 
early roots in 
Lebanon since 
1890, started 
agricultural 
support 1990) 
 Agriculture 
 Children’s rights 
 Environment 
 Good governance 
 Health 
 ICT  
 Women’s 
empowerment 
 Youth 
 Vocational training -
entrepreneurship 
 Over 400 local organizations and 
municipalities 
 Ministry of Agriculture, Tourism, 
Environment, Health 
 Donors in Lebanon (USAID, World 
Bank, AECID (Spanish gov.), UN 
organizations, UK aid form the 
department of international 
development (DFID) , ANERA 
(American), etc) 
 Development and marketing 
of small farmers’ products in 
areas prone to desertification 
 Support to women 
agricultural cooperatives 
 Stimulating markets and rural 
transformation program  
 
Accepts 
donations from 
various donors. 
Politically 
neutral in its 
activities.  
ILO (1976 the 
regional office 
 Enterprise development 
 Social protection 
 Other  UN agencies 
 Arab Labor Organization 
 Local socio-economic 
development in war-affected 
As a UN-IGO, 
ILO is 
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in Beirut, closed 
during the war, 
re-opened in 
1995) 
 Social dialogue 
 Employment 
 Skills and 
employability 
 International Labor 
standards  
 The international federation of Arab 
trade unions 
 General union of chambers of 
commerce, industry and agriculture in 
the Arab states 
 Ministry of Labor 
 Municipalities and cooperatives 
areas in south Lebanon 
 Recovery of Nahr el Bared 
surrounding Lebanese 
communities affected by 2006 
and 2007 conflicts 
 Conflict prevention and peace 
building in North Lebanon 
politically 
neutral and 
works with 
different 
groups/sects 
across Lebanon. 
UNDP (1960)  Democratic governance 
 Poverty reduction  
 Environmental and 
sustainable 
development 
 Crisis prevention and 
recovery 
 Other  UN agencies 
 Most ministries and government 
institutions such as CDR 
 Universities 
 Municipalities and cooperatives 
 Artgold initiative: 
implemented across Lebanon 
under the poverty reduction 
program/social and economic 
development portfolio 
 
As a UN-IGO, 
UNDP is 
politically 
neutral and 
works with 
different 
groups/sects 
across Lebanon. 
ICU (1994)  Rural development 
 Social development 
 Hygiene and health 
 University cooperation 
 Education and training 
 Advancement of 
women 
 Other Italian INGOs 
 Several ministries, in particular the 
Ministry of Agriculture 
 Several national NGOs 
 Municipalities and cooperatives 
 
 Rural development in the 
region of Mount Lebanon 
 Economic support to 
Internally Displaced People in 
the agricultural and agro-
industrial region of Shouf area 
(Phase I and II) 
Mainly 
subsidized by 
the Italian 
government. 
Accordingly, it 
fosters Italian 
foreign policy. 
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 Emergencies  Business development 
services in North and South 
Lebanon 
 Improving the environmental 
sustainability of irrigated 
agricultural production in 
Lebanon and Jordan 
Neutral on field 
by 
implementing 
projects with 
different 
groups/sects 
across Lebanon.  
Aec (initiated in 
1985, officially 
authorized in 
1995) 
 Agriculture 
 Employment 
 Youth 
 Social 
 Health 
 Environment 
 Rehabilitation for 
disabled people 
 
 The Spanish Agency for International 
Development Cooperation (AECID), 
public body of the Ministry of foreign 
Affairs of the Spanish government 
 Several INGOs: The Foundation for 
the Social Promotion of Culture 
(FPSC) – Spanish NGO, Diakonia – 
Swedish NGO, etc 
 Several ministries (Social Affairs, 
Environment, etc) 
 Municipalities and cooperatives 
 Increasing Lebanese 
agricultural competitiveness 
 Support of Kab Elias 
agricultural cooperative 
 Support of Kawkaba 
agricultural cooperative 
 Wataneh program 
 
Non-political, 
implements 
projects with 
different 
groups/sects 
across Lebanon. 
RMF (1991)  Agriculture 
 Education 
 Health 
 Human rights 
 Several American NGOs, in particular 
CHF 
 Several ministries, in particular the 
Ministry of Education, Social affairs, 
 Network for women 
cooperatives to build 
marketing opportunities 
 Rural women income 
A political-
family NGO. 
Initiated two 
years after the 
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 Economy  etc. 
 Municipalities and cooperatives, 
mainly located in North Lebanon 
generating activities and 
training programs 
 Olive oil development project 
 Promoting women’s 
participation in the economic 
and public sectors in North 
Lebanon 
 Professional training and 
integrated rural development 
in North Lebanon 
association of 
President Rene 
Moawad, 
originated from 
North Lebanon. 
It fosters the 
general policy 
of Mouawad 
family Who 
mainly supports 
US foreign 
policy.  
ADA(1975)  Agriculture 
 Education 
 
 Several UN organizations, mainly ILO 
and UNDP 
 Municipalities and cooperatives in 
South Lebanon and Bekaa where the 
majority of Shiite community is living 
 Federal Coop in South 
Lebanon 
 Olive growers support 
 
Part of Amal 
Shiite political 
movement, it 
fosters anti-
American 
foreign policies  
EC in Lebanon 
(partnership 
agreement in 
1977- European 
 Socio-economic 
reforms 
 Recovery and 
reinvigoration of the 
 Government institutions such as the 
Office of the Minister of State for 
Administrative Reform (OMSAR), 
Environmental and Social Fund for 
 Agriculture development 
project (in coordination with 
the MOA)  
Fosters 
European Union 
Foreign policy. 
Works via 
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Neighborhood 
policy in 2006) 
economy 
 Political reforms 
 
Development (ESFD) under CDR 
 Several ministries and municipalities  
government 
institutions with 
different 
groups/sets 
across Lebanon 
WV-Lebanon 
office (1975) 
 Advocacy, peace 
building, and dialogue 
 Development (general) 
 Emergency response 
and disaster mitigation 
 Ending human 
trafficking 
 Several academic institutions 
 Other American NGOs 
 Several ministries, in particular 
Ministry of Social Affairs 
 National NGOs 
 Municipalities and cooperatives 
 Sustainable Agriculture and 
Rural Development 
 Sustainable Agri-business 
initiatives in Lebanon 
Non-political. 
Even though a 
Christian NGO, 
it works with 
different sects 
across Lebanon    
IFAD (1992)  Rural development in 
Agriculture – financial 
services, rural 
infrastructure, research, 
storage 
 All projects implemented in 
coordination with the Ministry of 
Agriculture 
 Municipalities and cooperatives 
 
 Smallholder livestock 
rehabilitation project 
 Hilly areas sustainable 
agriculture development 
 
As a UN-IGO, 
IFAD is non-
political and 
works with 
different sects 
across Lebanon 
SF (2001)  Social development 
 Agriculture 
 Cultural 
 Health 
 Several donors, IGO, and INGO 
 Local organizations such as CDR 
 Academic institutions (Balamand, 
American University of Beirut, etc) 
 Strengthening bee husbandry 
in Akkar-North Lebanon 
 Support to cow breeders in 
North Lebanon 
A political-
family NGO. It 
fosters the 
policy of its 
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 Youth and education 
 ICT 
 Sports 
 Environment 
 Municipalities and cooperatives in 
North Lebanon 
 Creating the Minah market for 
fishermen cooperative in 
North Lebanon  
founder the 
Sunni Minister 
Mohammad el-
Safadi, 
originated from 
North Lebanon. 
The Minister is 
mainly 
supporting US 
foreign policy 
JBDA (1998)  Environment 
 Cooperative work 
 Sustainable 
development 
 Voluntary work 
 Human development 
(reduce the effect of 
Israeli aggression) 
 Municipalities and cooperatives in 
South Lebanon, Bekaa, Beirut sub-
urban where the majority of Shiite 
community is living 
 Several ministries in particular the 
Ministry of Agriculture 
 Lebanese universities  
 Network of cooperatives for 
crop marketing 
 Let’s cooperate (capacity 
building project) 
 Coop service centers 
 Coop capacity building and 
strategic planning 
 
Managed by 
Hezbollah 
Shiite political 
movement. 
Mainly funded 
by the Iranian 
Government. It 
fosters anti-
American 
foreign policies  
 
 
175 
 
4.3. Role of cooperatives in development agencies’ agenda 
 
This part of the chapter explores what cooperative enterprises could ordinarily achieve in the 
agendas of development agencies. Semi-structured interviews and internet based secondary data, 
in particular development agencies’ web pages, have constituted the units of analysis in this part. 
In web pages, I focused on general information detailing agencies’ development objectives 
without going into the programs or projects levels which were analyzed while studying the 
nature and process of projects implemented with coops. For instance, I checked the development 
objectives listed under such titles: “Our work” (ACDI/VOCA)”, “What We Do (USAID)”, “Our 
Expertise (CHF), “Areas of Work (ILO)”, “objectives of Work (JBDA, SF)”, “Strategic 
Frameworks (IFAD)”, etc. In those development objectives that reflect a general interest, for 
instance agriculture and food security, economic growth, enterprise development, community 
development, gender equality and women’s empowerment, etc., I explored where cooperative 
enterprises were given a role or listed as a tool to achieve these objectives.  In fact, semi-
structured interviews and internet secondary reviews were somehow complementary. For some 
information that is rarely listed in web pages or even in program and project reports, interviews 
were essential. For instance, in secondary data, agencies would not mention “answering donors’ 
requests” or “responding to government development plans” as a justification for using 
cooperatives. On the other hand, the macro level development objectives such as poverty 
reduction or social cohesion, which could be cited by respondents as an ipso facto long term role 
of cooperatives, were double checked in agencies’ web pages as development objectives 
facilitated by cooperative enterprises.  
To quantify the data collected and reviewed in this section, I grouped the role of cooperatives 
into two main categories distinguished by the level of their impacts: micro and macro level 
development objectives. Micro objectives were divided into two main sub-categories 
differentiating between socio-economic indicators and other unspecific indicators or reasons for 
selecting cooperative enterprises as a development tool. In table 12 in Annex VI, agencies 
received “YES-(Y)”, if they consider cooperatives having such roles or are used as a tool to 
reach micro or macro development objectives, or “No-(N)” if they do not consider that 
cooperatives have such roles in their development agenda. Chat 6 shows the number of agencies 
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(over a total of 15) attributing the roles listed to cooperative enterprises (R1 to R16) in their 
development agenda.  
At micro-level, for the socio-economic development indicators, results showed that twelve 
agencies have ascribed the role of decreasing the cost of production (R1) and improving access 
to market (R2) to cooperative enterprises. Increasing members’ skills (R5) was also a main role 
cited by eleven agencies. Moreover, at a micro-level, for the sub-category of other indicators, 
thirteen agencies justified their reliance on the cooperative enterprise tool for the reason of being 
a main legal institutional framework (R6) in rural areas. Seven agencies set the support of 
cooperatives as a direct target aiming to induce socio-economic development (R12). The use of 
cooperatives as a pre-set condition by donors (R9), to respond to government plans (R10), and as 
a tool for group control for political reasons (R11) were listed by few agencies. Certainly, 
agencies having political interest, in particular National NGOs, would not state their activities 
with cooperatives as a political control tool. Only the respondent of ADA mentioned that the 
association organizes affiliated groups in rural areas in a cooperative enterprise structure in order 
to logistically control them during election and to legalize their financial support. Probably, if I 
were able to interview JBDA and SF, they would have reported the same answer. RMF 
respondent denied the use of cooperatives for a political aim and mentioned that the foundation 
did not ask cooperatives’ members to vote for its candidates during election. However, knowing 
the structure of the Lebanese sectarian political system, RMF, by having a political aim in 
particular in North Lebanon, mainly supports affiliated groups, villages, cooperatives, etc. that 
vote for its policy. Accordingly, using cooperatives by politically oriented agencies would 
certainly have a political control aim. At national level, the majority of active NGOs have either 
political or religious backgrounds that are interconnected in the Lebanese context. This means 
that the political support of cooperative enterprises is a common practice applied through the 
implementation of development projects.  
At macro-level, fourteen agencies listed poverty alleviation (R13) as a major role of 
cooperatives. Eleven agencies planned to use cooperatives to induce social cohesion and 
integration (R14) and to create job opportunities (R15). Only four agencies identified fairer 
globalization (R16) as a development role attributed to cooperatives.  
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At macro and micro levels, poverty alleviation (R13) and the use of cooperatives as a main legal 
institutional framework in rural areas (R6) were the major identified reasons for using 
cooperatives in the development agencies’ agenda. Accordingly, the role of cooperatives as 
alternative market enterprises capable of alleviating the poverty of small and marginalized 
producers was mainly attributed to cooperative enterprises in Lebanon. Cooperatives can include 
poor people in the market economy but they do not necessarily produce a comparable 
performance to capitalist enterprises. In fact, this is the main role of cooperative enterprises 
under Neoliberalism. Cooperatives are seen as alternative private enterprises in the third non-
profit sector. They are effective in meeting the socio-economic needs that are not addressed by 
the private and public sectors.  
Chart 6: Number of agencies (over a total of 15) attributing selected roles (R1 to R16) to 
cooperative enterprises in their development agenda. 
 
• R1: Decrease the cost of production and increase income 
• R2: Improve access to markets – eliminate middlemen 
• R3: Improve and increase access to services  
• R4: Increase producers’ bargaining power – group empowerment 
• R5: Increase members’ skills  
• R6: Coop as a legal institution framework  
• R7: Grouping similar needs and having multi-dimensional impacts 
• R8: Equitable and sustainable support (principles and values)  
• R9: To answer donors’ request 
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• R10: Responding to government development plans  
• R11: Group control for a political reason 
• R12: Agencies have a mission to support cooperatives 
• R13: Poverty alleviation – food security, increase access to credit, improving economic 
and social conditions 
• R14: Social cohesion and integration – gender equality, increased empowerment and 
rights, facilitate social unity, key framework for social capital 
• R15: Job creation  
• R16: Fairer globalization – equitable distribution 
 
Most INGOs and IGOs ascribed a high number of roles to cooperative enterprises at micro and 
macro-levels (Chart 7). For ACDI/VOCA, this goes in parallel to its mission of fostering 
economic opportunities through cooperative enterprises. It is clearly stated in its name: 
“Cooperative Development and Assistance”. CHF has started implementing development 
interventions only by relying on cooperatives. Moreover, ACDI/VOCA and CHF are both 
members in the US Overseas Cooperative Development Council which brings together 
organizations aiming “to build a more prosperous world through cooperative enterprises” 
(OCDC 2012). ICU, YMCA, and UNDP respondents clearly stated that they only implement 
interventions through cooperative enterprises. This ensures long-term sustainable impacts. The 
remaining INGOs and IGOs (ILO, WV, and IFAD) have given a reduced number of roles to 
cooperatives in their development agendas. For WV and IFAD, because they were not 
interviewed, other indicators for selecting the cooperative enterprise were not identified. 
Secondary data do not list such indicators. This is the main reason for the reduced number of 
roles. For the ILO, it usually focuses on job creation and security and does not specify socio-
economic indicators at micro-level. 
All national NGOs except for RMF approximately attributed an equal number of roles to 
cooperative enterprises. RMF listed 15 roles out of 16 associated to cooperative enterprises. 
During the interview, RMF respondent mentioned that the organization only implements projects 
through local cooperative enterprises. In several interventions, RMF has supported producers to 
establish new cooperatives. In addition, most projects implemented by RMF were funded by 
CHF. In this case, it is not surprising to rely on the cooperative tool promoted by the main donor.  
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Chart 7: Sum of roles attributed to cooperatives by development agencies 
 
 
The findings of this part revealed that the development agencies interviewed and studied 
consider cooperatives as an essential tool to foster development in Lebanon at micro and macro 
levels in their development agendas. The following parts of this chapter examine the roles 
attributed to cooperatives at project level in terms of activities and impacts. Accordingly, further 
findings will help to identify if the attributed roles to cooperative enterprises in Lebanon were 
only theoretical or based on empirical achievements and previous successful interventions.  
 
4.4. Supporting cooperatives: role of agencies, projects, and impacts 
 
This part explores the role of development agencies in supporting producers’ cooperatives in 
Lebanon. It analyses the main activities and projects implemented with producers’ cooperatives 
and examines their impacts from the perspective of agencies studied and interviewed. This part 
will be matched with the impacts of cooperatives assessed from the perspective of producers’ 
members in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this research. Secondary reviews, mainly final project 
reports or project evaluation reports, were complemented by semi-structured interviews carried 
out with ten development agencies. By relying on both sources, I was able to: 
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• Report minor activities implemented in projects 
• Cover what agencies declare about their interventions with cooperatives and what they 
report in parallel 
• Collect what could not be stated in reports such as failure, vested interest, political 
interest, etc.  
• Verify either what has been expressed during interviews or what has been reported in 
secondary data 
• Expand the database and timeframe of my study  
The most important two to three projects, which were implemented with cooperative enterprises 
by each agency, in addition to the interviews, constituted the main units of analysis in this part. 
Projects were either identified during interviews or reported by agencies as main projects relying 
on the cooperative enterprise tool to induce socio-economic development. For USAID, being a 
bilateral donor, data of projects implemented through cooperative enterprises were explored 
alongside funded projects implemented by American NGOs such as CHF and ACDI/VOCA. 
However, for the EC, despite being a multilateral donor, one main project is assessed because it 
was implemented in coordination with the MOA and not through a NGO. For UNDP, I studied a 
program (Artgold) and not a project. For ILO, WV, IFAD, and ADA, only one project was 
identified as a main intervention implemented through cooperative enterprises. In total, twenty-
four projects formed the baseline of my data (Table 9). 
Table 9: List of studied projects implemented by different agencies 
Agency Projects 
USAID • Data will be expressed through USAID funded projects 
ACDI/VOCA • P1: Action for sustainable agro-industry in Lebanon  
• P2: Lebanon business linkages initiative  
• P3: Middle East and North Africa: Lebanon farmer to farmer 
program 
CHF • P4: Lebanon apple production improvement  
• P5: Humanitarian assistance to Lebanon  
• P6: Clustering for economic development and revitalization of 
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industry sectors (phase I: 2002-2005) 
YMCA • P7: Stimulating markets and rural transformation program  
• P8: Support to women’s agricultural cooperative  
ILO • P9: Local socio-economic development in war-affected areas in 
South Lebanon 
UNDP • P10: Artgold program 
ICU • P11: Support for agricultural cooperatives in Baalbeck/Hermel (Ross 
Program) 
• P12: Rehabilitation of the olive sector in the areas most affected by 
the South Lebanon conflict    
Aec • P13: Support for Kab-Elias cooperative 
• P14: Increasing Lebanese agricultural competitiveness 
RMF • P15: Olive Oil development project  
• P16: Professional training and integrated rural development - North 
Lebanon 
Amal Mov* • P17: Empowering women cooperatives and olive growers in South 
Lebanon 
EC • P18: Agricultural development project 
WVL • P19: Sustainable agri-business initiatives in Lebanon (SABIL) 
IFAD • P20: Smallholder livestock rehabilitation project 
SF • P21: Strengthening bee husbandry in Akkar 
• P22: Support for cow breeders 
JBDA • P23: Network of six cooperatives for crop marketing 
• P24: Coop service centers 
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4.4.1. The role of agencies in developing producers’ cooperatives  
 
This section details the role of different agencies in developing producers’ cooperatives in 
Lebanon. It shows how development agencies have supported and encouraged producers’ 
cooperatives to deliver their roles, detailed above in the first part of this chapter. It identifies the 
importance of implemented activities in addressing the challenges of cooperative enterprises and 
providing the main prerequisites for success.  
Similar to the approach that was used to quantify the role of cooperatives in the development 
agencies’ agendas; I grouped the activities carried out by various agencies into five main 
categories or role of development agencies, as follows: 
• Capacity building 
• Facilitate access to market 
• Facilitate access to credit 
• Financial support 
• Supportive environment: legal and regulatory framework  
These categories were divided into twelve sub-categories detailing the roles of agencies. In Table 
13 in Annex VI, for the twenty-four studied projects, agencies received “Yes-(Y)” if they 
supplied or carried these sub-categories under each separate project, or “No-(N)” if they did not 
report the implementation of these sub-categories. “Yes” answers were quantified into 
percentages under each sub-category in order to identify the main role of development agencies 
in supporting producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon. Agencies’ role (AR) is detailed in Chart 8.   
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Chart 8: Role of agencies in supporting producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon 
 
 
• AR1: Technical assistance: such as business development (feasibility study, product 
costing, profitability analysis, etc), quality control, packaging development, extension, 
field visits etc  
• AR2: Training: such as coop management, export requirements, international 
certification, branding, labeling, management, etc  
• AR3: Market linkages: local, international, between sub-sectors (input, processing, 
transport, etc)  
• AR4: Market information and research 
• AR5: Participation in workshops, local and international shows  
• AR6: Develop new products  
• AR7: Elaborate marketing strategies  
• AR8: Develop special credit facilities with local banks 
• AR9: Offer micro-credit 
• AR10: Equipment supply 
• AR11: Infrastructure 
• AR12: Supportive regulatory and legal framework 
 
Results showed that offering technical support (AR1) and training (AR2) in addition to 
equipment supply (AR10) and infrastructure (AR11), under the categories of capacity building 
and financial support for rural development, were the main activities or role of agencies in 
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developing producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon. Creating a legal and regulatory framework for 
cooperative development (AR12) was not a priority for development agencies. Only two projects 
(P7, P24) advocated for a supportive cooperative environment. Under the objective of facilitating 
access to markets, major activities focused on fostering market linkages (AR3) as well as market 
information and research (AR4). Participation in workshops, local and international shows 
(AR5) was also a significant activity in this category. In facilitating access to credits, INGOs and 
IGOs were the main actors. Only one project (P14) implemented by a National NGO (Arcenciel) 
supported coops to access credit intuitions (AR8). Four agencies offered micro-credit services to 
cooperatives as a project component (AR9).  
These activities or roles of development agencies have the potential to manage several internal 
and external challenges, as well as to facilitate the main internal and external pre-requisites for 
success. Table 10 matches where the main identified activities could play a role vis-à-vis 
challenges and pre-requisite indicators.  
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Table 10: Challenges and Pre-requisite indicators facilitated by development agencies 
 Indicators Activities or roles 
Internal 
challenges 
Horizon problem Financial support for rural development, credit 
facilities 
Portfolio problem Financial support for rural development 
Control problem Capacity building 
Free rider Capacity building 
Influence cost Capacity building 
External 
challenges 
Liberal environment Market linkages, research and information 
Unsuitable national 
environment 
 
Internal Pre-
requisites 
Answering producers needs Financial support for rural development 
Applying principles and 
values 
Capacity building 
Strong members 
participation 
Financial support for rural development, capacity 
building 
Efficient organizational 
structure 
Capacity building 
External pre-
requisites   
Support from the 
community 
Financial support for rural development, capacity 
building 
Supportive environment   
Increasing unity between 
cooperatives 
 
 
Findings showed that the activities or roles of development agencies in supporting producers’ 
cooperatives in Lebanon could theoretically address internal challenges and internal pre-
requisites for success. External challenges and the main external pre-requisites for success were 
not a priority for development agencies. During interviews, most respondents linked this 
weakness to the complementary role that should be played by the government. This is the role of 
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the DGC that should create and maintain a suitable regulatory and legal framework for the 
development of cooperatives.  
 
4.4.2. Projects implemented with producers’ cooperatives: nature and process 
 
In this part, I explore the nature of projects implemented with producers’ cooperatives and the 
process used by various development agencies to develop the cooperative enterprise tool. This 
part ends by detailing the main problems encountered by development agencies during the 
execution phase.  
4.4.2.1. Nature of projects 
 
Four main categories describing the nature of projects were identified based on the data collected 
from secondary reviews and semi-structured interviews. Categories are the following:  
• Skills’ development and empowerment 
• Marketing services 
• Production service provider (machinery, processing, etc.) 
• Individual member support  
In table 14 in Annex VI, agencies received “Yes-(Y)” if projects offered activities under the 
selected categories or “No-(N) if they did not implement similar activities with producers’ 
cooperatives.  Chart 9 shows the percentage of different selected categories in projects 
implemented by various development agencies.  
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Chart 9: Nature of projects implemented with producers’ cooperatives by development agencies 
 
 
In parallel to the role of agencies in developing the cooperative enterprise- capacity building and 
financial support for rural development- findings showed that agencies have implemented 
projects related to skills’ development and empowerment as a main nature (100 percent) and 
related to production service provider as a secondary complementary nature (83.3 percent). 
Indeed, these two natures of projects, which should theoretically be based on members’ common 
needs, contain the sustainability components essential for the development of cooperative 
enterprises. Agencies have apparently worked to empower members and build their capacities to 
manage their own production service units which should also theoretically offer feasible services 
to members. Further findings in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will evaluate whether the implemented 
projects have empirically contributed to skills’ development and the initiation of services needed 
by members. 
Coupled by marketing services (54.1 percent) and individual members’ support (50 percent), the 
sustainability of agencies’ interventions would also increase and contribute effectively to the 
development of cooperative enterprises.  
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4.4.2.2. Process of implementation 
 
In this section, I examine, in terms of process, how development agencies have implemented the 
projects studied in this research with producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon. I divided the process 
of implementation into two phases as follows:  
• Initiation phase 
• Progress of activities phase: coordination and partnership 
4.4.2.2.1. Initiation phase 
 
Projects during the initiation phase were divided into four categories as follows: 
• Activity identification 
• Members sharing 
• Coop initiation 
• Coop selection 
These four categories were divided into eleven sub-categories. In table 15 in Annex VI, agencies, 
similar to the previous approach, received “Yes-(Y)” if they listed sub-categories or activities 
during the initiation phase of the studied projects or “No-(N)” if they did not rely on such 
activities. Chart 10 shows the percentage of different sub-categories in the initiation phase.  
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Chart 10: Initiation phase activities in projects implemented with producers’ cooperatives 
 
• PI1: Project activities identified based on an agricultural or cooperative surveys  
• PI2: Project activities identified based on a local development plan  
• PI3: Project activities identified based on selected sector challenges 
• PI4: Project activities planned to be income generating without previous assessment  
• PI5: Members have financially shared in the project 
• PI6: Members have provided necessary infrastructure 
• PI7: Cooperatives established during the project 
• PI8: Cooperatives selected based on the total number of members 
• PI9: Cooperatives selected based on previous support  
• PI10: Cooperatives selected based on a gender approach 
• PI11: Cooperatives selected based on their effectiveness (Select active coop only) 
 
Findings showed that development agencies planned to respond to producers’ common needs by 
relying on cooperative surveys (PI1: 83.3 percent), local development plans (PI2: 75 percent), 
sector challenges (PI3: 87.5 percent), and income generating activities (PI4: 79.1 percent). 
Responding to producers’ needs is an essential point in facilitating internal pre-requisites for 
success. Otherwise, short term impacts and low sustainability resulting from the low reliance on 
answering common members’ needs would certainly lead to the failure of cooperative 
enterprises. In the members sharing category, members limited their contribution to the provision 
of necessary infrastructure (PI6: 41.6 percent). They did not share financially in all studied 
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projects (PI5: 0 percent). This point could be considered a weakness in the projects implemented 
with cooperative enterprises. Members’ economic participation in answering their common 
needs is an essential pre-requisite for success. Usually, members show low accountability for 
assets in which they do not have a financial stake, in particular when these assets do not directly 
respond to their needs. Sharing the provision of necessary infrastructure does not imply that 
members have invested financially together to provide infrastructure in implemented projects. 
Respondents mentioned that the necessary infrastructure was mainly donated by a powerful 
member who let the cooperative use his/her premises in order to facilitate the project’s 
implementation. Therefore, infrastructure sharing was not a common property owned by the 
cooperative. Such practices open doors to corruption and political control. Powerful members 
who have effectively provided the necessary conditions to receive development projects can 
control the initiated services and direct the cooperative to achieve their own objectives. 
Similarly, in some cases, where the cooperative has paid rent costs for members who provided 
the necessary infrastructure, no financial sharing has taken place. Rent costs were generated by 
the services that were donated by development agencies. 
For the coop initiation category, nine projects (PI7: 37.5 percent) initiated new cooperatives as a 
separate component while the remaining projects worked with already established cooperatives. 
Initiating cooperatives by agencies implementing a development project could be considered as a 
negative or a positive approach. It is positive when agencies support a group of producers that 
lacks the technical capacity to initiate a cooperative enterprise that could answer production 
challenges. However, it could be considered negative when producers accept to initiate a new 
cooperative as a legal institutional condition to receive development aid. The respondent of 
YMCA mentioned that the organization supports producers who show active participation and 
real common needs to form cooperative enterprises. However, it rejects the support of producers 
who aim to initiate a cooperative in order to receive development aid.  
Finally for the coop selection procedures, agencies stated active coops (PI11: 91.6 percent) and 
previously supported coops (PI9: 41.6 percent) as the main indicators for coop selection. These 
indicators ameliorate the potential of project sustainability and increase efficiency. Most INGO 
and IGO respondents declared that they have coordinated at field level with political parties to 
select active coops. This might be a necessary step in development projects. Politicians in 
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Lebanon may challenge the process of project implementation in the case that they were not 
given a role in selecting beneficiaries or at least informed about a selection. For national political 
NGOs, politicians choose cooperatives to receive support from their agencies. It means that 
political parties were able, through development agencies, to direct funds to their affiliated 
cooperatives. In fact, a good number of cooperatives might be initiated by political parties as 
detailed in Chapter 3. Therefore, the interventions of agencies have increased somehow the 
political control on cooperatives. They gave political parties a decision-making role in selecting 
cooperatives to receive support. This point contradicts with the principle of autonomy and 
independence in cooperative enterprises. 
 
4.4.2.2.2. Progress of activities’ phase: coordination and partnership  
 
The coordination and partnership phase was divided into three categories as follows:  
• During execution 
• After execution 
• Further support 
These categories were divided into seven sub-categories detailing activities with cooperatives. In 
Table 16 in Annex VI, agencies received “Yes-(Y)” if they carried out such type of sub-category 
or “No-(N)” if they did not. Chart 11 shows the percentage of different sub-categories in the 
second process of projects’ implementation (Process II (PII)).  
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Chart 11: Percentage of coordination and partnership sub-categories between agencies and 
cooperatives 
 
• PII1: Project completely managed by the 
implementing agencies (in case of service 
provider) 
• PII5: Regular meeting for monitoring 
and to identify possible interventions 
• PII2: Project managed in coordination 
with the coop manager and the agency  
• PII6: For new projects, coops supported 
before are priorities 
• PII3: Cooperation stopped and was 
limited to the project 
• PII7: Have planned to implement new 
projects with coops 
• PII4: Agency continued to run the 
project 
 
 
Findings showed that during execution, projects were mainly managed through a solid 
cooperation and coordination between the implementing agency and the cooperative manager or 
the board of directors (PII2: 70.9 percent). This process increases the potential of success and 
projects’ sustainability by limiting the top-down approach in management and by building the 
capacity of cooperatives to run their own projects. However, seven projects were directly 
managed by five different implementing agencies (PII1: 29.1 percent). I mean here that agencies 
were offering and managing services themselves, even the financial activities. This process 
reduces the opportunities of success and increases the dependency of cooperatives. The reasons 
for direct management differed between agencies. For ACDI/VOCA, the nature of P3 project, 
which is skills’ development and empowerment, does not allow direct management by 
cooperatives. For Aec and RMF, they planned in their development strategies for rural areas to 
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play the role of services’ provider to cooperatives and individual producers. They coordinated 
with cooperatives to reach their members and sometimes used their premises. They kept the 
financial and management structure of the project under their guidance without any significant 
role for the board of directors. For RMF, a political national NGO, continuing to manage projects 
donated to cooperatives offers the possibility of permanent political control through the services 
delivered to members. The control is on day to day basis and not limited to one intervention. For 
WV, their strategy was to initially run projects in terms of management and finance. Then, at the 
end of the project, they transferred assets to be managed by the cooperative. The WV approach is 
practical and efficient. It is close to the coordination and cooperation in management. It builds 
the capacity of the cooperative to manage assets and then transfer the management authority to 
the board of directors. For IFAD, their strategy was to build coop centers, employ and operate 
needed staff, and then transfer the management to the MOA. That is why IFAD did not involve 
cooperatives in the management. 
In after execution-coordination and partnership, results showed in most studied projects that 
agencies held regular meetings for monitoring and identifying possible interventions (PII5: 87.5 
percent). It implies that agencies have planned to cooperate with the cooperatives supported 
previously to implement further interventions. For EC and IFAD, no regular meetings were held 
because they usually work through the MOA that takes over the responsibility of coordination 
and partnership. For WV, the coordination and partnership with cooperatives had stopped. It had 
decided to stop working in the agricultural sector after finalizing the implementation of two 
USAID funded projects. Aec and RMF continued to run projects implemented with cooperatives 
(PII4: 20.4 percent). Both play the role of services’ provider in rural areas in place of 
cooperatives. In nine projects, cooperation was cancelled and limited to the projects’ 
implementation (PII3: 37.5 percent). Several reasons were identified.  For WV, IFAD, and EC, 
they are the same reasons for which they cancelled regular meetings. For Aec, the difficulty in 
communicating with the board of directors during the implementation had put on hold the 
coordination. For CHF, the implementation is usually through a local NGO such as RMF which 
takes over the responsibility of further cooperation. 
Finally, in twenty-two projects studied in this research, agencies expressed their intentions to 
cooperate with the cooperatives previously supported and planned to implement new 
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interventions with them (PII6 and PII7: 91.6 percent). This result explains the importance of the 
cooperative enterprise tool to foster socio-economic development from agencies’ perspective.   
 
4.4.2.3. Challenges encountered with cooperatives during projects’ implementation  
 
This section explores what development agencies have encountered or identified as problems or 
challenges in projects implemented with producers’ cooperatives.   
Encountered problems were grouped in two categories: 
• Internal between coop members 
• External with the implementing agency and the community 
Each category was divided into four sub-categories or challenges that appeared during projects’ 
implementation and were classified by development agencies as weaknesses reducing the 
potential of cooperatives to achieve the objectives set in each project.  
In table 17 in Annex VI, agencies received “Yes-(Y)” if they encountered such problems under 
different projects or “No-(N)” if they did not. Chart 12 shows the percentage of problems 
encountered by development agencies during projects’ implementation.  
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Chart 12: Internal and external problems encountered with cooperatives during projects’ 
implementation 
 
• EP1: Portfolio problem • EP5: Communication problem 
• EP2: Control problem • EP6: Lack of applying principles and 
values 
• EP3: Vested interest problem • EP7: Political problem 
• EP4: Free rider problem • EP8: Management problem 
 
 
Results showed that external challenges were identified by development agencies as the main 
challenges encountered during the implementation of projects with cooperatives. The percentage 
of occurrence of all sub-categories under external challenges was higher than the percentage of 
remaining sub-categories under internal challenges. The lack of applying the principles and 
values of cooperatives (EP6: 91.6 percent) and the communication with the implementing 
agency and the community (EP5: 83.3 percent) were the main encountered challenges. These 
two challenges are identified as pre-requisites for success in cooperative enterprises. The 
percentage of occurrence under political and management challenges (EP7 and EP8: 70.8 
percent) would be higher when agencies that responded negatively are analyzed. It is not 
surprising that the four political national NGOs (RMF, ADA, SF, and JBDA) did not encounter 
the political challenge. In fact, political control is part of their mission. For the management 
challenge, agencies managing projects in place of cooperatives did not encounter this challenge. 
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Therefore, all external challenges listed during projects’ implementation constitute a real threat 
for the development of cooperatives. They limit long-term potential impacts and increase the 
vulnerability of corruption practices.  
Although internal challenges showed lower percentages, the in-depth analysis would generate the 
same percentages as external challenges. National political NGOs (RMF, ADA, SF, and JBDA) 
did not report control (EP2) and vested interest (EP3) challenges. By default, the control 
challenge is incorporated in their political nature. The vested interest challenge is avoided by the 
increased control of agencies to ensure benefits for all members who should pay back in terms of 
voting during election. The same case is applicable for the free rider challenge (EP4). Therefore, 
internal challenges also constitute a major threat for the development of cooperatives, in 
particular after finalizing the projects’ implementation phase and leaving members by 
themselves to manage and deliver services. 
 
4.4.3. Impacts of projects implemented with cooperatives 
 
This part examines the main impacts of the studied projects from the perspective of development 
agencies. Fifteen listed impacts were grouped into eight main categories as following: 
1. Decreased the cost of production – increased income (I1-I2-I3)  
2. Improved access to market (I4-I5-I6-I7) 
3. Improved and increased access to services (I8-I9) 
4. Increased and maintained employment (I10-I11) 
5. Increased access to credits (I12) 
6. Improved skills (I13) 
7. Increased social cohesion (I14) 
8. Failure (I15) 
In table 18 in Annex VI, agencies received “Yes-(Y)” if they mentioned that the related impacts 
were achieved in the projects implemented with cooperatives or “NO-(N)” if they did not. Chart 
13 shows the percentage of different projects’ impacts as listed by development agencies 
197 
 
Chart 13: Impacts of projects implemented with cooperatives from the perspective of 
development agencies 
 
• I1: In production • I9: Better quality of services 
• I2: In processing  • I10: Maintain jobs 
• I3: In marketing • I11: Create new jobs 
• I4: Increase local direct sale • I12: Increased access to credit 
• I5: Open export markets • I13: Improved Skills 
• I6: Increase prices  • I14: Increased social cohesion 
• I7: Build solid linkages • I15: Failure 
• I8: Expand services 
 
Agencies identified the following impacts in more than seventy-five percent of the projects 
studied in this research: I1, I2, I4, I8, I9, I10, I11, I13, and I14.  
I1, I2, I4, I8, I9, and I13 impacts go in parallel with the role attributed to cooperatives in the 
agenda of development agencies (micro and macro objectives), the identified roles of agencies in 
developing the cooperative enterprise (Capacity building and Financial support for rural 
development) and the nature of implemented projects (Skills development and empowerment 
and Production service provider). The remaining outcomes (I10, I11, and I14) are the main 
objectives of development projects. Poverty alleviation is well represented in I1 and I2 by 
increasing income and I4 by increasing local direct sales. Increasing access to credit (I12) has a 
relatively low percentage (37.5 percent) and therefore is not considered as a main impact 
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achieved in the studied projects. Only one agency (Aec) has listed a failure (I15) impact in one 
project that did not achieve most of the listed impacts.  
Accordingly, producers’ cooperatives succeeded in delivering socio-economic development 
impacts in the various projects implemented by development agencies that were interviewed and 
studied in this research.  
 
4.5. Coordination and planning with the government  
 
The last part of this chapter analyzes the planning and coordination of various development 
agencies with the government and in particular with the MOA through the DGC. It aims to 
explore the nature of coordination with the government and to highlight the reasons reported for 
the lack of coordination.  
Based on the interviews and the available secondary data, it appeared that the coordination 
between development agencies and the government is limited to the field intervention level 
during the projects’ initiation phase and not to a strategic, intervention designing level. Agencies 
coordinated with the government to facilitate their interventions and not to support the 
government in implementing its agricultural development strategy. Few agencies were not even 
coordinating with the government at the field intervention level.   
I grouped the reasons for coordination with the government into three main categories (active 
coop identification, data verification, and facilitation of coop initiation) and the lack of 
coordination into two main categories (political and lack of systematic coop enterprise 
development plan).  
In table 19 in Annex VI, agencies received “Yes-(Y)” if they considered the coordination and 
planning with the government or their absence falls under the category in question and “No-N” if 
they did not. Chart 14 shows the reasons for coordination and planning or their absence with the 
government. 
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Chart 14: Coordination and planning between the government and various development agencies  
 
• CP1: Agencies coordinate and plan interventions with the government  
• CP2: Active coop identification 
• CP3: Data verification 
• CP4: Facilitate coop initiation 
• CP5: Political 
• CP6: Lack of systematic cooperative enterprise development plan 
 
Results showed that sixty percent of agencies coordinated equally with the government for the 
three listed specific categories. They sought the government support during the project initiation 
phase to identify active coops, verify data supplied by cooperatives, and facilitate their initiation. 
The remaining forty percent of agencies associated their lack of coordination and planning with 
the government to the lack of systematic cooperative enterprise development plans (CP6: 66.6 
percent) essential for long-term, sustainable impacts. The political reason (CP5: 33.3 percent) 
was also a significant cause for the lack of coordination. Some respondents mentioned that the 
previous practices of the MOA in selecting cooperative enterprises upon their political affiliation 
have generated a low credibility for the DGC. Instead, the DGC should be a neutral body guiding 
development agencies to support active cooperatives. Other respondents coordinated and planned 
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interventions with the government depending on the political interest of the Agriculture Minister. 
For instance, all American NGOs were not coordinating with the MOA for the last two years 
because the Minister, Dr. Hussein el Hajj Hasan, is backed by the Hezbollah party opposing 
foreign US political interest.   
In conclusion, the coordination of agencies with the government could be classified as weak, 
limited to the initiation phase and not to the achievement of specific planned impacts.   
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
A contradiction could be identified in the findings that were elaborated in this chapter.  
Development agencies attributed multiple roles to producers’ cooperatives at micro and macro 
levels in their development agendas. Accordingly, they mainly supplied cooperatives, from a 
neoliberal perspective, with capacity building and financial support for rural development that 
both facilitate and offer several pre-requisites for success. They planned interventions that 
promote skills’ development and assure the delivery of required services. They have relied on 
coordination and planning with cooperatives during the initiation and progress of activities 
phases in order to respond to members’ needs. However, multiple challenges in this coordination 
were highlighted. In particular, the political aim and control of cooperatives initiated or 
supported by political NGOs were the main challenges. Accordingly, producers’ cooperatives, in 
which producers have not shared in investment, could turn into a tool to channel political and 
development aid that would not alleviate producers’ needs but instead would favor corruption 
and mismanagement. Moreover, politicians participated in the process of beneficiaries’ selection 
and were able to direct aid to cooperatives supporting their policies. Some political agencies 
played the role of production services’ provider in place of cooperatives in order to offer political 
benefits for members on a daily basis. In fact, during projects’ implementation, development 
agencies identified several challenges at an external level with the community and at an internal 
level between members. Most of these challenges are associated with the political aim of 
cooperatives that subordinates members’ socio-economic aims. External and internal challenges 
could make activities implemented via cooperative enterprises vulnerable to corruption. 
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Although problems were encountered while implementing projects with producers’ cooperatives, 
development agencies found that cooperatives were able to deliver several impacts, in particular 
decreasing the cost of production, increasing access to market, improving access to services, 
increasing skills, increasing social cohesion, and creating job opportunities. Therefore, 
cooperatives were effective in inducing producers’ socio-economic development in Lebanon. All 
impacts achieved by cooperatives were connected with the nature of implemented projects and 
the role of agencies in supporting cooperatives. 
The contradiction in this chapter is between associating multiple roles to cooperative enterprises 
by agencies in their development agendas, identifying serious challenges that make difficult the 
achievement of these roles, and finally stating several impacts achieved in the field through the 
implemented projects. The stated impacts are normatively associated to cooperative enterprises 
as previously detailed in Chapter 1.  
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, which assess producers’ cooperatives from the perspective of members 
in terms of effective services and benefits, will evaluate if these impacts identified by 
development agencies were achieved in the field or were only reported in order to justify the 
political aim from supporting cooperatives.  
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Chapter 5- Status of Lebanese Producers’ Cooperatives 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I examined the role of producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon in fostering 
socio-economic development from the perspective of development planners: the government and 
the development agencies. I analyzed how both have supported and encouraged the development 
of producers’ cooperatives and what were the impacts of related interventions. Both chapters 
explored the first research question of this study.  This chapter answers the first part of my 
second research question which explores the role of cooperatives and their associated impacts 
from the perception of producers’ members. It examines, across the four different agricultural 
regions in Lebanon (previously detailed in Chapter 2), the status of active cooperatives which 
were selected in coordination with the regional offices of the DGC. Dormant cooperatives, which 
were not identified as active cooperatives by the DGC, were also studied in order to analyze the 
reasons that have contributed to their failure. Gender variation in the cooperative sector is also 
explored in this chapter by examining active women cooperatives. The effect of gender on the 
success or failure of cooperatives as well as the role of cooperatives in managing gender related 
problems is analyzed. Then, the status of cooperation in the different agricultural sub-sectors is 
explored: in the production (covering plant, animal, and related processing), fishery, and 
beekeeping (apiculture) sub-sectors. In the last part, findings in the different agricultural regions 
are combined together to reveal the status of active producers’ cooperatives across Lebanon. This 
empirical information is matched with what development planners have expressed in terms of the 
potential role of cooperatives and impacts achieved in development projects. 
 
5.2. Selection of active and dormant cooperatives 
 
First of all, supported by the DGC, I identified a list of active cooperatives which were initiated 
after 1990 in the three agricultural sub-sectors. Two main indicators were used to identify active 
cooperatives: first, delivering services to members, and second, having regular communication 
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with the DGC to update activities and progress. The second indicator is required by-law for 
cooperative enterprises in Lebanon. Then, from the list of active cooperatives in each agricultural 
region, I randomly selected ten producers’ cooperatives: eight agricultural (plant, animal, 
processing), one fishery, and one beekeeping. The size of sub-sectors’ representation was 
previously detailed in the methodology section in Chapter 1. In total, forty producers’ 
cooperatives under the three sub-sectors were interviewed across Lebanon. Table 20 in Annex 
VII details the list of interviewed active cooperatives, their main services, and their date of 
initiation. In the selection of dormant cooperatives, I relied on the index of cooperatives in 
Lebanon to identify cooperatives located in the nearby villages of active cooperatives and were 
initiated after 1990. Selection on the basis of various agricultural sub-sectors was not considered 
for dormant cooperatives. The number of interviewed dormant cooperatives differed from region 
to another based on the saturation of data collection. In total, twenty-four dormant cooperatives 
were interviewed across Lebanon. Table 21 in Annex VII details the list of interviewed dormant 
cooperatives, their main planned/offered services, and their date of initiation.  
 
5.3. Data collection 
 
Semi-structured interviews were carried with the board of directors of active and dormant 
cooperatives. Most interviews were previously fixed through phone calls. Sometimes a friend 
originated from the village joined to facilitate the first contact and assure trust. When a friend 
was invited, I made sure that he/she does not have any personal problem with my respondents. I 
started my interviews by introducing myself and in particular I mentioned the name of the village 
from where I am originated. This revealed that I have lived in rural areas where the majority of 
producers’ cooperatives are located. Some respondents have visited my village. This opened the 
door for an easy interaction when they asked about the update of families they know or the 
details of nearby places. Then, I directed our interaction to the common interest in agriculture. 
We talked about the previous harvest, the problems encountered during the last season, the 
updates of markets, etc. My personal experience (being a farmer and an agricultural engineer) 
often made respondents feel that I am one of them knowing their challenges in the sector and not 
just a researcher remote from their everyday realities. I created the impression that I had a 
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firsthand experience of their true problems. Most respondents asked pure technical questions 
about different production systems or treatment methods. I gave enough time to my respondents 
to know me and feel comfortable to exchange their experience in their cooperatives. After that, I 
explained the reasons for carrying out my interview. I presented a general description of the 
study and then gave respondents the floor to introduce their cooperatives by detailing the 
initiation process, organizational structure, projects, challenges, benefits, services, partnerships, 
etc. I showed a respect for their opinions and views without interruption. Previous scholarly 
literature on producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon has not given an attention to producers’ 
thoughts and opinions. I believe that producers’ experience could contribute to the existing body 
of literature by giving a solid proof on the reasons for the failure or success of Lebanese 
producers’ cooperatives. When more info was needed, I asked specific small questions that 
elaborate the purpose of the study in a way that respondents do not feel a questions-answers 
atmosphere. It was a kind of an informal conversation interview with causal discussions. 
Questions were in the form of what do you think? How did you behave in case this specific 
problem happens? What is the more important? Do you select this answer or the other? 
Whenever I figured a self-interest or corruption practices, I inquired more about the subject 
without showing a bad impression or making my respondents feel that they did inappropriate 
activities. After finalizing my questions and my respondents had nothing to add, I showed 
appreciation and promised to exchange the results of the study. Few respondents said to me: 
“Elias we would like to see your work when it is done. Your work might help us to overcome the 
challenges of our cooperatives and open fruitful opportunities. Come check on us from time to 
time”.  
 
5.4. The status of active producers’ cooperatives across the different 
agricultural regions in Lebanon 
 
Five main dimensions were identified to evaluate the status of active cooperatives. These 
dimensions describe the major characteristics of a cooperative enterprise as well as potential 
activities and practices that could be performed by cooperatives. Cooperatives are analyzed 
through their process of initiation that should be based on common needs and equal 
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opportunities, their organizational structure that should engage all members in the decision-
making process, their external cooperation/partnership that is essential in today’s open market 
economy, their services, and finally through their benefits and challenges encountered by 
members. Each dimension was sub-divided into a number of components that are assessed by 
means of measurable qualitative or quantitative indicators. Data for these indicators were 
collected during interviews. They were presented in “Yes” or “No” answers when they are 
qualitative and in numbers when they are quantitative. For some indicators, where the case is not 
available, such as when there is no manager in the organizational structure dimension, answers to 
related indicators in the same components were left empty. Positive “Yes” answers, in each 
region, were converted into percentage and then the average percentage of the four regions was 
calculated to show the performance of selected indicators across Lebanon. In each dimension, 
the average performance of indicators across Lebanon is displayed in charts in the text. All 
collected data (“Yes” or “No” answers and numbers) as well as charts including the percentage 
of indicators in the different agricultural regions are detailed in Annex VII.  
In total, the five identified dimensions were sub-divided into 22 components and 89 indicators.    
In Table 11, dimensions and components are presented. Indicators are separately listed while 
studying each dimension and component in the text.  
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Table 11: Dimensions and components used to assess active producers’ cooperatives  
Dimensions Components 
I- Initiation phase and progress (IP) 1. Membership 
2. Type of cooperatives 
3. Objectives 
4. Reasons behind initiation 
5. Assets owned directly after initiation 
6. Current assets  
II- Organizational structure (OS) 7. General meeting 
8. Board of Directors 
9. Manager 
10. Auditors 
III- Partnership and Environment (PE) 11. Cooperation between coops 
12. Cooperation with the community 
13. Education 
14. Acceptance of new members 
15. Cooperation with the government 
16. Cooperation with NGOs 
17. Competition with private suppliers 
18. Cooperation with producers’ unions 
IV- Service supply & participation (SSP) 19. Nature of services 
20. Increasing members’ participation 
V- Problems and Benefits (PB) 21. Internal challenges 
22. Membership benefits 
 
 
5.4.1. First dimension: Initiation Phase and Progress (IP) 
 
The difference in farm size and the distribution of holdings across the four agricultural regions, 
detailed in Chapter 2, were not expressed in the “initial number of membership” (IP1) in active 
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cooperatives (Chart 15). Larger farm size and smaller number of holdings in the Bekaa region 
did not produce smaller cooperatives in terms of initial number of membership, which should 
reflect to a certain degree the capacity of offering services to all members. Instead, a slightly 
higher membership in the Bekaa is revealed when the five highlighted outliers in the four regions 
are excluded. The average initial number of membership in the Bekaa is twenty compared to 
fourteen in North Lebanon and sixteen in the other two regions.  
Sixty-five percent of active cooperatives (26 coops from a total of 40) have an initial 
membership number below or equal to 20. Mandatory by-law, cooperatives in Lebanon should 
have minimum ten members in order to be set up. Eighty-seven percent of active cooperatives 
have an initial membership number below 35. A small membership during initiation could be 
classified as an advantage or a pre-requisite for success because cooperation tend to be more 
successful in homogeneous smaller groups (Claudia & Lerman 1991, IFAD 2001) and when all 
members receive economic benefits at the early stage of cooperation. Only twelve percent (five 
coops) of active cooperatives had more than 40 members as initial number of membership. Two 
main reasons produced this increased membership:  
• Political: Coop 16 and Coop 25 have both a political background (initiated by a political 
leader). Both tried to gather as many members as possible from different villages. The 
respondents of both cooperatives said: “We planned to engage all active supporters from 
the surrounding villages, so they can receive benefits and donations whenever secured by 
our political leader”.   
• Sectorial: Coop 9 and Coop 19 were both fishery cooperatives grouping all fishermen 
who own a fishing vessel in the same harbor.  
For coop 37, it is a cooperative union gathering four primary cooperatives in the Bekaa valley. 
On average, each of these four cooperatives grouped 30 members. Therefore, Coop 37 is 
considered within the normal range (below 35) of initial number of membership in the different 
agricultural regions.  
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Chart 15: Initial number of membership (IP1) of active cooperatives across the four agricultural 
regions 
 
 
 
In IP2 indicator, “the percentage of increase in membership”, active cooperatives were classified 
in five categories (Chart 16, Table 22):  
1. Showing a reduction in membership percentage: Coop 33 in the Bekaa region was the 
only cooperative in which the percentage increase of membership was negative. It is a 
women cooperative offering traditional processed food product. Women buy raw 
materials (fruits, cereals, etc) from local markets and then do processing in the 
cooperative center in order to increase the uniformity of products and monitor quality. 
Therefore no products were prepared by individual members who instead get paid for 
their labor work in the cooperative. Three to four years after the cooperative received a 
donation to initiate a processing unit, thirty-five percent of members gradually withdrew 
their membership in the cooperative. They had no common interest with the remaining 
active group who is interested in getting a job opportunity and not a marketing 
opportunity. In addition, the respondent of Coop 33 said that “Only serious and active 
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producers kept their membership in the cooperative. Members who did not receive a 
direct benefit preferred to leave the cooperative. This is the right decision”. 
2. Having zero percentage increase: twenty-five percent of active cooperatives over the four 
regions had a zero membership increase. They were differently spread across regions. 
Five were located in North Lebanon, four in South Lebanon, and one in the Bekaa. 
Eighty percent of these cooperatives had received a support (in terms of assets) directly 
after initiation. Five women cooperatives (Coop 2, 6, 13, 15, 17) were initiated during the 
project implementation phase. Women cooperatives were not asked by development 
agencies to increase membership in order to receive development aid. In general, 
agencies seek a higher number of members to spread benefits. Three cooperatives, Coop 
5, 7, and 8, were initiated by a political or village elite. They restricted new membership 
in order to control the decision-making process in the cooperative, but they offered 
services to non-members for the same price. I quote the exact words of the respondents of 
these three cooperatives: “We want to control activities in the cooperative. We do not 
want new members to change our aim or the way the cooperative is moving. But, non-
members are welcomed whenever they ask to receive the cooperative services”.  
3. Percentage increase of membership below or equal to 100: Thirty-two percent of active 
cooperatives registered below or equal to hundred percent increase of membership. No 
difference between regions was revealed. This category is classified as a normal progress 
or even a low increase in membership because most cooperatives have received a support 
through a development project i.e. they have a potential to serve more members. Some 
fishery cooperatives, Coop 9 and Coop 19, had already a high number of initial 
memberships. Accordingly, they showed a reduced percentage increase in membership. 
In coop 4, low increase in membership is attributed to the type of support received by this 
cooperative. Individual members were supported and not the cooperative as a whole. 
Therefore the board of directors only accepted new membership on the basis of 
individual support availability. Another reason for the low percentage increase in 
membership is the common property aspect of cooperative enterprises. For instance, in 
Coop 23, the board of directors rejected few memberships to restrict the ownership in 
assets donated by development projects. The respondent said to me: “Why should we let 
new members share the free donated assets with us. Once they become members, they 
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will own a part of the assets. We always offer them the available services similar to 
active members. We do not differentiate between them and the cooperative members”. 
4. Percentage increase between 100 and 500: Twenty-five percent of active cooperatives 
have registered a high percentage increase of membership. Reasons were classified as 
follows: 
• Sectorial: Coop 10, 20, and 30 are beekeeping cooperatives. In Lebanon the 
number of beekeepers in the same village is relatively small and would be 
inefficient to invest in a honey processing unit. Thus, active beekeepers from two 
to three villages usually start initiating a coop as a preparatory committee. Later 
on, other beekeepers from the nearby villages join the cooperative initiative. 
Moreover, a high increase of membership is more attractive to development 
agencies that aim to support as many beneficiaries as they can. In coop 39, a 
fishery cooperative, it is also a sectorial reason because fishermen in Hermel area 
did not join the cooperative in the initiation phase. Instead, they have gradually 
joined.  
• Project condition: Coop 3, 21, and 35 were asked by development agencies to 
increase membership in order to receive development aid. Coop 3, a plant 
production cooperative, recruited big-ruminant farmers as a condition to receive a 
milk processing project. The chairman of Coop 3 said: “A local NGO proposed to 
offer the cooperative a milk processing plant. Our members were only concerned 
with plant production. Therefore, we asked animal producers in the surrounding 
villages to join the cooperative. That is how we were able to receive the 
donation”. Likewise, Coop 21 increased membership as a condition to receive an 
olive mill project that requires a high number of members to assure financial 
sustainability.  
• Pre-requisite to seek development aid: Coop 26 and Coop 27 internally decided to 
increase membership in order to show an increased power in representation while 
seeking support from development agencies. Respondents of both cooperatives 
said: “A high number of members attract development agencies. Development 
agencies want to reach as many producers as they can. We decided to increase 
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membership, so we can increase the potential of the cooperative to receive 
development aid”. 
5. Above 500 percent increase in membership: fifteen percent (six cooperatives) of active 
cooperatives were classified as outliers by accounting for higher than 500 percent 
increase in membership. Three main reasons were identified:  
• Sectorial: Coop 29, a fishery cooperative, registered the highest percentage 
increase in membership (2700 percent). The preparatory committee has initiated 
the cooperative and then the fishermen working in the same harbor have joined. 
Coop 40, a bee cooperative, registered a higher percentage increase of 
membership than other beekeeping cooperatives because it groups members from 
a district and not from two to three villages such as for Coop 20 and Coop 30.   
• Political: Coop 11 and Coop 25 received political support. Because cooperatives 
can legally accept donations, politicians ask supporters to join cooperatives and 
accordingly to receive political support. 
• Individual support as a project component: Coop 14 received a long term 
development project supporting individual farmers. Non-member farmers, who 
want to benefit, should join the cooperative as a condition. The budget of the 
received project has supported a lot of farmers who later became members in the 
cooperative. Similarly, Coop 36 was involved in a long term twinning project 
with a municipality in France. Every year, non-member farmers, who have 
received support, gradually joined the cooperative.  
 
Findings in the second indicator reveal that the political factor in supporting cooperative 
enterprises generated either a restriction in membership or an outlier position compared to the 
average increase in membership. Both effects threaten the real purpose of cooperatives. Instead 
of meeting the socio-economic objectives of members, cooperatives may appear to be a tool for 
political control.  Accordingly, corruption practices increase and reduce the potential for long 
term success. Likewise is the effect of the increased percentage in membership as a pre-requisite 
to receive or direct development aid. Cooperatives end by grouping producers having different 
objectives that are difficult to be met either by members’ own investment or projects donated by 
development agencies.  
212 
 
Chart 16: Percentage increase of membership in active cooperatives across the four studied 
regions 
 
 
Most cooperatives have planned to offer the three Type of Support (IP2: 67.5 percent, IP4: 80 
percent, IP5: 100 percent) (Chart 17, Chart 29, Table 22) that agricultural/producers’ 
cooperatives can perform as classified in Chapter 1. Only women cooperatives in the production 
sub-sector (Coop 2, 6, 13, 15, 17, 28, 32, 33) in the four studied regions were more specialized 
and accordingly planned to limit their activities to the “marketing type” of cooperatives (IP5). 
Some fishermen (Coop 9, 39) and beekeeping (Coop 10, 20) cooperatives have also planned to 
limit their activities to the “services” (IP4) and “marketing” (IP5) types of cooperatives. Their 
action in the “supply type” (IP3) would not generate significant benefits to members. Expanding 
the intervention under the different types of producers’ cooperatives reflects the low reliance on 
the common need indicator that is considered a pre-requisite in establishing cooperative 
enterprises. It means that members do not specify the real purposes of cooperation and 
accordingly reduce the potential for short-term success by expanding their expectations. Several 
cooperatives mentioned that they decided to undertake diverse activities under the different types 
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of cooperatives in order to increase the potential of receiving development aid. Respondents 
mainly said: “To benefit from donations we planned to perform diverse activities falling under 
the different parts of the value chain. Whatever development agencies suggest, we can link the 
proposition to the initially planned objectives”. Some cooperatives, specialized in one crop 
production, such as Coop 16 for olive production, cited targeting olive value chain as a reason to 
plan interventions in the different types of cooperatives. Nevertheless, such cooperatives did not 
rely on the common need objective because priorities at the value chain level could be identified 
to establish specific cooperative initiatives. 
All cooperatives in the four studied regions identified the three selected objectives, “generate and 
secure income” (IP6), “job creation” (IP7), and “social cohesion” (IP8), as main outputs to be 
achieved through cooperatives (Chart 17, Chart 29, Table 22). This normative approach in 
setting general objectives is consistent with the ICA definition of cooperative enterprises: to 
meet the common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations of members.  
In the Reasons behind Initiation component, “common need” (IP9) of members were the motive 
behind less than fifty percent of cooperatives in each of the four studied regions and accounted 
for thirty-five percent of active cooperatives across Lebanon. Bekaa showed the highest 
performance compared to other regions. North Lebanon registered the lowest percentage (20 
percent). Low and medium reliance on common need is associated with the planned expansion of 
interventions under the different types of cooperatives (IP3, IP4, and IP5). The less cooperatives 
do not specify their interventions, the less their common need indicator would be identified as 
the reason behind initiation. Out of the fourteen cooperatives which cited their common need 
motive for cooperation in all regions, twelve cooperatives also stated the “condition to receive 
aid” (IP11) as a main reason for initiation. These cooperatives rely on common need reason and 
seek development aid in parallel. However, all of them have not “owned assets directly after 
initiation” (IP12). There is a high negative correlation (r = -0.92) between the common need 
reason for initiation and the possibility of owning assets during the initiation phase. It means that 
after identifying common needs, members did not share financially in order to implement a 
group project capable of answering their problems. Instead, they planned to seek development 
aid. For the remaining two cooperatives, both have owned assets directly after initiation: the first 
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through members’ own investment (Coop 27) and the second (Coop 36) through a twinning 
project with a municipality in France.   
More than eighty percent of cooperatives in each region listed “the condition of receiving 
development aid” (IP10) as the main reason for coop initiation. All cooperatives in Bekaa and 
South Lebanon (100 percent) cited this reason as the main motive for cooperation. Across 
Lebanon, ninety-two percent of cooperatives were initiated to receive development aid. 
Respondents stated directly this reason as an absolute reality. They mainly said: “We initiated 
our cooperative to receive donations. This is the easiest way to benefit from developing aid. Few 
cooperatives in Lebanon were practically initiated to respond to a common need. They do not 
exceed the number of your hands’ fingers. If anybody tells you other than that, they are lying and 
hiding the real purpose behind the establishment of cooperatives”. Only three cooperatives 
located in North and Mount Lebanon responded negatively to this indicator. Two of them, Coop 
6 and Coop 25, mentioned that their reason for cooperation was to channel the support of 
political/village elites but not an identified common need.  The third cooperative, Coop 27, has 
identified a common need and has relied on members’ own-investment to assure needed assets 
after initiation.  
For the last indicator in the Reasons behind Initiation component, “requested by a political, 
village elite or philanthropist” (IP11), results showed a similar performance in North, South, and 
Mount Lebanon regions (40 percent) and a reduced percentage (10 percent) in the Bekaa region. 
On average, thirty-two percent of active cooperatives across Lebanon cited this reason behind 
initiation. Three cooperatives out of thirteen were supported by a village elite or philanthropist. 
The remaining 10 cooperatives were encouraged by a political leader to start their cooperation 
initiative. “Our political leader asked us to establish cooperatives to improve our socio-economic 
conditions. He/she can help us to receive donations via our cooperatives”, the respondents of 
these 10 cooperatives said. Eleven cooperatives out of the thirteen under this indicator also 
mentioned “the condition to receive development aid” as the motive for cooperation (IP10). 
Here, a link could be traced between political NGOs and cooperatives such as for Coop 5, Coop 
12, Coop 13, etc. Political leaders support cooperatives through their political NGOs. The two 
other cooperatives, Coop 6 and Coop 25, received support either from a village 
elite/philanthropist or from an NGO that has coordinated with a local political leader during the 
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selection process. There are no specific reasons for the reduced percentage in the Bekaa. It seems 
that cooperatives supported by politicians did not show real progress in order to be considered 
active by the DGC. Moreover, after the end of the civil war, most of the interventions of 
development agencies in Lebanon have targeted the other three regions: Mount Lebanon in order 
to support people displaced during the civil war, South Lebanon after Israel’s withdrawal, and 
North Lebanon that is classified as the poorest area in Lebanon (Laithy et al 2008). Therefore, 
Bekaa received less development aid and accordingly the potential of politicians to direct this aid 
to affiliated cooperatives was lower than other regions.  
Results of the three indicators of the Reasons behind Initiation component showed that the 
majority of cooperatives in the different agricultural regions across Lebanon were initiated as a 
condition to receive development aid either from development agencies or from politicians. In 
fact, findings in Chapter 4 revealed that the interventions of development agencies with 
producers’ cooperatives were controlled to a certain degree by political leaders. Development 
agencies were coordinating with political leaders to select active cooperatives that will benefit 
from development projects. Specific common needs, which are identified as a pre-condition for 
success in cooperative enterprises, were not the main reason for members to seek cooperation. 
Instead, cooperation was linked to the condition of receiving development aid and showed very 
low performance in terms of members’ own investment. These factors increase the potential of 
corruption practices in cooperatives. Further findings in the Benefits and Problems dimension 
will show whether the condition to receive development aid behind initiation was productive for 
cooperative enterprises or reduced the efficiency of development projects.   
The fifth component under the initiation phase and progress dimension, Assets Owned Directly 
after Initiation, provides further evidence to confirm the previous results of the Reasons behind 
Initiation component. Sixty percent of cooperatives in North Lebanon “owned assets directly 
after initiation” (IP12) (Chart 17, Chart 31, Table 22). The three other regions showed a lower 
percentage (30-40 percent). The difference between regions is linked to the poverty indicator 
based on which development agencies select the priority regions. North Lebanon is classified as 
the poorest area in Lebanon (Laithy et al 2008). Seventeen cooperatives or forty-two percent of 
all cooperatives across the four regions “owned assets directly after initiation” (IP12). In the 
Bekaa, North Lebanon, and South Lebanon regions, these cooperatives mainly received “assets 
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from development projects” (IP14). However, in Mount Lebanon, assets directly received after 
initiation, were either donated by a “political party” (IP15) (Coop 22 and Coop 25) or assured 
through “members’ own investment” (IP13) (Coop 27) without coinciding with a support from 
development agencies. In North Lebanon, assets received from a political party coincided with 
assets received though a development project. This is the link between political parties and their 
political NGOs such as the case for Coop 4 and Coop 10. The Bekaa and South Lebanon regions 
showed no “political or charity support” (IP15). The interventions of political parties in both 
regions were limited to the logistical role in facilitating the linkage between cooperatives and 
development agencies such as for Coop 13, 15, 17, and 36. Only two cooperatives, Coop 27 and 
Coop 37, owned the first assets directly after initiation through “members’ own investment” 
(IP13). Coop 27 carried out a small investment and then started to seek support from 
development agencies. Further results in the indicator IP16 of this dimension showed that new 
owned assets in Coop 27 were donated by development agencies and not secured through 
members’ own investment. Members in Coop 37 are mainly big farmers having the capacity to 
carry out an investment at an individual level. In this case, members have initiated a cooperative 
to receive development aid and get tax exemptions that are offered by-law to cooperative 
enterprises.  
For the last component under the first dimension, Current Assets, results showed that only six 
cooperatives across the four agricultural regions did not increase their assets since initiation 
(IP16). The reasons were mainly associated with one of the following:  
1. Limited choices to offer new services: Coop 6, Coop 22, and Coop 27 responded to 
members’ need through the assets owned directly after initiation. Members identified 
other common needs such as technical support, new markets, etc. However, such services 
did not require further investment. 
2. Lack of human resources to seek development aid: Coop 24 and Coop 26 mentioned that 
they did not present new proposals to development agencies in order to receive new 
assets.  
3. Control of cooperatives by political NGOs:  services in coop 5 were completely managed 
by a political NGO (RMF) that has initially formed this cooperative and used it as a tool 
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to receive support from INGOs. RMF did not identify new services and accordingly 
assets did not increase after initiation.  
The remaining thirty-four cooperatives, or eighty-five percent of active cooperatives, managed to 
own “new assets through a development project” (IP17: 100 percent). Most respondents said: 
“Do you expect members to invest in new assets? We did not establish cooperatives to invest our 
own money. We deserve to be supported by the government and development agencies. We may 
share in assets to receive basic services”. In South Lebanon, thirty percent of cooperatives, which 
have increased their assets since initiation, received direct support from a political party or a 
charity donor (IP18). This percentage was lower in the Bekaa region and amounted for eleven 
percent of cooperatives or only one cooperative. In the four studied regions, only 8 cooperatives 
(23.6 percent) received support from a political party or a charity donor. These cooperatives also 
received new assets from a development project. Here again is the link between political parties 
and political NGOs such as the case for Coop 11, Coop 12, Coop 25, etc. For instance, the 
chairman of Coop 12 in South Lebanon is the regional manager of a local political NGO 
(JBDA). The chairman said: “My position as a regional manager enabled the cooperative to 
receive new assets same as other cooperatives enrolled in our programs. I just facilitated the link. 
All cooperatives are treated in the same way”. Only four cooperatives across the four regions 
relied on their members’ own investment (IP19:12.4 percent) to obtain new assets. Coop 12 in 
South Lebanon carried out self-investment from the profit generated by other services. Members 
in Coop 21 in Mount Lebanon shared in investment as a condition to receive assets from a 
development project. This is similar to the two remaining cooperatives, Coop 23 and Coop 31. 
However, in-depth analysis showed that these members’ own investments are not a real 
economic participation. In Coop 21, few wealthy members guaranteed the needed investment to 
receive a proposed project from a development agency. These members were not producers and 
two of them were not even living in Lebanon. Therefore this self-investment could be classified 
as a charity donation. In Coop 23, the chairman managed to get a loan from KAFALAT (loan 
guaranteed program detailed in Chapter 2) in order to cover the needed investment to receive a 
proposed project. Therefore, members did not share and payments for KAFALAT, offering one 
year grace period, were generated by the project. In Coop 24, members shared in the needed 
infrastructure to receive a proposed project. This infrastructure was donated by one member for a 
218 
 
short term period. Accordingly, coop members did not share financially. In fact, these three 
cooperatives (Coop 21, 23, 24) have received new assets from a development project 
implemented by the same agency (EC). The positive correlation between capital contribution and 
the success and growth of cooperative enterprises (COPAC 1995) could not be presumed in the 
Lebanese context. Results in this component correspond with the results of the members’ sharing 
category in the initiation phase of projects implemented by development agencies in Chapter 4.  
Assessment of projects showed that producers did not effectively share in the assets donated to 
cooperatives.   
 
As a conclusion for the first dimension, active cooperatives across Lebanon were mostly initiated 
to receive development and political aid. They are vulnerable to corruption practices and 
mismanagement. Further findings in the remaining dimensions of this chapter will evaluate their 
current status.  
Chart 17: Average percentage of different indicators of the initiation phase and progress 
dimension across Lebanon 
 
• Type of cooperative: IP3: Supply, IP4: Services, IP5: Marketing,  
• Objectives: IP6: Generate and secure income, IP7: Job creation, IP8: Social cohesion,  
• Reasons behind initiation: IP9: Common need, IP10: Condition to receive aid 
(government or NGOs), IP11: Requested by a political leader, village elite or philanthropist,  
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• Assets owned directly after initiation: IP12: Availability of assets directly after initiation, 
IP13: Assets assured through members’ own investment, IP14: Assets donated through a 
development project, IP15: Assets donated through a political party or a charity donor 
(philanthropist from the village),  
• Current assets: IP16: Current owned assets are the same as initial owned assets, IP17: 
New assets donated by a development project, IP18: New assets donated by a political party 
or a charity donor, IP19: New assets assured by members’ own-investment 
 
5.4.2. Second dimension: Organizational Structure (OS) 
 
In this dimension, the four main actors (the general meeting, board of directors, manager, and 
auditors) in the organizational structure of a cooperative enterprise are evaluated. The aim is to 
identify if each actor (named here a component) is properly playing its role and is applying 
meeting minimum requirements that distinguish the cooperative enterprise from a capitalist 
enterprise. The role and minimum requirements that should be applied by these main actors were 
previously detailed in Chapter 1. 
The data elaborated in this dimension are displayed as follows: Chart 18 shows the average 
percentage of indicators for cooperatives across Lebanon, Chart 30 in Annex VII shows the 
average percentage of indicators for cooperatives across the four agricultural regions, and Table 
23 in Annex VII details the collected data in this dimension.  
For the General Meeting component, results showed that only one cooperative (Coop 37) in the 
Bekaa region set its “policy” (OS1) and “strategy for work” (OS2) based on the decisions taken 
by the general meeting. It means that members in cooperatives in the four agricultural regions 
did not practice their power, based on the democratic member control principle, in order to 
identify their policy and strategy of work. Respondents, I mean here the Boards of Directors, 
mainly said: “We do not know that the general meeting should participate in designing the 
strategy and policy of the cooperative or even to vote on it. The general meeting is mainly 
involved in electing the Board of Directors and clearing the annual balance sheet”. Strong 
members’ participation and efficient organizational structure, identified as internal pre-requisites 
for success, were not found in active producers’ cooperatives. The difference in Coop 37 is that 
the chairman, who played a major role in establishing the cooperative, planned since the 
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initiation phase to involve all members in the decision-making process. In fact, the results of “the 
number of general meeting per year” (OS3) showed that eighty-seven percent of cooperatives 
across the four regions met only once per year. This yearly meeting was mandatory by-law in 
order to clear the annual balance sheet and elect the board of directors every two or three years. 
Outliers in this indicator met more than once per year. They did not meet to design their policies 
or strategies; however they were either updating their progress of work to the DGC or approving 
the acceptance of donations when requested by development agencies. In Coop 5, members did 
not meet at least once per year. As previously detailed, services in this cooperative were 
logistically and financially managed by the development agency that donated the coop assets. An 
additional proof of low participation of members is the “percentage of attendance in the general 
meeting” (OS4). Forty-five percent (18 coops) of cooperatives across the four regions registered 
less than fifty percent attendance in the only general meeting that took place. Mandatory by-law, 
the first call for the general meeting should have a minimum fifty percent attendance in order to 
legally take decisions. If the attendance is lower than fifty percent, a second call for a general 
meeting will be scheduled within two weeks. In the second meeting, decisions could be taken 
with less than fifty percent of total attendance. This means that decisions in these 18 
cooperatives, mainly clearing the annual balance sheet and elections, were taken by less than 
fifty percent of total attendance. The majority of members in these cooperatives showed no 
interest to participate in the decision-making process after a second call for a general meeting. In 
other terms, more than fifty percent of members in these cooperatives are not interested in what 
the coop or the board of directors carried out or achieved during the whole year. Accordingly, 
they are not even interested in what the cooperative is supplying in terms of services. 
Respondents told me: “We had a difficulty in gathering members to participate in the general 
meeting. However, when there is an individual benefit, such as receiving equipment after a 
training program, the majority of members attended. They tell us whenever there is a direct 
benefit we are interested to come, otherwise you can take the right decision and we will support 
you when needed”. Coop 3 mentioned that because the first general meeting has always 
registered less than fifty percent of total attendance, it planned in coordination with the DGC to 
hold the second meeting after one hour of the first meeting. In fact, if the board of directors 
delays the second meeting to another date within the coming two weeks, as cited in the 
cooperative law, the percentage of attendance will be much lower than the first meeting. Only 
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three cooperatives (Coop 17, Coop 31, and Coop 33) registered more than ninety percent 
attendance of members in the general meeting. These cooperatives have initially a small number 
of members and did not show a high percentage increase in membership after initiation. 
Therefore, these cooperatives succeeded in maintaining a high degree of homogeneity.  
In the second component, Board of Directors, results showed that board members were mainly 
developing the “strategy and policy of work” (OS5:95 percent) of active cooperatives across the 
four agricultural regions. In normal cases, the strategies of work should be developed by the 
general meeting while the implementing policies should be designed by the board of directors. 
This procedure is not applied in the organizational structure of active cooperatives. Once elected, 
board members design strategies and policies of work and do not involve the general meeting in 
the decision-making process. Producers in cooperatives do not decide or vote on the ways or 
procedures used to answer their common needs. In fact, this low interest is associated to 
“members’ own-investment” indicators (IP13, IP19). When members do not invest in their 
cooperatives, they would have no incentive to practice their role in planning and monitoring. 
This point is linked to the reasons of initiating cooperatives in Lebanon as revealed in the first 
dimension. If the aim of cooperatives is to channel development aid (IP10), members will only 
develop strategies to reach development agencies. Accordingly, it is not surprising that forty-
seven percent of active cooperatives across the four regions were “coached by development 
agencies” (OS6) to design their strategies or policies. North and South Lebanon regions showed 
higher percentage compared to the Bekaa and Mount Lebanon regions. This difference is 
associated with the focus of development agencies on South Lebanon after Israel’s withdrawal in 
2000 and on North Lebanon by being the poorest region. The positive point is that board 
members did not describe the support of agencies as a top-down approach in designing coop 
strategies and policies.  
Internally, board members in sixty-seven percent of active cooperatives across the four 
agricultural regions met less or equal to six times per year, which is the minimum number of 
meetings required by-law for the board of directors. This result could be analyzed as follows:  
• Either the cooperative is not delivering services: there is no need for the board of 
directors to meet more than once every two months. In this case, board members are 
applying what is required by-law.  
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• Or the manager is taking care of all activities carried out in the cooperative. In this case, 
board members meet every two months to monitor the progress of activities with the 
manager.  
The third component of this dimension, the Manager, will help to identify which possibility is 
more relevant in the Lebanese context.   
In Coop 5, board members did not meet at least once a year. As detailed before, this is linked to 
the direct control of the political NGO (RMF) which logistically and financially manages the 
project implemented with Coop 5.  Here, there are no reasons for the board of directors to meet. 
In Coop 14, board members met three times per month. Meetings were set as a condition to 
receive a project donated by a development agency. They were planned to increase the 
participation of board members and give direction to the coop manager. In terms of election, 
almost none of the board members and chairmen was elected based on a “clear strategy or work 
plan” to achieve the common coop objectives (OS8 and OS10). What is more important is that 
eighty-seven percent of board members in active cooperatives across the four agricultural regions 
were “elected by acclamation” (OS9). “We do not carry election in the cooperative. It is a kind 
of a consensual electoral system. We nominate members who represent all sub-groups and could 
be accepted by all coop members”, respondents said. The reasons for the lack of competition 
between members could be classified as follows: 
• Few members in the general meeting are aware of the role and responsibilities of board 
members 
• Few members, who were the most active in initiating the cooperative, control remaining 
members 
• The membership in the board of directors is a voluntary responsibility that needs a lot of 
effort and time and in parallel will not give an advantage over other members in receiving 
the coop benefits 
The board members in several cooperatives mentioned that their time availability to monitor 
services and their expertise in agriculture were the main reasons behind their election through 
acclamation.  
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For the Manager component, findings showed that only thirty percent of active cooperatives 
across the four agricultural regions “employed a manager” (OS11) to run the coop services. The 
percentage in North Lebanon was lower than the other three regions. Sixty-seven percent of 
managers had a permanent position in cooperatives. The remaining managers were seasonally 
employed to run services during the production season such as the case in the olive and 
beekeeping cooperatives. The salaries of four managers, or thirty-three percent of cooperatives 
that employed a manager, were covered by a development project implemented with the 
cooperative (Coop 5, Coop 14, Coop 23, and Coop 36). When projects ended, two managers (in 
Coop 14 and Coop 36) continued to receive their salaries through the income generated from the 
coop services, while the other two managers (in Coop 5 and Coop 23) were considered staff in 
the implementing agency and accordingly received their salaries from other projects. The salaries 
of the remaining eight managers, or sixty-seven percent of cooperatives that employed a 
manager, were directly covered by the income generated from the coop services. Only four 
managers across the four regions had a “business management background” (OS12) to run the 
cooperative services. Three of them (in Coop 14, Coop 23, and Coop 36) were recruited by a 
development agency during the implementation phase of the project received by the cooperative. 
The fourth manager (in Coop 37) was employed by a group of big producers who financially 
invested to initiate the coop services compared to other cooperatives. It means that the 
development agencies and members who financially shared in their cooperative tend to employ a 
manager to run the coop services and apply business oriented practices similar to capitalist 
enterprises. Other managers were mainly producers having an appropriate technical background 
to offer the coop services, such as the management of an olive mill in Coop 16 and Coop 21. 
These managers are technical staffs and not business managers capable to develop policies and 
strategies essential for the implementation of the general meeting objectives. What is positive is 
that all managers, except the one in Coop 5, “ensured the equal access of members” to the 
services offered by the cooperative (OS14). Therefore, the equality value was applied in all 
cooperatives that offered services through a hired manager.   
Findings showed, on one hand, the high percentage (67 percent) of board members that “met less 
than six times per year” (OS7), and on the other hand, the low percentage (thirty percent) of 
“cooperatives employing a manager” (OS11) with one half of them having met less than 6 times 
per year. Analyses, from a technical background, may partially demonstrate that a high number 
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of cooperatives in Lebanon are not delivering permanent services to members and are vulnerable 
to corruption practices due to the inefficient organizational structure that groups the general 
meeting, board members, and the manager. It is not clear yet how cooperatives, which often 
received assets that were donated by development agencies, were able to manage these assets 
mainly without employing a manager and while having board members met less than the 
mandatory by-law number of board meetings per year. Findings in the last two dimensions, 
Services Supply and Participation and the Problems and Benefits of Cooperatives, will make this 
situation clear.  
For the last component under this dimension, Auditors, results showed that the auditors’ 
committees in four active cooperatives (ten percent of coops: Coop 11, Coop 14, Coop 36, Coop 
37) across the four agricultural regions were elected based on “their technical background to 
monitor the activities of board members” (OS15). The remaining ninety percent of cooperatives 
randomly selected two or three members based mainly on their time availability to form the 
auditors’ committee. For instance, in Coop 3, the president of the auditors’ committee was the 
wife of the coop’s Vice President. In such a case, the kin-based relation as well as the non-
professional technical background of auditors obstructs the essential role of the auditors’ 
committee. In fact, in all active cooperatives no election was carried out to select auditors. Three 
out of four cooperatives (Coop 14, Coop 36, Coop 37) having technically experienced auditors, 
had a permanent manager to run the coop services. Twenty-five percent of the auditors’ 
committees in active cooperatives across the four regions did not “meet on a yearly basis” 
(OS16). They were located in the North and South Lebanon regions and did not mainly employ a 
manager to run the coop services except for Coop 5, which is completely managed by a political 
local NGO, and for Coop 16, where the manager is a technical member employed on a seasonal 
basis. These cooperatives were not holding the minimum number of meetings required by-law. 
Minimum two meetings per year are mandated by-law for the auditors’ committees. All these 
cooperatives did not elect auditors based on their technical background. Sixty-two percent of the 
auditors’ committees in active cooperatives (25 coops) across the four regions “met once on a 
yearly basis” (OS16). The purpose of the meeting was not to monitor the activities of board 
members, but instead it was to sign, and not to revise or agree, the annual financial presented by 
board members to the general meeting. Auditors that did not meet for at least one time on a 
yearly basis were separately signing the annual balance sheet without holding a committee 
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meeting. Four auditors’ committees applied mandatory by-law number of annual meetings. 
Three of them (In Coop 11, Coop 36, and Coop 37) had the necessary technical background to 
monitor the activities of board members. Only one auditors’ committee, in Coop 14, met four 
times during the year. Similar to the other three, auditors in this committee had the technical 
background to monitor board members. Findings revealed that the development agency that 
implemented a project with Coop 14 asked the auditors’ committee to meet for four times per 
year in association with the biweekly board members’ meetings. In this case, the auditors’ 
committee was able to monitor the financial activities of board members on a quarterly basis and 
has reported the associated progress to the general meeting. As an overall approach for the role 
of auditors, the majority of respondents said: “Auditors do not have a practical role. They do not 
know how to monitor the financial activities of the Boards of Directors. They are mainly 
nominated because it is mandatory by-law to have an auditor committee. They are listed only on 
papers in the DGC, but effectively they do not play any role in the cooperative”.  
In conclusion, all actors of the organizational structure of active cooperatives across the four 
agricultural regions in Lebanon rarely played their essential role in safeguarding the cooperative 
enterprise difference found in the distinct management process from capitalist enterprises. The 
inefficient organizational structure revealed in this dimension decreases the probability to 
achieve the roles attributed to cooperatives and mainly increases the potential occurrence of 
corruption practices and mismanagement.  
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Chart 18: Average percentage of different indicators of the organizational structure dimension 
across Lebanon 
 
• General meeting: OS1: Selects the policy of the coop, OS2: Votes on the strategy of 
work 
• Board of directors: OS5: Decided the policy and strategy of the coop, OS6: A NGO 
helped the coop to draft a policy or strategy, OS8: Prepared an action plan on which 
members of the general meeting have elected them, OS9: Have been elected by 
acclamation, OS10: Chairperson elected based on a proposed work plan,  
• Manager: OS11: Operates coop’s activities, OS12: Has a Business management 
background, OS13: Communicates on a weekly basis with the board of directors, OS14: 
Ensures equal access of members to services whatever they own in terms of shares in the 
coop,  
• Auditors: OS15: Were elected based on their technical background allowing them to 
monitor the work of board members 
 
5.4.3. Third dimension: Partnership and Environment (PE) 
 
The first part of the partnership and environment dimension (PE)-I explores the cooperation of 
active cooperatives with other primary or federal cooperatives and with the surrounding 
community through projects, education, and new membership. The second part of the partnership 
and environment dimension (PE)-II analyzes the cooperation of cooperatives with development 
planners, the government and development agencies, and with other producers’ unions. It 
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explores the competition of active cooperatives with capitalist enterprises in the supply of the 
production services. It aims to assess the degree of reliance of active cooperatives on the 
principles and values of cooperation, in particular the principles of voluntary and open 
membership, autonomy and independence, Education and training, cooperation among 
cooperatives, and concern for community. In addition, this dimension analyses the external pre-
requisites for the success of active cooperatives within their environment and with their 
secondary level organizational structure (cooperation between cooperatives). 
The data elaborated in PE-I and PE-II are displayed as follows: Chart 19 and Chart 20 shows the 
average percentage of indicators for cooperatives across Lebanon, Chart 31 and Chart 32 in 
Annex VII shows the average percentage of indicators for cooperatives across the four 
agricultural regions, and Table 24 and Table 25 in Annex VII details data collected for both parts 
of this dimension.  
In the Cooperation between Cooperatives component, results showed that only twenty-two 
percent (9 coops) of active cooperatives across the four agricultural regions “cooperated with 
each other” (PE1). No difference was identified between the four regions. “We did not identify a 
need to cooperate with other cooperatives. We do not have a problem in building such 
cooperation if we can succeed in receiving development aid”, most respondents declared. Six 
cooperatives out of nine cooperatives cooperating with each other were fishery and beekeeping 
cooperatives (Coop 9, 20, 29, 30, 39, and Coop 40). In total, eight fishery and beekeeping 
cooperatives were surveyed. Therefore, a positive correlation could be traced between these two 
sub-sectors and the tendency of cooperatives to cooperate with each other. The reason behind the 
cooperation of these nine cooperatives was to increase their power in order to “influence the 
sector related policies” (PE2: 100 percent). Only four cooperatives mentioned the reason to 
“increase access to services” behind their cooperation (PE3). Three of them (Coop 20, Coop 30, 
and Coop 40) were beekeeping cooperatives. The beekeeping sub-sector criterion played a role 
in increasing the cooperation for the purpose of access to the production services. All 
cooperatives, except three in Mount Lebanon, had a “membership in the cooperative 
confederation (apex) in Lebanon” (PE4: 92.5 percent). No specific reasons, for these three 
cooperatives, were identified to justify their decision not to join the cooperative confederation. 
Most cooperatives across the four regions joined the cooperative confederation because it is 
228 
 
“required by-law” (PE5: 74.3 percent). Seven cooperatives, out of thirty-seven, decided to join 
the cooperative confederation in order to “increase their power” (PE6: 19.6 percent). Only three 
cooperatives joined the cooperative confederation to have access to the “education and financial 
services” (PE7: 8.5 percent) essential for the preparation of the annual balance sheet. 
For the second component, Cooperation with the Community, findings showed that none of 
active cooperatives across the four agricultural regions allocated a part of their “surpluses to 
share in or initiate a community project” (PE8). After discussing with my respondents the 
principle of concern for the community in cooperatives, they all stated that: “It is difficult to 
apply this principle in Lebanon. Cooperatives need support from the community”. Knowing that 
five percent of yearly surpluses should be allocated by-law to a community project, cooperatives 
may either not generate any surpluses or lack the basic knowledge of Lebanese cooperative law. 
Only nine cooperatives across the four regions have implemented a “project with the 
municipality” (PE9: 22.5 percent). In most cases, cooperatives were benefiting from the 
partnership and not municipalities. In Coop 13, Coop 15, and Coop 33, municipalities provided 
the infrastructure needed for cooperatives, set as a condition to receive a project proposed by a 
development agency. Otherwise, cooperatives would not be selected to receive the development 
project. In coop 10, the municipality had a monitoring role during and after the implementation 
of the development project. In Coop 4 and Coop 10, the municipality guided and convinced 
various development agencies to support local cooperatives. In depth analysis showed that the 
chairmen of both municipalities were also the chairmen of these cooperatives. In Coop 18, the 
municipality benefited from the cooperative services, in particular the use of machineries to 
implement various activities in the village. Likewise, in Coop 36, the coop chairman, well 
connected in the development field, supported the municipality to receive a grant from a 
development agency. For the last indicator in this component, “implementing a project with a 
civil society organization” (PE10), none of active cooperatives across the four regions responded 
positively. All cooperatives preferred, when they have an opportunity to receive a project not 
directly falling under their objectives, to work the municipality that represents the local authority 
at the village level.   
In the third component, Education, thirty-seven cooperatives across the four regions managed to 
offer members “a proper education about their rights and responsibilities” (PE11: 92.5 percent). 
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Education was mainly provided by development agencies that reserved a budget for a capacity 
building element that included the theory and practice of cooperative enterprises. The role of the 
DGC in education and training, cited in Chapter 1, was not recognized by cooperatives. None of 
the active cooperatives across the four agricultural regions carried out training sessions in the 
surrounding community in order to disseminate the advantages of the cooperative enterprise 
model (PE12). This is considered a weak point when cooperatives are assessed based on their 
adherence to the education, training, and information principle. 
For the last component of the first part of this dimension, Acceptance of New Members, results 
showed that thirty-seven percent of cooperatives across the four agricultural regions accepted 
new members or will accept them if they “need or ask for the coop services” (PE13). The highest 
percentage was in Bekaa region. It progressively decreased to reach the lowest in the North 
Lebanon region. This result is linked to the higher performance of coops in the Bekaa in several 
indicators elaborated in the first two dimensions, in particular the “common need reason for 
initiation” (IP9), “assets assured through members’ own-investment” (IP19), “manager running 
the coop services” (OS11), and “the manager having a business management background” 
(OS12). The remaining sixty-three percent of cooperatives, which did not rely on the need of 
services offered as a condition for new membership, mainly accepted new members across the 
four regions in order to ‘increase their power” (PE14). Most respondents said: “We accepted new 
members because we need to reflect that the cooperative is representing the majority of 
producers in the village; therefore we can ask for more development aid”. In fact, cooperatives, 
seeking to receive development aid, tend to increase the number of members in order to reflect a 
higher power of representation, set as an important criterion for development agencies. Only nine 
cooperatives across the four regions set “the share in investment” (PE15) as a condition for new 
membership. The highest percentage was also in the Bekaa region. The principle of members’ 
economic participation is an essential pre-requisite for success to avoid free riders and the 
common property problem. A high perfect positive correlation (r = 1) links the condition of 
sharing in investment for new membership (PE15) with the condition of accepting new 
membership on the basis of their needs for the coop services (PE13) in the same component. 
For the last indicator in the first part of this dimension, only four cooperatives rejected a few 
membership requests (PE16) for the following reasons: 
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• Coop 4 and Coop 14: members in both cooperatives have received individual support 
through a development project. Accordingly, board members decided only to accept new 
membership on the basis of fund/support availability for individual member.   
• Coop 23 and Coop 25: both cooperatives have increased their assets through several 
projects donated by development agencies. Board members rejected new membership to 
avoid the common property problem. I quote their exact words: “Why do we need to 
accept new members. We already secured the assets needed. We do not want anyone to 
share in the assets we own. Producers are asking for membership to be considered owner 
of assets and not to receive benefits from the initiated services”. In parallel, board 
members offered the available services to non-members without any difference in the 
cost.  
There was a rejection for new membership in all regions except in the Bekaa. This is linked to 
the conditions of “the need for the coop services” (PE13) and “the share in investment” (PE15) 
in accepting new membership. Findings in this component reveal the reliance of active 
cooperatives on the voluntary and open membership principle in delivering the coop services to 
new members. However, the reason for accepting new membership was not to supply the coop 
services to new producers having the same common needs, but it was mostly to increase the 
power of representation to channel development and political aid.  
In the first part of the Partnership and Environment dimension, the main findings are 
summarized as follows:  
• Low cooperation between cooperatives: when there is cooperation, it is mostly linked to 
the reason of increasing power and to the sub-sector characteristics (fishery and 
beekeeping). 
• Most cooperatives joined the Lebanese cooperative confederation because it is a 
mandatory by-law condition. Few cooperatives mentioned the increase in power as a 
reason for the membership in the cooperative confederation.  
• Cooperation with the community aimed to direct benefits to cooperatives through local 
municipalities. The notion of surpluses allocated by-law for the cooperation with the 
community was not applied by all cooperatives.  
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• Education was supplied on a project basis by development agencies. Cooperatives do not 
disseminate the advantages and practices of cooperation on a village level.  
• The acceptance of new membership was mostly linked to the increase in power and 
representation of cooperatives seeking development and political aid.  
Chart 19: Average percentage of different indicators of the partnership and environment 
dimension (PE)-I across Lebanon 
 
• Cooperation between cooperative: PE1: Coop has an active cooperation with other 
cooperatives, PE2: Cooperation with other cooperatives in order to increase power, PE3: 
Cooperation with other cooperatives in order to increase access to services, PE4: Coop 
has membership in the cooperative confederation, PE5: Coop joined the cooperative 
confederation because it is mandatory, PE6: Coop joined the cooperative confederation 
to increase power, PE7: Coop joined the cooperative confederation to get education and 
finance services,  
• Cooperation with the community: PE8: Part of surpluses are allocated for a community 
project, PE9: Coop has implemented a project with the municipality, PE10: Coop has 
implemented a project with a local civil society organization,  
• Education: PE11: Proper education to members to know their rights and responsibilities, 
PE12: Carry training sessions within the community to disseminate the advantage of 
cooperative enterprises,  
• Acceptance of new members: PE13: Accept (or will) new members if they need the 
coop services, PE14: Accept (or will) new members to increase the coop power, PE15: 
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Accept (or will) new members if they would share in investment, PE16: Coop has 
rejected a few membership  
 
In the second part of the Partnership and Environment dimension, findings of the Cooperation 
with the Government component showed that twenty-two percent (nine coops) of active 
cooperatives across the four agricultural regions stated that the government has facilitated their 
“access to credit and diverse public services” (PE17). Two cooperatives (Coop 23 and Coop 36) 
received credit from the KAFALAT program, the subsidized government loan. They got a loan 
either for a collective project in the cooperative or for individual members in the cooperative. 
The other seven cooperatives mentioned the increased access to public services (trainings, 
extension, research, etc) as a benefit from their cooperation with the government. All beekeeping 
cooperatives benefited from public services. The beekeeping sub-sector received continuous 
support from the government, in particular through the training and extension services. The 
homogeneity of services, the required high technical knowledge for production, and the 
relatively small number of cooperatives across Lebanon, as previously detailed in Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 2, were the main reasons for the support of beekeepers over other producers. Only three 
production cooperatives (Coop 12, 16, and Coop 27) cited a significant benefit from public 
services. The remaining cooperatives mentioned that public services were never productive or 
offered practical solutions to resolve the technical and marketing challenges of Lebanese 
agriculture. “We did not know that public services are still functional in the MOA. We doubt that 
the government can make a difference at this level. Do you know if we can benefit from any 
program?” most respondents said. Through NGOs, main public services, whether efficient or not, 
were mainly received by producers as an element in the projects implemented with cooperatives. 
In the facilitation of access to credit, most cooperatives, seeking donations from development 
agencies without the economic participation of members, did not benefit from the KAFALAT 
program. Fifty-two percent of active cooperatives across the four agricultural regions received 
“direct support from the government in terms of financial, equipment, or production resources” 
such as pesticides, fertilizers, etc. (PE18). In the financial support, cooperatives were asked by 
the DGC to submit a proposal detailing the cost of activities and assets to be purchased. Most 
cooperatives rarely implemented what they have proposed. Moreover, the DGC did never carry 
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out monitoring visits to check how this financial support was spent by cooperatives. Few 
respondents said: “We did not receive a financial support from the government because we were 
not supporting the policy of the Agricultural Minister at that time”. Other types of support 
(equipment, production resources, etc.) had short term impacts and were mainly assured by 
political parties to affiliated cooperatives. All fishery and beekeeping cooperatives cited that the 
government succeeded in “maintaining good infrastructure and issuing the appropriate legal and 
regulatory frameworks” (PE19). The government constantly rehabilitated the main harbors of 
Lebanese coast in order to protect fishermen’s boats and secure their livelihood. For beekeeping 
cooperatives, the government protected the local production by imposing a tax on honey imports 
and issued proper norms and standards to differentiate the quality of honey. The production 
cooperatives did not benefit from such support for one of the following reasons (detailed in 
Chapter 2):  
• Inappropriate application of the agricultural calendar  
• Difficulty in reaching the export market. Accordingly, cooperatives do not rely on 
norms and regulations developed by LIBNOR  
• Norms and regulations are not applied in the local market 
For the last two indicators in this component, findings showed that seventy-three percent of 
cooperatives across the four agricultural regions “coordinated at a regular basis with the 
government” (i.e. the DGC) (PE20). They were updating the communications required by-law, 
inquiring and negotiating possible support, and participating in the strategic meetings of sub-
sector development. Twenty-three percent of cooperatives limited only their coordination with 
DGC to the “communications required by-law” (PE21). The remaining four percent (two coops: 
Coop5 and Coop10) of cooperatives did not coordinate with the government under these two 
indicators.  They were situated in the North Lebanon region. Coop 5 was completely managed by 
a political local NGO that preferred not to coordinate with the Ministry of Agriculture for a 
political reason. Coop 10 lacked the basis knowledge of the cooperative enterprise law. The 
board of directors did not know that it is required by-law to communicate with the DGC. In fact, 
Coop 10 implemented a project with the same political local NGO that did not put efforts to 
build the capacity of board members to carry out the necessary coordination with the DGC.  It is 
not surprising that the majority of cooperatives were coordinating with the government on a 
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regular basis (PE20) because this indicator was used by the DGC to select the active 
cooperatives that were recommended for this research.  
In the second component, Cooperation with NGOs, results showed that ninety-two percent of 
active cooperatives across the four regions “built a partnership” (PE22) with a NGO during the 
process of a project implementation. All respondents mentioned that “The first aim of 
cooperatives is to build cooperation with NGOs in order to receive development aid. 
Cooperatives were established to carry out such cooperation”. Only three cooperatives in the 
North and Mount Lebanon negatively responded to this indicator. Coop 6 received support from 
a village philanthropist and did not seek aid from a NGO. Coop 24 and Coop 26 did not manage 
yet to build any cooperation with a NGO. The finding in this indicator goes in parallel with “the 
condition to receive aid” (IP10) as a reason for initiation, the assets owned directly after 
initiation (IP14) and the “current assets” which were mainly donated by a NGO (IP17) in the 
Initiation Phase and Progress dimension. Sixty-two percent of cooperatives that built a 
partnership with a NGO continued “this coordination after the project ending phase” (PE23). It 
means that NGOs consider cooperative enterprises as a local development tool to implement 
sustainable interventions. The remaining cooperatives mentioned that NGOs stopped themselves 
the coordination after they finalized the implementation phase or cancelled their activities in the 
agricultural sector. Only three cooperatives across the four regions listed that NGOs used a “top-
down approach” (P24) during the project’s implementation phase. In Coop 5, the offered 
services in the cooperative were totally managed by a local political NGO that controlled internal 
and external decisions. In Coop 14, the development agency was directly involved in the internal 
management of the cooperative and did set the main strategies and policies that facilitate the 
implementation process of the project received by the cooperative. In Coop 40, the NGO did not 
take into consideration the propositions of the board of directors to modify in the donated assets. 
Board members were urged to proceed in the implementation despite the low efficiency and 
sustainability of the proposed intervention. Otherwise, they would lose the donation. Indeed, 
eighty percent of cooperatives across the four regions accepted “any support from NGOs” 
(PE25) even if the support does not answer the needs of members. Respondents said: “When we 
are not asked to share in investment, we accept anything from NGOs. If we do not take the 
proposed support, other cooperatives will take it and benefit. Anything for free is appreciated. 
Why not? ” For example, Coop 3, established with the aim of developing cereal production in 
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North Lebanon, accepted a milk processing unit and olive harvesting machines donated by 
development agencies. Coop 9, a fishermen’s coop, received a project to establish a sea-food 
restaurant that was completely managed by an independent third party providing a very low 
yearly return to the coop. In this case, the cooperative accepted a project that would not add any 
services to members and would generate a very low financial return that is not enough to initiate 
the services needed by members. In fact, only fifteen percent of cooperatives across the four 
agricultural regions accepted support responding to the “common needs of members” (PE26) and 
“having the minimum criteria of sustainability” (PE27). For instance, Coop 36, a viticulture 
cooperative in the Bekaa, only accepted what was identified by members as difficult to be 
achieved at an individual level such as the import of certified virus-free grape varieties.  
For the third component of this dimension, Competition with Private Suppliers, findings showed 
that eighteen percent of cooperatives across the four agricultural regions were challenged by a 
“high competition with other private suppliers/producers in the delivery of services or processed 
food products” (PE28). For instance, Coop 3 faced a competition in the milk processing sector 
with local suppliers who tend to produce lower quality of similar products offered with a lower 
market price. Coop 21 found inefficient and difficult to offer the same market price of olive 
milling compared to other suppliers who already met the depreciation cost of machines and 
accordingly reduced the cost of milling service. In fact, these cooperatives identified the 
“competition by price” (PE29) and “not by quality” (PE30) as the main reason challenging the 
delivery of services in the surrounding villages. It was detailed before in Chapter 1 in the 
performance of cooperatives under Neoliberalism that competition by price is a common 
challenge for producers’ cooperative due to the higher efficiency of their capitalist counterparts. 
Cooperatives that did not state a competition with private suppliers across the four regions 
justified their situation by one of the following reasons: 
• No similar services were offered by their capitalist counterparts. For instance, women 
cooperatives produced traditional food not available in big supermarkets  
• The coop services were offered at lower price and better quality and accordingly they 
regulated the local market 
• No continuous supply of services to figure out any market competition 
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For the last component under the Partnership and Environment-II dimension, cooperation with 
producers’ unions, results showed that twenty-five percent of cooperatives (ten coops) across the 
four agricultural regions “cooperated with a farmer/producer union” (PE30). No difference was 
identified between regions. All fishery and beekeeping cooperatives across the four regions were 
involved in a union cooperation. The small number of cooperatives under these two sub-sectors 
compared to the production sub-sector was the main reason for the involvement in a union 
cooperation. There is a need to group the effort of several cooperatives to establish the services 
needed by members and influence the government to apply their policies. Indeed, eighty-three 
percent of beekeeping and fishery cooperatives mentioned that their membership in a union 
delivered some “kind of benefits” (PE31). Increasing their power to influence sector related 
policies and asking for more government support were the main benefits delivered through 
unions. 
As a conclusion for the second part of the Partnership and Environment dimension, the 
following findings are noted:  
• Very low access of cooperatives to credit and public services offered by the government 
• The financial support offered by the government as well as equipments and production 
resources had short term effects 
• The benefits of maintaining and rehabilitating infrastructure in addition to issuing the 
appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks of different sub-sectors were mainly 
received by beekeeping and fishery cooperatives 
• High coordination with the DGC for active cooperatives in the three sub-sectors 
• Most cooperatives built a partnership with a NGO that considered them for further 
support and with very low top-down approach during the project’s implementation phase 
• Cooperatives accepted any kind of support from NGOs. The acceptance of support was 
not based on common needs and long term sustainability 
• Cooperatives reported a very low competition with their capitalist counterparts. When 
there is competition, it is mostly by price and not by quality 
• Few cooperatives, mainly in the beekeeping and fishery sub-sectors, cooperated with 
farmers/producers’ unions and always received a positive impact in influencing the 
related polices at sector level 
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Findings in both parts of this dimension reveal that active producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon 
are not benefiting from the increased power of the cooperative movement structure. The 
cooperative confederation is not delivering real benefits. Most cooperatives joined the 
cooperative confederation because it is required by-law. Cooperatives mainly cooperated with 
each other in order to increase their power to receive development and political aid and not to 
deliver new benefits for members. They do not effectively participate in developing the 
community in which they live and work. Their cooperation with the government had a short term 
effect and was mainly for a political reason. Their cooperation with NGOs complies with the 
principle of autonomy and independence; however, cooperatives tend to be a general 
development tool by accepting any support and not what it responds to the common need of 
members. At this point, there is a high potential for corruption practices and mismanagement 
when the support is not effective and not monitored by most members. One more important issue 
is that the majority of active cooperatives were not facing a competition with their capitalist 
counterparts. It means that they are generally out of the market by being less effective or 
delivering no services. This places cooperatives as alternative enterprises for rural development 
with a lower performance when compared to capitalist enterprises in the Lebanese context.   
Chart 20: Average percentage of different indicators of the partnership and environment (PE)-II 
dimension across Lebanon 
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• Cooperation with the government: PE17: Government facilitated access to credit and 
diverse public services, PE18: Financial support, equipments, inputs, PE19: Other 
support (Legal and regulatory framework, infrastructure for coops, etc), PE20: 
Permanent coordination with the government (DGC),  
• Cooperation with NGOs: PE21: Coordination limited to mandatory documents: such as 
minutes of meetings of the board of directors, annual balance sheet, etc., PE22: Coop 
built a partnership with a NGO, PE23: Partnership continued after the project’s ending 
phase, PE24: Top-down communication during the project’s implementation phase, 
PE25: Coop accepted or will accept any support from NGOs, PE26: Coop has only 
accepted support from NGOs based on members’ common needs, PE27: Coop has only 
accepted support from NGOs if it has the different criteria of sustainability,  
• Competition with capitalist enterprises: PE28: High competition with capitalist 
enterprises in the delivery of services, PE29: Competition by price, PE30: Competition 
by quality,  
• Cooperation with producers’ unions: PE31: Coop is a member in a farmers/producers’ 
union, PE32: Does the membership in a farmers’ union delivered any benefits to the 
coop? 
 
5.4.4. Fourth dimension: Services Supply and Participation (SSP) 
 
This dimension explores in terms of quantity and type the nature of services offered by active 
cooperatives. It analyzes the strategies adopted by cooperatives to increase the participation of 
members and accordingly to apply another pre-requisite for success.  
The data elaborated in this dimension are displayed as follows: Chart 21 shows the average 
percentage of indicators for cooperatives across Lebanon, Chart 33 in Annex VII shows the 
average percentage of indicators for cooperatives across the four agricultural regions, and Table 
26 in Annex VII details the data collected in this dimension.  
In the first component, the Nature of Services, findings revealed that twenty-five percent of 
active cooperatives across the four agricultural regions “did not offer any services to members” 
(SSP1). Seventy percent of these cooperatives implemented a project “donated by a development 
agency” (IP16) while none of them did carry out an “own investment to obtain new assets” 
(IP18). Ninety percent of these cooperatives had the general meeting “convened once on a yearly 
basis” (OS1) and always with “less than fifty percent participation” (OS4). In all of them, board 
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members met “less or equal to six times per year” (OS7), the minimum number of meetings 
mandatory by-law.  These cooperatives received either support to individual members such as in 
Coop 4 or services that were not needed by members such as in Coop 18, 19, 30, 34, and Coop 
39. Most respondents of these cooperatives said: “No services are currently offered in our 
cooperatives. We did not have the resources needed to initiate productive services for members. 
Our cooperation with NGOs did not allow the cooperative to supply services on a permanent 
manner”. Forty percent (sixteen coops) of active cooperatives across the four agricultural regions 
offered only one service to members, while twenty percent (eight coops) offered two services to 
members. Few cooperatives employed a manager to run these services; however, the majority 
relied on unpaid board members to offer services. It means that services offered by active 
cooperatives did not require a full time manager either due to their seasonal nature or because 
they were completely based on equipments that do not entail high managerial skills. Only fifteen 
percent of cooperatives (six coops) across the four agricultural regions offered more than two 
services to members. Two cooperatives, Coop 14 and Coop 29, supplied six services to 
members. These cooperatives were intensively supported by development agencies. The project 
implemented with Coop 14 amounted to USD 12 million distributed over 10 years. Seventy-nine 
percent of cooperatives offering services across the four agricultural regions supplied “paid 
services to members” (SSP2). In general, women cooperatives offered free services to members. 
These cooperatives should be classified workers’ cooperatives and not producers’ cooperatives. 
Women do not use the coop services but instead they were employed in their cooperatives. 
Therefore when individual members want to use the coop assets to mainly process small food 
quantities for own use, services were freely supplied while taking into consideration that the 
maintenance cost was generated from the coop services. In fact, women cooperatives were 
studied in this thesis because they are identified by the government and development agencies as 
producers’ cooperatives. Thus, because in the evaluation of the coop performance there is no 
difference between workers and producers’ cooperatives in terms of benefits, practices, and 
challenges, these women cooperatives were kept in this study to assess the gender factor in 
Lebanese cooperatives. The services of active cooperatives were mainly “concentrated during” 
(SSP4: 48 percent) and “after” (SSP5: 84 percent) cultivation/production. Only seventeen 
percent of these cooperatives offered services “before production” (SSP3). This finding is 
associated with the cooperative type during the initiation phase in the first dimension in which all 
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cooperatives have listed marketing (after cultivation) services as the first planned objective. For 
“the number of services offered each month” (SSP6), eighty percent of active cooperatives which 
offered services across the four regions supplied less or equal to five services each month to an 
individual member. Four cooperatives offered more than twenty services each month to an 
individual member. These cooperatives supplied marketing services of fresh products on a daily 
basis such as the marketing of dairy (Coop 3), poultry (Coop 14), and fish (coop 9 and coop 29) 
products.   
Regarding the second component in this dimension, Increasing Members’ Participation, active 
cooperatives across the four agricultural regions mainly offered “high quality services” (SSP9: 
38 percent) with “the equality in access to services” (SSP10: 55 percent) as tools to increase the 
participation of members. Only four cooperatives across the four agricultural regions relied on 
“monthly reports” (SSP7) and “several general meetings” (SSP8) to increase the level of 
participation of members. Forty percent of all cooperatives across the four regions did not rely on 
any selected indicators to increase the participation of members. Their respondents mainly said: 
“We do not have time and resources to increase members’ participation. Available resources 
were invested to reach NGOs and increase the potential of receiving development aid”. 
The main findings of this dimension are summarized as follows:  
• Most active cooperatives in Lebanon supplied few (one or two) paid services to members 
without being controlled by a permanent manager. This point is associated with the 
ineffective organizational structure, the weak partnership and supportive environment, 
and the aim of receiving development aid through the establishment of cooperatives. 
Indeed, active cooperatives in this study would not be able to offer any services to 
members without the support donated by development agencies. Probably, they would 
not have existed without development agencies and politicians.  
• Services were mainly concentrated in the marketing type  
• Most active cooperatives rely on high quality services and the equality in supplying 
services to increase the participation of members 
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Chart 21: Average percentage of different indicators of the services supply and participation 
(SSP) dimension across Lebanon 
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5.4.5. Fifth dimension: Problems and Benefits (PB) 
 
This dimension analyses what active cooperatives across the four agriculture regions reported in 
terms of problems or internal challenges as well as the received benefits from membership.  
The data elaborated in this dimension are displayed as follows: Chart 22 shows the average 
percentage of indicators for cooperatives across Lebanon, Chart 34 in Annex VII shows the 
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average percentage of indicators for cooperatives across the four agricultural regions, and Table 
27 in Annex VII to detail the data collected in this dimension.  
In the first component, Internal Challenges, all cooperatives across the four agricultural regions 
listed the “horizon problem” (PB1: 100 percent) as the main challenge encountered at the 
internal level. The capital needed for the initiation of services was never completely assured by 
members in all active cooperatives across Lebanon. Members did not share financially in the 
project submitted to the DGC to accept the establishment of their cooperatives. In the first 
dimension, Initiation Phase and Progress, results showed that few cooperatives applied the 
principle of members’ economic participation to own the assets needed for the supply of services 
to members. These cooperatives rarely shared in assets that were set as a condition to receive 
development aid. Therefore, members consider their cooperatives as a tool to receive 
development aid and not an enterprise in which the economic participation of members is 
required to achieve what members cannot achieve at an individual level. The limited financial 
means of members (undercapitalization of cooperatives) could not be considered the reason 
behind the low contribution to capital formation. Members in active cooperatives did not even 
design a plan to establish complementary services to what was donated by development 
agencies. They only planned to group their efforts to present proposals for development agencies 
and accordingly to receive development aid. This is not surprising because ninety-three percent 
of cooperatives reported “the condition to receive aid” (IP10) as the main reason behind the 
initiation of cooperatives. The “control problem” (PB3) was the second challenge (30 percent of 
coops) encountered by cooperatives across the four agricultural regions. The control problem 
was not linked to the poor governance and the lack of trust between members. It was associated 
with the control of powerful producers who have local political ties. For instance, in Coop 9, the 
chairman has held his position since the cooperative was established in 1990. Many cooperatives 
mentioned that there was an internal conflict between members due to the control of a group of 
them to the cooperative services. All cooperatives did not list the control of political NGOs as a 
challenge in this indicator. In fact, this kind of control was seen as support and was considered 
an ipso facto relation in the Lebanese sectarian context. “Political NGOs are supporting us more 
than apolitical NGOs. We appreciate their intention to support all members. We are coordinating 
with them on a permanent basis and we are looking forward for a continuous support. Political 
NGOs consider our cooperatives as regional development wings used to develop the socio-
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economic conditions of producers”, most respondents mentioned. Regarding the other three 
challenges, the “portfolio problem” (PB2), the “free rider” (PB4), and “the influence cost” 
(PB5), a maximum of three cooperatives in the four agricultural regions encountered such 
problems. When members do not share in investment or assure the total investment to establish 
the coop services, it is normal not to face problems in the priority for investment, free riders, and 
the influence cost level. In fact, most active cooperatives did not pay the management cost and 
did not even cover the depreciation cost of equipments donated by development agencies.  
As for the second component, Membership Benefits, findings showed that eighty-eight percent of 
cooperatives across the four agricultural regions listed “increasing members’ skills” (PB11) as 
the main benefit from membership. Respondents said: “Through development projects, members 
were able to attend a significant number of training workshops that ameliorated and developed 
their skills. The impact of such progress needs to be assessed at individual producers’ level”.  
Around fifty percent of cooperatives identified “increasing the power of members to influence 
their policies” (PB10) and “improving/increasing access to new services” (PB8) as the second 
main benefit from membership. Twenty-eight percent of cooperatives across the four regions 
listed “improving access to markets” (PB7) and “increasing members’ bargaining power” (PB9) 
as membership benefits. Only fifteen percent of active cooperatives (six coops) cited “decreasing 
the cost of production” (PB6) and accordingly increasing income as an achieved benefit from 
membership. Knowing that most cooperatives offered “paid services to members” (SSP5), 
results showed that only forty percent of cooperatives had a “positive annual balance” (PB12). 
This balance was very low compared to the investment cost donated by development agencies. 
For instance, Coop 14, which received a USD 12 million development project that included the 
support of individual members and the initiation of a coop’s services center, produced only USD 
45 thousand annual profits. There are three main reasons for having low annual profits associated 
with an insignificant decrease in the cost of production of services offered to members: 
• High running cost that reduces profit margins for the coop  
• Low request of services by members. This limits the economy of scale effect 
• Corruption practices that allow few members to benefit from the coop services. In some 
cooperatives, assets were leased at reduced cost for the benefit of only one or two 
members.  
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The findings of this dimension revealed that active cooperatives in Lebanon are not facing the 
prevalent challenges of cooperative enterprises because they are not applying the common 
practices of the cooperative enterprise model. When members do not share in the coop assets and 
only group their efforts to receive development aid, they would not encounter the main internal 
challenges and would not be accountable for the common assets. The improved skills of 
members through training, the increased power to receive development aid, and the improved 
access to services- which are associated with the nature of projects implemented by development 
agencies (detailed in Chapter 4)- did not decrease the cost of production that is the key economic 
factor for a long term successful cooperation. The findings of the second component of this 
dimension contradict with the findings of impacts achieved in development projects from the 
perspective of development agencies. The projects implemented with cooperative enterprises 
contributed to a large decrease in the cost of production and processing activities and to the 
improvement of local direct sale. Both achievements were not identified by producers’ members.  
Chart 22: Average percentage of different indicators of the problems and benefits (PB) 
dimension across Lebanon 
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5.5. The difference in the performance of cooperatives between the four 
agricultural regions  
 
The findings of the five dimensions revealed a main difference between the Bekaa region on the 
one hand and the North and South Lebanon regions on the other hand.  
As mentioned above, the North and South Lebanon regions were more supported by 
development agencies and political parties compared to the Bekaa region: North Lebanon is the 
poorest area in Lebanon and South Lebanon received large support after Israel’s withdrawal in 
2000. In the first dimension, Initiation Phase and Progress (IP), the North and South Lebanon 
regions revealed the following differences in performance compared to the Bekaa region: 
• Lower common need reason behind the initiation of cooperatives (IP9) 
• Higher political request as a reason behind initiation (IP11)  
• Higher availability of assets directly after initiation (IP12). Assets were mainly donated 
by development agencies 
• Lower percentage of assets assured directly after initiation through members’ own 
investment (IP13), the same is for the current assets (IP19) 
• Higher percentage of assets received directly after initiation  (IP15) 
• Higher current assets (IP18) donated by a political party, village elite or philanthropist in 
North Lebanon 
These differences provided favorable conditions for cooperatives in the Bekaa region during the 
Initiation Phase and Progress dimension. Cooperatives responded better to the common need of 
members, relied on members’ own investment, showed higher autonomy by being independent 
from donors and political parties, and were not initiated by development agencies during the 
project’s implementation phase.  
These differences produced an increased performance status for the Bekaa cooperatives in the 
remaining dimensions as follows:  
• Organizational Structure (OS) 
o Higher number of members’ participation in the general meeting (OS4) 
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o Lower intervention of NGOs in designing the coop’s strategy of work (OS6) 
o Higher percentage of chairmen elected on the basis of a proposed work plan 
(OS10) 
o Higher percentage of managers employed to operate the coop activities (OS11) 
o Higher percentage of managers having a business management background 
(OS12) 
• Partnership and Environment (PE) 
o Higher cooperation between cooperatives in order to increase the access to 
services (PE3) 
o Higher acceptance of new members if they need the coop services (PE13) and 
share in investment (PE15) 
o Higher permanent coordination with the government (PE20) 
o Higher percentage of partnership that has continued with NGOs after project’s 
ending phase (PE23) 
o Lower acceptance of any supports from NGOs (PE25) 
o Higher acceptance of support based on the common need of members (PE26)  
• Services Supply and Participation (SSP) 
o Higher percentage of paid services (SSP2) 
• Problems and Benefits (PB) 
o Higher improved access to market (PB7) 
o Higher increased members’ bargaining power (PB9) over North Lebanon only 
o Higher number of cooperatives generating positive annual balance (PB12) over 
North Lebanon only 
It should be noted that with all these listed differences between the Bekaa region on the one hand 
and the North and South Lebanon regions on the other hand, there are four cooperatives in the 
Bekaa region not “delivering any services to members” (SSP1). In North Lebanon, only one 
cooperative does not offer services, while in South Lebanon there are two cooperatives. 
However, there are four cooperatives employing a manager to run the coop services in the 
Bekaa, compared to one in the North and two in the South Lebanon. The number of services 
offered to members should be associated with the availability of a permanent manager to run 
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these services. The number of services’ indicator could not be assessed alone to evaluate the 
delivery of services by cooperatives.   
The Mount Lebanon region superseded the other regions in the following indicators:  
• Higher new assets received through members’ own investment (IP19). However, this is 
not a real members’ economic participation: it is either assured from the KAFALAT 
program (paid back from the income generated by services) or from the donations of few 
members 
• Less involvement of NGOs in designing the coop’s strategy of work (OS6) 
• Higher number of board members elected by acclamation (OS9) 
• Higher cooperation with municipalities (PE9) for the benefit of coops. The municipalities 
in Mount Lebanon have higher returns compared to the municipalities in other regions  
• Higher percentage of cooperatives that received financial support, equipments or inputs 
from the government (PE18) 
All these indicators, except OS9, are considered positive for the progress of cooperatives in the 
Mount Lebanon region. However, they are not significant or important to reflect a better 
performance of cooperatives compared to the other agricultural regions.  
 
5.6. The status of dormant cooperatives across the four agricultural regions 
 
Four main components were selected to assess the status of dormant cooperatives which were not 
recommended or identified active by the DGC for this study. They are the following: 
• Reasons behind initiation 
• Source of owned assets 
• Supply of services 
• Benefits from membership 
These components were divided into thirteen measurable indicators. The presentation of data is 
similar to the way data were presented in the first part of this chapter. Chart 23 shows the 
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average percentage of indicators for cooperatives across Lebanon and Table 28 in Annex VII 
details the data collected for dormant cooperatives. 
The Findings of the first component, Reasons behind Initiation, showed that all dormant 
cooperatives highlighted “the condition to receive development aid” (DC2) as the main reason 
behind initiation. Twenty-five percent of cooperatives (six coops out of a total of twenty-four 
dormant coops) across the four agricultural regions also listed “the initiation by a political party” 
(DC3) as a main reason for the establishment of cooperatives. These cooperatives were located 
in South Lebanon. Only three coops cited the “common need identified by members” as a reason 
behind initiation (DC1). None of them were located in the South or North Lebanon regions. 
These three cooperatives also mentioned the condition to receive development aid as the main 
reason for initiation. Cooperatives, which did not report the common need identified by members 
behind initiation, did not specify the aim of their collective initiative, but instead they cited broad 
objectives such as the development of the agricultural sector.  
Regarding the second component, Source of Owned Assets, results showed that sixty-eight 
percent of dormant cooperatives across the four agricultural regions do not own fixed assets. For 
the remaining cooperatives, findings revealed that the current assets were mainly donated by 
NGOs (DC5: 89 percent) and political parties (DC6: 78 percent). Most of these cooperatives 
were located in the Bekaa and the South Lebanon regions. No cooperatives mentioned the 
“economic participation of members” (DC4) in any owned assets. Only two cooperatives 
received few assets donated by the government (DC7: 22 percent) such as a tractor, olive 
harvesters, etc.  
For the third component, the supply of services, only three dormant cooperatives were offering a 
maximum of “one service to members” (DC8). Two of them were offering the “only service for 
free” (DC9). The third cooperative supplied the only service at a cost price. 
Finally, for the last component, Benefits from Membership, thirty-seven percent of dormant 
cooperatives reported the benefit of “increased skills” (DC12) and twenty-nine percent listed the 
benefit of “increased power” (DC13). None of dormant cooperatives cited the benefits of 
“increased access to market” (DC10) or “increased access to services” (DC11) from 
membership. 
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In summary, the dormant cooperatives assessed in this study were mainly initiated to channel 
development aid and as a tool to increase political control in certain regions. The majority of 
dormant cooperatives do not own fixed assets. When assets were found, they were mainly 
donated either by NGOs or by political parties. Dormant cooperatives do not offer services to 
members and mainly delivered the benefits of increased skills and increased power from 
membership. Therefore, compared to the active cooperatives assessed in the four agricultural 
regions, dormant cooperatives secured the main essential benefits from membership without 
offering services to members. They are legal organizations seeking development aid support to 
implement projects that would not generate additional impacts as findings revealed for the active 
cooperatives analyzed in this study.  
Most board members of dormant cooperatives stated the weak support of NGOs, the 
government, or politicians as well as the horizon problem as main reasons for the failure of 
cooperative initiatives. None of them listed the absence of common need, the inefficient 
organizational structure, the reduced participation of members, and the very low adherence to the 
cooperative principles and values as reasons for failure.  
 
Chart 23: Average percentage of different indicators of dormant cooperatives (DC) across 
Lebanon 
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• Reasons behind initiation: DC1: Common needs, DC2: Condition to receive 
development aid, DC3: Requested by a political leader,  
• Source of owned assets: DC4: Self-investment, DC5: Donated by NGOs, DC6: 
Donated by political parties, DC7: Donated by the government,  
• Benefits from membership: DC10: Increased access to market, DC11: Increased access 
to services, DC12: Increased members’ skills, DC13: Increased the power of members to 
influence their policies 
 
 
5.7. Women cooperatives in Lebanon 
 
In this part, the characteristics of active women cooperatives are explored over the five 
dimensions studied in the part of this chapter. The main similarities and differences with the 
remaining active cooperatives across the four agricultural regions and the three sub-sectors are 
analyzed. This part aims to assess the effect of the gender factor on cooperatives by examining 
the empirical status of active women cooperatives.  
In the list of active cooperatives (Table 20 in Annex VII), eight women cooperatives were 
interviewed across the four agricultural regions. They are the following: 
• North Lebanon: Coop 2, Coop 6 
• South Lebanon: Coop 13, Coop 15, Coop 17 
• Mount Lebanon: Coop 28 
• Bekaa: Coop 32, Coop 33 
The following section details the similarities of active women cooperatives with the remaining 
active cooperatives over the five dimensions:  
• Initiation phase and progress (IP): 
o All women cooperatives listed the three objectives of cooperatives: (IP6): 
generate and secure income, (IP7): job creation, (IP8): social cohesion.  
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o The condition to receive development aid (IP10) as well as requested by political 
leader, village elite, or philanthropist (IP11) were the main two reasons behind 
initiation 
o None of them carried out members’ own investment in the assets received directly 
after initiation (IP13) 
o Received assets directly after initiation were mainly donated by development 
agencies (IP14) or a political leader, a village elite, and a philanthropist (IP15) 
o Through the support of development agencies (IP17), all women cooperatives 
received new assets (IP16) without carrying out members’ own investment (IP19) 
• Organizational structure (OS) 
o The general meeting of women cooperatives did not select or design the coop 
strategies or policies (OS1, OS2) 
o The general meeting mainly convened once on a yearly basis (OS3) 
o Board members decided the coop strategies and policies (OS5) 
o Board members were not elected based on a work plan (OS8), most of them were 
elected by acclamation (OS9), and the chairperson was not elected based on a 
work plan (OS10) 
o Most women cooperatives were directly managed by board members. Only two 
coops employed a manager (OS11) who did not have a business management 
background (OS12), but he/she communicated with board members on a weekly 
basis (OS13) and ensured the equal access to services by members (OS14)  
o Auditors were not elected based on their technical background (OS15) and mainly 
convened once on a yearly basis (OS16) 
• Partnership and environment (PE) 
o All women coops had a membership in the cooperative confederation (PE4) 
because it is mandated by-law (PE5) 
o No surpluses were allocated for a community project (PE8) and no projects were 
implemented with a civil society organization (PE10) 
o All women coops received proper education on the cooperative enterprise model 
by NGOs (PE11) 
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o They accepted new members to increase their power (PE14) without setting the 
condition to share in investment (PE15) 
o Women coops were coordinating on a permanent basis with the government 
(PE20) 
o All women coops built a partnership with a NGO (PE22) and the top-down 
support was not cited (PE24) 
o Women coops accepted anything from NGOs (PE25) without relying on the 
common need indicator (PE26) or the criteria of long term sustainability (PE27) 
o They encountered low competition with private producers (PE28). The 
competition was by price (PE29) and not by quality (PE30) 
• Service supply and participation (SSP) 
o All women cooperatives offered one service (SSP1) after production (mainly 
processing) (SSP5) with a frequency of less than five services on monthly basis 
(SSP6) 
o They offered high quality services to increase the participation of members 
(SSP9) 
• Problems and benefits (PB) 
o The horizon (PB1) and control (PB3) problems were the main encountered 
challenges in women coops 
o Increased access to services (PB8) and increased members’ skills (PB11) were 
the main two benefits from membership  
o Few cooperatives generated a positive annual balance (PB12) 
In parallel, the main differences between active women cooperatives in comparison with the 
remaining active cooperatives over the five dimensions were the following:  
• Initiation phase and progress 
o All women cooperatives began with a small initial number of members (IP1) and 
the total membership was less than 35 members 
o Five women cooperatives showed no increase in the percentage of membership 
(IP2). One coop showed a decrease in membership. Its chairperson was a man 
who was elected to support women in reaching markets and coordinating with 
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suppliers (women in this coop have religious considerations that make difficult 
their communication with the external environment without being supported by a 
man). Two coops showed below than hundred percent increase in membership.  
o All women cooperatives planned to offer the marketing type (IP5) of services 
o All of them except Coop 33 owned assets directly after initiation (IP12) 
• Organizational structure (OS) 
o More than fifty percent of members participated in the general meeting (OS4) 
o Most women cooperatives were supported by NGOs to design their strategies and 
policies (OS6) 
o Most board members met more than the minimum number of meetings required 
by-law (OS7) 
• Partnership and environment (PE) 
o Women cooperatives did not cooperate with each other (PE1) 
o They were supported by municipalities (PE9) 
o The condition of common need was not set a reason to accept new members 
(PE13) 
o Women cooperatives received no support from the government either through the 
access to credit, public services (PE17), financial support and equipments 
(PE18), or the infrastructure rehabilitation and the legal and regulatory 
framework (PE19) 
o Cooperation with NGOs mainly stopped after the project’s ending phase (PE23) 
o None of the women cooperatives had a membership in a farmers/producers’ union 
(PE31) 
• Services supply and participation (SSP) 
o Women cooperatives offered free services (SSP2) 
o The participation of members was ensured through the equality of access to 
services (SSP10) 
• Problems and benefits (PB) 
o Increase the power of members to influence their policies (PB10) was not cited as 
a main benefit from membership  
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The similarities and differences of women cooperatives revealed that the idea of women 
cooperation through the cooperative enterprise model in the Lebanese context tends to have an 
image of a completely supported organization that temporarily assures low-paid job 
opportunities for local women. As previously explained, women cooperatives are workers’ 
cooperatives in Lebanon and not producers’ cooperatives as classified by the DGC. All women 
cooperatives were initiated through the support of a NGO and were fully equipped and trained to 
perform food processing activities. Without this support and the sharing of municipalities in the 
infrastructure investment cost, none of these cooperatives would have been found. Women 
cooperatives did not apply an efficient organizational structure. Most of them were involved in 
the production of traditional processed food and did not employ a manager to run the processing 
services. In the two coops that employed a manager, the production efficiency increased but 
without the generation of a positive annual balance that could be redistributed to members. 
Regarding the benefits from membership, the increase of members’ skills through the technical 
processing training offered by NGOs was the main tangible achievement. Board members listed 
the benefit of increased access to processing services, but the latter did not decrease the cost of 
production. Women were working in their cooperative and were only using the coop assets to 
carry out food processing for their own consumption. In-depth evaluation for the creation of job 
opportunities showed that few cooperatives recruited non-member women to perform processing 
activities at reduced cost. This approach was essential to decrease the cost of production and 
accordingly to offer lower prices enabling cooperatives to compete with their capitalist 
counterparts.  
Therefore, women cooperatives did not answer the common needs of producers in increasing the 
access to market and decreasing the cost of production. Instead, they offered low-paid job 
opportunities to members and non-members on a short-term basis. Most cooperative principles 
were not applied in women cooperatives, in particular the democratic member control, the 
economic participation of members, the autonomy and independence, the cooperation between 
cooperatives, and the concern for community. Likewise, most cooperative values were not 
respected. Only the equality value was found in the delivery of free services to members. The 
equality value was the only tool used to increase the participation of members. For the 
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requirement of an efficient organizational structure, women cooperatives did not rely on the 
difference in management applied in cooperative enterprises. Taking into consideration the large 
support in infrastructure and equipments donated by development agencies and the increase of 
members’ skills as the main benefit from membership, women cooperatives did not achieve the 
main advantages or potential roles of cooperative enterprises. The gender factor did not play a 
role in increasing the potential for success in cooperative enterprises. Instead, it reflected the 
notion of fully dependent cooperatives initiated by development agencies. Cooperatives have 
limited contribution in managing gender related problems in Lebanon. Women cooperated under 
a legal enterprise structure that allowed them to obtain development aid and initiate processing 
facilities that did not generate significant socio-economic impacts to members.  
 
5.8. Status of active cooperatives in the different agricultural sub-sectors 
 
This part explores the main differences between the three agricultural sub-sectors of active 
cooperatives across the four agricultural regions in Lebanon. It aims to identify if the sub-sector 
variable/factor generated positive or negative impacts on the performance of cooperatives in 
Lebanon.  
In the analysis of the status of active cooperatives across the four agricultural regions, sectorial 
differences between fishery and beekeeping cooperatives on the one hand- first category- and 
production cooperatives on the other hand- second category- were highlighted. The following 
section lists the main identified variations in the five dimensions between these two categories of 
agricultural sub-sector.   
Fishery and beekeeping cooperatives revealed the following differences in performance 
compared to production cooperatives in the five dimensions used to assess cooperatives: 
• Initial phase and progress (IP) 
o Higher percentage of increase in membership in order to bind efforts and increase 
power (IP2) 
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o They were mostly classified in the service (IP4) and marketing (IP5) 
cooperative’s types  
o Higher percentage of cooperatives initiated to answer producers’ common needs 
(IP9), five cooperatives out of eight  
o Only one cooperative owned asset directly after initiation (IP12), very low 
performance compared to production cooperatives 
o None of fishery and beekeeping cooperatives cited members’ own investment 
(IP19), few production cooperatives carried out members’ own investment 
• Organizational structure (OS) 
o Lower participation of members in the general meeting (OS4), all fishery and 
beekeeping cooperatives cited below than sixty percent participation 
o Lower number of board meetings on a yearly basis (OS7), all fishery and 
beekeeping cooperatives cited below than six meetings per year 
o Only one fishermen cooperative was managed by a permanent manager (OS11) 
• Partnership and environment (PE) 
o Higher cooperation between cooperatives (PE1) to increase power (PE2) and 
access to new services (PE3) 
o Fishery and beekeeping cooperatives did not implement a project with the local 
municipality (PE9) 
o Higher acceptance of new members based on their need for services (PE13) and 
in order to increase coop power (PE14) 
o All beekeeping cooperatives increased access to public services (PE17) 
o All fishery and beekeeping cooperatives received higher support from the 
government: financial, equipments, and inputs (PE18) and others related to 
infrastructure,  legal and regulatory frameworks (PE19)  
o All fishery and beekeeping cooperatives were involved in cooperation with a 
union (PE31), reported a positive benefit from this cooperation (PE32), in 
particular the increase in power.  
• Services’ supply and participation (SSP) 
o No major differences. Sixty-two percent of fishery and beekeeping cooperatives 
supplied paid services to members (SSP2) 
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• Problems and benefits (PB) 
o Higher increase in the power of members to influence the coop policies for 
fishery and beekeeping cooperatives (PB10) 
For all indicators that were not mentioned in the list of differences above, all cooperatives under 
the three sub-sectors showed similar performance or percentages.  
Fishery and beekeeping cooperatives showed better performance in answering the common 
needs of members and in applying several principles, in particular the voluntary and open 
membership, the autonomy and independence, and the cooperation between cooperatives. 
However, they showed lower performance in applying the principle of members’ economic 
participation and in adopting an efficient organizational structure. The main advantage over 
production cooperatives was the increased power to influence the coop policies. This power 
secured more support from the government and development agencies, however, it generated 
similar benefits received by cooperatives in the production sub-sector (i.e. decrease the cost of 
production, improve access to services, and improve access to local market). Therefore, in 
general, the sub-sector variable did not produce significant changes on the performance of 
cooperatives across the four regions. Supporting fishery and beekeeping cooperatives in applying 
an efficient organization structure and in increasing their reliance on the economic participation 
of members may produce a difference in performance among the three coop sub-sectors in 
Lebanon.  
 
5.9. Summary status of active cooperatives in Lebanon  
 
This part provides a general overview of the status of active cooperatives in Lebanon. It 
summarizes the major findings of the five dimensions and evaluates them in terms of failure or 
success factors. Then, it compares the empirical status of active cooperatives with their potential 
or achieved roles expressed by the government and development agencies in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4.   
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A significant percentage of active cooperatives in Lebanon (25 percent) do not apply the 
principle of voluntary and open membership. If they received support directly after initiation, 
they would tend to reduce membership and sometimes to restrict it. They do not need the 
financial resources of new members to share or increase the group investment. In normal cases, 
the cooperatives supported by development agencies should accept new members because they 
could potentially offer more services. Another reason for the restriction of membership is that 
cooperatives which already received support do not need to increase membership in order to 
reflect an important power of representation when seeking donations. Several cooperatives 
showed a high percentage increase in membership. It does not mean that cooperatives accepted 
new members because they need the coop services. Instead, results showed that the high 
percentage increase in membership had mainly the following reasons:  
• Project condition: board members were requested to increase membership as a condition 
to receive a donation 
• Political: politicians invited a large number of producers to join the coop after initiation. 
This way they can legally support them 
• Pre-requisite to seek aid: cooperatives grouping a large number of producers reflect an 
increased power of representation which is an important selection criterion for 
development agencies 
 
Most active producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon do not specify or prioritize the common need to 
be achieved through their collective action. They plan to offer services in the three types of 
agricultural cooperatives. They expand their aims in order to increase the chance of receiving aid 
under any suggested interventions. Moreover, all active cooperatives have planned to achieve the 
three main normative objectives: generate and secure income, job creation, and social cohesion. 
In this way, cooperatives tried to show the ideal image of a cooperative enterprise that assures 
the economic, social, and cultural needs of members. This image increases the potential of 
receiving development aid by meeting the objectives of development agencies.  
A high percentage of active producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon mentioned that the reason 
behind their establishment was the coop’s legal aspect that can group producers, can perform 
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economic activities, and can mainly receive donations by-law from development agencies and 
politicians. In other words, cooperatives were initiated as a condition to legally channel 
development and political aid. Therefore, cooperatives did not aim to answer the common needs 
of producers through a collective investment. Some cooperatives relied on the reason of common 
needs for initiation; however, they associated it with the condition to receive development aid. 
The cooperatives established by political NGOs revealed a complete dependency in internal 
management and the delivery of services. The source of coop assets justified the notion of 
financially dependent cooperative enterprises in Lebanon. The majority of assets were donated 
by development agencies. There was no real economic participation of members to own assets 
needed for production. The principle of members’ economic participation was not applied by 
cooperatives in the Lebanese context. 
The principle of democratic member control or an efficient organizational structure was not also 
applied by active producers’ cooperatives. The general meeting was not properly playing its role; 
board members were not accountable for their actions to the membership and were almost 
elected by acclamation; managers, if found, were not hired on a permanent basis and did not 
have the necessary background to run a cooperative enterprise; auditors did not have the 
necessary technical background to monitor the activities of board members and rarely meet to 
report the financial progress of the cooperative to the general meeting. 
Producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon did not cooperate with each other to pool their resources or 
to increase their power. They did not conduct a collective investment between cooperatives in 
order to survive in the competitive market economy. Instead, they sought individual support that 
reduces the potential of applying the economy of scale and increases the cost of development at a 
regional level. Cooperatives only united to fulfill what is required by-law without a major added 
value. They did not allocate surpluses for a community project. The principle of concern for 
community was not also applied in the Lebanese context. Instead, results showed that the 
community represented by the municipality had a concern for cooperatives by supplying 
infrastructure and financial supports. The principle of education, training, and information was 
maintained by NGOs that always allocated a budget to build the capacity of members about the 
practices of cooperative enterprises. However, no trainings were carried out on a regular basis by 
board members to educate new members or inform the general public about the nature and 
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benefit of cooperation. Cooperatives mainly coordinated with the government to receive 
financial support and fixed assets which did not produce any significant sustainable impacts. A 
part of the support to cooperatives had a political aim and might have affected the autonomy and 
independence of cooperatives. The cooperation with NGOs did not threaten the autonomy and 
independence of cooperatives in the coop practices. Cooperatives were only financially 
dependent. The cooperation with NGOs was not based on the common needs of producers. 
Instead, cooperatives accepted anything from NGOs even if the support did not have the 
minimum criteria for sustainability. Therefore, the aim of producers was not to answer their 
common needs as much as to receive development aid that could be highly vulnerable to 
corruption practices and mismanagement under such elaborated conditions. Regarding the 
competitive environment, it appeared that cooperatives did not face a significant competition 
with their capitalist counterparts. It means that cooperatives were excluded from the market by 
being less effective or delivering no services. This places them as alternative enterprises for rural 
development with a lower performance when compared to capitalist enterprises in the Lebanese 
liberal market economy. 
Most cooperatives offered a very low number of paid services to members without the need to 
hire a permanent manager. Some cooperatives did not offer any services. All services were based 
on assets donated by development agencies. Most services were concentrated in the marketing 
type of cooperatives. Therefore, the plan of cooperatives to undertake services under the three 
types of cooperatives was not met. The pre-requisite of strong members’ participation was 
maintained by the equality of access to services which may not respond to the need of all 
members.  
The horizon and control problems were the main challenges encountered by active producers’ 
cooperatives. The other main problems of cooperative enterprises were not faced by Lebanese 
cooperatives because members did not share in investment. This reduced the potential of having 
portfolio, free rider, and influence cost problems. In terms of benefits from membership, the 
decrease in the cost of production and the increase of access to market, which are the two 
important economic outputs, were not achieved by cooperatives. The benefits of increasing 
members’ skills, their power, and their access to services were not associated with a reduction in 
the cost of production and accordingly an increase in income.  
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All elaborated details reveal that active producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon did not meet the 
following essential pre-requisites for success: 
• The reliance on the principles and values of cooperatives including strong members’ 
participation  
• An efficient organizational structure 
• Answering members’ needs 
• Increasing the unity between cooperatives 
• Avoiding main cooperative enterprise problems 
Active producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon could not be named cooperatives in the real sense of 
practices and potential benefits. The pre-requisites for success were not applied by cooperatives 
at the following different levels: initiation, management, project implementation, and the supply 
of services. The principle of members’ economic participation should be changed into the 
principle of development aid and political support in the Lebanese context; voluntary and open 
membership into open membership to increase the power of representation to receive 
development and political aid; democratic members’ control into weak organizational structure 
and political control; autonomy and independence into full dependent organization; education 
and training into Education supplied by development agencies; cooperation between 
cooperatives to increase benefits for members into cooperation to receive low productive 
development aid; concern for community into concern for cooperatives by the community.  
There is an idea of a supported dependent initiative and not a cooperative initiative. When active 
cooperatives got a chance to implement a project donated by development agencies, the assets 
received and benefits were not productive. They were mainly wasted by failing to contribute to a 
reduction in the cost of production and to an increased income, which are the two essential 
benefits for small producers. Corruption practices and increased political control are the main 
reasons for the failure of cooperatives. Therefore, politicians benefited from cooperatives more 
than members benefited from their enterprises and from development aid. Politicians and 
development agencies wasted aid through cooperatives instead of inducing socio-economic 
development. It is meant to produce weak dependent cooperatives in order to increase the 
political control which could be threatened by real cooperative initiatives.  
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The findings of this chapter contradict with the benefits achieved in cooperatives from the 
perspective of development agencies in Chapter 4. They confirm what the Minister Consultant 
for cooperatives acknowledged in terms of low contribution of cooperatives regarding the 
development of the agricultural sector in Lebanon. Development agencies might have reported 
these benefits to justify their interventions and secure further supports.  
In Lebanon, it is very difficult for the government, development agencies, and members to 
benefit from cooperative enterprises unless they work together to manage the challenges 
highlighted under the detailed five dimensions.  
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Chapter 6- Membership Practices at Individual Producers’ Level  
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 explored the status of producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon by relying on the data 
collected through semi-structured interviews with the board of directors of active cooperatives. 
Internal practices showed that the majority of active producers’ cooperatives were characterized 
by the following: 
• Instead of relying on the common needs of members as a reason for initiation, 
cooperatives were established as a condition to receive development aid 
• A very low members’ economic participation 
• The general meeting was not involved in the design of the coop strategies and policies 
• Board members were elected by acclamation, but not based on a clear strategy of work 
• Auditors did not have the minimum requirements to perform their role 
• Financially dependent on development agencies and politicians  
• A low number of services offered to members 
• The horizon problem was the main challenge encountered by cooperatives 
• The access to new services (without a reduction in the cost of production) and the 
increase of members’ skills were the main impacts achieved by cooperatives 
These characteristics justified the low performance of producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon. This 
performance is mostly linked to the weak and inefficient role of the general meeting, which 
represents the highest body in cooperatives by applying the principle of democratic members’ 
control via the one member-one vote regulation. Therefore, it is essential to explore at the 
producers’ level why members were failing to manage and practice their role and 
responsibilities, which are set as pre-requisites for the success of cooperative initiatives.  
In this chapter, I wanted to specify what reasons at an individual producers’ level have 
contributed to the reduced benefits from cooperative enterprises in Lebanon. In addition my aim 
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was to verify if the listed benefits from membership detailed in Chapter 5 were effectively 
received by producers. 
This chapter starts by exploring the original idea behind producers’ cooperation and then details 
the practices of cooperation between members. It analyzes the benefits received by members and 
examines the main reasons for the reluctance of adjacent producers to join cooperatives.  
 
6.2. Data processing 
 
I carried out semi-structured interviews with three producers in all active cooperatives 
interviewed across the four agricultural regions in Lebanon. The total number of producers 
interviewed is 120. Similar to the previous chapters, the data in this chapter were grouped in 
components and then translated into measurable indicators. The answers of indicators were 
presented as follows: 
• In numbers, for quantitative data 
• “Yes-(Y)” or “No-(N)” answers, for qualitative data 
• Left empty (-) where the case was not available 
In order to simplify the analysis of data and their presentation, I grouped the answers of the three 
producers to the indicators assessed in each cooperative into one average answer representing the 
performance of the cooperative for the indicator in question. Therefore, instead of displaying 120 
answers for 40 cooperatives, I presented 40 average answers for the 40 active cooperatives 
studied in this thesis.  
 
6.3. Original idea behind producers’ cooperation 
 
Before proceeding to evaluate the main reasons of membership and the way producers initiated 
and joined cooperatives, I started by describing the main characteristics of producers that affect 
their involvement in cooperatives and in the agricultural sector in general.  
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The characteristics of producers were grouped into three components as follows: 
• Ownership of production resources: Land, farm, processing unit, fishing boat, etc. 
• Objectives from production 
• Involvement in agriculture 
These components were then assessed through seven measurable indicators: DP1-DP7. The data 
of these indicators were detailed in Table 29 in Annex VIII and displayed as a percentage across 
Lebanon in Chart 24. 
Results showed that seventy-seven percent of producers in active cooperatives interviewed 
across Lebanon “owned their production resources” (DP1). The remaining producers “rented 
their production resources” (DP2). Most of them were members in women cooperatives for 
which the ownership of a processing unit is a plus but not a requirement for production. In fact, 
all women coops owned their production tools that were donated by development agencies as 
detailed in Chapter 5. No producers “shared in their production resources” (DP3). Therefore, the 
membership in cooperatives in Lebanon was linked to the ownership of production resources. 
Producers owning their production resources showed a higher interest in group work that 
probably tends to have long term impacts.  
The majority of producers interviewed in active cooperatives across Lebanon listed a 
“commercial objective from production” (DP5: 95 percent). Only producers in two cooperatives 
(Coop 18 and Coop 34) limited their objective to “self-consumption” (DP4: 5 percent). These 
producers, who are active members in civil society organizations, did not establish their 
cooperatives to meet their production needs. Instead, they used cooperatives to group low 
educated farmers at the village level. Producers selected the cooperative enterprise because it is a 
legal organization that can accept donations from development agencies and politicians.  
In terms of involvement in the agricultural sector, findings showed that only twenty-seven 
percent of producers in active cooperatives earned more “than fifty percent of their income from 
agriculture” (DP7). This result goes in parallel with the dominance of small holdings and part-
time farming in Lebanon, which were previously detailed in Chapter 2. Part-time producers were 
employed in different fields such as: workers in a production factory, taxi drivers, teachers, 
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accountants, etc. All fishermen producers cited more than eighty percent of their income 
generated from fishing. Here, cooperation has a higher potential for success since it is the major 
economic activity affecting the livelihood of members. The remaining producers, who generated 
more than fifty percent of their income from agriculture, were mainly situated in the Bekaa 
region (6 cooperatives). This is associated with the highest average farm size in the Bekaa 
region, offering increased opportunities to assure a livelihood mainly dependent on agriculture. 
Four women cooperatives (Coop 2, 6, 15 and Coop 28) reported zero income from processing. It 
was explained in Chapter 5 that women cooperatives were workers’ cooperatives in which 
members were paid for their labor work. They did not use the coop services to process their own 
production. In three of these four coops, members were not interested in working for the coop; 
instead the coop recruited women non-members to perform the processing activities. For the 
fourth cooperative, the processing activity stopped due to a lack of efficient marketing channels. 
The income of members in the remaining women cooperatives did not pass the level of fifteen 
percent of their total income. 
In summary, producers in active cooperatives in Lebanon have owned their production resources, 
have a commercial objective from production, but have the highest percentage of their income 
generated from non-agricultural jobs. These characteristics could be considered positive or 
negative for the development of cooperative enterprises. On the one hand, cooperatives could be 
an institution grouping producers in Lebanon and having the potential to increase their 
agricultural production and income in a sustainable manner. This is the normative positive aspect 
used by the government and development agencies to develop agricultural strategies. On the 
other hand, producers may tend to reduce their investment in a classified supplementary income 
agricultural sector and see cooperatives as charitable organizations that legally channel 
development and political aid. This is the empirical negative aspect that was revealed in Chapter 
5.  
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Chart 24: Average percentage of the Description of producers (DP) in the four studied regions 
across Lebanon 
 
• Ownership of production resources: DP1: Own the production resource, DP2: Rent the 
production resource, DP3: Sharing of a production resource (share in production),  
• Objectives from production: DP4: Only for self-consumption, DP5: Commercial,  
• Involvement in agriculture: DP7: Having a higher than 50 percent income based on 
agriculture 
 
After detailing the main factors that affect the involvement of producers in the active 
cooperatives interviewed in this study, I assessed the process of initiation that analyzes the way 
producers grouped their efforts to pursue their specific objectives.  
Producers’ membership (PM) was divided into four components as follows:  
• Members’ recruitment 
• Relation between members 
• Main reasons for membership 
• Benefits received directly after joining cooperatives 
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These components were then assessed through sixteen measurable indicators (PM1-PM16: data 
were detailed in Table 30 in Annex VIII and were displayed as percentages across Lebanon in 
Chart 25). 
Results showed that fifty-five percent of producers in the active cooperatives interviewed across 
Lebanon cited “members having the same common needs” (PM1) as a main criterion for the 
recruitment of members. The percentage was higher in the Bekaa and Mount Lebanon regions 
compared to the North and South Lebanon regions. It is associated with the main reasons of 
having more development interest in North Lebanon and more political interventions in South 
Lebanon. All fisheries and beekeeping producers, except in one fishermen coop in North 
Lebanon, specified the “same common needs” (PM1) as a main criterion for the recruitment of 
members. In fact, because the production sub-sector represents a diversity of producers, i.e. 
including animal, plant and processing, the common need criterion tends to be less indicative for 
the recruitment of members. Forty-eight percent of producers were “recruited by development 
agencies” (PM3). In this case, development agencies either asked producers to initiate 
cooperatives or encouraged them to join the cooperatives established already in order to receive 
benefits from development projects. Thirty percent of producers also highlighted “the 
recruitment by political parties” (PM2) as a main motive to join cooperatives. The percentage of 
producers under these two indicators was higher in the North and South Lebanon regions for the 
main reasons detailed above. All members in active women cooperatives were recruited “by 
development agencies” (PM3). In fact, all women cooperatives interviewed in this study were 
initiated by one INGO (YMCA). First, women received intensive trainings on processing 
activities. Then, YMCA legalized their cooperation by supporting the establishment of 
cooperative enterprises in several villages. After a short time, it donated the processing tools 
needed for production.  
The recruitment of “individual producers” (PM4) registered the same percentage (73 percent) as 
the recruitment of a “group of producers” (PM5) in the active cooperatives studied across 
Lebanon. This means that cooperatives showed no difference in the way they recruited 
producers. In a normative approach, for the recruitment of a group of producers, cooperatives 
must provide services for them and additional benefits associated with membership. Therefore, 
the recruitment of producers in Lebanon was not associated with the ability of delivering services 
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to producers. Instead, cooperatives accepted new members based on the notion of increasing the 
representation of cooperatives and accordingly an increased potential to receive aid from 
development agencies, political parties, and the government. All producers who listed the 
recruitment by development agencies and political parties cited also the recruitment of a group of 
producers as a main procedure to increase membership.   
For the second component, Relation between Members, the relation of “similar production” 
(PM7: 55 percent) performed the highest percentage in cooperatives across the four agricultural 
regions. All fishermen and beekeepers listed this indicator as the main relationship aspect. A 
considerable percentage was also associated with the “kin-based relationship” (PM6: 43 percent) 
and the “similar domain of work and interest outside the agricultural sector” (PM8: 30 percent).   
In the third component, Main Reasons for Membership, results showed that all producers 
interviewed in active cooperatives mentioned “the condition to receive development aid” (PM9) 
as a main reason for membership. Likewise, seventy percent of producers cited “the condition to 
receive support from politicians” (PM10). None of them identified the indicator of “group 
investment to achieve the common needs” (PM11) under this component. This means that 
producers joined cooperatives to receive development and political support. Their aim was not to 
answer their common needs based on their collective investment. Cooperative enterprises were 
adopted by producers for their legal institutional function allowing them to accept donations. 
Otherwise, producers would not have chosen cooperatives to group their efforts. This 
understanding of cooperatives increases the incidence of corruption practices and 
mismanagement. This finding corresponds to the Reasons behind Initiation component that was 
elaborated in the first dimension, Initiation Phase and Progress (IP), in Chapter 5 where “the 
condition to receive development aid” (IP10) and “requested by politicians” (IP11) were 
identified as the main reasons for the establishment of cooperatives.  
For the last component, Benefits Received Directly after Joining Cooperatives, results revealed 
that sixty-eight percent of producers in the active cooperatives studied across Lebanon “received 
a direct benefit after joining cooperatives” (PM12). North Lebanon performed the highest 
percentage for the same reasons of having more political and development agency interventions 
compared to the other regions. This direct benefit is considered to be the main motive for 
membership in the active cooperatives studied across Lebanon. When no direct benefits were 
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offered, the percentage increase in membership was lower. Benefits were supplied in terms of 
“inputs” (PM13: 43 percent) and “equipments or access to equipments” through cooperatives 
(PM14: 45 percent). Almost, no “marketing benefits” (PM15: 3 percent) were offered directly 
after joining cooperatives. Benefits from membership were not secured through “members’ own 
investment” (PM16: 5 percent).  Members sought development and political support and did not 
carry out a collective investment to achieve their common needs.  
In conclusion, the original idea behind the cooperation of producers is to channel development 
and political support for the following reasons:  
• They seek cooperation without the economic participation of members in a 
supplementary income sector 
• The similar common needs indicator of recruitment is also associated with the political 
and development agency group recruitment indicator and kin-based relationship  
• The benefits received directly after joining cooperatives were not assured through 
members’ own investment 
Chart 25: Average percentage of different indicators of producers’ membership in the active 
cooperatives studied across Lebanon 
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• Members’ recruitment: PM1: By members having the same common needs, PM2: By 
a political party, PM3: By development agencies, PM4: Individual recruitment, PM5: 
Group recruitment,  
• Relation between members: PM6: Kin-based relation, PM7: Similar production, PM8: 
Similar domain of work or interest outside agricultural sector,  
• Main reasons for membership: PM9: To receive support from development agencies, 
PM10: To receive support from political parties, PM11: Group investment to achieve the 
common needs,  
• Benefits received directly after joining cooperatives: PM12: Received benefits 
directly after joining coops, PM13: Inputs (production resources), PM14: Equipments or 
access to equipments though the coop services, PM15: Marketing, PM16: Was benefit 
secured through self-investment? 
 
6.4. Practices of cooperation by producers 
 
This part examines the essential practices of cooperation that allow producers to apply the 
cooperative difference in the management and planning of common objectives. In addition, it 
analyses the main challenges reported at internal level.  
The practices of cooperation (PC) were divided into three components as follows: 
• Democratic members’ control 
• Knowledge of principles and values (including role of different actors) 
• Internal problems  
These three components were assessed through sixteen indicators (PC1-PC16: the data were 
detailed in Table 31 in Annex VIII and were displayed as percentages across Lebanon in Chart 
26). 
For the first component, results showed that producers in the active cooperatives interviewed 
across Lebanon do not participate in “planning their coop policy” (PC1) by practicing the 
democratic members’ control principle in the general meeting. It was detailed in Chapter 5 that 
board members planned the coop policy and started implementing it without first getting an 
approval from the general meeting. Ninety percent of producers elected active board members 
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having a potential to achieve “the coop objectives” (PC2). Board members were always elected 
by acclamation; meaning that producers did not elect them based on a clear work plan or defined 
targets. Moreover, it appeared that twenty-eight percent of producers in active cooperatives 
elected board members based on their “political affiliation and power” (PC3). This point is 
linked to the reasons behind membership in which members elected politically active 
representatives to increase the potential of getting development and political support. Only five 
percent of producers in active cooperatives voted in the “general meeting to resolve their 
challenges” (PC4). The majority of producers attended the general meeting for the two main 
reasons: 1- to elect board members and 2- to approve the annual balance sheet that is required 
by-law.  Moreover, findings showed that a low percentage of producers communicated on a 
monthly basis with board members (PC5: 25 percent) and a lower percentage on a quarterly basis 
with auditors (PC6: 8 percent). The highest communication percentage was in the Bekaa region 
compared to the other regions. By having agriculture as the main income (Description of 
producers DF7: 60 percent), producers in the Bekaa region communicated more with their 
representatives. Finally, the majority of producers in cooperatives that employed a manager cited 
the positive role of managers in responding to their needs and requests (PC7).  
For the second component, Knowledge of Principles and Values (including role of different 
actors), results showed that around twenty-five percent of producers in active cooperatives 
interviewed across Lebanon had the basic knowledge of principles and values (PC8) and 
received proper education (PC9) mainly through development projects.  The remaining 
producers knew that cooperatives are based on principles and values but they were not able to 
identify them. This result contradicts with the Education component in the Partnership and 
Environment (PE-I) dimension in Chapter 5 where board members stated that producers received 
“proper education to know their rights and responsibilities” in cooperatives (PE11). However, 
board members applied few principles and values, in particular in providing the “equal access to 
coop services” (PC10) and in “distributing the individual support” donated by development 
agencies (PC11).  
For the last component, Internal Problems, results showed that producers in the active 
cooperatives studied across Lebanon first encountered “the horizon problem” (PC12) and then 
the “control problem” (PC14) at the second level. Because producers in cooperatives in Lebanon 
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did not rely on their own investment, the horizon problem (capital formation and its 
management-undercapitalization) was their major challenge. Development agencies managed 
this challenge by supplying the investment needed in terms of fixed assets. In addition, because 
board members were not elected based on a clear work plan and were not communicating with 
producers at a regular basis, the control problem was identified as a second main challenge at the 
producers’ level. These two challenges were also identified in Chapter 5 at the board members’ 
level. Other problems- “portfolio” (PC13), “free rider” (PC15), and “influence cost” (PC16)- 
were not indicated by producers. This is normal because producers did not apply the principle of 
members’ economic participation to own their assets. When producers do not share financially in 
their cooperatives, these problems would not appear at the members’ level. Producers accepted 
whatever development agencies offered without being challenged to identify the priorities of 
different producers. 
In summary, producers in active cooperatives in Lebanon did not apply the democratic members’ 
control principle in the general meeting practices. They failed to adopt an efficient organizational 
structure. They showed a lack of knowledge in the principles and values that are essential to 
apply the cooperative difference. They did not receive an appropriate education either from the 
government or from development agencies. The problems encountered at the producers’ level 
were linked to the notion of dependent cooperative enterprises lacking the economic 
participation of members and to the weak organizational structure. 
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Chart 26: Average percentage of indicators of the practices of cooperation in active cooperatives 
studied across Lebanon 
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Ten measurable indicators assessed the benefits of cooperatives received by producers (Benefits 
from membership: BM1-BM10: the data were detailed in Table 32 in Annex VIII and were 
displayed as percentages across Lebanon in Chart 27).  
Results showed that “the number of services” (BM1) received by producers was exactly the same 
as those listed by board members in Chapter 5 in the Nature of Offered Services component. 
Fifty-two percent of producers in the active cooperatives interviewed across Lebanon cited an 
“acceptable quality” (BM2) of services. Forty-three percent of producers listed a “high quality 
level” (BM3) of services. The reduced role of producers in “selecting and planning the coop 
services” (BM4: 13 percent) is associated, first, with the main reasons of receiving political and 
development support from membership, and second, with the weak democratic members’ control 
detailed above in this chapter.  
In the benefits from membership, findings showed a similar performance of the indicators 
studied (BM5-BM10) with slightly lower percentages for producers’ members compared to 
board members’ listed benefits. “Increased skills” (BM9) and “increased access to services” 
(BM6) did not generate “a decrease in the cost of production” (BM5) and accordingly an 
increase in income that represents the measurable impact of both indicators (BM9 and BM6). 
Likewise, the low percentage of the access to market benefit (BM7: 18 percent) would not have 
positive impacts unless it coincided with an increase in income. Few producers in three 
cooperatives mentioned that the increased access to market was associated with an increase in 
income. Findings in the benefits from membership at the producers’ level contradict with the 
increased income and the reduced cost of production stated by development agencies in Chapter 
4. They confirm the reduced role of cooperatives in developing the agricultural sector that was 
declared by the government in Chapter 3. Therefore, cooperatives did not contribute to a 
significant improvement in the socio-economic conditions of producers. They were used to 
receive development and political support that was wasted due to the inefficient organizational 
structure of the general meeting, mismanagement, and corrupted practices by producers and 
development agencies. 
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Chart 27: Average percentage of indicators of the benefits from membership at the producers and 
board members’ levels in the active cooperatives studied across Lebanon 
 
• Benefit from Membership: BM1: Number of services received by producers, BM2: 
Acceptable quality of services, BM3: High quality of services, BM4: Members have 
selected and planned the coop services, BM5: Decrease the cost of production, BM6: 
Improve access to new services, BM7: Increase access to market, BM8: Improve 
bargaining power, BM9: Increase skills, BM10: Increase power of members to influence 
their coop policies 
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Components were divided into six indicators (Producers’ decision: PD1-PD6: The data were 
detailed in Table 33 in Annex VIII and were displayed as percentages across Lebanon in Chart 
28).  
In the first component, findings revealed that eighty-two percent of non-member producers 
(thirty-three out of forty non-member producers) received the “coop services from other private 
suppliers” (PD1). In fact, all non-members had also access to the coop services without the 
necessity to have a membership and even without being differentiated by price. By-law, non-
members should pay an additional cost compared to active members. This means that because 
most cooperatives received fixed assets in terms of donations from development agencies or 
politicians, they equally offered the available services to all adjacent farmers/processors. This 
situation did not even create a free rider problem, as revealed in the internal challenges, because 
producers did not share financially in their cooperatives. In the benefit of increased skills, 
cooperatives invited all adjacent producers because the training sessions were supplied by 
development agencies that aim to reach as many beneficiaries as they can. Therefore, being a 
member or a non-member was equal in terms of benefits in the majority of Lebanese producers’ 
cooperatives. When services were offered by both cooperatives and private suppliers, the 
difference in terms of the quality and price of services did not also constitute a reason for 
membership. Only around twenty percent of non-members cited that cooperatives offered a 
“better price of services” (PD2) with a “better quality” (PD3). However, because non-member 
producers had an equal access to services, they were not urged to join local cooperatives to 
receive this higher performance.  
For the second component, the Main Reasons for Reluctance, results showed that the majority of 
non-member producers chose not to join local cooperatives because they were not offered an 
“individual support” (PD4). Because the services in cooperatives and the capacity building were 
equally received, the only reason for non-members to join cooperatives is the potential to receive 
an individual support. None of the non-member producers listed the “absence of common needs” 
(PD5) as a main reason for reluctance. However, sixty-five percent of non-members cited the 
“procedure of recruitment” (PD6) by political NGOs as a weakness in cooperatives preventing 
them from active membership.  
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Therefore, non-member producers did not identify a positive impact or a plus from joining local 
cooperatives. The benefits from membership were equally accessed without the need of 
investment and further responsibilities.  
Chart 28: Average percentage of indicators of producers who decided not to join cooperatives 
across Lebanon 
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and skills- did not contribute to a reduction in the cost of production and accordingly to 
an increase in income.  
• Producers considered cooperatives a tool to legally channel development and political 
support, but not an efficient tool to alleviate their socio-economic challenges. They did 
not invest in their cooperatives, did not rely on the coop principles and values, and did 
not practice their role and responsibilities in applying an effective organizational 
structure. 
• Development agencies used the cooperative tool for two reasons: 1- their normative role 
in developing the socio-economic conditions of producers and 2- their ability to accept 
donations by-law and perform non-profit production services. They consider cooperatives 
a development tool that offers services to members and non-members without any 
differences. The only added value from being a coop member is the ownership of assets 
donated by development agencies. 
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Chapter 7- Concluding Notes and Recommendations 
 
 
7.1. Specific research findings  
 
This research analyzed whether the political rhetoric surrounding the role of cooperatives in 
agricultural sector development after the end of the civil war in Lebanon corresponds with how 
producers view the benefits and challenges in their cooperatives.   
In the first part -the policy study- findings showed that producers’ cooperatives could 
theoretically play a strategic role in inducing agricultural and socio-economic development in 
Lebanon. The characteristics of cooperatives and their potential role could offer a real solution to 
overcome the main challenges of producers encountered in the structure of the Lebanese 
economy, the post-war economic and reconstruction policies, the characteristic of Lebanese 
agricultural sector, and the nature of post-war agricultural development policies. Accordingly, 
the post-war governments relied on the cooperative tool in the supply, service, and marketing 
divisions of the production cycle. They planned to use cooperatives to perform the main 
normative impacts that could be delivered by them, in particular to decrease the cost of 
production, to increase access to services, to improve access to market, to increase bargaining 
power, to enhance the power of producers, and to increased producers’ skills. However, the 
semi-structured interviews revealed several weaknesses in the services of the Directorate General 
of Cooperatives, many financial and political barriers to implement the liberal policy of 
cooperatives’ development, and the general inefficiency of post-1992 producers’ cooperatives in 
developing the agricultural sector in Lebanon. In addition to the government, the development 
agencies attributed multiple roles for cooperatives at the micro and macro levels in their 
development agendas. They saw cooperatives as essential in decreasing the cost of production, 
increasing access to market, improving skills, and consequently alleviating poverty, supplying 
jobs, and increasing the social cohesion. They mainly supplied cooperatives, from a neoliberal 
perspective, with the capacity building and financial support needed for rural development. Such 
support offered several pre-requisites for success to cooperatives. The development agencies 
planned to perform the interventions that facilitate the development of skills and the delivery of 
services needed by producers. Although they listed serious internal and external challenges in the 
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projects implemented with cooperatives, they found that producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon 
have achieved their essential impacts, in particular decreasing the cost of production, increasing 
access to market, improving access to services, improving skills, alleviating poverty, providing 
job opportunities, and improving the social cohesion, and therefore, cooperatives were effective 
in inducing the socio-economic development of producers.  
The findings of the first part revealed a contradiction in the government rhetoric by stating, on 
the one hand, the normative essential role of cooperatives in developing the agricultural sector, 
and on the other hand, the inefficiency of producers’ cooperatives at the empirical level. The 
government continued to support cooperatives and adopted a weak approach to manage the root 
causes of their failure. For the development agencies, their rhetoric showed the strategic role of 
producers’ cooperatives in developing the agricultural sector in Lebanon at the level of strategies 
and empirical achievements.  
 
In the second part- the study of cooperatives and their producers- findings, of the semi-structured 
interviews carried out with the board of directors, showed that active producers’ cooperatives 
were mostly established to receive development and political aid across Lebanon. Their 
inefficient organizational structure decreased their performance, made difficult the achievement 
of their potential roles, and mainly raised the corruption practices and mismanagement. 
Cooperatives were not benefiting from the increased power of the cooperative movement 
structure. They cooperated to increase their power to receive development aid and not to deliver 
additional benefits to their members. They did not face a competition in the market with their 
capitalist counterparts. This labeled them as alternative enterprises for rural development with a 
lower performance in the Lebanese neoliberal market economy. Cooperatives offered few paid 
services- one or two- based on the assets donated by development agencies. These services did 
not generate significant surpluses in the cooperative. Producers did not invest in cooperatives to 
initiate new services responding to their common needs. In terms of impacts, cooperatives 
increased members’ skills and improved access to services without being able to reduce the 
production cost which is the key economic factor for long term successful cooperation. For the 
performance of cooperatives across the four agricultural regions in Lebanon, the Bekaa region 
showed a higher efficiency due to a less political intervention, greater members’ own investment, 
increased reliance on common needs, and a less support directly after initiating cooperatives 
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donated by development agencies and politicians. The sub-sector variable (production, fishery, 
and beekeeping) did not produce significant changes in the performance of cooperatives across 
the four agricultural regions. Supporting the fishery and beekeeping cooperatives in applying an 
efficient organizational structure and in increasing their reliance on the economic participation of 
members may produce a sub-sector difference. For the gender variable, cooperatives showed a 
limited contribution in managing the gender related problems in Lebanon. The notion of women 
cooperation under the cooperative enterprise model had an image of a completely dependent 
organization that assured low-paid job seasonal opportunities for local women. 
In-depth semi-structured interviews at the producers’ level confirmed the findings elaborated 
with the board of directors and revealed the negligible role of cooperatives in inducing the socio-
economic development of producers. Cooperatives were used to receive development and 
political support that was wasted due to the inefficient organizational structure of the general 
meeting, the mismanagement, and the corrupted practices of members and development 
planners. Non-members did not identify a plus from joining local cooperatives. The services 
offered to members were equally accessed by non-members without the need of investment and 
further responsibilities.  
The results of the second part revealed that active producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon could not 
be named cooperatives in the real sense of practices and potential benefits. There is an idea of a 
completely supported dependent initiative and not a cooperative initiative. When cooperatives 
were supported by development agencies, the assets and benefits received were not productive 
and were mostly wasted by failing to reduce the cost of production and to increase income.   
 
The findings of the first and the second parts showed that the rhetoric of development planners 
surrounding the role of post-war producers’ cooperatives in improving socio-economic 
development in Lebanon contradicts the empirical reality of how producers view the benefits and 
challenges in their cooperative enterprises. Further discussions in this chapter elaborate the 
specific problems, the challenges in theory and practices, the contribution to the literature, and 
the recommendations proposed for the main stakeholders.  
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7.2. Defining specific problems 
 
As shown in Chapter 1, the Lebanese case study of producers’ cooperatives is considered to be a 
unique model that it is difficult to find elsewhere with its all combined characteristics. 
Producers’ cooperatives worked within a liberal economic policy and a weak agricultural sector. 
They experienced a civil war and a reconstruction period, were highly controlled by politicians, 
and received a lot of support from development agencies. Therefore, specific case study 
problems/challenges, analyzing the empirical failure of cooperative initiatives in developing the 
agricultural sector in Lebanon, are interesting to be highlighted for further specific research into 
the cooperative sector. These problems could be defined or classified according to the main 
stakeholders of the cooperative sector, in particular the government, the development agencies, 
and the cooperatives themselves (Board of Directors and individual members). 
The government, by giving low priority to the agricultural sector and allocating a very low 
budget for its development, needed an organization that has the potential to induce, in the long 
term, the socio-economic development of producers. Cooperatives, by being an economic 
enterprise that can be initiated by producers in rural areas and by having succeeded in delivering 
socio-economic impacts as shown in Chapter 1, were normatively chosen by the government as a 
tool to implement agricultural development strategies. In this way, the government relied on 
cooperatives for their normative role and not for their real empirical situation or previous 
achievements. Cooperatives were seen on the basis of what they could do and not on the basis of 
what they are actually offering to producers. This approach coincided with the political aim of 
the sectarian government members who supported cooperatives to increase clientelism and 
control. Accordingly, the government did not aim or work properly to strengthen the monitoring 
role of the DGC and appeared to design strategies on papers for the development of cooperatives. 
Politicians wanted cooperatives to be weak, dependent, mismanaged, and corrupt because 
otherwise they would lose their control over producers that was maintained by the continuous 
delivery of political and development aid to cooperatives. 
For the development agencies, like for the government, cooperatives were chosen for their 
normative role and not based on their real empirical status. Development agencies sought to 
work with a group of producers who can sell and buy (perform economic services), offer 
production services, accept donations by-law, distribute equal benefits, and democratically 
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manage decisions and select priorities. That is why development agencies selected cooperatives 
and sometimes established them. Moreover, in order to implement development projects, 
agencies needed a local ownership that has the potential to offer sustainable long term impacts 
after the project’s ending phase. The problem is that agencies created the need, designed and 
implemented interventions that were totally donated to cooperatives without the economic 
participation of members. When agencies planned to implement a project in a certain area, they 
first started to identify stakeholders and then approached them. Cooperatives, by being an 
organization authorized by the government, were the most practical tool to reach the local 
producers and support development agencies in implementing their projects. In addition, 
agencies assured the management costs needed to run the assets donated to cooperatives. This 
heavy support turned cooperatives into decentralized branches of development agencies and not 
organizations owned by producers, in particular when agencies continued to manage the coop 
assets after the end of the project. Finally, the weakest point is the political aim of some 
development agencies and the coordination of others with politicians to select active 
cooperatives to benefit from development projects. Both transformed the socio-economic aim of 
cooperative initiatives into a political aim that was fostered by mismanagement and corruption. 
For cooperatives, members established them to respond to the interest of the government and 
development agencies in supporting an economic cooperative enterprise and not to answer their 
common needs through a collective investment.  The Lebanese cooperatives could be named 
charity organizations, groups of producers, etc. that have the legal structure of a cooperative 
enterprise in name only and not in practices and benefits. The principles and values of 
cooperatives were not taken into consideration to manage and monitor cooperatives. Instead of 
benefiting from the assets donated by development agencies and other financial supports to 
initiate productive services, most initiatives showed limited impacts either due to the corruption 
practices and the mismanagement by members or due to the improper planning and 
implementation by development agencies. The majority of cooperatives studied in this thesis 
were never neutral; they have mainly increased the political control of politicians either by 
accepting political aid or by benefiting from their connections to receive development aid.  
These specific problems reveal that the main stakeholders are benefiting from the inefficient 
cooperative initiatives for self-interest in contrast to the common aims of producers as well as the 
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development objectives. The Lebanese cooperatives are political and corruption tools formally 
legalized under the cooperative law and progressively maintained by the occasional development 
aid channeled by the political development agencies.  
 
7.3. Challenges of Lebanese producers’ cooperatives 
 
This section summarizes the main challenges facing the development of producers’ cooperatives 
in Lebanon. It groups the challenges that were highlighted in the policy study as well as in the 
cooperatives’ study.  
 
Unspecific common needs and objectives  
Producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon do not specify their common needs and objectives, which 
are the real purposes behind any collective initiatives. Instead, they enlarge their expectations by 
planning various activities in the three types of cooperatives (supply, service, and marketing) and 
the three main socio-economic objectives (income generation, job creation, and social cohesion). 
They formulate an initiation project that is rarely based on their common challenges and then 
they submit it to the DGC that mainly accepts to establish cooperatives by having the minimum 
number of producers required by-law and by showing the viability of the project proposed by 
members. After that, members start, through a legal way, to seek development and political aid 
identified as the main reasons for the establishment of cooperatives. This situation reveals a 
dominance of fake or ghost cooperative enterprises in the agriculture sector and raises a question 
mark about the usefulness of considering them as a strategic tool for agricultural development 
even if the Lebanese economic and agricultural characteristics present favorable conditions.  
 
Absence of the collective investment notion 
Members in cooperatives do not rely on the principle of members’ economic participation to 
answer their common needs and achieve their objectives. Cooperatives do not need to show their 
financial capacity to secure the initial investment costs of the project proposed in the initiation 
file.  Findings in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 revealed that all assets owned by cooperatives were donated 
by development agencies or politicians without the economic participation of members. Because 
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cooperatives do not share in investment, they accept any interventions proposed even if these 
interventions do not answer their common needs. Accordingly, members show low 
accountability for assets and put no efforts in management and monitoring. That is what makes 
cooperatives and projects implemented through them vulnerable to corruption practices and 
mismanagement.  
 
Lack of autonomy and independence  
Producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon are dependent on development agencies and politicians. By 
aiming to receive development and political aid, cooperatives were initiated to be dependent. In 
fact, because they managed to get development or political aid, they were labeled active from the 
government’s perspective. In some cases, agencies employed the managers/workers of 
cooperatives in order to control the project activities. In other cases, agencies continued to run 
activities after the project’s ending phase and effectively became the executing and the financial 
body of cooperatives. The politicians through their connections with the government and their 
own development agencies maintain a continuous control of cooperatives and impose 
dependency by selecting cooperatives to benefit from development aid. 
 
Inefficient organizational structure that reduces the democratic control of members 
In the majority of cooperatives in Lebanon, the general meeting does not play its essential role in 
designing or voting on the coop strategies and policies. This goes in parallel to the unspecific 
common needs that make targeting development aid as the main strategy of cooperatives. The 
general meeting only convenes to apply what is required by-law in terms of the election of the 
board of directors and the clearance of the annual balance sheet. Most board members are elected 
by acclamation and mainly for their time availability, their political affiliation, and their power. 
The auditors do not perform their role in monitoring the board of directors and reporting the 
progress to the general meeting. They do not have the technical background to monitor the 
financial activities of cooperatives and meet less than the minimum number of meetings required 
by-law.    
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Reduced impacts of the cooperative movement  
Producers’ cooperatives cooperate with each other to increase their power in receiving 
development and political aid, but not to increase services delivered to members. Most 
cooperatives join the cooperative confederation because it is mandatory in the Lebanese 
cooperative law. Therefore, producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon do not benefit from the 
increased power of the cooperative movement structure that facilitates the development of 
cooperatives in the liberal market economy.      
 
Lack of knowledge and application of principles and values 
All challenges detailed above reveal the lack of knowledge and application of the principles and 
values of cooperatives by the general meeting, the board of directors, and the auditors. Principles 
and values are the heart of cooperatives and the main characteristic that differentiate them from 
their capitalist counterparts. The Lebanese producers’ cooperatives lack this essential pre-
requisite for success that limits their potential roles and mainly raises corruption practices and 
mismanagement.  
 
Low performance of cooperatives 
In comparison with their capitalist counterparts, producers’ cooperatives reveal a lower 
performance in the Lebanese liberal market economy. They do not have the capacity to offer 
services to members or they mainly supply few services that did not contribute to a reduction in 
the cost of production. They are not even considered as alternative enterprises for rural 
development as classified under the neoliberal market economy. They failed also to play this 
role. In fact, cooperatives are not facing a significant competition with their capitalist 
counterparts. This means that they are out of the market or most probably supplying services that 
are not attractive to capitalist enterprises, which seek profit maximization. Cooperatives did not 
succeed in benefiting from the development and political aid. Instead, aid was not productive and 
was mainly wasted.    
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Inefficient government role and support   
Producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon did not benefit from the public services planned for 
cooperatives’ development under the post-war agricultural strategies. Financial, political, and 
multiple logistical barriers limited the implementation of public services and accordingly their 
associated achievements. Several weaknesses are identified in the services of the DGC that is not 
playing an efficient role in the proper initiation of cooperatives, the follow-up support, and the 
continuous monitoring. The DGC has a limited role in preventing the main corruption practices 
and the mismanagement of cooperatives. Moreover, the political aim of cooperatives in the post-
war period did not create a supportive environment for their development. Cooperatives 
succeeded in delivering their political aim but they failed in achieving their socio-economic 
impacts.  
 
The challenges of producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon reveal the fruitless role of cooperatives in 
inducing socio-economic development in Lebanon. Cooperatives are not cooperatives in 
practices and benefits. They are legal organizations grouping producers to waste development 
aid and achieve political aims.  
 
7.4. Contribution to the literature  
 
This research revealed that the government and development agencies may rely in their policies 
and strategies on cooperative enterprises based on their normative role in inducing socio-
economic development and not on their real empirical status or previously achieved impacts. 
Producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon did not significantly contribute to poverty alleviation, social 
cohesion, and sustainable employment. The government may sometimes report a failure or a 
lower performance of the cooperative tool in achieving the designed strategies, but it may 
continue to consider it as an efficient development tool in the production sector. In fact, 
cooperatives were considered as economic enterprises that are theoretically democratic in 
decision making and can legally accept donations from the government, politicians, and 
development agencies. Thus, development planners may rely on cooperatives for their logistical 
role in reaching the majority of producers while working to develop the agricultural sector. 
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These findings were ignored by the different authors who reported the use of cooperatives based 
on their potential roles at the enterprise level and for socio-economic development. After being 
selected by development planners, cooperative enterprises may not achieve efficient impacts, but 
instead may prove to foster corruption practices and mismanagement. Sometimes the 
government may play a role in facilitating corruption in cooperatives. Its main role in Lebanon in 
favoring proper legal and regulatory frameworks was effective in giving free hand to 
cooperatives to participate in corruption. This result adds a vulnerability to corruption 
component in the challenge of unsuitable national environment for the development of 
cooperatives. This was not mentioned by the World Bank, advocating for an enabling legal and 
regulatory environment that assures the autonomy of cooperatives (World Bank 2007). The DGC 
in Lebanon did not apply the minimum monitoring measures that ensure the proper supportive 
control of cooperatives in their practices and activities. As a result, the government increased the 
dependency of cooperatives instead of strengthening their autonomy through an appropriate 
assistance and coaching. In-depth analysis showed that the government may intend to increase 
the dependence of cooperatives in order to increase the control opportunity by political NGOs. 
Thus, the government facilitated the control of cooperatives by local politicians. This finding 
adds the government factor in increasing the control over cooperatives in the control problem of 
internal challenges where Uma Lele and Chris Penrose-Buckley only revealed the role of 
politicians and local elites under this aspect (Lele 1981, Penrose-Buckley 2007). This makes 
unnecessary the useful role of coordination between the different stakeholders in developing 
cooperative enterprises. Development agencies chose to coordinate with politicians in selecting 
cooperatives that would benefit from development projects. Therefore, development agencies 
may report different criteria in selecting cooperatives. Moreover, they appeared to report 
unattained impacts meeting their planned objectives. They wanted to justify the usefulness of 
assets donated to cooperatives. If they report to donors that their interventions did only increase 
producers’ skills and did not decrease the cost of production or increase income, they will not be 
able to channel more grants by relying on the cooperative tool. Sometimes, agencies chose to 
continue managing the projects implemented with cooperatives in order to control members on a 
daily basis, and in addition they carried out improper interventions with a significant aspect of 
mismanagement. Therefore, mainly political development agencies and donors supporting them 
played a role in the failure of producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon. In fact, without the support of 
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developing agencies, the active cooperatives studied in this thesis would not have existed or at 
least offered services to members. In many cases, development agencies initiated cooperatives to 
help in the implementation of development projects. They supported cooperatives because they 
can legally accept donations, as mentioned earlier, and they did not ask for the economic 
participation of members. Thus, the partnership of cooperatives with development agencies 
could be identified as an external challenge for cooperative enterprises. This finding was ignored 
in the literature.  
For the potential role of producers’ cooperatives at the enterprise level, this research showed that 
cooperatives in Lebanon are an essential tool to: 
• Enhance members and non-members’ skills through the capacity building activities 
funded by development projects. Increased skills did not contribute to a reduction in the 
cost of production. This result contradicts with the impact of increased farm productivity 
and efficiency (UN/DESA 2009).   
• Increase access to services for members and non-members without a reduction in the cost 
of production or an increase in income. 
• Increase the power of members to seek development and political aid. This was the main 
achievement of cooperatives. It was ignored by Johnston Birchall and John Empson who 
reported the useful role of cooperatives in enhancing the power of members to influence 
their common policies (Birchall 2004, Empson 1984).  
Therefore, the active cooperatives classified by the government and development agencies 
revealed a low performance and were mainly a political tool maintained through corruption 
practices and mismanagement. They were initiated to receive development and political aid, had 
an inefficient organizational structure, were financially dependent, and delivered no productive 
services to members. The financial dependency of cooperatives was not directly indicated as a 
main internal challenge in the literature. Von Pischke and John Rouse only mentioned the 
subsidized notion of producers’ cooperatives in the developing countries under the horizon 
problem (Von-Pischke & Rouse 2004). Further findings showed that there was no significant 
difference between dormant and active cooperatives in Lebanon. Receiving development and 
political aid by active cooperatives did not increase the performance of producers. Also, there 
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was no significant difference between cooperatives in the three agricultural sub-sectors studied in 
this thesis. The gender factor showed also no difference in the performance of cooperative. 
Under such conditions and mainly where there is no members’ economic participation, most 
reported internal and external challenges would not face cooperative enterprises. There were no 
problems in the priority for investment, in the influence costs, and of free rider. The control 
problem by politicians and the dependency on development aid were seen as pre-requisites for 
success in Lebanese cooperatives. The highly competitive environment favored by the liberal 
economy could place cooperatives in a weak situation and accordingly channel more aid for the 
socio-economic development of producers. In terms of pre-requisites for success in directing 
more aid and facilitating corruption in Lebanese cooperatives, the key factors are to disregard the 
principles and values of cooperatives, to reduce the participation of members, to apply an 
inefficient organizational structure, and to increase the unity between cooperatives in order to 
receive more support. All the pre-requisites for success in the literature were not found in the 
majority of Lebanese cooperatives.  
Under Neoliberalism, active cooperatives in Lebanon did not carry adaptation, hybridization, or 
degeneration to increase their performance as mentioned by Roger Spear (2004), but instead they 
turned up into an efficient tool to waste development aid, foster corruption, and increase political 
control. Post-war reconstruction and development policies produced a weak cooperative sector 
reflecting the image of a completely dependent enterprise having corruption practices and 
mismanagement as the main guiding principles.   
Finally, this thesis confirms the occurrence of all corruption practices in cooperatives as 
mentioned in the literature: misuse to pursue political aims (Lele 1981, Throp et al 2005, Bernard 
et al 2008, Kwapong and Korugyando 2010), a tool to receive government and donors support 
(Ellner 2010), and benefit to non-members and restriction of membership (Holtland 2011). It 
adds an in-depth description and examples of corruption and mismanagement practices that 
could affect the development of producers’ cooperatives. The main practices are the following:  
• Increasing membership in cooperatives to improve their potential in receiving political 
and development aid 
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• Expanding the type of planned services in cooperatives (supply, services, and marketing) 
in order to increase their chance in receiving any projects proposed by development 
agencies 
• Assuring the infrastructure needed, as a condition to receive assets from development 
agencies, by only few members and not through the economic participation of all 
members  
• The general meeting convening less than the minimum number of meetings required by-
law and leaving the role of designing the coop strategies and policies to the board 
members. 
• Board members convening less than the minimum number of meetings required by-law 
• Board members elected based on their political power and affiliation  
• Auditors meeting less than the minimum number of meetings required by-law and do not 
have the background to monitor the activities of board members 
• Board members do not offer the proper education to members about the principles and 
values of cooperatives 
• Board members accepting any interventions proposed by NGOs 
• Non-members paying the same cost of services as the coop members  
• Non-members controlling the coop services through a kin-based relationship 
• Personal use of coop assets by the president 
• The DGC accepting the election of board members in a second general meeting set after 
one hour of the first general meeting (minimum 50% of all members should be in the first 
meeting in order to elect board members, otherwise the second general meeting can elect 
board members by less than 50% attendance)  
• The DGC accepting the initiation of cooperatives by any ten members, either producers 
or no, and based on a project that members do not need to secure its investment costs 
• The DGC donating financial support to cooperative without further monitoring  
• Development agencies managing the coop services 
• The coordination of development agencies with politicians to select active coops that 
would benefit from development projects 
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7.5. Concluding recommendations  
 
The last section of this chapter proposes fundamental recommendations for the development of 
producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon. Recommendations are suggested at policy and practice 
levels detailing the roles of the main stakeholders: the government, development agencies, and 
cooperatives (producers and board of directors).  
 
Policy level 
The government must define a role for cooperatives that is feasible within their prevailing 
empirical conditions as detailed in this thesis. Expectations should be adapted to the financial 
and technical capacity of members, unions, and apex organization. These are not suitable for 
roles requiring large investment and advanced management skills. In parallel, the government 
must adopt a policy enabling cooperatives to fulfill the role ascribed to them. This involves 
creating a supporting environment that aims at strengthening the performance of cooperatives. 
This could include facilitated access to guaranteed credit program, direct access to markets 
without intermediaries, direct import of production resources with tax-exemption, etc. Subsidies 
programs and financial support should be specific to the needs of each cooperative and time-
bound. Both should fill the gaps preventing cooperatives to play their role. Development 
agencies should also specify the role of cooperatives in their policies and strategies in a way that 
complies with the prevailing empirical conditions. Programs for the development of producers’ 
cooperatives should be designed over a long-term period and responsive to producers’ needs. 
They should substantially increase the accountability of producers with regard to donated assets. 
Development agencies should help preventing the market from squeezing out small producers 
and enhance their capacity to meet their common needs.  The government and development 
agencies should cooperate together to unify their vision in developing cooperatives. They should 
involve the apex organization and cooperatives’ unions in designing strategies for the 
development of cooperative enterprises. 
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Practice level  
The government must only accept the initiation of cooperatives based on a well-designed project 
proposal in which members provide at least half of the investment cost needed. It must 
complement the participatory initiation by a training program detailing the role of different 
actors in the organizational structure of cooperatives. The general meeting, board of directors, 
and auditors must know how to manage their cooperative in order to deliver feasible services and 
prevent corruption practices. The monitoring role of the government must be revised in a way to 
increase transparency and limit corruption without compromising the independence of 
cooperatives. The government must update the cooperative law to facilitate the development of 
cooperatives under the prevailing conditions. In particular, it must allow the participation of 
financial members with non-voting shares and hybridization, both of which are essential in order 
to increase the performance of cooperatives under the existing neo-liberal economic conditions. 
The government must carry periodic dissolution of dormant cooperatives.  
Development agencies must not initiate new cooperatives to implement development projects. 
The potential to succeed with newly initiated cooperatives is much lower than with well-
established cooperatives, and the investment cost is much higher. Projects should only support 
complementary activities that are needed for production instead of equipping cooperatives with 
whole production lines. Requesting from cooperatives to contribute financially in 
complementing the donated assets for their projects is crucial in order to increase their 
accountability. Anti-corruption measures should be integrated in the different phases of project 
implementation. Development agencies and their representatives should be fully committed to 
respect the autonomy of cooperatives and promote sustainable interventions.  
Services in cooperatives should be designed to fit the changing capacity and constraints 
identified by members. In order for cooperatives to provide services that are offered by private 
suppliers, their cost must be lower and/or their quality must be higher. Cooperatives must avoid 
services with high technical aspects requiring the permanent presence of non-member 
professionals. They must supply simple services initiated with low investment cost and offered 
with minimum running cost. For instance, they can build strategic partnership with private 
suppliers to deliver lower cost products and services through the application of the economy of 
scale.  
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Annex I: Development agencies’ Questionnaire  
 
A- General information:  
 
- Name of the NGO and category 
 
- Objectives 
 
- Activities in Lebanon 
 
- List of major projects implemented with producers cooperatives after 1990 
 
- List of supported producers’ cooperatives  
 
- Current partnership with producers’ cooperatives 
 
- Projects' document or evaluation reports 
 
B- Supporting cooperatives:  
 
- What were the types of activities implemented in different projects? 
o Equipments 
o Education including management 
o Marketing 
o Other____________________ 
 
- How were these activities planned? (if responding to need) 
o Cooperatives' survey 
o Project components 
o Development policy 
o Other_____________________ 
 
- Did members share? (Sharing in investment) 
o None 
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o A percentage 
o No direct support 
o Other_____________________ 
 
- Were cooperatives initiated during the project phase? If yes, on which basis and how? 
(top down approach)  
 
- What were the criteria to select cooperatives? (efficiency of intervention)  
o Total number of members 
o Type  
o Previous activities  
o Gender 
o Others ____________________ 
 
- Describe or draw the nature of communication during the project? (top down approach) 
  
- What was the background of officers implementing the project? (top down approach) 
o Social worker 
o Agriculture engineer 
o Others_____________________ 
 
- What were the results achieved in projects? 
o Increased income 
o Increased market access 
o Increased knowledge 
o Increased power 
o Increased services 
o Failure 
o Others _____________________ 
 
- What were the problems encountered during project implementation? 
o Vested interest 
o Lack of cooperative sense 
o Portfolio problem 
o Control Problem 
o Free rider 
o Communication between the coop and NGO 
o Others ______________________ 
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- What was the kind of partnership set after the project? (continuous support for 
community)  
o None  
o Monitoring for assets 
o Local partner for development 
o Others _____________________ 
 
- Are there any new projects to support cooperatives? List them and activities. How were 
these projects designed? (continuous support for coop as an instrument for development)    
 
 
C- Development Policy:  
 
- What were the reasons for selecting cooperatives as a tool for development? 
o Grouping similar needs 
o A legal group and organization recognized by the government 
o To respond to government plans 
o Equitable and sustainable support 
o Having potentials 
o Succeeded in the developed world 
o Donors request 
o Could be controlled 
o Others ______________________ 
 
- What is the role that the NGO has played to manage the external challenges of 
cooperatives 
o Fairer competition 
o Favorable environment 
o Others _____________________ 
 
- What could/did cooperatives achieve in your development agenda? And how? 
o Poverty alleviation 
o Social integration 
o Sustainable employment 
o Contribution to the MDGs 
o Fairer globalization 
o Others______________________ 
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- Did you rely on any of the international recommendation for the promotion of 
cooperatives 
o ILO Recommendation n.193 (2002) 
o UN Guidelines (2001) 
o Others _______________________ 
 
- Did you cooperate with the government and other stakeholders in identifying major 
challenges? If yes, how did you cooperate? What were the designed plans? 
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Annex II: Directorate of Cooperative's Questionnaire  
 
A- General Information and Status 
 
- How many cooperatives are they registered in Lebanon? 
  
- What is the current role of the Directorate General of Cooperatives in supporting 
autonomous producers’ cooperatives across Lebanon and creating a supportive 
environment? 
 
- What are the special considerations given to cooperatives, if any?   
  
- How do you accept the request to initiate new cooperatives? On which basis?  
 
- What are the services offered to these new cooperatives? 
 
- Is the Directorate General of Cooperatives dissolving any cooperatives? On which basis? 
And how?  
 
- Is there any new relevant statistical information about cooperatives after 1990? Like the 
share of coop in employment and domestic products. 
  
- Why did not Lebanon join the International Cooperative Alliance?  
 
- Are cooperative principles in Lebanon the same as the principles developed by the 
International Cooperative Alliance in the cooperative identity? 
  
- What was the role of producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon? How do you describe the 
newly initiated cooperatives after the war? 
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B- Development policy  
 
- Why cooperatives are considered by the government as a key instrument for 
development?  
 
- Was the cooperative confederation or a cooperative group invited to participate in the 
development of agricultural strategies?  
 
- What could cooperatives achieve in your development plans (in agriculture and in 
general)? And How?  
 
- Did they achieve the planned objectives? 
 
- Is the government applying the international recommendations to promote cooperatives?  
  
- What is the role of the government in facilitating the development of producers’ 
cooperatives? What are/were the implemented activities to manage external and internal 
challenges?  
 
- Describe the communications with other stakeholders to develop producers’ cooperatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
326 
 
Annex III: Board of Directors Questionnaire  
 
A- General information:  
 
- Cooperative’s name 
 
- Initiated in which village 
 
- Area covered by the coop services 
 
- Date of initiation 
 
- Total number of members (small or big scale activity) 
 
- Increase in membership: initial number – current number of members (active coop that 
work to increase services for needed non-members) 
 
- How many active members in the coop and why? (membership practices)  
 
- Cooperative's type: Supply, service, or marketing (diversity of activity) 
 
- Cooperative's sector.  
 
- How was the cooperative initiated? (Top-down approach or a response to common need)  
o Felt a common need that could not be achieved at individual level 
o We were supported to initiate a coop by NGOs 
o Our political leader encouraged us 
o Other _______________________ 
 
- List the objectives behind the initiation of the cooperative (Top-down approach or a 
response to common need)   
 
- List assets owned after initiation. How was the original capital assured? (economic share 
or top down approach) 
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o Self-investment 
o Budget from a project 
o Political party 
o Other ________________________ 
 
- List current owned assets. How was the capital assured? (membership investment or 
seeking development aid, etc) 
o Same as initial assets 
o Budget from a project 
o Self-investment 
o Other _______________________ 
 
- List the current offered services (efficiency of the cooperative) 
 
B- Organization, principles, and values: 
 
- Is the organizational structure of coop adopted? general meeting, number of board 
members, auditors, manager, and workers (real coop structure different from a capitalist 
enterprise) 
o All existing 
o No manager  
o No workers 
o Other __________________ 
 
- Who planned the coop policy? (membership practices and dominance by leaders or 
development organization) 
o Members in the general meeting 
o Local elite, a politician  
o An NGO helped us 
o The board of directors 
o Other ___________________ 
 
- Strategies for work designed for __________ period? 
o Short 
o Medium 
o Long 
o Other 
 
- Number of general meetings/year (membership practices) 
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- Number of attendees in the general meeting (membership practices) 
 
- Number of board members’ meetings/year (membership control) 
 
- Average number of attendees in board members’ meetings (membership practices) 
 
- List the basics on which board members were elected (membership practices) 
 
- Are board members elected based on a clear work plan? (membership practices) 
 
- On which basis is the board chairman elected? (membership practices) 
o Leadership skills 
o Availability of time 
o Good work plan 
o A friend 
o Other ___________________ 
 
- How was the manager hired, if any? On which basis? (good governance)  
o Academic background 
o Work experience 
o Management skills 
o Communication skills 
o Knowledge in cooperative work 
o Other ___________________ 
 
- What is the academic background and work experience of the manager? (good 
governance) 
 
- How often do you visit the cooperative? (good governance) 
o Daily 
o Weekly 
o Monthly 
o 4 times/year 
o Other ____________________ 
 
- How does the manager communicate with board members? (good governance) 
o Daily 
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o When there is something urgent 
o Monthly reports 
o Other ____________________ 
 
- How do you monitor the work of the manager in implementing the coop policy? (good 
governance) 
o Monthly check up of activities 
o Monthly report 
o During board meetings 
o Direct weekly monitoring 
o Other _____________________ 
 
- How does the manager ensure the equal right of access to services for all members? 
(good governance) 
o Run activities by turn 
o Give services first to members dealing more with the coop 
o Give services first to members having big share in the coop 
o Give services first based on efficiency: ex: big land surface etc. 
o Other _____________________ 
 
- How did/do you solve any problem between the manager/workers and members? (good 
governance) 
o I do not interfere 
o Usually, members do not inform the board 
o The manager does not inform the board 
o Discuss the problem with members and ask the manager to find a fair solution 
o Other _____________________ 
  
- Do you cooperate with other cooperatives? If yes, on which basis? And for what 
benefits? (cooperation between cooperatives) 
o No cooperation with other cooperatives 
o Yes because we need to increase our power 
o Yes because they have a service that we cannot offer; so we will be able to deliver 
it to our members 
o Yes because the other cooperative is still in the initial phase and need our offered 
services  
o Other ______________________ 
 
- If the cooperative was a member in the confederation cooperative: what did this 
membership offer to your cooperative? (cooperation between cooperatives) 
o Offered nothing 
o Education 
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o Projects 
o Worked with the government to force coop policies 
o Other ______________________ 
 
- How often do you get services from the coop? (equality between board and members) 
o When I ask 
o In my turn 
o I get some services from outside the coop 
o Never 
o Other ______________________ 
 
- How is the cooperative linked to the community? Any project implemented with the 
community? (concern for community) 
o We implemented a project with the municipality 
o We have spent part of our surpluses in a small project helping the community 
o We facilitated the work of an NGO in implementing a project with the community 
o Other ______________________ 
 
- How do you increase members’ participation? (prerequisite for success) 
o Reports during the general meeting 
o Monthly reports  
o Call for a general meeting to take important decisions 
o Providing high quality services 
o Keeping equality in all our activities 
o Ask for their feedback in the delivered services 
o Other ________________________ 
 
- How do you accept new members? On which basis, if any? (avoid over rider problem) 
o If they need coop services and we are able to offer them 
o Yes we accept new members in order to increase our power 
o Yes if they can share in our investments 
o No we do not accept new members, we are having difficulties  to serve current 
members 
o Other _________________________ 
 
- Did u face a problem in priorities for investment? (portfolio problem) 
 
- Did u face a problem in collecting capital for investment? (horizon problem) 
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- How do you think that the cooperative is delivering benefits to members? (benefit from 
membership)  
o Power 
o Services otherwise not accessible 
o Decrease cost of production 
o Increase marketing 
o Keep them in the agriculture work 
o Innovations, new skills 
o Not helping 
o Working with NGOs 
o Other ________________________ 
 
- Do you spread the cooperative advantage through education and training to members and 
non-members? (education) 
o It is important but we did not provide education service yet 
o We carry out many training sessions to disseminate the cooperative idea 
o We educate our members to know principles and values in the initial phase as 
well as for new members 
o Other _______________________ 
 
- Describe achievements until today? (benefit from membership)  
o Little achieved 
o We can do more 
o We are not supported to achieve our objectives 
o We did a lot………………………… 
o Other ________________________ 
 
- What is your coop's total annual earning?  
 
- What is best working in your coop? And what is not working? (problem and benefit) 
 
 
C- Partnership and Environment:   
 
- Do any private suppliers compete with the cooperative in offering services to members? 
(competition in the working environment)  
o We provide better services with lower cost 
o Yes some suppliers are competing with us by quality and price 
o Members do their self interest sometimes and not the interest of the group 
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o Yes private suppliers have lower transaction costs and are more efficient 
o Other ________________________ 
 
- If yes, what are the key factors of competition? Why weren’t they achieved by the coop?   
 
- How do you describe the government help in creating a supportive environment and 
access to credits?  
o No help from the government 
o No good credit facilities available for the cooperatives 
o The government is providing some equipments and a financial support  
o Suitable environment for private companies based on the deregulation of trade 
o Other ________________________ 
 
- How do you communicate with the government?  
o No communication 
o Submit the yearly balance sheet only 
o Education training 
o Through NGOs 
o Other _________________________ 
 
- Any support received from the government?  
 
- Draw the relation with the government?  
 
- What about NGOs? Did you go for or have any partnership?  
o Yes we have an actual partnership, on which basis? 
o We had a partnership but terminated with after the project’s implementation phase 
o We help several NGOs in developing our community through a continuous 
partnership 
o No partnership 
o Other _________________________ 
 
- On which basis did/do you cooperate with NGO? (if coop help responding to need) 
o We accept anything from NGOs 
o We cooperate to respond our common needs 
o if activities have a certain degree of sustainability  
o Other ________________________ 
 
- Are services offered by NGOs relevant to your needs? (if coop help responding to need) 
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o Yes, exactly what we need 
o Not relevant 
o Offered services can help but they are not what we need 
o Other ________________________ 
 
- Describe the relation with NGOs after the end of the project?  
o Once the project has ended, partnership has stopped 
o We still cooperate until now 
o We planned for further projects 
o It was a total failure 
o Other ______________________ 
 
- Draw the relation with NGOs?  
 
- What were the activities and the results of the projects implemented with NGOs?  
 
- Any new projects? Is the coop seeking new supports from NGOs?  
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Annex IV: Producers' Questionnaire 
 
A- Socio-economic info:  
Producer's name: _____________________________________________________________ 
Date and place of Birth: ________________________________  male or  female 
Village: ______________________, Agriculture region: ______________________________ 
Phone numbers: ______________________________________________________________ 
Member in _________________________________________________ cooperatives (to check 
if the producer is member in different cooperatives) 
Year of membership: ______ Land surface: ______Ha, average size of plots: _______ Ha 
Ownership of Land (producers' class indicator): _______________________________________ 
Crops and related surface (involvement in agriculture and class indicator): __________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Yearly Production (involvement in agriculture, class indicator, and activities with the coop):____ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Other occupied jobs (involvement in agriculture as secondary job): _______________________ 
Number of children and their involvement in agriculture: _______________________________ 
 
B- Membership practice in the Cooperative: 
  
- How did you join the coop? (indicator if the coop was initiated by members themselves 
or top-down approach) 
o Through a member 
o Through the village elite 
o NGO 
o Media 
o Other ________________ 
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- Were you in the preparation committee of the coop? Or did you join later? If later who 
invited you? (indicator if the coop was initiated by members themselves or top-down 
approach) 
 
- Did u join the coop alone or in a group? (indicator if members were encouraged by 
political parties or government)  
 
- What is your relation with other members? (coop on family basis or grouping members 
having common needs) 
o Kin based 
o Neighbor 
o Similar production 
o Other _________________  
 
- What did the coop directly offer you after becoming a member? (if the member has 
joined to get a benefit from a project or support from the government i.e. vested interest) 
o Nothing 
o Inputs 
o Equipments 
o Marketing 
o Other ________________ 
 
- List your investments in the coop? (indicator if the coop was initiated to seek aid from 
NGOs or as a real economic collective investment) 
  
- List three to four major reasons behind membership i.e. why did u join the coop? (initial 
idea behind the cooperative membership) 
 
- On which principles and values do you rely in applying your membership? List them? (to 
know if members know the cooperative principle in order to foster their membership and 
control the cooperative) 
 
- Did you receive a training on the principles and values of cooperatives or your already 
know them? If yes, who supplied the training? (to check if the cooperative is educating 
members on principles and values)  
 
- Describe your relation with other members? For example in solving a problem you have 
faced in the cooperative (practices of cooperation and internal core principles) 
o No relation 
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o Pooling resources 
o Solidarity 
o Providing useful networks  
o Other ________________ 
 
- Are you getting the same benefits from the coop compared to other members? (equality 
in cooperatives) 
o Yes 
o Few members have more power 
o Other ________________ 
 
- On which basis did/do u elect your representatives in the board of directors? (practices of 
membership and political neutrality) 
o Action plan to compensate needs 
o Good and honest people 
o Friends 
o Same political party 
o No idea 
o Other ________________ 
 
- Did you participate in planning the coop policy? Did you vote on it? (practices of 
membership to meet the needs on short and long term) 
o No idea 
o Yes I have voted 
o No policy 
o I have a role 
o Other ________________ 
 
- Are you claiming about problems in the general meeting? (practices of membership and 
equality) 
o Yes 
o No 
o I claimed but nothing has happened  
o Other ________________ 
 
- On monthly basis, how many times do you communicate with board members (in the 
production season)? (active representation, practices of membership, and activities with 
the coop) 
o One time 
o When needed 
o Not necessary 
o Other ________________  
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- Are you communicating with auditors to monitor the financial progress of the coop? 
(active representation, practices of membership) 
o No idea 
o Yes, we revise them twice per year (minimum bylaw requirement) 
o Not interested 
o Other ________________  
 
- Describe how political parties are helping they coop to achieve the planned objectives? 
(political neutrality and dominance by politicians: autonomy and independence) 
o Direct money support 
o Support to get help from the government, NGOs, etc 
o Other ________________ 
 
- Is the municipality chairman supporting the coop (or helped the coop)? If yes, how and 
why? (political neutrality and dominance by politicians: autonomy and independence and 
participation with the community) 
o No 
o Yes because he considers us as a partner 
o Yes because he has a good network, can link the coop to NGOs 
o Other _________________ 
 
- Describe the communication with the manager. Is he/she responding to your requests? 
(practices of membership) 
o Good and responding to our needs 
o He/she deals as a manager and not as a worker inside our organization 
o Bad communication 
o Apply different policies then the planned in the general meeting 
o Other __________________  
 
- Rate on 1 to 5 the contribution of your cooperative to the development of the Lebanese 
agriculture sector (general evaluation from producers' view) 
o 1: Strongly contributed 
o 2: Good contribution 
o 3: Contributed but not enough  
o 4: it has a potential to contribute 
o 5: Did not contribute 
 
C- Benefits from membership  
- List services supplied by the cooperative (benefits from the coop or a coop in name only) 
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- Do you need other services not supplied by the coop? If yes, list them. (to inquire if the 
cooperative answers all producers’ need, what is in common, or only offer what they get 
through donations) 
 
- Did you plan the offered services? What was your sharing in them? (investment and 
responding common needs) 
o I planned and shared equally 
o Did not plan but shared 
o Donation, no one shared 
o Joined after investment 
o Other _________________ 
 
- Are services offered by the coop available with the same price from other suppliers? 
(decrease cost of production) 
o Lower cost 
o Similar cost 
o Higher cost 
 
- Are the offered services new? Were they available with the same price before initiating 
the coop?  (respond to needs difficult to be secured at individual level)  
  
- Were new marketing channels facilitated or reached by the coop? (increase marketing 
opportunity) 
o Yes, we get access to new market 
o Not offered by the coop 
o We are asking to find new markets 
o They tried but did not work due to higher transaction cost 
o Other ________________ 
 
- How do you describe your bargaining power after joined the coop? (increase bargaining 
power) 
o Stronger 
o Better 
o Did not change 
o Other ________________  
 
- What if you did not join the coop? How can u get these services? (cooperative responding 
to needs) 
o No way to get services unless through the coop 
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o Able to get from a private supplier but with higher cost 
o No problems, easily offered by other suppliers 
o Other ________________ 
 
- What is the ratio of your production marketed through the coop? (efficiency of 
cooperative work) 
 
- List any skills you have learned through the coop? (increase skills) 
o Agriculture practices 
o Packing 
o Processing 
o Other __________________ 
 
- How were surpluses, if any, used?  Did you agree on the way surpluses were spent? 
(membership and efficiency of investment) 
o No surpluses 
o Agreed and were spent on new services 
o Agreed and were spent to implement a project in our community 
o No idea  
o Other _________________ 
 
- On a scale of 1 to 5 how do you rate the services supplied by the coop? (quality of 
offered services) 
o 1: Best quality 
o 2: Good quality 
o 3: Not good, but acceptable 
o 4: Low quality 
o 5: Very low quality 
 
- What would you do if they were low quality? (membership) 
o Leave the coop 
o Use my membership to make a change 
o Get from another suppliers 
o Nothing 
o Other __________________  
 
- On a scale of 1 to 5 how do you rate the importance of the role played by the coop in 
facilitating and ameliorating your production? (general evaluation from producers' 
perspective) 
o 1: Wasn't able to work without my cooperative membership 
o 2: Played an essential role  
o 3: It helped but could do more 
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o 4: Have potentials and still waiting 
o 5: did not help, rated as a complete failure 
  
E- Problems in cooperatives   
- For the offered services: on which basis did u accept to share? (horizon problem) 
o My need 
o Could be needed in the future 
o No idea 
o Other ___________________ 
 
- Did u financially share in services? (portfolio problem) 
o No because I have no financial capacity to share 
o No because services did not answer my priorities 
o No because I felt a vested interest in defining new services 
o Yes Because ______________ 
 
- Do you use some of the listed services? And did you deal with someone offering better 
quality services (horizon and free rider problem) 
o Yes  
o No 
 
- What about young or old members? Do they participate financially similar to you in the 
coop? Do their strategies differ from yours? (portfolio problem) 
o We have the same focus 
o They are different but have good ideas to share 
o They are different and having no sense of cooperation 
o They should not be in the cooperative 
o Other ____________________ 
 
- What about the manager? Did he/she respond to your need? What if he/she did not? 
(Control problem) 
o I stop dealing with the cooperative 
o I use my membership to react and tell board members to manage the problem 
o I do not care 
o Other ____________________  
 
- Do you have access to all services whenever you want? On which basis does the 
cooperative manager run services between members? (Control problem) 
o We are fighting to get services 
o No equality 
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o The manager responds only to board members 
o I do not know how the manager distribute services in the coop 
o Other _____________________ 
 
- Do you accept non-members to use the cooperative services? Are non-members using 
coop services? (Control problem) 
o I do not accept because they did not share in the investment 
o Yes they can use them 
o They can use but with higher price as per the coop law 
o Other ______________________ 
 
- In marketing, do low quality products receive same price as your high quality products? 
(free rider problem) 
o Yes I am suffering for this 
o Yes but I have no problem 
o No there are different prices based on quality 
o I stopped to market through the coop due to this problem and limited my benefit 
to other services 
o Other ______________________  
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Annex V: Non-membres' Questionnaire  
 
Same questions for socio-economic data as members plus the following questions:  
- Are any of the services offered in the local cooperative in your village relevant to your 
production needs? List them?  
 
- From where are you getting now coop services?  
o Private suppliers 
o Cooperate with another producer to get the service 
o My friend is a big landowners and own these services so I can use them 
o Other _______________________  
 
- Where did/do u sell your production?  
o Same where the cooperative sell members products 
o I cooperate with my neighbor who have access to a good market 
o Other _______________________  
 
- Why didn't you join the cooperative so you can get lower cost for services or diversified 
services including marketing benefits? (efficiency of the local cooperatives in from non-
members view) 
o I applied for membership but they did not accept my application because they 
cannot offer for more members their services 
o No need to join, I am able alone to get all services 
o I can get coop services with same price without joining the coop 
o Low quality of services offered 
o Other _______________________ 
 
- Did anyone invite you to join the coop? If they invite you, will you join? (political 
neutrality and individualism) 
  
- Since you are not a member in the cooperative, do you think that you are losing some 
benefits delivered by the coop, or it could be an advantage to you in having more 
competitive suppliers offering better quality services? (efficiency of the local 
cooperatives from non-members view)  
o Yes I am loosing from being alone 
o Advantage for me, I like to work individually 
o Advantage to choose better quality services 
o I don't care 
o Other ________________________ 
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- Do you think that you have the same chance as members in getting coop services and 
with the same price? (efficiency of the local cooperatives from non-members view)  
o Yes no added value for my membership 
o Other _________________________ 
 
- Will you support the cooperative in implementing projects within the community? 
(support from the community) 
o No they are numerous and can accomplish work without my help 
o Yes for sure 
o Other _________________________ 
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Table 12: Roles (R) of cooperatives enterprises in development agencies’ agenda 
 Micro Level Macro level  
Socio-economic 
development indicators 
Other indicators for using the 
cooperative enterprise 
Main national 
development objectives  
 
Agencies R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15 R16 Total 
Y/ 16 
USAID N N Y N Y N N N N N N N Y N N N 3 
ACDI/VOCA Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y N 12 
CHF Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N 12 
YMCA Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y 11 
ILO N N N N N Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 7 
UNDP Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 11 
ICU Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N 12 
Aec Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N 9 
RMF Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 15 
ADA Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y N 11 
EC N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N 1 
WV Y Y N N Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y N 7 
IFAD Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N 9 
SF Y Y N N Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y N N 7 
JBDA Y Y N Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y N 9 
Total Y/15 12 12 9 8 11 13 9 8 4 2 1 7 14 11 11 4 136 
• R1: Decrease the cost of production and increase income 
• R2: Improve access to markets – eliminate middlemen 
• R3: Improve and increase access to services  
• R4: Increase producers’ bargaining power – group empowerment 
• R5: Increase members’ skills  
• R6: Coop as a legal institution framework  
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• R7: Grouping similar needs and having multi-dimensional impacts 
• R8: Equitable and sustainable support (principles and values)  
• R9: To answer donors’ request 
• R10: Responding to government development plans  
• R11: Group control for a political reason 
• R12: Agencies have a mission to support cooperatives 
• R13: Poverty alleviation – food security, increase access to credit, improving economic and social conditions 
• R14: Social cohesion and integration – gender equality, increased empowerment and rights, facilitate social unity, key 
framework for social capital 
• R15: Job creation  
• R16: Fairer globalization – equitable distribution 
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Table 13: Agencies’ role (AR) in supporting producers’ cooperatives in Lebanon 
 Capacity 
building 
Facilitate access to market Facilitate 
access to Credit 
Financial 
support for RD 
Supportive 
environment 
Agencies Projects AR1 AR2 AR3 AR4 AR5 AR6 AR7 AR8 AR9 AR10 AR11 AR12 
ACDI/VOCA P1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N 
P2 Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N N 
P3 Y N N N N Y N N N N N N 
CHF P4 Y Y N N Y N N N N Y Y N 
P5 N Y N N N N N N N Y Y N 
P6 Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N 
YMCA P7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y 
 P8 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N 
ILO P9 Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y N 
UNDP P10 Y Y N N Y N N Y Y Y Y N 
ICU P11 Y Y N N N N N N N Y Y N 
P12 Y Y N N N N N N N Y Y N 
Aec P13 Y Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y N 
P14 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 
RMF P15 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N 
P16 Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y N 
ADA P17 Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N 
EC P18 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 
WV P19 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 
IFAD P20 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
SF P21 Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y N 
P22 Y Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y N 
JBDA P23 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y N N 
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P24 Y Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y 
T Y/24  23 23 16 14 13 10 9 11 4 21 18 2 
%  95.8 95.8 66.6 58.3 54.1 41.6 37.5 45.8 16.6 87.5 75 8.3 
• AR1: Technical assistance: such as business development (feasibility study, product costing, profitability analysis, etc), quality 
control, packaging development, extension, field visits etc  
• AR2: Training: such as coop management, export requirements, international certification, branding, labeling, management, 
etc  
• AR3: Market linkages: local, international, between sub-sectors (input, processing, transport, etc)  
• AR4: Market information and research 
• AR5: Participation in workshops, local and international shows  
• AR6: Develop new products  
• AR7: Elaborate marketing strategies  
• AR8: Develop special credit facilities with local banks 
• AR9: Offer micro-credit 
• AR10: Equipment supply 
• AR11: Infrastructure 
• AR12: Supportive regulatory and legal framework 
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Table 14: Nature of projects implemented with producers cooperatives by various development agencies 
  
 Nature of projects 
Agencies Projects Skills development and 
empowerment 
Marketing 
services 
Production service 
provider 
Individual member 
support 
ACDI/VOCA P1 Y Y Y Y 
P2 Y Y N N 
P3 Y N N N 
CHF P4 Y N Y N 
P5 Y N Y Y 
P6 Y Y Y Y 
YMCA P7 Y Y Y N 
P8 Y Y Y N 
ILO P9 Y N Y Y 
UNDP P10 Y N Y Y 
ICU P11 Y N Y Y 
P12 Y N Y Y 
Aec P13 Y Y Y N 
P14 Y Y Y Y 
RMF P15 Y Y Y Y 
P16 Y N Y Y 
ADA P17 Y N N N 
EC P18 Y Y Y N 
WV P19 Y Y Y Y 
IFAD P20 Y Y Y Y 
SF P21 Y N Y N 
P22 Y N Y N 
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JBDA P23 Y Y N N 
P24 Y Y Y N 
T Y/24  24 13 20 12 
%  100 54.1 83.3 50 
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Table 15: Initiation phase’s activities in the projects implemented with producers’ cooperatives by development agencies 
 
 Process I (PI): Initiation phase 
Activity identification Member sharing Coop initiation Coop selection 
Agencies Projects PI1 PI2 PI3 PI4 PI5 PI6 PI7 PI8 PI9 PI10 PI11 
ACDI/VOCA P1 N N Y N N N Y N N N Y 
P2 N N Y N N N N N Y Y Y 
P3 Y N Y N N N N N N N Y 
CHF P4 N Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y 
P5 Y Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y 
P6 Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y 
YMCA P7 Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y 
P8 Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y Y Y 
ILO P9 N Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y 
UNDP P10 Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y 
ICU P11 Y Y N Y N Y N N N N Y 
P12 Y Y N Y N Y N N N N Y 
Aec P13 Y N Y Y N Y N N N N Y 
P14 Y N Y Y N Y N N N N Y 
RMF P15 Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N Y 
P16 Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N Y 
ADA P17 Y N N Y N N N N N N Y 
EC P18 Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N Y 
WV P19 Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N N 
IFAD P20 Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N N 
SF P21 Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y 
P22 Y Y Y Y N N N N Y N Y 
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JBDA P23 Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y N Y 
P24 Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y N Y 
T Y/24 20 18 21 19 0 10 9 3 10 6 22 
% 83.3 75 87.5 79.1 0 41.6 37.5 12.5 41.6 25 91.6 
• PI1: Project activities identified based on an agricultural or cooperative surveys  
• PI2: Project activities identified based on a local development plan  
• PI3: Project activities identified based on selected sector challenges 
• PI4: Project activities planned to be income generating without previous assessment  
• PI5: Members have financially shared in the project 
• PI6: Members have provided necessary infrastructure 
• PI7: Cooperatives established during the project 
• PI8: Cooperatives selected based on the total number of members 
• PI9: Cooperatives selected based on previous support  
• PI10: Cooperatives selected based on a gender approach 
• PI11: Cooperatives selected based on their effectiveness (Select active coop only) 
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Table 16: Progress of activities (coordination and partnership) between agencies and producers’ cooperatives 
 Process II (PII): Coordination and Partnership 
During Execution After Execution Further Support 
Agencies Projects PII1 PII2 PII3 PII4 PII5 PII6 PII7 
ACDI/VOCA P1 N Y N N Y Y N 
P2 N Y N N Y Y Y 
P3 Y N Y N Y Y Y 
CHF P4 N Y Y N Y Y Y 
P5 N Y Y N Y Y Y 
P6 N Y Y N Y Y Y 
YMCA P7 N Y N N Y Y Y 
P8 N Y N N Y Y Y 
ILO P9 N Y Y N Y Y Y 
UNDP P10 N Y N N Y Y Y 
ICU P11 N Y N N Y Y Y 
P12 N Y N N Y Y Y 
Aec P13 Y N Y Y Y Y Y 
P14 Y N N Y Y Y Y 
RMF P15 Y N N Y Y Y Y 
P16 Y N N Y Y Y Y 
ADA P17 N Y N N Y Y Y 
EC P18 N Y Y N N N Y 
WV P19 Y N Y N N N N 
IFAD P20 Y N Y N N Y Y 
SF P21 N Y N N Y Y Y 
P22 N Y N N Y Y Y 
JBDA P23 N Y N N Y Y Y 
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P24 N Y N N Y Y Y 
T Y/24 7 17 9 4 21 22 22 
% 29.1 70.9 37.5 20.8 87.5 91.6 91.6 
 
• PII1: Project completely managed by the implementing agencies (in case of service provider) 
• PII2: Project managed in coordination between the coop manager and the agency agent 
• PII3: Cooperation has stopped and was limited to the project 
• PII4: Agency continued to run the project 
• PII5: Regular meeting for monitoring and to identify possible interventions 
• PII6: For new projects, supported coops before are priorities 
• PII7: Have planned to implement new projects with coops 
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Table 17: Internal and external encountered problems by agencies in the projects implemented with producers’ cooperatives 
 Encountered Problems (EP) or challenges 
Internal between members External with the implementing agency and the community 
Agencies Projects EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 EP7 EP8 
ACDI/VOCA P1 Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 
P2 Y N N N N Y Y Y 
P3 N N N N Y Y Y N 
CHF P4 Y N Y N Y Y Y N 
P5 Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 
P6 N N Y Y Y N Y Y 
YMCA P7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
P8 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
ILO P9 Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 
UNDP P10 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
ICU P11 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
P12 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
Aec P13 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
P14 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
RMF P15 N N N N Y Y N N 
P16 N N N N Y Y N N 
ADA P17 N N N N N Y N N 
EC P18 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
WV P19 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IFAD P20 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SF P21 Y N N Y Y Y N Y 
P22 Y N N Y Y Y N Y 
JBDA P23 N N N Y N Y N N 
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P24 N N N Y N Y N N 
T Y/24 16 12 13 14 20 22 17 17 
% 66.6 50 54.1 58.3 83.3 91.6 70.8 70.8 
• EP1: Portfolio problem 
• EP2: Control problem 
• EP3: Vested interest problem 
• EP4: Free rider problem 
• EP5: Communication problem 
• EP6: Lack of applying principles and values 
• EP7: Political problem 
• EP8: Management problem 
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Table 18: Impacts (I) of projects from the perspective of development agencies 
 Decrease the 
cost of 
production 
Improved access to 
market 
Increased 
access to 
services 
Increased 
employment 
Increased 
access to 
credits  
Improved 
skills 
Increased 
social 
cohesion 
Failure 
Agencies Projects I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 I9 I10 I11 I12 I13 I14 I15 
ACDI/VOCA P1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
P2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y N 
P3 Y Y N N N N N N N Y N N Y N N 
CHF P4 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 
P5 Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 
P6 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
YMCA P7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
P8 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 
ILO P9 Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
UNDP P10 Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
ICU P11 Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 
P12 Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 
Aec P13 N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y 
P14 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
RMF P15 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 
P16 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N 
ADA P17 Y Y Y Y N N N Y N Y N N Y Y N 
EC P18 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
WVS P19 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
IFAD P20 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
SF P21 Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y N N Y Y N 
P22 Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y N N Y Y N 
JBDA P23 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 
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P24 Y Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 
T Y/24 23 23 13 18 11 14 11 21 20 23 18 9 24 23 1 
% 95.8 95.8 54.1 75 45.8 58.3 45.8 87.5 83.3 95.8 75 37.5 100 95.8 4.1 
 
• I1: In production 
• I2: In processing  
• I3: In marketing 
• I4: Increase local direct sale 
• I5: Open export markets 
• I6: Increase prices  
• I7: Build solid linkages 
• I8: Expand services 
• I9: Better quality of services 
• I10: Maintain jobs 
• I11: Create new jobs 
• I12: Increased access to credits 
• I13: Improved Skills 
• I14: Increased social cohesion 
• I15: Failure 
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Table 19: Reasons for coordination and planning (CP) or their absence between the government and development agencies  
Agencies 
Associated reasons for coordination and planning (CP) with the government (Ministry of Agriculture, 
DGC) 
CP1: 
Coordination 
with the 
government 
Reasons for CP Reasons for lack of CP 
CP2: Active 
coop 
identification   
CP3: Data 
verification 
CP4: Facilitate 
coop initiation  
CP5: Political CP6: Lack of 
systematic coop 
enterprise dev. 
plan  
USAID N N N N Y Y 
ACDI/VOCA N N N N N Y 
CHF N N N N Y Y 
YMCA Y Y Y Y N N 
ILO Y Y N Y N N 
UNDP N N N N N Y 
ICU Y Y Y Y N N 
Aec N N N N N Y 
RMF N N N N Y Y 
ADA Y Y Y Y N N 
EC Y Y Y Y N N 
WVL Y N N Y N N 
IFAD Y Y Y Y N N 
SF Y N Y N N N 
JBDA Y Y Y Y N N 
T Y/15 9 7 7 8 3 6 
% 60 31.8* 31.8* 36.4* 33.3** 66.6** 
*percentage sum of total yes for the three categories (7+7+8=22): reasons for coordination, ** percentage sum of yes for both 
categories (3+6=9): reasons for lack of coordination 
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Table 20: List of active cooperatives interviewed in different agricultural regions and the three agricultural sub-sectors: name, main 
services, and initiation date 
Agricultura
l region 
Agricultural 
sub-sector 
Coop 
Reference 
Nb 
Cooperative name Main Services Date of 
initiation 
North 
Lebanon 
Production Coop 1 Agricultural coop in Aidamoun General production services: plowing, 
spraying, harvesting, etc. 
1994 
Coop 2 Processing coop for women in Zgharta-
zawiye 
Production of traditional processed food 2002 
Coop 3 Halba coop for development and 
agricultural processing 
Milk collection and processing. Olive 
harvesting.  
2005 
Coop 4 Rural development coop in Kherbet Char Organic mushroom production 2006 
Coop 5 Dareb Baachtar coop for the development 
and processing of olive production 
Olive processing: pressing and filling. 
Olive production: spraying, plowing, etc.  
2006 
Coop 6 Andaket coop for development and 
processing (Andket-pro) 
Production of traditional processed food 2006 
Coop 7 Tal Abbas coop for animal production Forages production: planting, harvesting, 
and processing.  
2005 
Coop 8 Masoudiyeh coop for rural development General production services: plowing, 
spraying, harvesting, etc. 
2006 
Fishery Coop 9 Fishermen coop in Bebnine General production services: wood box 
production, ice making, fishing boats 
1990 
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repair, etc. and marketing services 
Beekeeping Coop 10 Beekeeping coop in Beit el Fakes Apiculture processing: honey extraction, 
filling, storage, etc.  
1991 
South 
Lebanon  
Production Coop 11 Maghdouche coop for citrus flower and 
derivatives 
Marketing services and processing: 
extraction of citrus flower essential oil 
1995 
Coop 12 Agricultural cooperative in Aarabsalim General production services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. Inputs supply. Carob 
molasses production. Composting. Forages 
supply.  
2002 
Coop 13 Aarabsalim coop for agricultural 
production and processing “zouwedet el 
Daiaa” 
Production of traditional processed food 2005 
Coop 14 Jezzine development coop Marketing and inputs supply for: 
apiculture, aviculture, thyme production, 
ect 
2002 
Coop 15 Dair Kanoun el naher coop for 
agricultural production and processing 
Production of traditional processed food 2002 
Coop 16 Douweir coop for agricultural extension Olive processing: oil extraction and filling. 
Harvesting services.  
1997 
Coop 17 Chihabieh coop for agricultural 
processing and production 
Production of traditional processed food 2006 
Coop 18 Sarba coop for plant and animal General production services: plowing, 2007 
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development spraying, harvesting, etc. 
Fishery Coop 19 Fishermen coop in Sarafand Marketing and inputs supply for fishermen: 
fishing nets, etc 
1991 
Beekeeping Coop 20 Coop for beekeeper in Nabatiyeh “ al 
Chifa2” 
Apiculture processing: honey extraction, 
filling, storage, etc. 
2000 
Mount 
Lebanon 
Production Coop 21 Aamatour production cooperative Olive processing: oil extraction and filling. 
Harvesting services. 
1991 
Coop 22 Agricultural coop in Jiye Inputs supply 1998 
Coop 23 Agricultural production and development 
coop “Liban village” 
Extension services and cold storage 2001 
Coop 24 Animal raising and production 
cooperative “Liban village” 
General animal production services: inputs 
supply 
2001 
Coop 25 Olive cooperative in Shouf region Olive processing: oil extraction and filling. 
Harvesting services. Soap production.  
2001 
Coop 26 Agricultural cooperative in Baskinta 
“Almarj el Akhdar” 
General agricultural services: spraying, 
plowing, etc. 
2005 
Coop 27 Agricultural cooperative in Barouk-
Fraidis 
General agricultural services: spraying, 
plowing, etc. Processing services.  
1995 
Coop 28 Mayrouba processing cooperative 
“Mawasemna” 
Production of traditional processed food 2005 
Fishery Coop 29 Fishermen cooperative in Ouzaii Marketing and inputs supply: fishing nets, 
ice blocks, etc. Coop Owns a restaurant. 
1995 
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Beekeeping Coop 30 Beekeeping cooperative in Aley Caza Honey production from collectively owned 
beehives 
1991 
Bekaa Production Coop 31 Agricultural cooperative in Kaa el rim Cold storage and plowing services 1997 
Coop 32 Women cooperative for agricultural 
processing in wadi el taym 
Production of traditional processed food 2004 
Coop 33 Women cooperative for agricultural 
processing in al Mhaidse “Nejmet el 
sobeh” 
Production of traditional processed food 1999 
Coop 34 Agricultural cooperative in North wadi el 
taym 
General agricultural services: plowing and 
spraying, etc 
1995 
Coop 35 The union of Bekaa farmers’ cooperative Extension services and research in a 
demonstration plot 
2001 
Coop 36 Coteaux D’heliopolis cooperative Viticulture services: plowing, spraying, 
input supply and marketing services 
1999 
Coop 37 Processing and export cooperative for 
fruit and vegetables in Zahle “Al wadi el 
zahabi” 
Post-harvest services: sorting and packing. 
Cold storage 
2006 
Coop 38 The union of agricultural cooperative in 
Dair el Ahmar 
Cold storage and general production 
services: plowing, spraying, etc 
1999 
Fishery Coop 39 Fish marketing in Assi Basin Marketing services for fishermen 1994 
Beekeeping Coop 40 Beekeeper cooperative in Baalbeck Apiculture processing: honey extraction, 
filling, storage, etc. Wax production.  
1991 
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Table 21: List of dormant cooperatives interviewed in different agricultural regions: name, main services, and initiation date  
Agricultural 
region 
Coop 
Reference 
Nb 
Cooperative name Main Services Date of 
initiation 
North 
Lebanon  
Coop 41 Baarzla coop for agricultural development General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc.  
2000 
Coop 42 Zouk el Housniyeh coop for agricultural development General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. 
2005 
Coop 43 Karkaf coop for agricultural development Olive harvesting 2005 
Coop 44 Tal hayat coop for rural development and agricultural 
processing 
General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. 
2006 
Coop 45 Wadi el Jamous coop for agricultural development General agriculture services for crops 
cultivated under greenhouses 
2005 
South 
Lebanon 
Coop 46 Floriculture coop in Addousiyeh Seedling production 1995 
Coop 47 Agricultural coop in Ghaziyeh General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. 
2002 
Coop 48 Haret Saida for agricultural processing and marketing Production of traditional processed 
products 
2004 
Coop 49 Saksakiyeh fishermen coop Marketing services for fishermen 2006 
Coop 50 Dair kanoun el naher coop for agricultural and animal 
resource development 
General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. Forages supply.  
2001 
Coop 51 Agricultural coop in Maaraket General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. 
1993 
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Coop 52 Agricultural coop in Tayer debba General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. 
2005 
Coop 53 Agricultural and development coop in Bent jbeil Caza General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. 
1994 
Coop 54 Deir Aames coop for agricultural development General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. 
2005 
Mount 
Lebanon 
Coop 55 Fishermen cooperative in Al Safra Inputs supply and marketing for fishermen  1995 
Coop 56 Agricultural coop in Kfarnabrakh General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. 
1995 
Coop 57 Agricultural coop in Hammana General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. 
1990 
Coop 58 Agricultural coop in Barbara General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. 
2000 
Bekaa Coop 59 Agricultural coop in Ammik General agricultural services: plowing, 
spraying, etc. 
1994 
Coop 60 Agricultural coop in Anaa Collective potato cultivation 1995 
Coop 61 Agricultural coop in Kefraya Grape molasses processing 1994 
Coop 62 Production and processing coop in Ham Production of traditional processed 
products 
2005 
Coop 63 Arsal processing coop Production of traditional processed 
products 
1999 
Coop 64 Agricultural coop in Maaraboun General agri. services: plowing, etc.  2004 
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Chart 29: Percentage of different indicators of the initiation phase and progress (IP) dimension across the four agricultural regions in 
Lebanon 
 
• Definition and data of IP3 till IP19 indicators are detailed in Table 32: Data for the Initiation phase and progress dimension 
 
IP3 IP4 IP5 IP6 IP7 IP8 IP9 IP10 IP11 IP12 IP13 IP14 IP15 IP16 IP17 IP18 IP19 
Cooperative type Objectives Reason Behind Initiation 
Owned Assets at 
Initiation 
Owned assets when 
interviewed 
North LB 50 80 100 100 100 100 20 90 40 60 0 83.3 50 20 100 25 0 
South LB 60 70 100 100 100 100 40 100 40 40 0 100 0 0 100 30 10 
Mount LB 90 90 100 100 100 100 30 80 40 40 25 25 50 30 100 28.5 28.5 
Bekaa 70 80 100 100 100 100 50 100 10 30 33.3 100 0 10 100 11.1 11.1 
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Table 22: Data for the Initiation phase and progress (IP) dimension  
Initiation Phase and Progress (IP) 
Agricultural 
region 
Coop 
Reference 
Nb 
Membership Cooperative 
type 
Objectives Reason behind 
initiation 
Owned assets directly 
after initiation 
Owned assets during 
interview 
  IP1 IP2 IP3 IP4 IP5 IP6 IP7 IP8 IP9 IP10 IP11 IP12 IP13 IP14 IP15 IP16 IP17 IP18 IP19 
North 
Lebanon 
Coop 1 20 355 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N - - - N Y N N 
Coop 2 13 0 N N Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 3 17 200 N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N - - - N Y N N 
Coop 4 11 30 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N - - - N Y N N 
Coop 5 16 0 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y - - - 
Coop 6 15 0 N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y - - - 
Coop 7 15 0 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 8 12 0 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 9 115 20 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N - - - N Y Y N 
Coop 10 14 470 N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y N 
 % of Yes   50 80 100 100 100 100 20 90 40 60 0 83.3 50 20 100 25 0 
South 
Lebanon 
Coop 11 12 633 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N - - - N Y Y N 
Coop 12 14 85 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N - - - N Y Y Y 
Coop 13 30 0 N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 14 21 900 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 15 12 0 N N Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 16 52 0 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N - - - N Y N N 
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Coop 17 12 0 N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N N Y Y N 
Coop 18 17 100 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N - - - N Y N N 
Coop 19 120 43 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N - - - N Y N N 
Coop 20 11 400 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N - - - N Y N N 
 % of Yes   60 70 100 100 100 100 40 100 40 40 0 100 0 0 100 30 10 
Mount 
Lebanon 
Coop 21 10 500 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N - - - N Y N Y 
Coop 22 24 45 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y - - - 
Coop 23 26 34 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N - - - N Y N Y 
Coop 24 26 34 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N - - - Y - - - 
Coop 25 90 551 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y Y N 
Coop 26 14 150 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N - - - Y - - - 
Coop 27 12 450 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N Y N N 
Coop 28 14 78 N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 29 13 2700 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N - - - N Y Y N 
Coop 30 11 350 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N - - - N Y N N 
 % of yes   90 90 100 100 100 100 30 80 40 40 25 25 50 30 100 28.5 28.5 
Bekaa Coop 31 11 100 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N - - - N Y N Y 
Coop 32 28 21 N N Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 33 34 -35 N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N - - - N Y Y N 
Coop 34 15 0 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N - - - N Y N N 
Coop 35 20 140 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N - - - Y - - - 
Coop 36 22 1300 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 37 15 20 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N N Y N N 
Coop 38 120 20 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N - - - N Y N N 
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Coop 39 12 200 N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N - - - N Y N N 
Coop 40 22 1000 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N - - - N Y N N 
 % of Yes   70 80 100 100 100 100 50 100 10 30 33.3 100 0 10 100 11.1 11.1 
 
• Membership: IP1: Number of members during the initiation phase, IP2: Percentage increase in membership during interview 
time 
• Type of cooperative: IP3: Supply, IP4: Services, IP5: Marketing,  
• Objectives: IP6: Generate and secure income, IP7: Job creation, IP8: Social cohesion,  
• Reasons behind initiation: IP9: Common need, IP10: Condition to receive aid (government or NGOs), IP11: Requested by a 
political leader, village elite or philanthropist,  
• Assets owned directly after initiation: IP12: Availability of assets directly after initiation, IP13: Assets assured through 
members’ own investment, IP14: Assets donated through a development project, IP15: Assets donated through a political party 
or a charity donor (philanthropist from the village),  
• Current assets: IP16: Current owned assets are the same as initial owned assets, IP17: New assets donated by a development 
project, IP18: New assets donated by a political party or a charity donor, IP19: New assets assured by members’ own-investment 
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Chart 30: Percentage of different indicators of the organizational structure (OS) dimension across the four agricultural regions in 
Lebanon 
 
Definitions and data of OS1 till OS15 indicators are detailed in Table 33: Data for the organizational structure dimension  
 
OS1 OS2 OS5 OS6 OS8 OS9 OS10 OS11 OS12 OS13 OS14 OS15 
General Meeting Board of Directors Manager Auditors 
North LB 0 0 90 60 0 90 0 10 0 0 0 0 
South LB 0 0 100 60 0 70 0 30 33.3 100 100 20 
Mount LB 0 0 100 30 0 100 0 40 20 60 100 0 
Bekaa 10 10 90 40 10 90 20 40 50 100 100 20 
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Table 23: Data for the organizational structure (OS) dimension 
Organizational Structure (OS) – In a primary cooperative 
Agricultural 
region 
Coop 
Reference 
Nb 
General meeting Board of directors Manager Auditors 
OS1 OS2 OS3 OS4 OS5 OS6 OS7 OS8 OS9 OS10 OS11 OS12 OS13 OS14 OS15 OS16 
North 
Lebanon 
Coop 1 N N 1 40 Y Y 12 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 2 N N 1 80 Y Y 15 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 3 N N 1 20 Y N 10 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 4 N N 1 80 Y Y 6 N Y N N -  - N 0 
Coop 5 N N 0 - N Y 0 N Y N Y N N N N 0 
Coop 6 N N 2 80 Y N 5 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 7 N N 1 40 Y Y 4 N Y N N - - - N 0 
Coop 8 N N 1 50 Y N 4 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 9 N N 1 30 Y N 2 N N N N - - - N 0 
Coop 10 N N 1 40 Y Y 6 N Y N N - - - N 0 
 % of yes 0 0   90 60  0 90 0 10 0 0 0 0  
South 
Lebanon 
Coop 11 N N 1 45 Y Y 8 N Y N N - - - Y 2 
Coop 12 N N 1 70 Y Y 3 N Y N N - - - N 0 
Coop 13 N N 1 50 Y Y 6 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 14 N N 1 40 Y Y 36 N N N Y Y Y Y Y 4 
Coop 15 N N 1 50 Y Y 3 N Y N N - - - N 0 
Coop 16 N N 1 60 Y N 4 N Y N Y N Y Y N 0 
Coop 17 N N 1 90 Y Y 5 N Y N N - - - N 0 
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Coop 18 N N 3 40 Y N 6 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 19 N N 1 35 Y N 4 N N N N - - - N 1 
Coop 20 N N 1 60 Y N 5 N N N Y N Y Y N 1 
 % of yes 0 0   100 60  0 70 0 30 33.3 100 100 20  
Mount 
Lebanon 
Coop 21 N N 1 25 Y N 24 N Y N Y N Y Y N 1 
Coop 22 N N 4 60 Y Y 6 N Y N Y N Y Y N 1 
Coop 23 N N 1 40 Y N 5 N Y N Y Y N Y N 1 
Coop 24 N N 1 40 Y N 5 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 25 N N 1 10 Y N 10 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 26 N N 1 30 Y N 4 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 27 N N 1 55 Y N 5 N Y N Y N Y Y N 2 
Coop 28 N N 1 60 Y Y 8 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 29 N N 1 30 Y Y 5 N Y N N - - - N 0 
Coop 30 N N 1 35 Y N 4 N Y N N - - - N 1 
 % of yes 0 0   100 30  0 100 0 40 20 60 100 0  
Bekaa Coop 31 N N 1 100 Y N 12 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 32 N N 1 60 Y Y 15 N N N Y N Y Y N 1 
Coop 33 N N 4 100 Y Y 12 N Y N Y N Y Y N 1 
Coop 34 N N 1 60 Y N 6 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 35 N N 1 40 Y Y 4 N Y Y N - - - N 1 
Coop 36 N N 1 50 Y Y 12 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 2 
Coop 37 Y Y 1 90 N N 12 N Y N Y Y Y Y Y 2 
Coop 38 N N 1 70 Y N 4 N Y N N - - - N 1 
Coop 39 N N 1 40 Y N 3 N Y N N - - - N 1 
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Coop 40 N N 1 50 Y N 6 N Y N N - - - N 1 
 % of yes 10 10   90 40  10 90 20 40 50 100 100 20  
 
 
• General Meeting: OS1: selects the policy of the coop, OS2: Votes on the strategy of work, OS3: Nb of general meeting per 
year, OS4: percentage of members’ participation in the general meeting, 
• Board of directors: OS5: Decided the policy and strategy of the coop, OS6: A NGO helped the coop to draft a policy or 
strategy, OS7: Nb of official board meetings per year, OS8: Prepared an action plan on which members of the general meeting 
have elected them, OS9: Have been elected by acclamation, OS10: Chairperson elected based on a proposed work plan,  
• Manager: OS11: Operates coop’s activities, OS12: Has a Business management background, OS13: Communicates on a 
weekly basis with the board of directors, OS14: Ensures equal access of members to services whatever they own in terms of 
shares in the coop,  
• Auditors: OS15: Were elected based on their technical background allowing them to monitor the work of board member, 
OS16: Nb of auditors meeting per year. 
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Chart 31: Percentage of different indicators of the Partnership and Environment (PE)-I dimension across the four agricultural regions 
in Lebanon 
 
Definition and data of PE1 till PE15 indicators are detailed in Table 34: Data for the partnership and environment (I) dimension  
 
PE1 PE2 PE3 PE4 PE5 PE6 PE7 PE8 PE9 PE10 PE11 PE12 PE13 PE14 PE15 PE16 
Cooperation Between Coops Cooperation with the Community Education Acceptance of New Members 
North LB 20 100 0 100 80 20 0 0 30 0 90 0 20 90 0 20 
South LB 20 100 50 100 80 20 10 0 30 0 90 0 30 80 10 10 
Mount LB 20 100 50 70 57 28.5 14 0 10 0 90 0 40 100 20 20 
Bekaa 30 100 66.6 100 80 10 10 0 20 0 100 0 60 90 40 0 
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Table 24: Data for Partnership and Environment (PE)-I dimension 
Partnership and Environment (PE) – (1) 
Agricultural 
region 
Coop 
Reference 
Nb 
Cooperation between coops 
Cooperation with 
the community 
Education 
Acceptance of new 
members 
PE1 PE2 PE3 PE4 PE5 PE6 PE7 PE8 PE9 PE10 PE11 PE12 PE13 PE14 PE15 PE16 
North 
Lebanon 
Coop 1 Y Y N Y Y N N N N N Y N Y Y N N 
Coop 2 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 3 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 4 N - - Y Y N N N Y N Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 5 N - - Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N 
Coop 6 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 7 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 8 N - - Y Y N N N Y N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 9 Y Y N Y N Y N N N N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 10 N - - Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y Y N N 
 % of yes 20 100 0 100 80 20 0 0 30 0 90 0 20 90 0 20 
South 
Lebanon 
Coop 11 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N Y Y Y N 
Coop 12 Y Y N Y Y Y N N N N Y N Y Y N N 
Coop 13 N - - Y Y N N N Y N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 14 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 15 N - - Y Y N N N Y N Y N N N N N 
Coop 16 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N Y Y N N 
Coop 17 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N N N N N 
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Coop 18 N - - Y Y N N N Y N N N N Y N N 
Coop 19 N - - Y N N N N N N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 20 Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N Y N N Y N N 
 % of yes 20 100 50 100 80 20 10 0 30 0 90 0 30 80 10 10 
Mount 
Lebanon 
Coop 21 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N N Y Y N 
Coop 22 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N Y Y N N 
Coop 23 N - - N - - - N N N Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 24 N - - N - - - N N N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 25 N - - Y Y N N N Y N Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 26 N - - N - - - N N N N N N Y N N 
Coop 27 N - - Y N N Y N N N Y N Y Y N N 
Coop 28 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N N Y Y N 
Coop 29 Y Y N Y N Y N N N N Y N Y Y N N 
Coop 30 Y Y Y Y N Y N N N N Y N Y Y N N 
 % of yes 20 100 50 70 57 28.5 14 0 10 0 90 0 40 100 20 20 
Bekaa Coop 31 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N Y Y N N 
Coop 32 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N Y Y N N 
Coop 33 N - - Y Y N N N Y N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 34 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N N N N N 
Coop 35 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N N Y N N 
Coop 36 N - - Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y N 
Coop 37 N - - Y Y N N N N N Y N N Y Y N 
Coop 38 Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Y N Y Y Y N 
Coop 39 Y Y N Y N Y N N N N Y N Y Y N N 
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Coop 40 Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Y N Y Y Y N 
 % of yes 30 100 66.6 100 80 10 10 0 20 0 100 0 60 90 40 0 
 
• Cooperation between cooperative: PE1: Coop has an active cooperation with other cooperatives, PE2: Cooperation with 
other cooperatives in order to increase power, PE3: Cooperation with other cooperatives in order to increase access to services, 
PE4: Coop has membership in the cooperative confederation, PE5: Coop joined the cooperative confederation because it is 
mandatory, PE6: Coop joined the cooperative confederation to increase power, PE7: Coop joined the cooperative 
confederation to get education and finance services,  
• Cooperation with the community: PE8: Part of surpluses are allocated for a community project, PE9: Coop has 
implemented a project with the municipality, PE10: Coop has implemented a project with a local civil society organization,  
• Education: PE11: Proper education to members to know their rights and responsibilities, PE12: Carry training sessions 
within the community to disseminate the advantage of cooperative enterprises,  
• Acceptance of new members: PE13: Accept (or will) new members if they need the coop services, PE14: Accept (or will) 
new members to increase the coop power, PE15: Accept (or will) new members if they would share in investment, PE16: 
Coop has rejected a few membership  
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Chart 32: Percentage of different indicators of the Partnership and Environment (PE)-II dimension across the four agricultural regions 
in Lebanon 
 
Definition and data of PE17 till PE32 indicators are detailed in Table 35: Data for the partnership and environment (II) dimension  
 
PE17 PE18 PE19 PE20 PE21 PE22 PE23 PE24 PE25 PE26 PE27 PE28 PE29 PE30 PE31 PE32 
Cooperation with the 
government Cooperation with NGOs 
Competition with 
capitalist enterprises 
Cooperation 
with 
producers' 
unions 
North LB 10 30 20 50 30 90 66.6 11.1 90 0 10 20 100 0 20 100 
South LB 30 60 20 80 20 100 70 10 80 20 30 10 100 0 30 66.6 
Mount LB 30 70 20 70 30 80 50 0 100 10 0 10 100 0 30 66.6 
Bekaa 20 50 20 90 10 100 60 10 70 30 20 30 100 0 20 100 
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Table 25: Data for Partnership and Environment (PE)-II dimension 
Partnership and Environment (PE) – (2) 
Agricultural 
region 
Coop 
Reference 
Nb 
Cooperation with the government Cooperation with NGOs 
Competition with 
private enterprises 
Cooperation 
with 
producers 
unions 
PE17 PE18 PE19 PE20 PE21 PE22 PE23 PE24 PE25 PE26 PE27 PE28 PE29 PE30 PE31 PE32 
North 
Lebanon 
Coop 1 N Y N Y N Y Y N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 2 N N N Y N Y N N Y N N Y Y N N - 
Coop 3 N N N Y N Y Y N Y N N Y Y N N - 
Coop 4 N N N Y N Y N N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 5 N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 6 N N N Y N N - - N N Y N - - N - 
Coop 7 N N N N Y Y Y N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 8 N N N N Y Y Y N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 9 N Y Y N Y Y N N Y N N N - - Y Y 
Coop 10 Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y N N N - - Y Y 
 % of yes 10 30 20 50 30 90 66.6 11.1 90 0 10 20 100 0 20 100 
South 
Lebanon 
Coop 11 N Y N Y N Y Y N N Y Y N - - N - 
Coop 12 Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y N Y N - - Y N 
Coop 13 N N N N Y Y Y N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 14 N N N Y N Y N Y Y N N Y Y N N - 
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Coop 15 N N N Y N Y Y N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 16 Y Y N Y N Y Y N N Y Y N - - N - 
Coop 17 N N N Y N Y N N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 18 N Y N Y N Y N N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 19 N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N N N - - Y Y 
Coop 20 Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N - - Y Y 
 % of yes 30 60 20 80 20 100 70 10 80 20 30 10 100 0 30 66.6 
Mount 
Lebanon 
Coop 21 N Y N Y N Y N N Y N N Y Y N N - 
Coop 22 N Y N Y N Y Y N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 23 Y N N N Y Y N N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 24 N N N N Y N - - Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 25 N Y N N Y Y Y N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 26 N Y N Y N N - - - Y N N - - N - 
Coop 27 Y Y N Y N Y N N Y N N N - - Y N 
Coop 28 N N N Y N Y N N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 29 N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N - - Y Y 
Coop 30 Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N - - Y Y 
 % of yes 30 70 20 70 30 80 50 0 100 10 0 10 100 0 30 66.6 
Bekaa Coop 31 N Y N Y N Y N N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 32 N N N Y N Y Y N Y N N Y Y N N - 
Coop 33 N N N Y N Y N N Y N N Y Y N N - 
Coop 34 N Y N Y N Y N N Y N N N - - N - 
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Coop 35 N N N Y N Y Y N N Y N Y Y - N - 
Coop 36 Y N N Y N Y Y N N Y Y N - - N - 
Coop 37 N N N N Y Y Y N N Y Y N - - N - 
Coop 38 N Y N Y N Y Y N Y N N N - - N - 
Coop 39 N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N - - Y Y 
Coop 40 Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N N N - - Y Y 
 % of yes 20 50 20 90 10 100 60 10 70 30 20 30 100 0 20 100 
 
• Cooperation with the government: PE17: Government facilitated access to credit and diverse public services, PE18: 
Financial support, equipments, inputs, PE19: Other support (Legal and regulatory framework, infrastructure for coops, etc), 
PE20: Permanent coordination with the government (DGC),  
• Cooperation with NGOs: PE21: Coordination limited to mandatory documents: such as minutes of meetings of the board of 
directors, annual balance sheet, etc., PE22: Coop built a partnership with a NGO, PE23: Partnership continued after the 
project’s ending phase, PE24: Top-down communication during the project’s implementation phase, PE25: Coop accepted or 
will accept any support from NGOs, PE26: Coop has only accepted support from NGOs based on members’ common needs, 
PE27: Coop has only accepted support from NGOs if it has the different criteria of sustainability,  
• Competition with capitalist enterprises: PE28: High competition with capitalist enterprises in the delivery of services, 
PE29: Competition by price, PE30: Competition by quality,  
• Cooperation with producers’ unions: PE31: Coop is a member in a farmers/producers’ union, PE32: Does the membership 
in a farmers’ union delivered any benefits to the coop? 
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Chart 33: Percentage of different indicators of the services supply and participation (SSP) dimension across the four agricultural 
regions in Lebanon 
 
Definition and data of SSP2 till SSP10 indicators are detailed in Table 36: Data for the services supply and participation (SSP) 
dimension  
SSP2 SSP3 SSP4 SSP5 SSP7 SSP8 SSP9 SSP10 
Nature of services Increasing members particiaption 
North LB 66.6 22.2 55.5 77.7 0 0 10 30 
South LB 77.7 33.3 44.4 88.8 10 10 50 70 
Mount LB 71.4 14.2 57.1 71.4 0 0 50 60 
Bekaa 100 0 33.3 100 20 0 40 60 
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Table 26: Data for the services supply and participation (SSP) dimension 
Services Supply & Participation (SSP) 
Agricultural region Coop Reference Nb Nature of services Increasing members participation 
SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP4 SSP5 SSP6 SSP7 SSP8 SSP9 SSP10 
North Lebanon Coop 1 2 Y N Y N 2 N N N Y 
Coop 2 1 Y N N Y 3 N N N N 
Coop 3 1 Y N N Y 30 N N N N 
Coop 4 0 - - - - - N N N N 
Coop 5 1 Y N N Y 2 N N N N 
Coop 6 1 N N N Y 1 N N N Y 
Coop 7 3 Y Y Y Y 4 N N Y N 
Coop 8 3 Y Y Y N 5 N N N N 
Coop 9 2 N N Y Y 30 N N N N 
Coop 10 2 Y N Y Y 2 N N N Y 
 % of yes  77.7 22.2 55.5 77.7  0 0 10 30 
South Lebanon Coop 11 2 Y N N Y 5 N N Y Y 
Coop 12 6 Y Y Y Y 7 N N Y Y 
Coop 13 1 N N N Y 3 N N N Y 
Coop 14 6 Y Y Y Y 20 Y N Y Y 
Coop 15 1 N N N Y 2 N N N N 
Coop 16 1 Y N Y Y 2 N N Y Y 
Coop 17 1 N N N Y 3 N N N Y 
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Coop 18 0 - - - - 0 N Y N N 
Coop 19 0 - - - - 0 N N N N 
Coop 20 2 Y Y Y N 2 N N Y Y 
 % of yes  55.5 33.3 44.4 88.8  10 10 50 70 
Mount Lebanon Coop 21 2 Y N Y Y 3 N N Y Y 
Coop 22 1 Y N Y N 4 N N Y Y 
Coop 23 1 N N Y N 1 N N N Y 
Coop 24 0 - - - - 0 N N N N 
Coop 25 2 Y N N Y 1 N N N N 
Coop 26 0 - - - - 0 N N N N 
Coop 27 1 Y N N Y 2 N N Y Y 
Coop 28 1 N N N Y 1 N N Y Y 
Coop 29 6 Y Y Y Y 25 N N Y Y 
Coop 30 0 - - - - 0 N N N N 
 % of yes  71.4 14.2 57.1 71.4  0 0 50 60 
Bekaa Coop 31 1 Y N N Y 1 N N N Y 
Coop 32 1 Y N N Y 3 N N N Y 
Coop 33 1 Y N N Y 2 N N Y Y 
Coop 34 0 - - - - 0 N N N N 
Coop 35 0 - - - - 0 N N N N 
Coop 36 3 Y N Y Y 4 Y N Y Y 
Coop 37 2 Y N Y Y 10 Y N Y Y 
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Coop 38 0 - - - - 0 N N N N 
Coop 39 0 - - - - 0 N N N N 
Coop 40 1 Y N N Y 1 N N Y Y 
 % of yes  100 0 33.3 100  20 0 40 60 
 
• Nature of services: SSP1: Nb of services offered to members by the coop, SSP2: Do members pay in order to receive 
services? SSP3: Services offered before production (supply), SSP4: Services offered during production (service), SSP5: 
Services offered after production (marketing), SSP6: maximum frequency of services per month for one member,  
• Increasing members participation: SSP7: Monthly reports were prepared to increase the participation of members, SSP8: 
Several general meetings were carried to increase the participation of members, SSP9: High quality services were offered to 
increase the participation of members, SSP10: The equality in access to services was used to increase the participation of 
members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
387 
 
Chart 34: Percentage of different indicators of the problems and benefits (PB) dimension across the four agricultural regions in 
Lebanon 
 
Definition and data of PB1 till PB12 indicators are detailed in Table 37: Data for the problems and benefits (PB) dimension  
 
PB1 PB2 PB3 PB4 PB5 PB6 PB7 PB8 PB9 PB10 PB11 PB12 
Internal Challenges Benefits for members 
Series1 100 0 40 0 0 10 10 40 10 50 80 20 
Series2 100 0 20 10 10 20 40 70 50 60 90 70 
Series3 100 20 30 10 0 10 10 50 10 50 90 30 
Series4 100 10 30 0 0 20 50 40 40 50 90 40 
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Table 27: Data for the problems and benefits (PB) dimension 
Problems and Benefits (PB) 
Agricultural region Coop Reference Nb Internal Challenges Benefits for members 
PB1 PB2 PB3 PB4 PB5 PB6 PB7 PB8 PB9 PB10 PB11 PB12 
North Lebanon Coop 1 Y N Y N N N N N N Y Y Y 
Coop 2 Y N Y N N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 3 Y N Y N N N N N N Y Y N 
Coop 4 Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y N 
Coop 5 Y N N N N N N N N N N Y 
Coop 6 Y N N N N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 7 Y N N N N N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 8 Y N N N N N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 9 Y N Y N N N N N N Y N N 
Coop 10 Y N N N N Y N Y N Y Y N 
 % of yes 100 0 40 0 0 10 10 40 10 50 80 20 
South Lebanon Coop 11 Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Coop 12 Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Coop 13 Y N N N N N N Y N N Y Y 
Coop 14 Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Coop 15 Y N N N N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 16 Y N N N N Y N Y N Y Y Y 
Coop 17 Y N N N N N N Y Y N Y Y 
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Coop 18 Y N N N N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 19 Y N Y N N N N N N Y N N 
Coop 20 Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 % of yes 100 0 20 10 10 20 40 70 50 60 90 70 
Mount Lebanon Coop 21 Y N Y N N N N Y N Y Y N 
Coop 22 Y N N N N N N N N Y Y N 
Coop 23 Y Y N N N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 24 Y N N N N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 25 Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y 
Coop 26 Y N N N N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 27 Y N N Y N N N Y N Y Y Y 
Coop 28 Y N N N N N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 29 Y N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y 
Coop 30 Y N N N N N N Y N N Y N 
 % of yes 100 20 30 10 0 10 10 50 10 50 90 30 
Bekaa Coop 31 Y N N N N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 32 Y Y Y N N N Y Y N Y Y N 
Coop 33 Y N N N N N Y Y Y N Y N 
Coop 34 Y N N N N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 35 Y N Y N N N N N N Y Y N 
Coop 36 Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Coop 37 N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Coop 38 Y N Y N N N N N N N Y Y 
Coop 39 Y N N N N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 40 Y N N N N N Y N Y Y N Y 
 % of yes 100 10 30 0 0 20 50 40 40 50 90 40 
 
• Internal challenges: PB1: Horizon problem, PB2: Portfolio problem, PB3: Control problem, PB4: Free rider problem or 
common property problem, PB5: Influence cost problem,  
• Membership benefits: PB6: Decrease the cost of production and increase income, PB7: Improve access to market, PB8: 
Improve and increase access to new services, PB9: Increase members’ bargaining power, PB10: Increase the power of 
members to influence their policies, PB11: Increase members’ skills, PB12: Coop is doing a positive annual balance 
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Table 28: Data for Dormant Cooperatives (DC) across the four regions 
Dormant cooperatives 
Agri. 
region 
Coop 
reference 
Nb 
Reason behind 
initiation 
Source of owned assets Services 
services 
Benefits from membership 
DC1 DC2 DC3 DC4 DC5 DC6 DC7 DC8 DC9 DC10 DC11 DC12 DC13 
North 
LB 
Coop 41 N Y N N Y N N 1 N N N Y Y 
Coop 42 N Y N - - - - 0 - N N Y Y 
Coop 43 N Y N - - - - 0 - N N N N 
Coop 44 N Y N - - - - 0 - N N N N 
Coop 45 N Y N - - - - 0 - N N N N 
South 
LB 
Coop 46 N Y Y N Y Y N 0 - N N N N 
Coop 47 N Y N - - - - 0 - N N N Y 
Coop 48 N Y Y - - - - 0 - N N Y N 
Coop 49 N Y Y - - - - 0 - N N N N 
Coop 50 N Y Y N Y Y Y 1 N N N Y Y 
Coop 51 N Y Y N N Y Y 0 - N N Y Y 
Coop 52 N Y N - - - - 0 - N N N N 
Coop 53 N Y Y N Y Y N 0 - N N Y Y 
Coop 54 N Y N N Y Y N 1 Y N N Y N 
Mount 
LB 
Coop 55 Y Y N - - - - 0 - N N N Y 
Coop 56 N Y N - - - - 0 - N N N N 
Coop 57 N Y N - - - - 0 - N N N N 
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Coop 58 N Y N - - - - 0 - N N N N 
Bekaa Coop 59 N Y N - - - - 0 - N N N N 
Coop 60 Y Y N - - - - 0 - N N N N 
Coop 61 N Y N N Y Y N 0 - N N N N 
Coop 62 N Y N N Y N N 0 - N N Y N 
Coop 63 Y Y N N Y Y N 0 - N N Y N 
Coop 64 N Y N - - - - 0 - N N N N 
 % of yes 13 100 25 0 89 78 22   0 0 37 29 
 
• Reasons behind initiation: DC1: Common needs, DC2: Condition to receive development aid, DC3: Requested by a political 
leader,  
• Source of owned assets: DC4: Self-investment, DC5: Donated by NGOs, DC6: Donated by political parties, DC7: Donated 
by the government,  
• Services’ supply: DC8: Nb of offered services, DC 9: members pay to get services,  
• Benefits from membership: DC10: Increased access to market, DC11: Increased access to services, DC12: Increased 
members’ skills, DC13: Increased the power of members to influence their policies 
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Table 29: Data for the description of producers in the four regions across Lebanon 
Description of Farmers (DF) 
Agricultural region Coop Reference Nb Ownership of 
production resource 
Objectives from 
production 
Involvement in 
agriculture 
DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4 DP5 DP6 DP7 
North Lebanon Coop 1 Y N N N Y 20 N 
Coop 2 N Y N N Y - N 
Coop 3 Y N N N Y 10 N 
Coop 4 Y N N N Y 30 N 
Coop 5 Y N N N Y 20 N 
Coop 6 N Y N N Y - N 
Coop 7 Y N N N Y 70 Y 
Coop 8 Y N N N Y 80 Y 
Coop 9 Y N N N Y 80 Y 
Coop 10 Y N N N Y 35 N 
 % of yes 80 20 0 0 100  30 
South Lebanon Coop 11 Y N N N Y 15 N 
Coop 12 Y N N N Y 35 N 
Coop 13 N Y N N Y 5 N 
Coop 14 Y N N N Y 25 N 
Coop 15 N Y N N Y - N 
Coop 16 Y N N N Y 30 N 
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Coop 17 N Y N N Y 5 N 
Coop 18 Y N N Y N - N 
Coop 19 Y N N N Y 80 Y 
Coop 20 Y N N N Y 20 N 
 % of yes 70 30 0 10 90  10 
Mount Lebanon Coop 21 Y N N N Y 20 N 
Coop 22 Y N N N Y 30 N 
Coop 23 Y N N N Y 45 N 
Coop 24 N N N - - - N 
Coop 25 Y N N N Y 25 N 
Coop 26 Y N N N Y 40 N 
Coop 27 Y N N N Y 30 N 
Coop 28 N Y N N Y - N 
Coop 29 Y N N N Y 85 Y 
Coop 30 Y N N N Y 20 N 
 % of yes 80 10 0 0 100  10 
Bekaa Coop 31 Y N N N Y 60 Y 
Coop 32 N Y N N Y 10 N 
Coop 33 N Y N N Y 15 N 
Coop 34 Y N N Y N - N 
Coop 35 Y N N N Y 80 Y 
Coop 36 Y N N N Y 60 Y 
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Coop 37 Y N N N Y 70 Y 
Coop 38 Y N N N Y 60 Y 
Coop 39 Y N N N Y 90 Y 
Coop 40 Y N N N Y 30 N 
 % of yes 80 20 0 10 90  60 
 
• Ownership of production resources: DP1: Own the production resource, DP2: Rent the production resource, DP3: Sharing 
of a production resource (share in production),  
• Objectives from production: DP4: Only for self-consumption, DP5: Commercial,  
• Involvement in agriculture: DP6: percentage of income from agriculture, DP7: Having a higher than 50 percent income 
based on agriculture 
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Table 30: Data for Producers’ membership in active cooperatives across Lebanon  
Producers’ Membership (PM) 
Agricultural 
region 
Coop 
Reference 
Nb 
Members’ recruitment Relation between 
members 
Main reasons for 
membership 
Direct benefits after Joining 
Cooperatives 
PM1 PM2 PM3 PM4 PM5 PM6 PM7 PM8 PM9 PM10 PM11 PM12 PM13 PM14 PM15 PM16 
North 
Lebanon 
Coop 1 Y N N Y N N Y N Y N N Y Y N N N 
Coop 2 N N Y N Y Y N Y Y N N Y N Y N N 
Coop 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y N 
Coop 4 Y N N Y N Y Y N Y N N Y Y Y N N 
Coop 5 N Y Y N Y N N N Y Y N Y N Y N N 
Coop 6 N Y N N Y Y N N Y N N Y N Y N N 
Coop 7 N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N N 
Coop 8 N N Y N Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y N N 
Coop 9 Y N N N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y N N N 
Coop 10 N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N N 
 % of yes 40 40 60 50 80 70 60 20 100 60 0 100 50 70 10 0 
South 
Lebanon 
Coop 11 Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y N N N N N N 
Coop 12 N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y N N 
Coop 13 N N Y N Y Y N N Y N N Y N Y N N 
Coop 14 N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y N N 
Coop 15 N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y N N 
Coop 16 N Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N N N N 
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Coop 17 N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y N N 
Coop 18 Y N N Y N N N Y Y N N N N N N N 
Coop 19 Y Y N Y Y N Y N Y Y N N N N N N 
Coop 20 Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N N 
 % of yes 40 30 60 90 90 40 30 10 100 90 0 60 30 60 0 0 
Mount 
Lebanon 
Coop 21 Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N 
Coop 22 N Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y N N N 
Coop 23 Y N Y N Y N N Y Y Y N N N N N N 
Coop 24 Y N Y N Y N N Y Y Y N N N N N N 
Coop 25 N Y N N Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y N N 
Coop 26 Y N N Y N N Y Y Y N N N N N N N 
Coop 27 Y N N Y N N Y N Y N N N N N N N 
Coop 28 N N Y N Y Y N N Y N N Y N Y N N 
Coop 29 Y Y N N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y N N N 
Coop 30 Y Y N Y N N Y N Y Y N Y Y N N N 
 % of yes 70 40 40 50 70 20 60 40 100 70 0 50 40 20 0 0 
Bekaa Coop 31 Y N N Y N N Y Y Y Y N N N N N N 
Coop 32 N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y N N 
Coop 33 N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y N N 
Coop 34 Y N N Y N N N Y Y N N N N N N N 
Coop 35 Y N N Y N N Y Y Y N N N N N N N 
Coop 36 Y N N Y N Y Y N Y N N Y Y N N Y 
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Coop 37 Y N N Y N N Y Y Y N N Y N Y N Y 
Coop 38 N N Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N N N N N N 
Coop 39 Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N N N 
Coop 40 Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N 
 % of yes 70 10 30 100 50 40 70 50 100 60 0 60 50 30 0 20 
 
• Members’ recruitment: PM1: By members having the same common needs, PM2: By a political party, PM3: By 
development agencies, PM4: Individual recruitment, PM5: Group recruitment,  
• Relation between members: PM6: Kin-based relation, PM7: Similar production, PM8: Similar domain of work or interest 
outside agricultural sector,  
• Main reasons for membership: PM9: To receive support from development agencies, PM10: To receive support from 
political parties, PM11: Group investment to achieve the common needs,  
• Benefits received directly after joining cooperatives: PM12: Received benefits directly after joining coops, PM13: Inputs 
(production resources), PM14: Equipments or access to equipments though the coop services, PM15: Marketing, PM16: Was 
benefit secured through self-investment? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
400 
 
Table 31: Data for the practices of cooperation in active cooperatives across Lebanon 
Practices of Cooperation (PC) 
Agricultural 
region 
Coop 
Reference Nb 
Democratic Members’ Control Knowledge of principles 
& values (including 
roles of # actors) 
Internal Problems 
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10 PC11 PC12 PC13 PC14 PC15 PC16 
North Lebanon Coop 1 N Y N N N N - N N Y Y Y N Y N N 
Coop 2 N Y N N N N - N N Y Y Y N Y N N 
Coop 3 N Y N N N N N N N Y N Y N Y N N 
Coop 4 N Y N N N N - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 5 N N Y N N N - N N Y Y Y N Y N N 
Coop 6 N Y N N N N - Y Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 7 N Y N N N N N N N N N Y N Y Y N 
Coop 8 N N Y N N N - N N N N Y N Y N N 
Coop 9 N N N N N N - N N N N Y N Y N N 
Coop 10 N Y Y N N N - N N Y Y Y N Y N N 
 % of yes 0 70 30 0 0 0 0 10 10 70 60 100 0 80 10 0 
South Lebanon Coop 11 N Y N N N N Y N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 12 N N Y N N N Y N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 13 N Y N N Y N Y N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 14 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 15 N Y N N N N - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
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Coop 16 N Y N N N N Y N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 17 N Y N N Y N - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 18 N Y N N N N - Y Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 19 N Y Y N N N - N N Y Y Y N Y N N 
Coop 20 N Y N N N N Y N N Y Y Y N N N N 
 % of yes 10 90 30 10 30 0 100 20 30 100 100 100 0 10 0 0 
Mount Lebanon Coop 21 N Y N N N N Y N N Y Y Y N Y N N 
Coop 22 N Y Y N Y N Y N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 23 N Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 24 N Y N N N N - Y Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 25 N Y Y N N N - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 26 N Y N N N N - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 27 N Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 28 N Y N N N N - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 29 N Y Y N N N - N N Y Y Y N Y N N 
Coop 30 N Y Y N N N - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
 % of yes 0 100 40 0 20 0 100 30 30 100 100 100 0 10 0 0 
Bekaa Coop 31 N Y N N Y Y - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 32 N Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N 
Coop 33 N Y N N N N Y N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 34 N Y N N Y N - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 35 N Y N N N N - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
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Coop 36 N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 37 N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N 
Coop 38 N Y N N N N - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 39 N Y Y N N N - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
Coop 40 N Y N N N N - N N Y Y Y N N N N 
 % of yes 0 100 10 10 50 30 100 30 30 100 100 90 0 10 0 0 
 
• Democratic members’ control: PC1: Participating in planning the coop policy, PC2: Electing active board members or 
auditors, having a potential to achieve the coop objectives, PC3: Electing board members based on their political power and 
affiliation, PC4: Voting in the general meeting on the proposed solutions to resolve the coop’s main challenges, PC5: Monthly 
communication with the board of directors, PC6: Quarterly communication with auditors, PC7: Mangers respond to the needs  
of members  
• Knowledge of principles and values: PC8: Knowledge of the main coop principles and values, PC9: Members received 
education about the coop principles and values, PC10: Equality in receiving the coop services (when available), PC11: 
Equality in receiving individual support (donation from the government or development agencies) (when available),  
• Internal problems: PC12: Horizon problem, PC13: Portfolio problem, PC14: Control problem, PC15: Free rider or common 
property problem, PC16: Influence cost problem  
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Table 32: Data for the benefit from membership at producers’ level in active cooperatives across Lebanon 
Benefit from membership (BM) 
Agricultural region Coop Reference Nb BM1 BM2 BM3 BM4 BM5 BM6 BM7 BM8 BM9 BM10 
North Lebanon Coop 1 2 Y N Y N Y N N Y N 
Coop 2 1 Y N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 3 1 N N N N N N N N N 
Coop 4 0 - - - N N Y Y Y Y 
Coop 5 1 Y N N N N N N N N 
Coop 6 1 Y N N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 7 3 Y N N N Y N N N N 
Coop 8 3 Y N N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 9 2 N N N N N N N N Y 
Coop 10 2 N Y N N Y N N Y Y 
 % of yes  66.6 11.1 11.1 0 50 10 10 60 30 
South Lebanon Coop 11 2 N Y N N Y Y N N N 
Coop 12 6 N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y 
Coop 13 1 Y N N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 14 6 N Y N N Y Y N Y Y 
Coop 15 1 Y N N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 16 1 N Y N Y Y N N Y Y 
Coop 17 1 Y N N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 18 0 - - - N N N N Y N 
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Coop 19 0 - - - N N N N N Y 
Coop 20 2 N Y N N Y Y N Y Y 
 % of yes  37.5 62.5 0 20 80 40 0 80 50 
Mount Lebanon Coop 21 2 N Y Y N Y N N Y N 
Coop 22 1 Y N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 23 1 Y N N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 24 0 - - - N N N N N N 
Coop 25 2 Y N N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 26 0 - - - N N N N Y N 
Coop 27 1 Y N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 28 1 Y N N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 29 6 Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Coop 30 0 - - - N N N N Y N 
 % of yes  85.7 14.2 14.2 10 50 0 0 100 10 
Bekaa Coop 31 1 Y N N N N N N Y N 
Coop 32 1 N Y N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 33 1 N Y N N Y N N Y N 
Coop 34 0 - - - N N N N Y N 
Coop 35 0 - - - N N N N Y N 
Coop 36 3 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Coop 37 2 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Coop 38 0 - - - N N N N Y Y 
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Coop 39 0 - - - N N N N Y Y 
Coop 40 1 N Y N N N N N Y Y 
 % of yes  16.6 83.3 28.5 20 40 20 20 100 50 
 
• Benefit from Membership: BM1: Number of services received by producers, BM2: Acceptable quality of services, BM3: 
High quality of services, BM4: Members have selected and planned the coop services, BM5: Decrease the cost of production, 
BM6: Improve access to new services, BM7: Increase access to market, BM8: Improve bargaining power, BM9: Increase 
skills, BM10: Increase power of members to influence their coop policies 
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Table 33: Data for producer who did not join cooperatives across Lebanon 
Producers’ decision not to join local cooperatives (PD) 
  Services availability (processing, 
marketing, extension, ect)  
Main reasons for reluctance 
Agricultural region Coop Reference Nb PD1 PD2 PD3 PD4 PD5 PD6 
North Lebanon Coop 1 Y N N Y N N 
Coop 2 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 3 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 4 N Y Y Y N N 
Coop 5 Y N N N N Y 
Coop 6 Y N N Y N N 
Coop 7 N Y Y Y N Y 
Coop 8 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 9 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 10 Y N N Y N Y 
 % of yes 80 20 20 90 0 70 
South Lebanon Coop 11 N Y Y Y N Y 
Coop 12 N Y N Y N Y 
Coop 13 Y N N Y N N 
Coop 14 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 15 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 16 Y Y Y Y N N 
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Coop 17 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 18 Y N N Y N N 
Coop 19 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 20 Y N N Y N Y 
 % of yes 80 30 20 100 0 70 
Mount Lebanon Coop 21 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 22 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 23 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 24 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 25 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 26 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 27 Y N N Y N N 
Coop 28 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 29 N Y Y Y N N 
Coop 30 Y N N Y N N 
 % of yes 90 10 10 100 0 70 
Bekaa Coop 31 Y N N Y N N 
Coop 32 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 33 Y N N Y N N 
Coop 34 Y N N Y N N 
Coop 35 Y N N Y N N 
Coop 36 N Y Y Y N N 
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Coop 37 N Y Y Y N Y 
Coop 38 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 39 Y N N Y N Y 
Coop 40 Y N N Y N Y 
 % of yes 80 20 20 100 0 50 
  
• Services availability: PD1: Accessibility of services from private suppliers, PD2: Price competition offered by coops, PD3: 
Quality competition offered by coops,  
• Main reasons for reluctance: PD4: Not receiving an individual support, PD5: Not answering the common needs, PD6: the 
procedure of members’ recruitment  
 
 
 
